overshot runway meaning supplier

overshoot•The tower acknowledged him, once more ordering the Ilyushin to overshoot.•I tried to turn in behind him but found that I was going to overshoot and pulled away to starboard.•An approaching Ilyushin passenger-jet was told to overshoot as the tower lined Duncan up on the runway.•The budget deficit will probably overshoot its target of 5.8 percent of GDP.•A Hillman Imp, a roof rack, the beak of an upturned canoe overshooting its windscreen.•I allowed about six feet at first, just in case Dawn overshot the glove.•A commuter plane overshot the runway Sunday night in Augusta.•The airbrakes can then be reduced once it is clear that the glider will not overshoot with full airbrake.

An engineered materials arrestor system, engineered materials arresting system (EMAS), or arrester bedrunway to reduce the severity of the consequences of a runway excursion. Engineered materials are defined in FAA Advisory Circular No 150/5220-22B as "high energy absorbing materials of selected strength, which will reliably and predictably crush under the weight of an aircraft". While the current technology involves lightweight, crushable concrete blocks, any material that has been approved to meet the FAA Advisory Circular can be used for an EMAS. The purpose of an EMAS is to stop an aircraft overrun with no human injury and minimal aircraft damage. The aircraft is slowed by the loss of energy required to crush the EMAS material. An EMAS is similar in concept to the runaway truck ramp or race circuit gravel trap, made of gravel or sand. It is intended to stop an aircraft that has overshot a runway when there is an insufficient free space for a standard runway safety area (RSA). Multiple patents have been issued on the construction and design on the materials and process.

Research projects completed in Europe have looked into the cost-effectiveness of EMAS. Arrestor beds have been installed at airports where the runway safety areas are below standards, and their ability to stop aircraft with minimal or no damage to the air frame and its occupants has proven to bring results far beyond the cost of installations. The latest report, "Estimated Cost-Benefit Analysis of Runway Severity Reduction Based on Actual Arrestments", shows how the money saved through the first 11 arrestments has reached a calculated total of 1.9 billion USD, thus saving more than $1 B over the estimated cost of development (R&D, all installations worldwide, maintenance and repairs reaching a total of USD 600 million). The study suggests that mitigating the consequences of runway excursions worldwide may turn out to be much more cost-effective than the current focus on reducing the already very low probability of occurrence.

The FAA"s design criteria for new airports designate Runway Safety Areas (RSAs) to increase the margin of safety if an overrun occurs and to provide additional access room for response vehicles. A United States federal law required that the length of RSAs in airports was to be 1,000 feet (300 m) by the end of 2015, in a response to a runway overrun into a highway at Teterboro Airport in New Jersey.

Of the 15 non-U.S. installations, eight were provided by Zodiac Arresting Systems (two in China, two in Madrid, one in Taiwan, two in Norway and one in Saudi Arabia), six were provided by RunwaySafe (one in Switzerland, and three in overseas departments of France – one in Reunion Island, two in Mayotte), one in Japan, one in Germany, two in Brazil and one provided by Hankge (China).

The first EMAS was developed in the mid-1990s by ESCO/Engineered Arresting Systems Corp. (later Zodiac Arresting Systems) as part of a collaboration and technical acceptance by the FAA. The fourth generation EMAS arrestor beds are composed of blocks of lightweight, crushable cellular concrete material, encased in jet blast resistant protection, designed to safely stop airplanes that overshoot runways. Zodiac"s EMAS is installed on over 110 airport runways at over 65 airports on three continents.

The Swedish company Runway Safe AB developed an EMAS system, a foamed silica bed made from recycled glass contained within a high-strength plastic mesh system anchored to the pavement at the end of the runway. The foamed silica is poured into lanes bounded by the mesh and covered with a poured cement layer and treated with a top coat of sealant.

On 19 January 2010, a Bombardier CRJ-200 commercial regional airliner with 34 persons aboard overran the runway at Yeager Airport in Charleston, West Virginia after a rejected takeoff.

On 2 November 2011, a Cessna Citation II business aircraft with 5 persons aboard overran the runway at Key West International Airport in Key West, Florida.

In October 2013, a Cessna 680 Citation business aircraft with 8 persons aboard overran the runway at Palm Beach International in West Palm Beach, Florida.

In October 2016, a Boeing 737 aircraft with 37 persons aboard, including Republican vice-presidential candidate Mike Pence, overran the runway at LaGuardia Airport, New York.

On 27 February 2019 an Embraer Phenom 100 operated by Quest Diagnostic Laboratories overran a runway at the Charles B. Wheeler Kansas City Downtown Airport (KMKC) at 4:28am local time resulting in the safe stopping of the aircraft with the pilot being the only occupant aboard.

On 13 October 2006, New York Yankees player Alex Rodriguez"s private jet was brought to a halt safely by the EMAS installation at Bob Hope Airport in Burbank, California. The system was installed after the 2000 Southwest Airlines Flight 1455 runway overshoot that injured 43 passengers and the captain.

