workover rig blowout free sample

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In industry jargon, a “blowout” has in past years been called a “gusher” or “wild well” because the operator has lost control of the well and either crude oil or natural gas (or a combination of the two) is spewing out at a tremendous rate, similar to the huge and high geysers of water gushing out of Yellowstone’s Old Faithful.

However, an oil & gas blowout is far from the natural beauty of a national park geyser phenomenon. In a blowout, protocols and processes to keep control of that well and the drilling operations have failed.

Perhaps the most well-known blowout is the travesty that occurred in the Gulf of Mexico, when the oil drilling rig named “Deepwater Horizon” exploded in April 2010, killing eleven (11) workers on the rig itself and allowing 4,000,000 barrels of oil to flow into the Gulf of Mexico before the rig was capped 87 days after the explosion occurred. For details, read the Environmental Protection Agency’s case history and synopsis, including the $5.5 billion federal Clean Water Act penalty and added $8.8 billion in natural resource damages assessed against rig owner and operator BP Exploration & Production.

Anyone employed in the Oil & Gas Industry is aware that merely being around an oil or gas rig puts them at risk of an explosion or a fire simply because they are dealing with a flammable product. Static electricity, cigarettes, as well as on-site equipment like welding tools can kindle a catastrophe.

However, workers must depend upon the owner and operator of the drilling rig to preserve their safety as the product is being extracted. See, “Safety Hazards Associated with Oil and Gas Extraction Activities,” published by the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA).

When working in drilling operations, the owner and operator of the rig has a duty to control that well and prevent pressure from building up, resulting in a gusher or blowout. Well control is the legal responsibility of the owner and operator of the drilling site. This is done through (1) drilling fluid pressure monitoring and (2) Blowout Preventers.

Companies must understand the pressure dynamics that exist as oil or gas is being pulled from its origins and placed into production. The underground fuel (gas, oil) naturally exists under pressure called “formation pressure.” When the extraction occurs, drilling creates its own pressure. In industry terms, this is called “mud pressure.”

It is imperative that these two pressures are carefully monitored at all times during the drilling and extraction process. If the natural formation pressure exceeds the drilling mud pressure, then there is the risk of a blowout.

Alongside human supervision of the drilling operations to protect against blowouts is a range of equipment developed within the industry to assist in well control. Collectively, they are called “blowout preventers” (BOPs).

BOPs consist of specialized products made specifically for drilling purposes. They are a vital component of the rig’s design and should be installed and tested before drilling operations begin. Routine BOP pressure tests are required both by federal regulation (14 days) and industry standards (21 days), as well. See, e.g., “Examination of Blowout Preventer Pressure Test Frequency,” prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Argonne National Laboratory for the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement and published May 2019.

The BOPs and their corresponding valves are placed on top of the casing head. They work to shut off the well if need be, thereby blocking any rush of underground oil or gas and shielding against a blowout.

When a blowout happens, lives can be lost in both an initial explosion as well as in the raging fire fueled by the gushing oil or gas. Environmental harm from the escaping fuel will also have a widespread and long-lasting impact.

In these situations, both the victims of the blowout as well as their loved ones may have legal claims to assert against the owner and operator of the drilling operations and the rig itself, as well as against others involved in the process including developers, producers, sellers, and maintenance companies involved with faulty BOP equipment.

Investigations will reveal the cause of the blowout. The Deepwater Horizon blowout, for example, was later determined to have been caused by a faulty BOP. For more, read “BP Shortcuts Led to Gulf Oil Spill, Report Says,” written by John M. Broder and published in the New York Times on September 15, 2011.

WigRum is proud to represent victims seeking justice from some of the most powerful oil companies in the world in the aftermath of severe and deadly blowouts and oil rig explosions. Those who have failed in their duty of care to keep people safe and thereby cause serious injury or death can be made to pay damages to the victims and their families that include medical claims and economic harm, as well as the possibility of punitive damages.

In January 2020, an Oklahoma jury awarded $20,000,000.00 in a wrongful death lawsuit brought in the aftermath of the Patterson 219 oil rig fire near Quinton, Oklahoma, on January 22, 2018, considered to be the deadliest drilling accident since the 2010 Deepwater Horizon rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico.

