first step act 2018 safety valve made in china

The Act represents a dramatically different and enlightened approach to fighting crime that is focused on rehabilitation, reintegration, and sentencing reduction, rather than the tough-on-crime, lock-them-up rhetoric of the past.

Perhaps the Act’s most far-reaching change to sentencing law is its expansion of the application of the Safety Valve—the provision of law that reduces a defendant’s offense level by two and allows judges to disregard an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum penalty if the defendant meets certain criteria. It is aimed at providing qualifying low-level, non-violent drug offenders a means of avoiding an otherwise draconian penalty. In fiscal year 2017, nearly one-third of all drug offenders were found eligible for the Safety Valve.

Until the Act, one of the criteria for the Safety Valve was that a defendant could not have more than a single criminal history point. This generally meant that a defendant with as little as a single prior misdemeanor conviction that resulted in a sentence of more than 60 days was precluded from receiving the Safety Valve.

Section 402 of the Act relaxes the criminal history point criterion to allow a defendant to have up to four criminal history points and still be eligible for the Safety Valve (provided all other criteria are met). Now, even a prior felony conviction would not per se render a defendant ineligible from receiving the Safety Valve so long as the prior felony did not result in a sentence of more than 13 months’ imprisonment.

Importantly, for purposes of the Safety Valve, prior sentences of 60 days or less, which generally result in one criminal history point, are never counted. However, any prior sentences of more than 13 months, or more than 60 days in the case of a violent offense, precludes application of the Safety Valve regardless of whether the criminal history points exceed four.

These changes to the Safety Valve criteria are not retroactive in any way, and only apply to convictions entered on or after the enactment of the Act. Despite this, it still is estimated that these changes to the Safety Valve will impact over 2,000 offenders annually.

Currently, defendants convicted of certain drug felonies are subject to a mandatory minimum 20 years’ imprisonment if they previously were convicted of a single drug felony. If they have two or more prior drug felonies, then the mandatory minimum becomes life imprisonment. Section 401 of the Act reduces these mandatory minimums to 15 years and 25 years respectively.

These amendments apply to any pending cases, except if sentencing already has occurred. Thus, they are not fully retroactive. Had they been made fully retroactive, it is estimated they would have reduced the sentences of just over 3,000 inmates. As it stands, these reduced mandatory minima are estimated to impact only 56 offenders annually.

Section 403 of the Act eliminates the so-called “stacking” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) penalties. Section 924(c) provides for various mandatory consecutive penalties for the possession, use, or discharge of a firearm during the commission of a felony violent or drug offense. However, for a “second or subsequent conviction” of 924(c), the mandatory consecutive penalty increases to 25 years.

Occasionally, the Government charges a defendant with multiple counts of 924(c), which results in each count being sentenced consecutive to each other as well as to the underlying predicate offense. For example, a defendant is charged with two counts of drug trafficking and two counts of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), which requires a consecutive 5 years’ imprisonment to the underlying offense for mere possession of a firearm during the commission of the drug offense. At sentencing, the Court imposes 40 months for the drug trafficking offenses. As a result of the first § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) conviction, the Court must impose a consecutive 60 months (5 years). But what about the second § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) conviction? In such situations, courts have been treating the second count as a “second or subsequent conviction.” As such, the 60-month consecutive sentence becomes a 300 month (25 years) consecutive sentence. In our hypothetical, then, the sentencing court would impose a total sentence of 400 months (40+60+300) inasmuch as the second 924(c) count was a “second or subsequent conviction.”

Now, under the Act, to avoid such an absurd and draconian result, Congress has clarified that the 25-year mandatory consecutive penalty only applies “after a prior conviction under this subsection has become final.” Thus, the enhanced mandatory consecutive penalty no longer can be applied to multiple counts of 924(c) violations.

Finally, Section 404 of the Act makes the changes brought about by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 fully retroactive. As the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s “2015 Report to Congress: Impact of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,” explained: “The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), enacted August 3, 2010, reduced the statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses to produce an 18-to-1 crack-to-powder drug quantity ratio. The FSA eliminated the mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine and increased statutory fines. It also directed the Commission to amend the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to account for specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances in drug trafficking offenses involving any drug type.”

While the Act now makes the FSA fully retroactive, those prisoners who already have sought a reduction under the FSA and either received one, or their application was otherwise adjudicated on the merits, are not eligible for a second bite at the apple. It is estimated that full retroactive application of the FSA will impact 2,660 offenders.

Reducing the severity and frequency of some draconian mandatory minimum penalties, increasing the applicability of the safety valve, and giving full retroactive effect to the FSA signals a more sane approach to sentencing, which will help address prison overpopulation, while ensuring scarce prison space is reserved only for the more dangerous offenders.

Mark H. Allenbaugh, co-founder of Sentencing Stats, LLC, is a nationally recognized expert on federal sentencing, law, policy, and practice. A former staff attorney for the U.S. Sentencing Commission, he is a co-editor of Sentencing, Sanctions, and Corrections: Federal and State Law, Policy, and Practice (2nd ed., Foundation Press, 2002). He can be reached at mark@sentencingstats.com.

On behalf of The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, a coalition charged by its diverse membership of more than 220 national organizations to promote and protect civil and human rights in the United States, we write to express our support for the First Step Implementation Act of 2021 (S. 1014), the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021 (S. 601), and the COVID-19 Safer Detention Act of 2021 (S. 312). In total, these three bipartisan measures would bring about narrow, yet meaningful improvements to federal sentencing. While The Leadership Conference believes that further, and stronger, legislation is necessary to transform our nation’s untenable criminal-legal system, these bills are a welcome step in that direction. We urge you to support these bills and to oppose any amendments that substantially change these provisions.

The First Step Implementation Act of 2021 furthers the goals of the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA),[1] which markedly changed sentencing laws and curbed the number of individuals entering prison. Sentencing practices, such as federal mandatory minimum sentences, are the fundamental building blocks of our system’s use of unnecessarily harsh prison sentences that have fueled our crisis of mass incarceration. While the FSA made necessary advancements to the federal sentencing scheme, it represents only modest improvements to our system and did not implement retroactively key provisions — a necessary component of any federal sentencing legislation.