Boburg, Shawn (17 September 2013). "Teterboro Airport gets $1M for runway project". northjersey.com. Archived from the original on 5 May 2014. Retrieved 5 May 2014.

Jacobs, Kenneth (1 March 2006). "Runway Safety Areas - An Airport Operator"s Perspective". Federal Aviation Administration. pp. 8, 9, 13. Archived from the original on 27 September 2012. Retrieved 20 August 2014.

"PSA Airlines Canadair CRJ-200 N246PS operating as US Airways flight 2495 from Charleston, West Virginia (CRW) to Charlotte, North Carolina (CLT) with 30 passengers [sic] and 3 crew, overran the runway following a rejected take-off. The aircraft was stopped by the EMAS at the end of the runway, sustaining only minor damage to its landing gear doors."

Mele, Christopher (27 October 2016). "Plane With Mike Pence Aboard Skids Off La Guardia Runway". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 28 October 2016.

Oldham, Jennifer (14 October 2006). "Yankee Player"s Jet Overruns Runway in Burbank". The airport installed the $4-million safety system after a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 skidded off the same runway and onto a street in 2000, injuring 43 passengers and the captain on the same runway.

Towers may exercise this authority when authorized by a LOA with the facility that provides the IFR service, or by a facility directive at collocated facilities.Controllers may initiate, or pilots may request, a visual approach even when an aircraft is being vectored for an instrument approach and the pilot subsequently reports:The airport or the runway in sight at airports with operating control towers.

At locations with an operating control tower, the aircraft is to follow a preceding aircraft and the pilot reports the preceding aircraft in sight and is instructed to follow it to the same runway, or

The pilot need not report the airport/runway in sight.At locations with an operating control tower, the pilot reports the airport or runway in sight but not the preceding aircraft. Radar separation must be maintained until visual separation is provided.

At locations without an operating control tower or where part-time towers are closed, do not specify a runway when issuing a visual approach clearance, issue a visual approach clearance to the airport only.

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 7-4-4, Approaches to Multiple Runways.APPROACHES TO MULTIPLE RUNWAYSAll aircraft must be informed that approaches are being conducted to parallel, intersecting, or converging runways. This may be accomplished through use of the ATIS.

When conducting visual approaches to multiple runways ensure the following:Do not permit the respective aircrafts" primary radar targets/fusion target symbols to touch unless visual separation is being applied.

When the aircraft flight paths intersect, ensure approved separation is maintained until visual separation is applied.The following conditions apply to visual approaches being conducted simultaneously to parallel, intersecting, and converging runways, as appropriate:Parallel runways separated by less than 2,500 feet. Unless approved separation is provided, an aircraft must report sighting a preceding aircraft making an approach (instrument or visual) to the adjacent parallel runway. When an aircraft reports another aircraft in sight on the adjacent extended runway centerline and visual separation is applied, controllers must advise the succeeding aircraft to maintain visual separation. Do not permit an aircraft to overtake another aircraft when wake turbulence separation is required.

Parallel runways separated by 2,500 feet but less than 4,300 feet.When aircraft are approaching from opposite base legs, or one aircraft is turning to final and another aircraft is established on the extended centerline for the adjacent runway, approved separation is provided until the aircraft are:Established on a heading or established on a direct course to a fix or cleared on an RNAV/ instrument approach procedure which will intercept the extended centerline of the runway at an angle not greater than 30 degrees, and,

One pilot has acknowledged receipt of a visual approach clearance and the other pilot has acknowledged receipt of a visual or instrument approach clearance.When aircraft are approaching from the same side of the airport and the lead aircraft is assigned the nearer runway, approved separation is maintained or pilot-applied visual separation is provided by the succeeding aircraft until intercepting the farther adjacent runway extended centerline.

Provided that aircraft flight paths do not intersect, when the provisions of subparagraphs (a),(d) are met, it is not necessary to apply any other type of separation with aircraft on the adjacent extended runway centerline.

When aircraft are approaching from the same side of the airport and the lead aircraft is assigned the farther runway, the succeeding aircraft must be assigned a heading that will intercept the extended centerline of the nearer runway at an angle not greater than 30 degrees. Approved separation must be maintained or pilot-applied visual separation must be provided by the succeeding aircraft until it is established on the extended centerline of the nearer runway.

NOTE-The intent of the 30 degree intercept angle is to reduce the potential for overshoots of the extended centerline of the runway and preclude side-by-side operations with one or both aircraft in a “belly-up” configuration during the turn. Aircraft performance, speed, and the number of degrees of the turn are factors to be considered when vectoring aircraft to parallel runways.

The 30-degree intercept angle is not necessary when approved separation is maintained until the aircraft are established on the extended centerline of the assigned runway.