On November 16, 2018, Andrew Hutchison was working as an overnight tool pusher on a drilling rig located in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. That night, a BOP failure happened when a valve failure allowed drilling mud to shoot to the ground surface along with hydrogen sulfide, a poisonous gas.

Mr. Hutchison, a husband and father of four minor children, heroically died trying to save a co-worker who had been thrown back onto the rig floor from the unanticipated pressurized release of poisonous gas and mud. He pulled his co-worker to safety. Tragically, Andrew Hutchison perished while trying to escape himself, suffering fatal exposure to the toxic gas being released in the blowout.

A blowout is the uncontrolled release of crude oil and/or natural gas from an oil well or gas well after pressure control systems have failed.blowout preventers intended to prevent such an occurrence. An accidental spark during a blowout can lead to a catastrophic oil or gas fire.

Gushers were an icon of oil exploration during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. During that era, the simple drilling techniques, such as cable-tool drilling, and the lack of blowout preventers meant that drillers could not control high-pressure reservoirs. When these high-pressure zones were breached, the oil or natural gas would travel up the well at a high rate, forcing out the drill string and creating a gusher. A well which began as a gusher was said to have "blown in": for instance, the Lakeview Gusher blew in in 1910. These uncapped wells could produce large amounts of oil, often shooting 200 feet (61 m) or higher into the air.gas gusher.

Despite being symbols of new-found wealth, gushers were dangerous and wasteful. They killed workmen involved in drilling, destroyed equipment, and coated the landscape with thousands of barrels of oil; additionally, the explosive concussion released by the well when it pierces an oil/gas reservoir has been responsible for a number of oilmen losing their hearing entirely; standing too near to the drilling rig at the moment it drills into the oil reservoir is extremely hazardous. The impact on wildlife is very hard to quantify, but can only be estimated to be mild in the most optimistic models—realistically, the ecological impact is estimated by scientists across the ideological spectrum to be severe, profound, and lasting.

The development of rotary drilling techniques where the density of the drilling fluid is sufficient to overcome the downhole pressure of a newly penetrated zone meant that gushers became avoidable. If however the fluid density was not adequate or fluids were lost to the formation, then there was still a significant risk of a well blowout.

In 1924 the first successful blowout preventer was brought to market.wellhead could be closed in the event of drilling into a high pressure zone, and the well fluids contained. Well control techniques could be used to regain control of the well. As the technology developed, blowout preventers became standard equipment, and gushers became a thing of the past.

In the modern petroleum industry, uncontrollable wells became known as blowouts and are comparatively rare. There has been significant improvement in technology, well control techniques, and personnel training which has helped to prevent their occurring.

A blowout in 1815 resulted from an attempt to drill for salt rather than for oil. Joseph Eichar and his team were digging west of the town of Wooster, Ohio, US along Killbuck Creek, when they struck oil. In a written retelling by Eichar"s daughter, Eleanor, the strike produced "a spontaneous outburst, which shot up high as the tops of the highest trees!"

The Shaw Gusher in Oil Springs, Ontario, was Canada"s first oil gusher. On January 16, 1862, it shot oil from over 60 metres (200 ft) below ground to above the treetops at a rate of 3,000 barrels (480 m3) per day, triggering the oil boom in Lambton County.

underwater blowout in U.S. history occurred on 20 April 2010, in the Gulf of Mexico at the Macondo Prospect oil field. The blowout caused the explosion of the Transocean and under lease to BP at the time of the blowout. While the exact volume of oil spilled is unknown, as of June 3, 2010United States Geological Survey Flow Rate Technical Group has placed the estimate at between 35,000 to 60,000 barrels (5,600 to 9,500 m3) of crude oil per day.

