power tong snub line made in china

API Spec 7 2010 also includes a comprehensive listing of best practice guidelines for just about any drilling and well servicing equipment operations you can think of.

When rigging up the Casing equipment make sure the Hawk jaw tong has been laid out, and then bring the Casing tong up first (before the bails), this way the tong & computer can be set up and calibrated while the Fill up tool & the auto handling equipment is installed.

Model XQ28/2.6 hydraulic power tong is an improved type of XYQ1.8 which is used to make up and break out sucker rod thread in Well Service. This product has the following features:

A. The structure is compact, concise and light. Master tong is driven by a low-speed large torque hydraulic motor that matches with a manual control valve. The backup tong is just like a spanner. The total weight is approximately equal to XYQ1.8.

B. The operating is briefness and convenience with high efficiency. Put the respondence size jaw set into master tong and the respondence size glutting into backup tong, turning the reset knob incorrect direction then can make up and break out sucker rod by operating manual control valve. Two speed, snapping at low speed, spinning at high speed.

During the Three Kingdoms, the territory of present-day Yunnan, western Guizhou and southern Sichuan was collectively called Nanzhong. The dissolution of Chinese central authority led to increased autonomy for Yunnan and more power for the local tribal structures. In AD 225, the famed statesman Zhuge Liang led three columns into Yunnan to pacify the tribes. His seven captures of Meng Huo, a local magnate, is mythologized in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms.

By the 750s, Nanzhao had conquered Yunnan and became a potential rival to Tang China. The following period saw several conflicts between Tang China and Nanzhao. In 750, Nanzhao attacked and captured Yaozhou, the largest Tang settlement in Yunnan. In 751, Xianyu Zhongtong (鮮于仲通), the regional commander of Jiannan (present-day Sichuan), led a Tang campaign against Nanzhao. The king of Nanzhao, Geluofeng, regarded the previous incident as a personal affair and wrote to Xianyu to seek peace. However, Xianyu Zhongtong detained the Nanzhao envoys and turned down the appeal. Confronted with Tang armies, Nanzhao immediately turned its allegiance to the Tibetan Empire.

Nanzhao"s expansion lasted for several decades. In 829, Nanzhao suddenly plundered Sichuan and entered Chengdu. When it retreated, hundreds of Sichuan people, including skilled artisans, were taken to Yunnan. In 832, the Nanzhao army captured the capital of the Pyu kingdom in modern upper Burma. Nanzhao also attacked the Khmer peoples of Zhenla. Generally speaking, Nanzhao was then the most powerful kingdom in mainland Southeast Asia, and played an extremely active role in multistate interactions.

In 902, Zheng Maisi, the Qingpingguan (清平官,"Prime Minister") of Nanzhao, murdered the infant king of Nanzhao, and established a new kingdom called Dachanghe. Nanzhao, a once-powerful empire, disappeared. In 928, Yang Ganzhen (楊干貞) usurped the Dachanghe king and established Zhao Shanzheng, a qingpingguan as emperor of Datianxing (大天興). In 929, Yang Qianzhen abolished Zhao Shanzheng and established himself as Emperor of Dayining (大義寧).

Yunnan was transformed by the events of the Second Sino-Japanese War, which caused many east coast refugees and industrial establishments to relocate to the province. It assumed strategic significance, particularly as the Burma Road from Lashio, in Burma to Kunming was a fought over supply line of vital importance to China"s war effort.

Yunnan has less than 4% of the land of China, yet the province harbors around 42.6% of all protected plant species and 72.5% of all protected wild animals in the country, of which 15% are strictly endemic to Yunnan.gaur, a giant forest-dwelling bovine, the Indochinese tiger and the Asian elephant.Yunnan box turtleYunnan snub-nosed monkey.Yunnan lar gibbon, another moribund species, has already gone extinct.

Yunnan has sufficient rainfall and many rivers and lakes. The annual water flow originating in the province is 200 cubic kilometres, three times that of the Yellow River. The rivers flowing into the province from outside add 160 cubic kilometres, which means there are more than ten thousand cubic metres of water for each person in the province. This is four times the average in the country. The rich water resources offer abundant hydro-energy. China is constructing a series of dams on the Mekong to develop it as a waterway and source of power; the first was completed at Manwan in 1993.