Variances between heading assigned to intercept the extended centerline of the runway and aircraft ground track are expected due to the effect of wind and course corrections after completion of the turn and pilot acknowledgment of a visual approach clearance.

Procedures using Radius-to-Fix legs that intercept final may be used in lieu of the 30-degree intercept provisions contained in this paragraph.Parallel runways separated by 4,300 feet or more.When aircraft are approaching from opposite base legs, or one aircraft is turning to final and another aircraft is established on the extended centerline for the adjacent runway, approved separation is provided until the aircraft are:Assigned a heading or established on a direct course to a fix or cleared on an RNAV/instrument approach procedure which will intercept the extended centerline of the runway at an angle not greater than 30 degrees, and,

One of the aircraft has been issued and the pilot has acknowledged receipt of the visual approach clearance.When aircraft are approaching from the same side of the airport and the lead aircraft is assigned the nearer runway, approved separation is maintained or pilot-applied visual separation is provided by the succeeding aircraft until intercepting the farther adjacent runway extended centerline.

Provided that aircraft flight paths do not intersect, when the provisions of subparagraphs (a), (b), or (d) are met, it is not necessary to apply any other type of separation with aircraft on the adjacent extended runway centerline.

When aircraft are approaching from the same side of the airport and the lead aircraft is assigned the farther runway, the succeeding aircraft must be assigned a heading that will intercept the extended centerline of the nearer runway at an angle not greater than 30 degrees. Approved separation must be maintained or pilot-applied visual separation must be provided by the succeeding aircraft until it is established on the extended centerline of the nearer runway.

NOTE-The intent of the 30 degree intercept angle is to reduce the potential for overshoots of the extended centerline of the runway and preclude side-by-side operations with one or both aircraft in a “belly-up” configuration during the turn. Aircraft performance, speed, and the number of degrees of the turn are factors to be considered when vectoring aircraft to parallel runways.

The 30-degree intercept angle is not necessary when approved separation is maintained until the aircraft are established on the extended centerline of the assigned runway.

Variances between heading assigned to intercept the extended centerline of the runway and aircraft ground track are expected due to the effect of wind and course corrections after completion of the turn and pilot acknowledgment of a visual approach clearance.

Procedures using Radius-to-Fix legs that intercept final may be used in lieu of 30-degree intercept provisions contained in this paragraph.Visual approaches may be conducted to one runway while visual or instrument approaches are conducted simultaneously to other runways, provided the conditions of subparagraph (a), (b), or (d) are met.Intersecting and converging runways. Visual approaches may be conducted simultaneously with visual or instrument approaches to other runways, provided:Approved separation is maintained until the aircraft conducting the visual approach has been issued, and the pilot has acknowledged receipt of, the visual approach clearance.

Although simultaneous approaches may be conducted to intersecting runways, staggered approaches may be necessary to meet the airport separation requirements specified in paragraph 3-10-4, Intersecting Runway/Intersecting Flight Path Separation.

The published name of the CVFP and the landing runway are specified in the approach clearance, the reported ceiling at the airport of intended landing is at least 500 feet above the MVA/MIA, and the visibility is 3 miles or more, unless higher minimums are published for the particular CVFP.

An aircraft not following another aircraft on the approach reports sighting a charted visual landmark, or reports sighting a preceding aircraft landing on the same runway and has been instructed to follow that aircraft.

It means that the aircraft has touched down on the runway before going off it. Overshoot is used in the same sense (note that overrun/overshoot occurs both in TO/landing).

However, there is one case where they are used differently. Overshooting the runway also can mean that the aircraft has touched beyond the end of the runway i.e. missed the runway entirely.

As hard as we"ve tried over the years, we can"t seem to come up with a definitive way of translating the condition of a runway into a number that we can plug into tables and charts to figure out our likelihood of stopping the airplane in the amount of runway in front of us. Our most recent attempt is known as a "Runway Condition Code" taken from a "Runway Condition Assessment Matrix." So that"s what is shown here. (If this is news to you, it was first unveiled with SAFO 16009.) I"ll follow that with some of the older systems in case you run into them.

Landing overruns that occur on wet runways typically involve multiple contributing factors such as long touchdown, improper use of deceleration devices, tailwind and less available friction than expected. Several recent runway-landing incidents/accidents have raised concerns with wet runway stopping performance assumptions. Analysis of the stopping data from these incidents/accidents indicates the braking coefficient of friction in each case was significantly lower than expected for a wet runway as defined by Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25 § Section 25.109 and Advisory Circular (AC) 25-7D methods. These incidents/accidents occurred on both grooved and un-grooved runways. The data indicates that applying a 15% safety margin to wet runway time-of-arrival advisory data, as recommended by SAFO 06012 (or current guidance), may be inadequate in certain wet runway conditions. Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) procedures implemented by the FAA on October 1, 2016, added new insight as to how flightcrews can evaluate runway braking performance prior to landing. TALPA defines WET as “Includes damp and 1/8-inch depth or less of water,” while CONTAMINATED is “greater than 1/8-inch of water.”