Accordingly, the First Step Implementation Act of 2021 corrects implementation and interpretation errors that contravene the spirit of the FSA — such as implementing retroactively key sentencing reforms. For instance, the legislation would make the FSA’s sentencing reforms retroactive to individuals who received enhanced mandatory minimum sentences for prior drug offenses and to individuals who received “stacked” mandatory minimum sentences; permit judges to expand the sentencing safety valve in federal drug cases if the court finds that the defendant’s criminal history score overrepresents their record’s seriousness or likelihood of recidivism; allow courts to reduce sentences for offenses committed by those under the age of 18 if the defendant has served at least 20 years; enable sealing or expungement of nonviolent juvenile delinquency adjudications and juvenile criminal records; and require the attorney general to establish procedures to ensure criminal records exchanged for employment purposes are accurate.

While we support the First Step Implementation Act, we also ask you to address other issues arising from the FSA through other mechanisms. In particular, we urge you to continue robust oversight over and investigations into the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) implementation of the use of the “Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs” (PATTERN). BOP continues to use PATTERN to make release decisions, even though experts have cautioned that it is scientifically unverified and built on historically biased data resulting in bias against Black people, Latino people, poor people, unhoused people, and people with mental illness.[2] In fact, a January 2021 report by the National Institute of Justice reveals that the Department of Justice was unable to revalidate PATTERN due to errors and inconsistencies — meaning the BOP is using an unvalidated risk-assessment tool to make life and death decisions during the global pandemic.[3] We urge the you to address this issue in several ways: by continuing vigorous and robust oversight to ensure BOP is meeting its commitments under the FSA, by advising BOP to halt the use of PATTERN until it is validated, and by introducing legislation to fix this unreliable and discriminatory assessment.

The Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021 similarly makes meaningful improvements to sentencing laws. In particular, S. 601 would ensure that federal judges cannot consider acquitted or dismissed charges in their sentencing decisions. S. 601 would amend 18 U.S.C. §3661 to preclude federal courts from considering acquitted conduct at sentencing, except for the purposes of mitigating a sentence. While juries must convict based on the higher standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt,” current federal law permits judges to impose enhanced sentencing based on acquitted or dismissed charges under the less demanding standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” The consideration of such conduct in sentencing decisions compounds the trial penalty and can often lead to longer federal sentences, exacerbating mass incarceration and depriving defendants of basic due process. This legislation would correct an unjust facet of federal sentencing laws.

The COVID-19 Safer Detention Act of 2021 (S. 312) clarifies and expands the eligibility for the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program introduced within the FSA. S. 312 ensures that eligibility decisions for the program are subject to judicial review and explicitly names COVID-19 vulnerability as a basis for compassionate release. S. 312 also shortens the judicial review waiting period for elderly home detention and compassionate release during the pandemic from 30 to 10 days. The COVID-19 virus has swept through federal prisons: as of September 10, 2021, more than 42,000 federally incarcerated individuals have contracted the coronavirus, and more than 250 federally incarcerated individuals, many of whom were over 60 years old, have died of the virus.[4] High rates of underlying health issues among incarcerated populations place many individuals in custody in high-risk categories that make them more susceptible to complications if they contract the virus.[5] This legislation provides for meaningful expansion of the pilot program and removes arbitrary benchmarks that ultimately endanger lives. Moreover, while this legislation is written within the context of the global health crisis, the pandemic has shown that release has not had a deleterious impact on public safety, and we encourage Congress to make permanent effective programs such as this even after the end of the pandemic.

These three bills represent meaningful improvements to address faults in the federal sentencing scheme and further fulfill the promise of the First Step Act. These bills will immediately save lives and curb the number of individuals forced into the criminal-legal system. We urge you to support these important bills. If you have any questions, please contact Sakira Cook, Senior Director of the Justice Reform Program, at [email protected].

[3] Nat’l Inst. Of Justice. “2020 Review and Revalidation of the First Step Act Risk Assessment Tool.” Jan. 2021. Pg. 7. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/256084.pdf.

On behalf of The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, and the 108 undersigned organizations, we write to urge you to vote NO on The FIRST STEP Act (H.R.5682). While well intentioned, this bill takes a misguided approach to reforming our federal justice system. Without question, we appreciate the inclusion of some promising provisions to address some of the problems in the federal prison system,[1] however, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) already has broad authority to make the majority of these changes through administrative action. In sum, this bill falls short on its promise to “meaningfully” tackle the problems in the federal justice system – racial disparities, draconian mandatory minimum sentences, persistent overcrowding, lack of rehabilitation, and the exorbitant costs of incarceration. Decisions we make now through this bill could have deep implications for our ability to impact the abiding and deepening harms that lead to mass incarceration.

The Dangerous “Risk Assessment System”: The Act purports to offer people in prison the chance to “earn time credits” towards early release to pre-release custody– but by building and placing a “risk and needs assessment” algorithm in the hands of the Attorney General – one not required to be designed or tailored for the individuals it is meant to judge – we risk embedding deep racial and class bias into decisions that heavily impact the lives and futures of federal prisoners and their families.

Researchers have shown that risk assessment tools applied in sentencing decisions in Florida – meant to predict recidivism – were twice as likely to be wrong when evaluating Black people as White people.[2]  One of the first independent studies analyzing the use of risk assessment in pretrial showed that decisionmakers using risk assessment tools – in this case, Kentucky judges – ignored their results over time, while also overseeing an increase in failures-to-appear at court and an increase in pretrial arrests.[3] A further recent analysis showed that risk assessment tools are as accurate as a prediction made by a random human selected over the Internet.[4]

We cannot introduce algorithmic risk assessment into the assignment of housing and release decisions or rehabilitative opportunities without sufficient transparency, independent testing for decarceral and anti-racist results prior to implementation, and regular effective oversight for not just what the tool purports to predict, but how decisionmakers in our prison system use it. The Act uses “risk assessments” in an untested manner.[5] It fails to ensure transparency, independent testing, or analysis of the proposed risk assessment system or its results prior to its adoption or implementation. And again, it doesn’t require the tool to be designed or tailored for the individuals it is meant to judge.