Petroleum or crude oil is a naturally occurring, flammable liquid consisting of a complex mixture of hydrocarbons of various molecular weights, and other organic compounds, found in geologic formations beneath the Earth"s surface. Because most hydrocarbons are lighter than rock or water, they often migrate upward and occasionally laterally through adjacent rock layers until either reaching the surface or becoming trapped within porous rocks (known as reservoirs) by impermeable rocks above. When hydrocarbons are concentrated in a trap, an oil field forms, from which the liquid can be extracted by drilling and pumping. The downhole pressure in the rock structures changes depending upon the depth and the characteristics of the source rock.Natural gas (mostly methane) may be present also, usually above the oil within the reservoir, but sometimes dissolved in the oil at reservoir pressure and temperature. Dissolved gas typically comes out of solution as free gas as the pressure is reduced either under controlled production operations or in a kick, or in an uncontrolled blowout. The hydrocarbon in some reservoirs may be essentially all natural gas.

The downhole fluid pressures are controlled in modern wells through the balancing of the hydrostatic pressure provided by the mud column. Should the balance of the drilling mud pressure be incorrect (i.e., the mud pressure gradient is less than the formation pore pressure gradient), then formation fluids (oil, natural gas, and/or water) can begin to flow into the wellbore and up the annulus (the space between the outside of the drill string and the wall of the open hole or the inside of the casing), and/or inside the drill pipe. This is commonly called a kick. Ideally, mechanical barriers such as blowout preventers (BOPs) can be closed to isolate the well while the hydrostatic balance is regained through circulation of fluids in the well. But if the well is not shut in (common term for the closing of the blow-out preventer), a kick can quickly escalate into a blowout when the formation fluids reach the surface, especially when the influx contains gas that expands rapidly with the reduced pressure as it flows up the wellbore, further decreasing the effective weight of the fluid.

Blowouts can eject the drill string out of the well, and the force of the escaping fluid can be strong enough to damage the drilling rig. In addition to oil, the output of a well blowout might include natural gas, water, drilling fluid, mud, sand, rocks, and other substances.

Blowouts will often be ignited from sparks from rocks being ejected, or simply from heat generated by friction. A well control company then will need to extinguish the well fire or cap the well, and replace the casing head and other surface equipment. If the flowing gas contains poisonous hydrogen sulfide, the oil operator might decide to ignite the stream to convert this to less hazardous substances.

Sometimes blowouts can be so forceful that they cannot be directly brought under control from the surface, particularly if there is so much energy in the flowing zone that it does not deplete significantly over time. In such cases, other wells (called relief wells) may be drilled to intersect the well or pocket, in order to allow kill-weight fluids to be introduced at depth. When first drilled in the 1930s relief wells were drilled to inject water into the main drill well hole.

The two main causes of a subsea blowout are equipment failures and imbalances with encountered subsurface reservoir pressure.Subsea wells have pressure control equipment located on the seabed or between the riser pipe and drilling platform. Blowout preventers (BOPs) are the primary safety devices designed to maintain control of geologically driven well pressures. They contain hydraulic-powered cut-off mechanisms to stop the flow of hydrocarbons in the event of a loss of well control.

Even with blowout prevention equipment and processes in place, operators must be prepared to respond to a blowout should one occur. Before drilling a well, a detailed well construction design plan, an Oil Spill Response Plan as well as a Well Containment Plan must be submitted, reviewed and approved by BSEE and is contingent upon access to adequate well containment resources in accordance to NTL 2010-N10.

An underground blowout is a special situation where fluids from high pressure zones flow uncontrolled to lower pressure zones within the wellbore. Usually this is from deeper higher pressure zones to shallower lower pressure formations. There may be no escaping fluid flow at the wellhead. However, the formation(s) receiving the influx can become overpressured, a possibility that future drilling plans in the vicinity must consider.

Myron M. Kinley was a pioneer in fighting oil well fires and blowouts. He developed many patents and designs for the tools and techniques of oil firefighting. His father, Karl T. Kinley, attempted to extinguish an oil well fire with the help of a massive explosion—a method still in common use for fighting oil fires. Myron and Karl Kinley first successfully used explosives to extinguish an oil well fire in 1913.