If you hear your runway is reporting a "3/3/3" is that good? Well it means all three segments of the runway are "medium" so I guess that"s better than a "2/2/2" but not as good as a "5/5/5" as you might suspect. But this is the system we have now and it is actually better than those "mu" or "RCR" numbers of the past in that they are supposed to be more accurate. I"m not so sure, but here is what the book says followed by some added information from the airport management side of the house.

Runway condition code (RwyCC) values range from 1 (poor) to 6 (dry). For frozen contaminants on runway surfaces, a runway condition code reading of 4 indicates the level when braking deceleration or directional control is between good and medium.

Numerical readings may be obtained by using the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM). The RCAM provides the airport operator with data to complete the report that includes the following:

Assessments for each zone (see 4−3−9c1(c)) will be issued in the direction of takeoff and landing on the runway, ranging from “1” to “6” to describe contaminated surfaces.

When runway condition code reports are provided by airport management, the ATC facility providing approach control or local airport advisory must provide the report to all pilots.

Pilots should use runway condition code information with other knowledge including aircraft performance characteristics, type, and weight, previous experience, wind conditions, and aircraft tire type (such as bias ply vs. radial constructed) to determine runway suitability.

The Runway Condition Assessment Matrix identifies the descriptive terms “good,” “good to medium,” “medium,” “medium to poor,” “poor,” and “nil” used in braking action reports.

It seems like we"ve replaced highly subjective words ("good," "medium," "poor," and "nil") for seven numbers that may seem equally subjective. It also seems we gave up the science of the "Mu" number that is still used with the ICAO SNOWTAM system. But the change actually has more good than bad. We pilots don"t understand the process as well as we should and are too quick to hear the three magic numbers and stop listening. If you understand how the numbers are produced and the importance of the language that follows, you might have some very useful decision making tools. AC 150/5200-30D is what airport operators use to manage runway and taxiway reporting and snow removal. It has a lot of good information for pilots who want to "read between the lines" when it comes to an RCC.

Following the overrun accident of a Boeing-737 in December of 2005, the FAA found that the current state of the industry practices did not have adequate guidance and regulation addressing operation on non-dry, non-wet runways, i.e., contaminated runways. As such, the FAA chartered an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to address Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) requirements for the appropriate parts 23, 25, 91 subpart K, 121, 125, 135, and 139. In formulating recommendations, it became clear to the ARC that the ability to communicate actual runway conditions to the pilots in real time and in terms that directly relate to expected aircraft performance was critical to the success of the project.

The ARC got it mostly right but we need to keep in mind this was an industry-wide effort and though the business aviation community was represented, the largest users (the airlines) obviously carried more weight. So we got a system that is tailored towards large airports with sophisticated snow removal equipment. The system is also "one size fits all," so terms like "ice" on a runway in Alaska (dry and compacted and therefore rough) is equal to "ice" in New England (covered with a film of supercooled water). So let"s tackle this. Is the RCC a subjective measure? To find out, we should look at the RCAM presented above in AIM (a pilot"s manual) to what the airport operator is given. But you can"t do that unless you understand μ . . .

How about in English? If the surface is very "grippy" and will not allow the object to slide, it can have a coefficient of friction of 1.0 — meaning it would take just as much force to lift the object as it would to push it. If the surface is extremely slippery, it could theoretically have a coefficient of 0.0 — meaning it takes no effort at all the push the object. The coefficient of friction can be greater than 1.0. (Imagine the object velcroed to the surface, for example.)

MU (friction) values range from 0 to 100 where zero is the lowest friction value and 100 is the maximum friction value obtainable. For frozen contaminants on runway surfaces, a MU value of 40 or less is the level when the aircraft braking performance starts to deteriorate and directional control begins to be less responsive. The lower the MU value, the less effective braking performance becomes and the more difficult directional control becomes.

When the MU value for any one-third zone of an active runway is 40 or less, a report should be given to ATC by airport management for dissemination to pilots.

FAA-approved friction measuring equipment may be employed to help in determining the effects of friction-enhancing treatments, in that it can show the trend of a runway as to increasing or decreasing friction. Airport operators should not attempt to correlate friction readings (Mu numbers) to Good/Medium (previously known as Fair)/Poor or Nil runway surface conditions, as no consistent, usable correlation between Mu values and these terms has been shown to exist to the FAA’s satisfaction. It is important to note that while manufacturers of the approved friction measuring equipment may provide a table that correlates braking action to Mu values, these correlations are not acceptable to the FAA. To ensure that data collected are accurate, qualified personnel should use FAA-approved equipment and follow the manufacturer’s instructions for use. Note: It is no longer acceptable to report or disseminate friction (Mu) values to aircraft operators. This includes informal dissemination outside of the NOTAM system. In support of this change the NOTAM system will no longer allow for the reporting of this information. Airplane braking performance cannot be directly related to Friction (Mu) values. Runway Condition Codes, which will be included in the runway condition NOTAM, where applicable, are directly relevant to the determination of required landing distances.