The Overbroad List of Exclusions: The majority of people in prison will eventually be released. Categorically excluding entire groups of people from receiving early-release credits[6] will undermine efforts to reduce prison overcrowding and improve public safety since such exclusions weaken the incentive to participate in recidivism-reduction programming. Furthermore, many of these exclusions, such as those based on immigration-related offenses,[7] could have a disproportionate impact on people of color.[8]

The Overbroad Discretion Provided to Attorney General Sessions: The bill gives broad authority to the Attorney General and would rely upon implementation by this administration.[9] Despite assurances to the contrary, this administration has failed to take any active steps to improve the justice system, has dismantled existing protections, and has shown outright hostility to people of color and other historically marginalized communities.[10] Furthermore, Attorney General Jeff Sessions is a well-known, longtime opponent of sentencing and prison reform. It would be unwise and harmful to vest so much discretion in an Attorney General so hostile to meaningful justice reform.

Allows for the privatization of certain public functions and allows private entities to profit from incarceration. The bill retains a provision that in order to expand programming and productive activities, the Attorney General shall develop policies for wardens of each BOP facility to enter into partnerships with private entities and industry-sponsored organizations.[17]

The Absence of Appropriations for Implementation: The resources needed to expand programming authorized under the bill have not been – and may never be – appropriated. In fact, Congress could decide today, absent this legislation, that prison programming should be funded and increase the BOP’s budget by $50 million a year for the next five years.Instead, the FY19 BOP budget calls for a reduction.[18] Furthermore, the recidivism reduction programming that currently exists in the federal prison system is grossly underfunded and not enough to serve those currently incarcerated. Therefore, without any guarantees that the necessary funding will be appropriated, this bill is an empty promise.

The Undetermined Human and Fiscal Impact: It is unclear what the fiscal impact of this bill will be, given that the Congressional Budget Office has not released a score for the bill. Moreover, it is unclear what the human impact of this bill will be, given that neither the BOP nor the U.S. Sentencing Commission has produced updated estimates on the number of people projected to be impacted by the legislation. Proponents argue that at least 4,000 people will be impacted by the good time fix alone; however, relying on that number is misleading because it is based upon data that is over a decade old.[19] No hearings have been held and there is no CBO score available in order to explore these questions further.

For the foregoing reasons, we urge you to vote “No” on the FIRST STEP Act and The Leadership Conference will include your position on the bill in our voting scorecard for the 115th Congress. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Sakira Cook, Senior Counsel at The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, at (202) 263-2894 or [email protected].

[1] See, e.g., prohibitions on the shackling of pregnant women, a retroactive “good time” fix, reforms to the federal compassionate and elderly release programs, and an audit of the program several years after its implementation.

[3] SeeStevenson, Megan. “Assessing Risk Assessment in Action.” Minnesota Law Review, Forthcoming. March 18, 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3016088.

[4] SeeDressel, Julia and Farid, Hany. “The accuracy, fairness, and limits of predicting recidivism.” Science Advances. January 17, 2018. http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/1/eaao5580.

[5] When risk and needs assessment evaluations are adopted, they are typically used by states to identify programming for people in prison, rather than to award time credits. See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code § 498.002 (classifying inmates’ “time-earning category” based on factors other than risk assessment); R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-24 (determining amount of sentence credit based on factors other than risk assessment); Okla. Stat. § 57-138 (same); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.18 (same); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.193 (same).

[6] Seethe 48 exclusions listed within The FIRST STEP Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. § 3632(d)(4)(D) (2018). See also The FIRST STEP Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. § 3632(d)(4)(B)(iii) (2018). https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5682/BILLS-115hr5682ih.pdf.

[7] See, e.g., The FIRST STEP Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. § 3632(d)(4)(B)(iii) (2018). See also The FIRST STEP Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xliii) (2018). https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5682/BILLS-115hr5682ih.pdf.

[8] Over twelve thousand people are being held in federal prison for immigration offenses, according to most recent data from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and a total of 60,000 people are being detained because of an immigration offense by BOP, U.S. Marshalls, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. See“Offenses.” Bureau of Prisons. Accessed May 21, 2018. https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp. See also Wagner, Peter and Sawyer, Wendy. Prison Policy Initiative. “Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018.” March 14, 2018. https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html.

[9] See, e.g., The FIRST STEP Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. § 3632(g) (2018) (“the Attorney General shall monitor and assess the use of the [risk and needs assessment] System”). See also The FIRST STEP Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. SEC. 102 (h)(5) (2018) (“the Attorney General shall develop policies for the warden of each prison of the Bureau of Prisons to enter into partnerships”). See also The FIRST STEP Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. § 3632(a) (“In carrying out this subsection, the Attorney General may use existing risk and needs assessment tools, as appropriate”). See also The FIRST STEP Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. § 3632(e) (2018) (“The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall develop guidelines for the reduction of rewards and incentives earned under subsection (e) for prisoners who violate prison rules or evidence-based recidivism reduction program or productive activity rules” with a few limitations). In total, the term “Attorney General” appears 20 times in The FIRST STEP Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. (2018). https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5682/BILLS-115hr5682ih.pdf.

[10] See “Without Justice: Trump’s Across-the-Board Assault on Civil and Human Rights.” The Leadership Conference Education Fund. Jan. 2018. http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/monitor/Without-Justice-2018.pdf.

[13] See The FIRST STEP Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. SEC. 102 (b)(1)(B) (2018). See also The FIRST STEP Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. § 3632(d)(4)(C) (2018). https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5682/BILLS-115hr5682ih.pdf.

[19] See Dear Colleague Letter from Senator Durbin, Senator Harris, Senator Booker, Representative Jackson Lee, and Representative Lewis. Pg. 3. May 17, 2018. https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000163-6f9d-dbc0-a56b-efdd053a0001.