After the Macondo-1 blowout on the Deepwater Horizon, the offshore industry collaborated with government regulators to develop a framework to respond to future subsea incidents. As a result, all energy companies operating in the deep-water U.S. Gulf of Mexico must submit an OPA 90 required Oil Spill Response Plan with the addition of a Regional Containment Demonstration Plan prior to any drilling activity.

In order to regain control of a subsea well, the Responsible Party would first secure the safety of all personnel on board the rig and then begin a detailed evaluation of the incident site. Remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) would be dispatched to inspect the condition of the wellhead, Blowout Preventer (BOP) and other subsea well equipment. The debris removal process would begin immediately to provide clear access for a capping stack.

Several not-for-profit organizations provide a solution to effectively contain a subsea blowout. HWCG LLC and Marine Well Containment Company operate within the U.S. Gulf of Mexico

On Sep. 30, 1966, the Soviet Union experienced blowouts on five natural gas wells in Urta-Bulak, an area about 80 kilometers from Bukhara, Uzbekistan. It was claimed in Komsomoloskaya Pravda that after years of burning uncontrollably they were able to stop them entirely.physics package into a 6-kilometre (20,000 ft) borehole drilled 25 to 50 metres (82 to 164 ft) away from the original (rapidly leaking) well. A nuclear explosive was deemed necessary because conventional explosives both lacked the necessary power and would also require a great deal more space underground. When the device was detonated, it crushed the original pipe that was carrying the gas from the deep reservoir to the surface and vitrified the surrounding rock. This caused the leak and fire at the surface to cease within approximately one minute of the explosion, and proved to be a permanent solution. An attempt on a similar well was not as successful. Other tests were for such experiments as oil extraction enhancement (Stavropol, 1969) and the creation of gas storage reservoirs (Orenburg, 1970).

Walsh, Bryan (2010-05-19). "Gulf Oil Spill: Scientists Escalate Environmental Warnings". Time. Archived from the original on June 29, 2010. Retrieved June 30, 2010.

Whipple, Tom (2005-03-15). "Full steam ahead for BC offshore oil drilling". Energybulletin.net. Archived from the original on 2008-01-20. Retrieved 2016-01-30.

"East Texas Oil Museum at Kilgore College – History". Easttexasoilmuseum.com. 1930-10-03. Archived from the original on 2016-02-08. Retrieved 2016-01-30.

Norris Mcwhirter; Donald McFarlan (1989). the Guinness Book of Records 1990. Guinness Publishing Ltd. ISBN 978-0-85112-341-7. Archived from the original on 2018-05-03.

Christopher Pala (2001-10-23). "Kazakhstan Field"s Riches Come With a Price". Vol. 82, no. 715. The St. Petersburg Times. Archived from the original on 2013-12-28. Retrieved 2009-10-12.

"NTL No. 2010-N10". BSEE.gov. US Department of the Interior Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement. Archived from the original on 2015-09-30.

Madrid, Mauricio; Matson, Anthony (2014). "How Offshore Capping Stacks Work" (PDF). Society of Petroleum Engineers: The Way Ahead. 10 (1). Archived (PDF) from the original on 2015-11-29.

CineGraphic (4 July 2009). "An Atomic Bomb will stop the Gulf Oil Leak, LOOK!". Archived from the original on 7 November 2017. Retrieved 3 May 2018 – via YouTube.

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Although this incident appeared to be contained, and the two employees escaped with only minor injuries, working on a rig poses many dangers. The oil industry is a major part of the North Dakota economy, but the hazards of working in the oil fields are significant. Following are four common injuries often suffered by our oil workers: Burns. Fires and explosions come without warning on oil rigs and fields. Burns can be life-changing injuries, especially third- and fourth-degree burns. Serious burns like these can cause scarring, chronic pain, and impaired mobility. They can require months of healing time, and some burn victims may never be able to return to work again, leaving a worker without a paycheck.

If you were injured working on a North Dakota oilfield, the lawyers at Larson Law Firm, P.C. can help. You may be entitled to compensation for medical bills, lost wages, and disability. We will fight for your rights as a worker. To schedule your free initial consultation with an attorney, call our Minot office at 701-484-4878, or fill out our contact form.