There are two basic types of friction measuring equipment that can be used for conducting friction surveys on runways during winter operations: Continuous Friction Measuring Equipment (CFME) and Decelerometers (DEC).

Continuous Friction Measuring Equipment (CFME). CFME devices are recommended (over Decelerometers) for measuring friction characteristics of pavement surfaces covered with contaminants, as they provide a continuous graphic record of the pavement surface friction characteristics with friction averages for each one-third zone of the runway length.

Decelerometers. Decelerometers are recommended (over CFMEs) for airports where the longer runway downtime required to complete a friction survey is unacceptable and for busy airports where it is difficult to gain access to the full length of a runway crossed by another runway. Decelerometers should be of the electronic type due to the advantages noted below. Mechanical decelerometers may be used, but should be reserved as a backup. Airports having only mechanical devices should plan to upgrade as soon as possible. Neither type of decelerometer will provide a continuous graphic record of friction for the pavement surface condition. They provide only a spot check of the pavement surface. On pavements with frozen contaminant coverage of less than 25 percent, decelerometers are used only on the contaminated areas. For this reason, a survey taken under such conditions will result in a conservative representation of runway braking conditions. This should be considered when using friction values as an input into decisions about runway treatments. In addition, any time a pilot may experience widely varying braking along the runway, it is essential that the percentage of contaminant coverage be noted in any report.

Electronic decelerometers eliminate potential human error by automatically computing and recording friction averages for each one-third zone of the runway. They also provide a printed record of the friction survey data.

Mechanical decelerometers may be used as a backup to an electronic decelerometer. The runway downtime required to complete a friction survey will be longer than with an electronic decelerometer. Mechanical decelerometers do not provide automatic friction averages or a printed copy of data.

Lateral Location. On runways that serve primarily narrow-body airplanes, runway friction surveys should be conducted approximately 10 feet (3 m) from the runway centerline. On runways that serve primarily wide-body airplanes, runway friction surveys should be conducted approximately 20 feet (6 m) from the runway centerline. Unless surface conditions are noticeably different on the two sides of the runway centerline, only one survey is needed, and it may be conducted on either side.

The RCAM is the method by which an airport operator reports a runway surface assessment when contaminants are present. Use of the RCAM is only applicable to paved runway surfaces. Once an assessment has been performed, the RCAM defines the format for which the airport operator reports and receives a runway condition “Code” via the NOTAM System. The reported information allows a pilot to interpret the runway conditions in terms that relate to airplane performance. This approach is a less subjective means of assessing runway conditions by using defined objective criteria. Aircraft manufacturers have determined that variances in contaminant type, depth, and air temperature can cause specific changes in aircraft braking performance. At the core of the RCAM is its ability to differentiate among the performance characteristics of given contaminants.

Conditions Acceptable to Use Decelerometers or Continuous Friction Measuring Equipment to Conduct Runway Friction Surveys on Frozen Contaminated Surfaces.

5.1.4.1. The data obtained from such runway friction surveys are considered to be reliable only when the surface is contaminated under any of the following conditions:

The RCAM is the method by which an airport operator reports a runway surface assessment when contaminants are present. Use of the RCAM is only applicable to paved runway surfaces. Once an assessment has been performed, the RCAM defines the format for which the airport operator reports and receives a runway condition “Code” via the NOTAM System. The reported information allows a pilot to interpret the runway conditions in terms that relate to airplane performance. This approach is a less subjective means of assessing runway conditions by using defined objective criteria.

Airport operators normally access the system through the "NOTAM Manager" application. The first question will be "Is greater than 25% of the overall runway length and width, or cleared width (if not cleared from edge to edge), contaminated?" If the answer is no the only option will be to report contaminant percentage, type, and depth, when applicable, for each third of the runway, as well as any treatment. No Runway Condition Code is reported.

So you"ve got more than 25% coverage. The next thing to do is look at the left column on the RCAM and look for the type and depth of contaminant as well as temperature. Do that for each third of the runway. If only a portion of the runway is cleared (such as the center 75"), you only have to consider that portion. Unless you have upgrades and downgrades, the Runway Condition Codes will enter the system. Notice you didn"t have to do anything with the decelerometer.

If the airport operator thinks the RCC can be upgraded or should be downgraded, they can take a drive with an approved decelerometer. But only RCCs of 1 or 2 can be upgraded and even then they can only be upgraded up to a 3. You can take the decelerometer"s μ reading to upgrade or downgrade the RCC. What about pilot reports? Pilot reports can only be used to downgrade an RCC and only for the portion of the runway experienced.