[20] See Letter to Members of the House Judiciary Committee: Vote “No” on The FIRST STEP Act. The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights. May 8, 2018. http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/policy/letters/2018/not-retroactive-Sign-On-Letter-Oppose-First%20Step%20Act-5.8.18-FINAL.pdf.

Senator Durbin. The American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Council of Prison Locals. May 8, 2018. https://www.afge.org/globalassets/documents/bop/first-step-letter-5-11-18.pdf.

[22] See Dear Colleague Letter from Senator Durbin, Senator Harris, Senator Booker, Representative Jackson Lee, and Representative Lewis. May 17, 2018. https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000163-6f9d-dbc0-a56b-efdd053a0001.

This past May, the Trump administration’s leadership on meaningful, conservative criminal justice reform helped the House to pass the Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person (or First Step) Act by a vote of 360 to 59.

On Wednesday, President Donald Trump announced his support for the Senate’s amended version of the First Step Act, including some modest yet much-needed sentencing reforms.

Conservative states have led the way on similar criminal justice reforms, adopting changes that successfully increase public safety, reduce prison spending, strengthen families and communities, and offer more Americans a second chance to lead a safe and prosperous life.

But that committee saw a silver lining: “[C]ase studies of innovative, evidence-based practices provide a strong indication that [the trend] can be reversed.”

The thrust of the First Step Act is an attempt to reduce the high recidivism rates that currently exist—and they certainly are high. In 2016, the U.S. Sentencing Commission estimated that 49.3 percent of federal offenders who were released in 2005 were re-arrested within eight years, and a Bureau of Justice Statistics study of 30 states found that among offenders who were released from state custody in 2005, 76.6 percent were re-arrested within five years.

After all, 95 percent of all individuals who are presently incarcerated will eventually be released. They are going to be our neighbors, and we ought to be concerned about what kind of shape they are going to be in when they are released. Will they become law-abiding citizens? Or will they return to a life of crime and endanger our safety?

The First Step Act would require the Department of Justice to adopt a validated Risk Assessment tool and apply it to every federal inmate to determine if they are a minimal, low, medium, or high risk of recidivating upon release.

And each inmate would undergo a “needs assessment” to determine if some factor—such as a lack of education or job skills, a mental illness, or a substance abuse issue—contributed to his criminal behavior but might be meaningfully addressed while he is incarcerated.

The First Step Act would then require the Bureau of Prisons to offer programs that are designed to address these issues, and offer certain inmates incentives to take and complete those courses in order to reduce the risk that they will return to a life of crime once they are released.

The First Step Act is premised on the belief that while some hardened and violent offenders will likely always pose a threat to public safety and should remain incarcerated, evidence shows that many offenders can, through some of these programs, end up becoming productive, law-abiding members of society, breaking the pernicious cycle that currently exists of prisons becoming a revolving door.

After all, if we do what we have always done—warehouse offenders without addressing some of the underlying issues that caused them to commit crime in the first place—we will get what we have always gotten: people who leave prison and quickly return to a life of crime, thereby endangering public safety.

Unfortunately, the way the law was written allowed for even individuals with no prior criminal history, who engaged in a series of drug transactions while carrying a weapon, to be sentenced to multiple consecutive sentences.

Angelos had no criminal record, but on three separate occasions he sold marijuana worth a total of $350 to a police informant, and each time he had a firearm—which he never brandished or used. Nonetheless, the prosecutor charged Angelos with three separate drug transactions and three separate § 924(c) charges for possessing a firearm on each of these occasions.

Angelos was convicted of these charges. His sentence for the underlying drug offense (based on the total quantity of drugs that he sold), plus the five-year penalty for possessing a firearm during the first transaction, plus 25 years for each of the “subsequent” 924(c) offenses, all added up to a first-time sentence of 55 years.

To address that unduly harsh penalty, the FIRST STEP Act would clarify that a “subsequent” conviction, for purposes of § 924(c), means an offense committed after being released from prison for having committed a prior § 924(c) offense.

The second sentencing provision involves the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced the weight disparity between crack and powder cocaine mandatory minimum sentences from 100:1 to 18:1. Congress decided that this disparity resulted in sentences that were unfair and too draconian.

In order to have triggered a five-year mandatory minimum under the old law, criminals had to sell 500 grams of powder cocaine or 5 grams of crack cocaine—hence the 100:1 disparity. After the Fair Sentencing Act, selling 28 grams of crack cocaine would trigger the five-year mandatory minimum—an 18:1 weight disparity.

But Congress made that relief only available to those convicted after the law’s enactment, which strikes some people as unfair. After all, if Congress thought that the old sentencing regime was fundamentally unfair, then why shouldn’t it offer some potential relief to people who were sentenced under this old regime?

The third proposal would expand what is known as the “safety valve” for mandatory minimum sentences. In 1994, Congress created the “safety valve” (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)) to help ensure that mandatory minimum drug sentences were focused on higher-level drug traffickers, not those playing minor roles in a drug conspiracy.

In order to qualify for the safety valve, an offender must meet a strict five-part test, including the fact that the offense did not result in a serious bodily injury, no firearm was used, the offender admits his guilt and tells the government everything he knows, and the offender was not an organizer or leader of the illegal conduct.

But by offering relief to defendants with only the slightest criminal record, if any, the safety valve left some very low-level offenders subject to rather draconian mandatory minimum penalties.

According to a recent report by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a “significant portion of offenders who performed relatively low-level functions did not qualify under the safety valve provision. For example, a significant portion of couriers (31.9 percent), mules (28.8 percent), and employees/workers (33.9 percent) did not qualify for the safety valve in fiscal year 2016.”

The First Step Act would slightly expand the parameters of the existing safety valve to enable judges to sentence more low-level offenders (assuming they meet the other four prongs of the current five-part test) who have a modest criminal record of non-violent offenses without regard to the mandatory minimum penalty that might otherwise apply. This would go a long way toward avoiding incidents of manifest injustice.