Yunnan is one of China"s relatively undeveloped provinces with more poverty-stricken counties than the other provinces. In 1994, about 7 million people lived below the poverty line of less than an annual average income of 300 yuan per capita. They were distributed in the province"s 73 counties mainly and financially supported by the central government. With an input of 3.15 billion yuan in 2002, the absolutely poor rural population in the province has been reduced from 4.05 million in 2000 to 2.86 million. The poverty alleviation plan includes five large projects aimed at improving infrastructure facilities. They involve planned attempts at soil improvement, water conservation, electric power, roads, and "green belt" building. Upon the completion of the projects, the province hopes this will alleviate the shortages of grain, water, electric power and roads.

Yunnan lags behind the east coast of China in relation to socio-economic development. However, because of its geographic location the province has comparative advantages in regional and border trade with Southeast Asian countries. The Lancang River (upper reaches of Mekong River) is the waterway to southeast Asia. In recent years land transportation has been improved to strengthen economic and trade co-operation among countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Yunnan"s abundance in resources determines that the province"s pillar industries are: agriculture, tobacco, mining, hydro-electric power, and tourism. In general, the province still depends on the natural resources. The secondary sector is currently the largest industrial tier in Yunnan, contributing more than 45 percent of GDP. The tertiary sector contributes 40 percent and agriculture 15 percent. Investment is the key driver of Yunnan"s economic growth, especially in construction.

The first railway in Yunnan was the narrow gauge Yunnan–Vietnam Railway built by France from 1904 to 1910 to connect Kunming with Vietnam, then a French colony. In Yunnan, the Chinese section of this railway is known as the Yunnan-Hekou Railway and the line gave Yunnan access to the seaport at Haiphong. During the Second World War, Britain and the United States began building a railway from Yunnan to Burma but abandoned the effort due to Japanese advance.

Due in part to difficult terrain both locally and in surrounding provinces and the shortage of capital for rail construction, Yunnan remained outside of China"s domestic rail network until 1966 when the Guiyang–Kunming Railway was completed. The line would not enter into operation until 1970, the same year that the Chengdu-Kunming was completed. The Nanning–Kunming Railway to Guangxi was completed in 1997, followed by the Neijiang–Kunming Railway in 2001. The Panxi Railway, originally built in 1975 to draw coal from neighboring Guizhou, was electrified in 2001 and adds to eastern Yunnan"s outbound rail transport capacity.

Within the province, the Kunming–Yuxi, opened in 1993, and the Guangtong–Dali, opened in 1998, expanded the rail network to southern and western Yunnan, respectively. The Dali–Lijiang Railway, opened in 2010, brought rail service to northwestern Yunnan. That line is planned to be extended further north to Xamgyi"nyilha County.

The province is extending the railway network to neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. From Yuxi, the Yuxi–Mengzi Railway, built from 2005 to 2013, and the Mengzi–Hekou Railway, under construction since 2008, will form a standard gauge railway connection with Vietnam. The Dali–Ruili Railway, under construction since May 2011, will bring rail service to the border with Myanmar. Also under planning is a rail line from Yuxi to Mohan, in Xishuangbana Prefecture, on the border with Laos. This line could be extended further south to Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.

Second-level national highways stretch 958 km (595 mi), third-level highways, 7,571 km (4,704 mi) and fourth-level highways, 52,248 km (32,465 mi). The province has formed a network of communication lines radiating from Kunming to Sichuan and Guizhou provinces and Guangxi and Tibet autonomous regions, and further on to Burma, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand.

Generally, rivers are obstacles to transport in Yunnan. Only very small parts of Yunnan"s river systems are navigable. However, China is constructing a series of dams on the Mekong to develop it as a waterway and source of power; the first was completed at Manwan in 1993.

In 1995, the province put an investment of 171 million yuan to add another 807 km (501 mi) of navigation lines. It built two wharfs with an annual handling capacity of 300,000 to 400,000 tons each and four wharfs with an annual handling capacity of 100,000 tons each. The annual volume of goods transported was two million tons and that of passengers transported, two million.