Downgrade Assessment Criteria. When data from the shaded area in the RCAM (i.e., CFME/deceleration devices, pilot reports, or observations) suggest conditions are worse than indicated by the present contaminant, the airport operator should exercise good judgment and, if warranted, report lower runway condition codes than the contamination type and depth would indicate in the RCAM. While pilot reports (PIREPs) of braking action provide valuable information, these reports rarely apply to the full length of the runway as such evaluations are limited to the specific sections of the runway surface in which wheel braking was utilized. It is not appropriate to use downgrade assessment criteria to upgrade contaminant based assessments of condition codes (e.g., from 2 to 3).

The correlation of the Mu (μ) values with runway conditions and condition codes in the RCAM are only approximate ranges for a generic friction measuring device and are intended to be used for an upgrade or downgrade of a runway condition code. Airport operators should use their best judgment when using friction measuring devices for downgrade assessments, including their experience with the specific measuring devices used.

Pilot Reported Braking Action. This is a report of braking action on the runway, by a pilot, providing other pilots with a degree/quality of expected braking. The braking action experienced is dependent on the type of aircraft, aircraft weight, touchdown point, and other factors.

Republican vice-presidential nominee Mike Pence"s Boeing 737 at LaGuardia Airport.On Thursday, the campaign plane carrying Republican vice-presidential nominee Mike Pence skidded off the runway after landing at New York"s LaGuardia Airport.

The positive resolution to a potentially disastrous event can be attributed to the Engineered Material Arresting System or EMAS located at the end of the runway.

EMAS is made up of massive blocks of material that collapse as the wheels of an airplane roll over it, thereby sinking the plane into the runway and bringing it to a safe and gradual stop. The system is designed to be able to stop aircraft traveling at speeds up to 80 mph.

#PencePlane was overshot runway and wound up on #FAA mandated "arrestor bed," which stopped it in its tracks. #abc7ny pic.twitter.com/2LddxmUkfa- Josh Einiger (@JoshEiniger7) October 28, 2016

After a routine training mission, the aircraft belonging to the South Dakota Air National Guard’s 114th Fighter Wing was attempting to land on Runway 15 at Sioux Falls Regional Airport (FSD), also known as Joe Foss Field, on May 12, 2022.

Footage shot at the scene shows the F-16 nose-down in the grass after its landing gear collapsed. Its nose appears to have separated from the airframe. The canopy is still attached to the wreckage, meaning that the pilot did not eject from the aircraft. No injuries were reported.

A @SoDak_ANG 114th Fighter Wing F-16 has crashed after sliding off the end of a runway in Sioux Falls. Officials say the pilot is safe. Find out more on @keloland.comhttps://t.co/NFiH4LPWhV pic.twitter.com/wIvAGkKAZ3

Runway overruns during landing are a top safety focus for Boeing, regulatory agencies, and the entire commercial aviation industry. Boeing is working with the industry to develop a comprehensive runway safety strategy — called Situational Awareness and Alerting for Excursion Reduction (SAAFER) — that is based on a data-driven consensus of root causes, risk factors, and interventions.

This article explores the strategy in terms of near- and long-term recommendations to airlines and flight crews to address the causes of runway overruns as well as flight deck design solutions currently under development.

Boeing event data shows that there are numerous contributors to runway overruns. Causes of landing overruns may begin as early as the approach briefing or occur once the airplane is on the ground and decelerating (see fig. 1). Understanding the root causes of runway excursions is fundamental to mitigating them.

The circle size represents the relative frequency that the item was a contributing factor to a runway overrun. Frequently, a runway overrun is the result of more than one contributing factor occurring simultaneously.

The Boeing SAAFER strategy implements a combination of procedural and flight deck enhancements along with additional crew education (i.e., training aids) to mitigate runway landing overruns. Components of this approach — procedural enhancements, training aids, and existing flight deck technology — are already available to operators. Boeing recommends implementing these excursion mitigations immediately.

Boeing’s runway safety strategy provides flight crews with enhanced awareness, guidance, and alerting tools from the approach-planning phase through landing rollout and deceleration. The strategy’s goal is to keep pilots aware and in control of this phase of flight and enable them to make correct and timely decisions that will ensure a safe landing.

Boeing recommends that airlines consider modifying their approach and landing procedures to incorporate runway safety recommendations. Augmenting existing landing procedures is a currently available solution that can mitigate runway overrun excursions in the near term without waiting for future technological flight deck enhancements.

Calculate required runway length. As the flight crew prepares its approach briefing, it should use real-time information to analyze how much runway is required relative to runway available. Performing a landing distance calculation using the real-time airplane and actual runway data (e.g., contamination, wet, grooved, or ungrooved surface) can mitigate runway overrun excursions caused by inadequate runway length.

Determine go-around point. Calculating and briefing a go-around point or the latest point on the runway by which the flight crew must touch down during the approach briefing also has potential to reduce overrun excursions. This go-around distance calculation can mitigate the approximately 44 percent of runway overrun excursions that are attributed to long landings.