If passed, the First Step Act would reduce the mandatory life sentence for a third conviction down to 25 years, and would reduce the mandatory 20-year sentence for a second conviction down to 15 years.

This website is using a security service to protect itself from online attacks. The action you just performed triggered the security solution. There are several actions that could trigger this block including submitting a certain word or phrase, a SQL command or malformed data.

After many months of negotiations between a Republican-controlled U.S. Congress and the Trump Administration, on December 21, 2018, the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) was signed into law by President Trump.[1] While this legislation was named the “First Step Act” to signal that it was the first attempt at incremental change to the federal criminal justice system, that name is actually a misnomer and ignores several successful reforms that preceded the legislation’s passage.[2] The FSA was actually the next step of many previous steps that have resulted in reforms far more significant to the federal criminal justice system.

Well before Jared Kushner, President Trump’s son-in-law, joined with some conservative and progressive organizations and became interested in federal criminal justice reform, there were many criminal justice, civil rights, human rights, and faith-based activists who successfully advocated for justice reform, including sentencing reform, on the federal level over the past fifteen years. Early supporters of the FSA did not think that President Trump or the Republican Congress would support changes to sentencing laws, and were satisfied with including what they considered prison reform provisions or “back end” changes to the criminal justice system.[7] In addition, former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, the DOJ, and several members of Congress opposed including sentencing reforms.[8]

During the first six months after the law was enacted, almost all of the people who have benefited from the law benefited from the sentencing provisions that early supporters and former Attorney General Sessions were willing to sacrifice. However, many criminal justice, civil rights, and faith advocates, as well as members of Congress understood that no true changes to the federal system could happen without addressing the unjust sentencing laws that have contributed to the mass incarceration crisis in this country.[9]

The possibility of these efforts actually began under another Republican President, George W. Bush, who in his 2004 State of the Union speech said, “America is the land of second chance, and when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead should lead to a better life.”[11] This sentiment being expressed by a Republican President, a member of a party that has been known as the more “law and order” political party of the two major parties, created an opening to begin a conversation about criminal justice reform. Later that year, President Bush announced his Prisoner Re-Entry Initiative (PRI) designed to assist formerly incarcerated people in their efforts to return to their communities. PRI connected people returning from prison with faith-based and community organizations to assist them in finding work and prevent them from recidivating.[12] Ultimately, Congress passed legislation in 2008 called the Second Chance Act (SCA) that created funding for organizations around the country to help people coming home from prison by providing reentry services needed to transition back to their communities.[13] The concept for this federal funding was born out of President Bush’s PRI.

In 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Brennan Center for Justice, and Break the Chains organizations published a groundbreaking report titled, Caught in the Net: The Impact of Drug Policies on Women and Families.[14] This report was one of the first publications to document the alarming rise of incarceration of women for drug offenses. In 2005, there were more than eight times as many women incarcerated in state and federal prisons and local jails as in 1980. The number of women imprisoned for drug-related crimes in state facilities increased by 888% between 1986 and 1999.[15] These numbers are important because more than forty-five percent of the people in federal prison are there for drug offenses, of which seven percent are women.

Almost simultaneously, federal advocates began to reinvigorate efforts to address one of the most notoriously discriminatory federal criminal laws, also known as the 100 to one crack to powder disparity. This law, enacted in 1986, punished people more harshly for selling crack cocaine than it did powder cocaine. Under the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, a person would receive at least a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for selling 500 grams of powder cocaine but would receive the same sentence for selling merely five grams of crack cocaine. More importantly, what was apparent at the time was that crack cocaine was used in African-American communities because it was more readily available due to the lower cost compared to powder cocaine. Powder cocaine was used more often by whites because they could afford to purchase the more expensive drug. In 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA 2010) which reduced the 100 to one disparity between crack and powder cocaine to eighteen to one and eliminated the five-year mandatory sentence for possession of crack cocaine.[16]

Between 2005 and 2019, a combination of legal, legislative, executive, and U.S. Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission) law and policy changes resulted in reforms that led to a decline in the federal prison population of more than 38,000 people.[21] At its height, the BOP held more than 219,000 people in federal prisons across the country. As of September 2019, those numbers have decreased to 177,251.[22] The reason for the significant decline is because these legal and policy changes were focused on revamping federal sentencing and retroactive application of changes. Similarly, the most impactful provision of the FSA has been retroactivity of the FSA 2010. The Sentencing Commission estimates that the expansion of the 1994 safety valve provision[23] will also have a significant effect for years to come.

Some of these reforms took place years before the “First Step” Act or bills that preceded it[24] were even thought of, but it is important to understand how these and other policy changes laid the foundation for a “First Step” Act to become law. Furthermore, early supporters of the “First Step” Act cannot rewrite history with the title of a bill. In the end, this legislation was an example of incremental change to the federal criminal justice system, but it was not the first example, nor the most significant. In order for history to reflect an accurate picture of how reforms to the federal criminal justice system have successfully unfolded over the past decade or more, this Article will detail the actual first steps that led to a political environment in Washington where criminal justice reform could be considered, and ultimately enacted in 2018.

Mandatory minimum penalties are criminal penalties requiring, upon conviction of a crime, the imposition of a specified minimum term of imprisonment.[25] The Boggs Act, which provided mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses, was passed in 1951.[26] In 1951, Congress began to enact additional mandatory minimum penalties for more federal crimes.[27] Congress passed the Narcotics Control Act in 1956, which increased these mandatory minimum sentences to five years for a first offense and ten years for each subsequent drug offense.[28]

Since then, mandatory minimum sentences have proliferated in every state and federal criminal code. In 1969, Nixon called for drastic changes to federal drug control laws. In 1970, Congress responded with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, supported by both Republicans and Democrats, which eliminated all mandatory minimum drug sentences except for individuals who participated in large-scale ongoing drug operations. Nixon signed the Act on October 27, 1970.[29]

Ironically, the next year, Nixon declared a “war on drugs” and increased the presence of federal agencies charged with drug enforcement and supported bills with mandatory sentences.[30] John Ehrlichman, an aide to Nixon, more recently has admitted that the “war on drugs” was actually a war on black people:

Mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenses emerged again after the death of Len Bias. In 1986, University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias died of a drug overdose just days after the Boston Celtics picked him in the NBA draft.[32] After the reemergence of mandatory sentences in federal law in the 1980s, many observers began to see the same problems that lead to the repeal of drug mandatory minimums in 1970. Mandatory sentences prohibit judges from reducing an individual’s sentence based on mitigating factors such as circumstances of the case or a person’s role, motivation, or likelihood of repeating the crime. Treating similar defendants differently and different defendants the same is unfair. Also, it is ineffective at reducing criminal behavior because mandatory sentences do not take into account the many factors prosecutors consider when deciding if they will charge the minimum sentence.[33]

Contrary to popular belief, mandatory minimum sentencing laws are neither mandatory nor do they impose minimum sentences. Some have said that the combination of unjust sentences and a dangerous combination of unencumbered prosecutorial power has created what is known as the “trial penalty.”[36] The trial penalty is when people who exercise their right to trial receive higher sentences than those who plead guilty. True mandatory sentencing laws would result in everyone arrested for the same crime receiving the same sentence if convicted. But in reality, mandatory sentences simply transfer the discretion that a judge should have to impose an individualized sentence based on relevant factors, such as a defendant’s role in the crime, criminal history, and likelihood of reoffending, and give that discretion to prosecutors.

A prosecutor need never disclose her reasons for bringing or dropping a charge. Judges, on the other hand, must disclose their reasons for sentencing in the written public court record, and aggravating factors can be contested by the defendant.[37] A defendant faced with a plea deal of 1.5 years or a risk of twenty years imprisonment if he goes to trial is likely to choose the former, no matter how weak the evidence. Individuals who choose to exercise their constitutional rights and go to trial are often sentenced not only for their misconduct, but also for declining to take the plea deal on the prosecutor’s terms.[38] The threat of mandatory minimum penalties may cause defendants to give false information,[39] to plead guilty to charges of which they may actually be innocent,[40] or to forfeit a strong defense.[41]

Federal mandatory minimum laws and some state laws afford defendants relief from the mandatory minimum in exchange for information helpful to prosecutors. People charged with low-level crimes and charged with mandatory minimums—drug couriers, addicts, or those on the periphery of the drug trade, such as spouses—often have no information to give to prosecutors for a sentence reduction. Finally, it is extremely expensive to incarcerate people under mandatory sentences. By putting all discretion in the hands of prosecutors who have a professional interest in securing as many convictions as possible, mandatory minimums ensure that public policy concerns about cost, racial disparities, and whether a particular sentence results in public safety are not a priority.[42] The decision regarding what level of incarceration will serve public safety is best left in the hands of judges, who have more of an incentive to balance public safety needs against the facts of an individual case.

In the 1970s, observers of the American judicial system were increasingly concerned with the widespread disparity in sentencing. Judges, with very broad discretion, imposed widely varying sentences for the same offenses. The enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA)[43] was Congress’s response to the growing inequality in federal sentences.[44] The SRA’s objectives were to increase certainty and fairness in the federal sentencing system and to reduce unwarranted disparity among individuals with similar records who were found guilty of similar crimes. The legislation created the Sentencing Commission, an independent expert panel given the responsibilities of producing federal sentencing guidelines and monitoring the application of the guidelines.[45]

As enacted, the SRA codified a framework for a determinate sentencing scheme under federal law.[46] Supporters of the SRA wanted to reduce unwarranted disparity among defendants having similar records or guilty of similar conduct. They also wanted to increase certainty and fairness of sentencing. The drafter of the SRA, Kenneth Feinberg, said himself that the primary motivating factor was the concern over sentencing disparities.[47] Parole in the federal system was abolished entirely, and to provide the certainty and fairness that SRA proponents sought, sentences were to be based upon “articulate grounds.”[48] Courts were directed to “‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes (of sentencing).’”[49] The statute enumerated four purposes of sentencing: (1) punishment, (2) deterrence, (3) incapacitation, and (4) rehabilitation.[50] However, the statutory text of the SRA provides no clear statement as to how these four purposes were to be reconciled with each other.

Not long after the passage of the SRA, Congress began to enact new mandatory minimum sentences.[51] From 1984 to 1990, Congress passed a number of mandatory minimums primarily aimed at drugs and violent crime.[52] Lawmakers argued that enacting mandatory penalties would deter crime by creating fixed and lengthy prison terms.[53] Less than ten years after passing many of the mandatory penalties, members of Congress familiar with criminal justice issues began to realize that these sentences were inconsistent with the objectives of the SRA.[54]

After the enactment of the SRA, the most infamous mandatory minimum law passed by Congress was the penalty relating to crack cocaine. Cocaine had long been illegal in America, and, as later happened with crack, powder cocaine’s prohibition had always carried a racial component.[55] Crack was a new method of packaging the drug, produced by heating a mixture of powder cocaine (cocaine hydrochloride), baking soda (sodium bicarbonate), and water. The chemical interaction between these ingredients creates what is commonly known as “crack”—a hard material similar to a rock.[56] Applying a hot flame will vaporize crack, and, through smoking, cocaine vapor can be inhaled into the lungs and can very quickly enter the bloodstream and go to the brain.

In June 1986, the country was shocked by the death of University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias in the midst of crack cocaine’s emergence in the drug culture. Bias, who was African American, died of a drug and alcohol overdose three days after being drafted by the Boston Celtics. Many in the media and public assumed that Bias died of a crack overdose.[58] Motivated in large part by the notion that the infiltration of crack cocaine was devastating America’s inner cities and by Bias’ death, Congress quickly passed the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA). Many in Congress believed that the existing sentences for drug crimes were inadequate to deal with the dangers of this new drug based on the enormous fear of crack. Although it was later revealed that Bias actually died of a powder cocaine overdose,[59] Congress had already passed the harsh, discriminatory crack cocaine law by the time the truth about Bias’ death was discovered.