Yunnan"s cultural life is one of remarkable diversity. Archaeological findings have unearthed sacred burial structures holding elegant bronzes in Jinning, south of Kunming. In northeastern Yunnan, frescoes of the Jin dynasty (266–420) have been discovered in the city of Zhatong. Many Chinese cultural relics have been discovered in later periods. The lineage of tribal way of life of the indigenous peoples persisted uninfluenced by modernity until the mid-20th century. Tribal traditions, such as Yi slaveholding and Wa headhunting, have since been abolished. After the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), in which several minority cultural and religious practices were suppressed, Yunnan has come to celebrate its cultural diversity and subsequently many local customs and festivals have flourished.

Dardess, John W. (2003). "Chapter 3: Did the Mongols Matter? Territory, Power, and the Intelligentsia in China from the Northern Song to the Early Ming" (PDF). In Smith, Paul Jakov; von Glahn, Richard (eds.). The Song –Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center. p. 111. ISBN 9780674010963. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2016-08-16. Retrieved 2016-07-11.

"Myanmar to open second largest border trade zone". People"s Daily Online. February 13, 2006. Archived from the original on 2007-10-18. Retrieved 2008-10-14.

December 30, 2004, was hardly a proud moment for China, Asia"s rising superpower. On that day, China"s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, announced $2.7 million in disaster relief to victims of the great Sumatran tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands of people and wiped out hundreds of towns along the western coast of the Indonesian island. Liu was understandably a bit defensive as foreign reporters peppered him with questions about the minimal aid amount. "China is a developing country," he offered. "We have a population of 1.3 billion. China"s per capita gdp is still very low." The $2.7 million was, he explained, "equivalent to the annual income of 20,000farmers."

Unsurprisingly, this was not an image that was seen in China. China"s official Xinhua news agency breathlessly reported that Indonesians were emotionally overwhelmed by China"s aid. On January 2, a week after the tidal wave, a Sumatran refugee named "Awada," who drove an ambulance for a team of Chinese medics, was moved to proclaim, "China, in my heart, is a great nation!" These words (complete with exclamation point) comprised the headline at the top of the international news page on the January 3, 2005People"s Daily. Despite the fact that China"s meager contributions excluded them from the international "core group" of tsunami aid donors, Chinese readers were left with the rosy impression that their country was "a major humanitarian aid power."

To the rest of Southeast Asia, reported the New York Times (January 4, 2005), the huge American, Japanese, and European aid campaigns were "a reminder that the world"s most populous country is still far from being the dominant power in Asia." Added the Washington Post (January 5, 2005), "the response has also underscored the limitations of China - a fast-growing economic powerhouse that nevertheless has not been able to offer anywhere near the amount of aid provided by Japan, the United States or Britain."

All true. But anyone who concluded from the Times and Post accounts that in 2005, China was merely a bit player in Southeast Asia - or anywhere else in the world - would be dead wrong. Beijing"s political leaders know that superpowers aren"t measured by their foreign aid budgets, or by their economies. They are measured by their ability to use their comprehensive national power - economic, political, and above all military - to gain the obeisance of their neighbors and their regional and global rivals.

It seems that the United States may already have resigned itself to China"s imminent emergence as a "military superpower" - the term Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice used to describe it in a June 29, 2005 interview with the Wall Street Journal. For regardless of the niggardliness of its Tsunami aid effort, China is now the dominant power in Southeast Asia. How it became so should yield insights into its strategies for the rest of the globe.

In his National Security Strategy paper of September 2002, President Bush announced, "We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge," an unmistakable declaration that U.S. defenses must be so awesome that no other country would even "challenge" them. At the same time, he pledged that he would be "attentive to the possible renewal of old patterns of great power competition. Several potential great powers are now in the midst of internal transition - most importantly Russia, India, and China." And while he was hopeful about Russia and India, he could only admit that "China"s leaders have not yet made the next series of fundamental choices about the character of their state."

No doubt Chinese strategists believe countries like Sweden, Canada, and Denmark are more suited to compassionate policies. For a rising superpower in Asia, as Machiavelli noted in a different context in The Prince, "it is much safer to be feared than loved" because "men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails."