Add thrust reverser callout. Boeing has added a mandatory thrust reverser callout to the flight crew training manual and the flight crew operating manuals for all Boeing models. It is intended to increase the flight crew’s situational awareness of thrust reverser deployment in conjunction with the speed brakes during the landing rollout. This callout, along with using the reversers until the stop is assured (no early stowage), provides a runway excursion mitigation for the approximately 80 percent of excursions where inadequate or late thrust reverser usage was a contributing factor.

Updating approach and landing procedures may not address all runway overrun excursion events that are caused by inadequate runway length when landing long or using inadequate or improper deceleration devices. These runway overrun excursions may require additional pilot situational awareness and involvement. However, these relatively simple, highly feasible, non-equipage enhancements can help reduce runway overrun excursions in the near term.

Runway overrun event data suggests that a number of runway overruns can be avoided if the flight crew has a more thorough understanding of the interrelationship between the landing environment and the potential risks existing that day (e.g., weather, winds, runway conditions, minimum equipment list items, airplane weight).

A failure or misunderstanding of each of these factors has contributed to runway overrun excursions. For example, many flight crews may not fully understand the importance of using thrust reversers on wet runways. As runway friction decreases due to deteriorating runway conditions, the role of the thrust reverser becomes more important. Additionally, there have been accidents in which the crew had difficulty deploying the thrust reversers and consequently neglected to ensure the spoilers were fully extended during the landing rollout.

Another concern centers on ensuring that the appropriate deceleration devices are used until the airplane is at a stop. This is especially important when there is a known risk of an overrun excursion. It is necessary to ensure all deceleration devices are utilized fully when facing a runway overrun excursion.

The aviation industry has produced a variety of useful tools to help pilots understand these relationships. The Flight Safety Foundation approach and landing accident reduction toolkit and the International Civil Aviation Organization/International Air Transport Association toolkits are available on the Internet. They provide valuable information flight crews can use to help avoid runway overrun excursions.

Boeing is developing an approach and landing training-aid video intended to be viewed by pilots in order to enhance their understanding of their dynamic landing environment, the day’s risk factors, available tools, and desired actions and outcomes relating to runway excursions. This training-aid video is scheduled for release in late 2012.

Boeing is focusing on human-factors-driven flight deck design enhancements that are consistent with existing and planned airport, air traffic, and customer operating strategies. These enhancements are targeted at runway overrun prevention through all approach phases: approach planning, approach, touchdown, and deceleration.

During approach planning, flight deck tools and procedures assist the flight crew in determining the required runway length and where on the runway the airplane is expected to stop, given current conditions (see fig. 2). Boeing already offers a landing distance calculator on electronic flight bags. The new strategy augments this existing technology by adding a more effective way to display this information to the flight crew. By graphically depicting the dry and contaminated stopping location during approach planning, the crew can definitively assess its risk of runway overrun before touching down. The pilot also has the option of manually entering a reference line. This could be a land and hold short operation, a taxiway exit, or a desired touchdown or go-around point.

During the approach, the airplane’s stability and tailwinds are major contributing factors to runway overrun excursions. New flight deck enhancements provide aural and visual cues to assist the pilot in flying a stabilized approach (see fig. 3). Boeing’s new runway safety strategy provides a simplified approach technique to reduce workload even in normal conditions. As a final safeguard, the system alerts the pilot to unstable conditions or to a runway that is too short for that landing.

After reaching decision height but before touching down, the primary contributing factor to a runway overrun is a long landing (i.e., airplane that exceeds the touchdown zone). Boeing’s new runway safety technology provides landing and flare guidance on the HUD and aural and visual runway positional situational awareness on the HUD and primary flight display (see fig. 4). Conformal runway edge lines and runway remaining markers assist the crews’ positional situational awareness on the runway even in low-visibility conditions.

Flight crews receive landing and flare guidance on the head-up display (HUD) and aural and visual runway positional situational awareness on the HUD and primary flight display.

After touchdown, the primary contributing factors of runway excursions are the actual runway condition and inadequate or late use of deceleration devices. Boeing’s SAAFER strategy provides a visual indication of the predicted stop point on the runway based on real-time deceleration. It also provides a distance-remaining voice callout and alerts the crew when its current deceleration is insufficient and may result in a runway overrun excursion (see fig. 5).

The system provides a visual indication of the predicted stop point on the runway based on real-time deceleration, as well as a distance-remaining voice callout.

Boeing’s SAAFER strategy combines procedural and flight deck enhancements with additional crew education to mitigate runway overrun excursions. When flight crews are aware and in control of the situation, they will make effective and timely decisions to ensure a safe landing.

HALIFAX — Confusing runway instructions, an unexpected tailwind and crew fatigue were factors that contributed to a 2018 runway overshoot that destroyed a Boeing 747 cargo jet at Halifax Stanfield International Airport, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada says.