Congress did not provide a clear record of the reasons for the sentencing disparity between minor crack infractions and serious powder offenses even though Congress intended to combat the crack cocaine “epidemic” through this legislation.[60] The Senate conducted only a single hearing on the 100 to one ratio, which only lasted a few hours and few hearings were held in the House on the enhanced penalties for crack offenses.[61] As a consequence of the ADAA’s expedited schedule, there was no committee report to document Congress’ intent in passing the ADAA or to analyze the legislation. The abbreviated legislative history of the ADAA does not provide a single consistently cited rationale for the crack powder penalty structure.

What little legislative history that does exist suggests that members of Congress believed that crack was more addictive than powder cocaine[66] and that it caused crime.[67] It also indicates members of Congress thought that crack cocaine caused psychosis and death, and that young people were particularly prone to becoming addicted to it,[68] as well as that crack’s low cost and ease of manufacture would lead to even more widespread use. Based on what ultimately turned out to be myths, Congress decided to punish crack more severely than powder.

Two years later, drug-related crimes were still on the rise. In response, Congress intensified its war against crack cocaine by passing the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.[70] The 1988 Act created a five-year mandatory minimum and twenty-year maximum sentence for simple possession of five grams or more of crack cocaine.[71] The maximum penalty for simple possession of any amount of powder cocaine or any other drug remained at no more than one year in prison.

In the years after the enactment of the ADAA, many of the myths associated with crack cocaine have been dispelled. In 1996, a study published by the Journal of American Medical Association found that the physiological and psychoactive effects of cocaine are similar regardless of whether it is in the form of powder or crack.[72] In addition, the media stories that appeared in the late 1980s of crack-addicted mothers giving birth to “crack babies” are now considered greatly exaggerated.[73]

In the 1990s, federal sentencing policy for cocaine and crack offenses came under extensive scrutiny. These concerns led Congress in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (1994 Crime Bill) to direct the Sentencing Commission to submit a report and recommendations to Congress on cocaine sentences.[74] On February 28, 1995, the Sentencing Commission unanimously recommended that changes be made to the cocaine sentencing structure including a reduction in the 100 to one ratio.[75] On May 1, 1995, the Sentencing Commission submitted to Congress proposed legislation and amendments to its sentencing guidelines, which would have equalized the penalties between crack and powder cocaine possession and distribution at the level of powder cocaine, and provided sentencing enhancements for violence or other harms.[76] On October 30, 1995, Congress rejected the proposed amendment to the sentencing guidelines and directed the Sentencing Commission to make further recommendations regarding the powder and crack cocaine statutes and guidelines that did not advocate parity.[77] For the first time in the guidelines’ history, Congress and the President rejected a guideline amendment approved by the Sentencing Commission.[78] Congress explicitly directed the Sentencing Commission that “the sentence imposed for trafficking in a quantity of crack cocaine should generally exceed the sentence imposed for trafficking in a like quantity of powder cocaine.”[79]

Again in 2002, the Sentencing Commission examined the disparity. The Sentencing Commission had hearings with a wide range of experts, who overwhelmingly concluded that there is no valid scientific or medical distinction between powder and crack cocaine.[83] Among those experts was Dr. Glen Hanson, then Acting Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, who testified before the Sentencing Commission, stating that, in terms of pharmacological effects, crack cocaine is no more harmful than powder cocaine. Dr. Alfred Blumstein, Professor of Urban Systems and Operations Research at Carnegie Mellon University, indicated that it would be more rational to use sentencing enhancements to punish individuals who use violence, regardless of the drug type, rather than to base sentencing disparities on the chemical itself. Such enhancements should also account for a person’s role in the drug trade. He also noted that the 100 to one drug quantity disparity suggests racial discrimination.[84]

After the 2002 hearings, the Sentencing Commission issued a new report on crack and powder cocaine disparities and once again found that the 100 to one ratio between the drugs was unjustified.[85] The Sentencing Commission made the following findings: (1) the current penalties exaggerate the relative harmfulness of crack cocaine, (2) the current penalties sweep too broadly and apply most often to lower level offenders, (3) the current quantity-based penalties overstate the seriousness of most crack cocaine offenses and fail to provide adequate proportionality, and (4) the current penalties’ severity mostly impacts minorities.[86]

Stephen Breyer, a current Supreme Court Justice, stated that: “[i]n 1994 Congress enacted a ‘safety-valve’ permitting relief from mandatory minimums for certain non-violent, first-time drug offenders. This, in my view, is a small, tentative step in the right direction. A more complete solution would be to abolish mandatory minimums altogether.”[90]

[these] mandatory minimum sentences are perhaps a good example of the law of unintended consequences. There is a respectable body of opinion which believes that these mandatory minimums impose unduly harsh punishment for first-time offenders. . . . [M]andatory minimums have also led to an inordinate increase in the prison population and will require huge expenditures to build new prison space . . . .[91]

In 2004, the Blakely v. Washington[92] decision laid the groundwork for the Court to address mandatory federal sentencing guidelines. Blakely pleaded guilty to the kidnapping of his estranged wife which under Washington state law would have resulted in a maximum sentence of fifty-three months. The judge in the case sentenced Blakely to ninety months because he had acted with “deliberate cruelty.”[93] The Court held an “exceptional” sentence increase under state law, based on the judge’s finding and not a jury’s, violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.[94] The Court ruled that, based on its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,[95] facts increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.[96]

The next year, the Court was faced with a case involving a federal judge sentencing a defendant above the Guidelines in United States v. Booker.[97] The Court again held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, or even the ordinary sentencing range, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the Court held that the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury and declared that the Guidelines could not be mandatory.[98] Prior to Booker, the statute compelled sentencing courts to impose sentences within the Guidelines’ range, barring exceptional circumstances specific to the individual.[99] Trial judges could not account for instances when the Guidelines sentence for a specific offense failed to effectuate the broad sentencing goals articulated by Congress.[100] Bookerfundamentally altered the landscape of sentencing. The opinion in Booker struck from the federal sentencing statute the provision that mandated the imposition of sentences within the Guidelines.[101] While allowing sentencing courts to continue to make factual findings, the Booker opinion cured the statute of constitutional infirmity by declaring the Guidelines to be merely advisory. In 2007, the Court in Rita v. United States[102] reiterated that sentencing courts could no longer “presum[e] that the Guidelines sentence should apply.”[103] Rita emphasized that district courts must take the Guidelines into account when sentencing, even if they are no longer bound by them.[104]