From a geostrategic standpoint, strong countries surround China. Japan and Korea lie to the east, Russia to the north, India to the west. The only outlet for Chinese imperial ambitions is Southeast Asia. Most Southeast Asians understand that China is rapidly becoming the predominant power in the region and already behave accordingly. Beijing"s diplomats have effectively translated China"s burgeoning economic clout into political influence, leaving in question the U.S. role in and commitment to the region, even with its traditional allies and friends.

Singapore"s Senior Minister Goh Chok-Tong has publicly chided the U.S. for its disengagement from Southeast Asia. He noted in a June 9 speech that in the past decade China has successfully launched 27 separate asean-China mechanisms at different levels, while 28 years after the U.S.-asean dialogue was formalized in 1977, "there are currently only seven U.S.-aseanbodies and they meet only infrequently."

In early 2000, Condoleezza Rice wrote, "China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region. This means that China is not a "status quo" power but one that would like to alter Asia"s balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the "strategic partner" the Clinton administration once called it."

While Dr. Rice has become a bit less direct in her locution during her tenure as secretary of state, her observation remains valid. Johns Hopkins professor Francis Fukuyama, writing in the Wall Street Journal (March 1, 2005), sees a similar trend in China"s ambitions: "The Chinese know what they are doing: Over the long run, they want to organize East Asia in a way that puts them in the center of regional politics. They can succeed where [then-Malaysian Prime Minister Mohammed] Mahathir failed because they are an economic powerhouse capable of doling out favors." Of course, they can also mete out sanctions.

In the view of numerous analysts, a desire to demonstrate to Asia that China, not Japan, is the dominant regional power was the animating force behind the government-organized anti-Japanese riots and boycotts of Japanese goods in the spring of 2005. It is clear that Beijing intends to become the predominant force in Southeast Asia by constructing a framework of relationships that place Beijing in positions of leadership and influence while isolating the United States from its traditional role and its allies in the region.

While this may make sense in a strict Wealth of Nations sense, the ultimate effect will be China"s industrial dominance in Southeast Asia, with the individual asean partners reduced to providing China with non-manufactured goods. Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok-Tong, looking for a silver lining to Chinese economic predominance in the region, suggested that aseanuse the challenge as a "time for action," adding that this is the moment to adapt to meet the change and to realize regional economic integration.

Delighted, the Chinese took the opportunity to marginalize the Vientiane arf when it rolled around at the end of July. While the asean foreign ministers made do without the company of their U.S., Japanese, and Indian counterparts, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing"s presence in Vientiane was conspicuous. He attended separate one-on-one sessions with each of the ten asean foreign ministers and joined the asean+3 forum with diplomats from Japan and South Korea. But he left the Laotian capital at the opening of the arf meeting, which included ministers from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and of course the U.S. deputy secretary of state. Savvy diplomatic observers saw Minister Li"s snub of the arf as a clear signal of China"s disdain for Asian security meetings that included "non-Asians."

In October 2003, just a day after unhappy oppositionmembers hooted President George W. Bushwhile he was addressing Australia"s Parliament, Chinese President Hu Jintao addressed the Australian Senate with assurances that China "wants to become Australia"s long-term economic partner as trade ties enter a new era." He then followed up by signing the biggest single trade deal in Australian history, a 25-year natural gas supply contract worth U.S. $21.7 billion. In 2004, Chinese steel mills were dangling the prospect of a U.S. $9 billion, 25-year iron ore supply contract in front of Australia"s top mining concern, bhp Billiton. Throughout 2004 and 2005, China pursued additional trade contracts for - of all things - uranium. Australia does not sell fissionable materials to China because of Beijing"s marked disregard for international nonproliferation restrictions. Yet, when Chinese officials approached Canberra about purchasing refined uranium for power purposes, the Australians showed considerable interest. As negotiations continue, it is clear that Australia is less concerned about proliferation than it is desirous of good trade relations with China.