In an investigation report released Tuesday, the independent agency also cited insufficient braking on a wet runway, noting that the aircraft was wrecked as it slid down a grassy embankment 270 metres past the end of the runway. All three crew members received minor injuries, but the sole passenger – a deadheading pilot – was not injured.

The board’s investigation found that a confusing notice to pilots – known as a Notice to Airmen or NOTAM – led the crew to wrongly believe the longer of the two runways in Halifax – Runway 23 – was not available for landing. As a result, they planned to land on Runway 14, which is 2,347 metres long.

As the aircraft approached the runway in the dark just after 5 a.m., air traffic control failed to tell the crew about the availability of Runway 23, although an automated information system was broadcasting that information, the report said.

Less than 90 seconds before the jet crossed the threshold, the crew realized there was a tailwind to contend with, as well as a rain-slicked runway. Airplanes typically take off and land into the wind, which offers pilots more lift and, as a result, more control. But tailwind landings are possible within certain limits.

“Upon landing, a series of events prevented the aircraft from decelerating as expected and caused the aircraft to drift to the right of the runway,” the report said.

The brakes were applied eight seconds after touchdown, but maximum braking effort did not occur until 15 seconds later, the report said. At that point, the 183,500-kilogram jumbo jet was about 240 metres from the end of the runway

The safety board also noted that the uneven terrain where the aircraft came to rest was beyond the runway’s 150-metre runway end safety area, which is designed to reduce the risk of damage to aircraft that land short of the runway or overshoot it.

The report said that in 2007, the board recommended Transport Canada require all runways longer than 1,800 metres to have a 300-metre runway end safety area or a means of stopping aircraft that provides an equivalent level of safety.

Sydney Airport (YSSY) operates two parallel runways set at 1,037 metres apart. Using a procedure called independent visual approaches (IVA), two aircraft can be on final approach at the same time while operating in visual meteorological conditions.

if for any reason, including radio failure or radio congestion, contact cannot be established or maintained with Director preventing instructions being issued by ATC or a vectoring request being made by the flight crew to enable intercept of the final approach course for the assigned runway, then an aircraft should initiate a turn in order to track the extended centreline of the assigned runway

Pilots must remember that it is imperative they are fully aware of their responsibility to fly accurate heading and fly onto final without overshooting the runway centreline.

The declared LDA for runway 9 must be used when showing compliance with the landing distance requirements of the applicable airplane operating rules and/or airplane operating limitations or when making a before landing performance assessment. The LDA is less than the physical runway length, not only because of the displaced threshold, but also because of the subtractions necessary to meet the RSA beyond the far end of the runway. However, during the actual landing operation, it is permissible for the airplane to roll beyond the unmarked end of the LDA

The declared ASDA for runway 9 must be used when showing compliance with the accelerate-stop distance requirements of the applicable airplane operating rules and/or airplane operating limitations. The ASDA is less than the physical length of the runway due to subtractions necessary to achieve the full RSA requirement. However, in the event of an aborted takeoff, it is permissible for the airplane to roll beyond the unmarked end of the ASDA as it is brought to a full-stop on the remaining usable runway

to cause (an aircraft) to fly or taxi too far along (a runway) during landing or taking off, or (of an aircraft) to fly or taxi too far along a runway

A Philippine Airlines (PAL) Airbus A320overshot a runway on landing in the southern Philippine city of Butuan this morning (26 October), resulting in minor injuries and reportedly slight damage to the aircraft.

The accident statistics prove it: The base-to-final turn continues to be one of the big killers in general aviation. Most often, troubles arise when a pilot realizes too late that he is overshooting the runway and so tightens the turn while simultaneously hauling back on the yoke. That’s a recipe for a rarely survivable stall-spin accident.

The key to avoiding putting the airplane in a dangerous position when you’re already low and slow is to heed a few simple tips. The first is to know what the wind is doing. If it’s blowing left to right across the runway, it means you’ll have a tailwind on a left base and will have to start your turn to final sooner.

Even if the wind is blowing from the opposite direction or there’s no wind at all, you should start the base-to-final turn early with a gentle bank. You can always increase the bank angle as needed, but the idea is to ease into the turn. I like to start every turn to final as though I’m going to land on the near edge of the runway. Once I’m certain I won’t overshoot, I adjust the turn to roll out right on the centerline. Remember, too, that in order to stall the airplane, you need to be loading up the wing. Forward pressure as you turn will help you remember to fight the tendency to pull into a risky situation.

Which leads us to a final point. When flying the approach, you should focus your attention not just on the runway, but rather on a specific touchdown point. On final, line up with the centerline by putting it exactly between your heels, as though you’re going to slide your feet onto the runway with one foot on either side of the centerline. In the flare, don’t fixate on the centerline. Instead, keep an eye on the edges of the runway a distance in front of the airplane, which gives a better height perspective than the centerline does.