The Booker decision was a reaction to a number of problems in the pre-Booker system. Noticeably, sentencing pre-Booker still encompassed many of the same problems the SRA set out to remedy—imbalance, consistency, and unfairness. While attempting to resolve inconsistency in sentencing, the SRA became too rigid. With respect to individual characteristics, the Guidelines significantly restricted judges’ ability to consider many aspects, such as a defendant’s age and family circumstances, and instead focused on a defendant’s criminal record as the most important characteristic.[105] As the former Chair of the Sentencing Commission, Judge William K. Sessions, argued that the Guidelines turned judges into computers, thereby taking away their humanity and reason.[106]

With the Booker decision, federal courts began to apply the Guidelines in an advisory manner to reduce some of the rigidity which some judges complained of. However, judges are only able to sentence people below statutory mandatory minimum sentences in limited circumstances.[107] In the wake of Booker, the Sentencing Commission continues to fulfill its role in developing guidelines, but judges no longer are required to follow the Guidelines. Under the advisory Guidelines system, sentencing courts are still tasked with consulting the Guidelines, but are not bound by them. The Guidelines still provide federal judges with fair and consistent sentencing ranges to consult at sentencing. The advisory Guidelines take into account both the seriousness of the criminal conduct and the defendant’s criminal record. Certain characteristics (including age and mental condition) “may be relevant” in granting a departure from the Guidelines range if “present to an unusual degree.”[108] The Sentencing Commission has also taken steps to encourage judges to consider human characteristics in sentencing.[109]

Now the next question was would the Sentencing Commission have the courage to apply the new amendment to those in prison, i.e. retroactively. In April 2008, the Sentencing Commission did just that by voting unanimously to apply the Crack -2 amendment retroactively.[116] As of June 2011, over 16,000 people were resentenced by federal judges across the country in accordance with the Guideline amendment.[117] The process of resentencing individuals based on the retroactive amendment was smoothly coordinated among the courts, probation officers, U.S. Attorneys’ offices, and the Federal Public Defenders. This was a critical moment in the reform movement in Washington to address one of the most unjust and discriminatory federal sentencing policies. Advocates had finally convinced an important branch of government to take steps to deal with the burgeoning federal prison population and the policies that were fueling it.

Another critical turning point in the movement to address mass incarceration at both the federal and state level was in 2008, when the Pew Center on States’ Public Safety Project (Pew) released its report, One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008.[119] This groundbreaking report found for the first time in history that more than one in every 100 adults in America were in jail or prison.[120] The report also detailed how mass incarceration in this country impacted state budgets without increasing public safety.[121] Pew’s ability to crystalize the increasing reliance on incarceration in America with the easily understandable statistic of one in 100 got the attention of the public, advocates, and policymakers.

Furthermore, the report, while acknowledging the need to incarcerate violent and repeat offenders, notes that more people are behind bars principally because of a flood of policy choices such as the “three-strikes” and other sentencing laws that impose longer, often draconian prison sentences on people. Just as important to the argument of public safety, the report points out that prison growth and higher incarceration rates do not reflect a corresponding increase in crime or a surge in America’s overall population.[127]

The impact of Pew’s research on the necessity to address a criminal justice system that had grown out of control cannot be minimized. Being able to succinctly describe the consequences of many years of policies that have led to our country imprisoning 2.3 million people not only got the attention of policy experts, but also elected officials. Harsh punitive policies that many elected officials at the state and federal level created, supported, and built their political careers on began to come under fire as advocates and the public now had concrete evidence of the human and societal costs. Moreover, a Republican President who had begun to understand that because so many people were in prison and would eventually return to their communities across the country, real public safety required those returning home to be given a second chance to be productive citizens and succeed. The political and public mindset began to change regarding those who were incarcerated and the reasons why this country locked so many people up. In addition, the realities of the 2008 recession—that many states were left with few options but to cut the costs of incarceration and that reducing the money spent on jails and prisons did not result in an increase in crime or a decrease in public safety—was critical to states taking the lead on cutting prison populations. The United States had become an incarceration nation before our very eyes and a global leader in a category that it should not have been proud to be in.

In April 2008, Congress passed the bipartisan Second Chance Act, with the support of law enforcement, corrections, criminal justice and civil rights advocates, courts, and behavioral health experts, among others. This historic legislation was signed into law by President George W. Bush.[132] The SCA is the federal government’s investment in approaches to assisting people transitioning back to their communities and to reduce recidivism and corrections costs for state and local governments.[133] The 2008 bill authorized $165 million in federal grants to state, local, and tribal governments and nonprofit organizations to fund services and programs. The law not only improved the lives of people who are casualties of the criminal justice system but also represented a change in the conversation about the criminal justice system and society’s obligations to help formerly incarcerated people.

More than 840 grants have been awarded for reentry programming to nonprofit organizations and government agencies in forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories as a result of SCA funding since 2009.[134] The National Reentry Resource Center estimates 164,000 people have benefited from services and programming funded by the SCA as of December 2017.[135] Services such as education, housing, employment training and assistance, substance use treatment, mentoring, victims support, and other services have been funded by the SCA to help people successfully leave jails and prisons. SCA grants also focus on improving corrections and supervision practices in order to reduce recidivism.[136]

On November 4, 2008, then-Senator Barack Obama won the election for President of the United States. During his campaign, President Obama considered criminal justice a priority issue. “Since my first campaign, I’ve talked about how, in too many cases, our criminal justice system ends up being a pipeline from underfunded, inadequate schools to overcrowded jails,”[137] Obama said in a speech at the NAACP convention in Philadelphia in 2015.

Also, it became cl