Clearly not satisfied with Australian obeisance, in April 2005, Beijing tried carrots and sticks to influence Canberra"s foreign policy. Australian Prime Minister John Howard traveled to China that month, where Beijing offered a bilateral free trade agreement, the first ever with a developed country. To Howard"s credit, he made no concession to China on Taiwan policy during the visit. Furthermore, encouraged by Indonesia and Malaysia, Howard declared Australia"s interest in participating in the East Asia Summit (eas). China"s reaction was negative. Howard told reporters, "It"s fair to say that the Premier expressed stronger views about Australia"s participation than had previously been expressed by China," but declined to elaborate. Later, according to a report in the Sydney Morning Herald (April 20, 2005), an Australian official complained, "the Chinese haven"t lifted a finger to help us," and another admitted, "deep down, the Chinese would rather we weren"t there." Australia did eventually gain an invitation to the eas, but only because of support from the asean countries.

Despite the marginal policy successes with Canberra, the fact that Beijing feels able to challenge Australia"s alliance with the United States, steeped as it is in shared national experiences, is clear evidence that China is now a confident regional power and judges that neither America nor Australia has the resolve to face it down.

Because Singapore"s Changi Naval Base is the only port in Southeast Asia suitable for U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier support, it is essential that U.S. forces maintain a strong cooperative relationship with their Singaporean counterparts. Moreover, it is important that the United States not tolerate Chinese pressure on Singapore that would jeopardize American naval operations in the South China Sea or in the region in general.

After September 11, 2001, however, festering terrorist cells active in the Philippines" southern islands received urgent attention from the Pentagon. Revelations that Al Qaeda operatives in Manila had planned suicide hijackings and even the assassination of visiting Pope John Paul ii prior to 9/11 alerted U.S. policymakers to the necessity for massive counter-terrorism cooperation with the Philippines and other asean countries. Even so, U.S. support for the Philippines did not extend to its maritime frictions with the Chinese. When the Philippine Air Force tried to purchase used F-5 fighter aircraft from Taiwan at bargain-basement prices in 2002, Beijing threatened retaliation and Washington failed to support the bid. Manila eventually declined to purchase the aircraft.

China and Thailand have maintained close military ties since the early 1980s, conducting extensive military personnel exchanges and exercises. Thailand has purchased warships and army equipment from China, much of which has been tantamount to military gift aid. On July 1, 2005, in celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra outlined his anticipation of further enhancing cooperation for a more dynamic strategic partnership with China.

The Southeast Asian country most influenced by China is Burma. Because of its systematic human rights abuses, gross mismanagement of its economy, and outlandish corruption, the junta that controls Burma is an international pariah. Beijing is literally Rangoon"s only friend. China supplies the arms and economic aid the Burmese military needs to stay in power, and, more important, it provides political acceptance. In return, China gets unrestricted access to Burma"s natural resources and military bases at key locations in the Indian Ocean.

The benefit to the U.S. trade agenda is that a tifa would give Washington a forum for discussing group trade and investment issues that it is already negotiating in bilateral ftas. The tifa would preempt problematic issues, give other asean members in line for an fta an idea of what to expect when it"s their turn, and help, ultimately, with harmonizing all the various trade regimes. It would also give Washington a venue and substantive reason for engaging asean as a whole that it does not have now.

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Survivors cried out for help from within mountains of debris as first responders contended with rain and snow. Seismic activity continued to rattle the region, including another jolt nearly as powerful as the initial quake. Workers carefully pulled away slabs of concrete and reached for bodies as desperate families waited for news of loved ones.

The region sits on top of major fault lines and is frequently shaken by earthquakes. Some 18,000 were killed in similarly powerful earthquakes that hit northwest Turkey in 1999.

In Adana, 20 or so people, some in emergency rescue jackets, used power saws atop the concrete mountain of a collapsed building to open up space for any survivors to climb out or be rescued.

In Diyarbakir, hundreds of rescue workers and civilians formed lines across a huge mound of wreckage, passing down broken concrete pieces and household belongings as they searched for trapped survivors.

—Alsayed reported from Azmarin, Syria, while Fraser reported from Ankara, Turkey. Associated Press writers Zeynep Bilginsoy in Istanbul, Bassem Mroue and Kareem Chehayeb in Beirut, and Kim Tong-hyung in Seoul, South Korea, contributed to this report.