Oil rig blowouts may be a common part of the drilling process, but they are dangerous and can easily lead to life-changing injuries. Blowouts stem from an imbalance of pressure below or above the ground. These incidents can cause severe fires or explosions that lead to such injuries as disfigurement, chemical exposure or projectile injuries to the head.

If you are injured in a blowout or someone you love is killed in one, the educated North Dakota oil rig blowout attorneys of Larson Law Firm P.C. are ready to fight for the compensation you need to effectively cover your medical care and other losses.

Oil rig blowouts generally occur for two reasons: drilling pressure from above the ground or a shifting of liquids and gasses below the ground. When the pressure changes, the liquid shoots out of the ground, and oil workers race to stop the leak and minimize the loss of precious oil. It is in that race to stop the leak that mistakes are frequently made.

Oil rig blowouts involve very high pressures, caustic chemicals and heavy-duty equipment. This means that, when a blowout occurs, there is great potential to cause very serious or even fatal injuries. Some of the most common injuries our skilled North Dakota oil field injury lawyers have seen include: Deep wounds from flying objects

The types of injuries you experience often depend on how close you are to blowout location. You could be involved in an oil rig blowout and come out unscathed. You could also lose an arm or be paralyzed for the remainder of your life.

Oil rig blowout settlements are typically related to the severity of your injuries. The more serious your injuries, the more medical care you are going to need, the greater the reduction in your ability to work, and the greater the pain and suffering you experience.

Our experienced North Dakota oil rig blowout attorneys fight to get the maximum settlement the law allows after your accident. We understand that financial compensation needs to provide for: Past and future medical bills

In addition, if someone you love was killed in an oil rig blowout, you may also be able to sue for wrongful death damages. Our experienced attorneys fight to get the best settlement possible, whether it is for your own injuries or for the loss of a loved one. We work with a team of investigators and expert witnesses to prove the negligence of the oil company and to show the extent of the losses you have suffered. If the settlement offer is unfair or unjust, we can try your case in court.

Your claim may be worth thousands, or it may be worth millions. No matter how big or small your case, the lawyers of Larson Law Firm P.C. believe you deserve compensation for the injuries you have suffered in an oil rig blowout accident. Call our firm in Minot today at 701-484-4878 or use our contact form to start talking with one of our lawyers and fighting for what you deserve. Your first consultation is free. We also serve residents throughout Ward, Williams, McKenzie, Pierce and Mountrail Counties.

Workers in the upstream oil and gas industry face dangers every day they’re on the job. But few are as catastrophic as an oilfield blowout and explosion.

Because of the significant hazards involved with drilling, interventions, and workovers, oil and gas operators are required to ensure that operations are properly planned, employees and contractors are thoroughly trained, and the necessary equipment is in place to protect against kicks and changes in hydrostatic pressure that, when not properly controlled, can have catastrophic (and fatal) consequences for those onsite.

Our Undefeated Oil and Gas Blowout and Explosion Lawyers have won Billions in verdicts and settlements for oilfield workers and their families in connection with the worst oilfield blowouts and disasters in history, including the #1 largest oilfield settlements in US history for workers who were severely burned and tragically killed during the January 2020 blowout in Burleson County, Texas, the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion, and the Shell Enchilada platform explosion in the Gulf of Mexico.

If you or a loved one were injured, catastrophically burned, or tragically killed during an oil field blowout or explosion, our Oilfield Accident Lawyers will

Blowouts themselves result from an uncontrolled “kick,” defined as “undesirable entry of formation fluids into casing or tubing.” Kicks occur due to formation pressures exceeding workover fluid hydrostatic pressures, which causes formation fluids (gas, oil, or condensate) to flow into the wellbore.

Subsea blowouts:involve offshore drilling rigs, where pressure control equipment –the blowout preventer – is located on the seafloor. Because they can occur at depths ranging from 10 to 8,000 feet, subsea blowouts are extremely difficult to control. This was the case when the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, tragically killing 11 offshore workers and injuring dozens of others.

Surface blowouts: occur on land and are the most common type of well blowout. In addition to oil and gas, a surface blowout can cause rocks, mud, and sand to be ejected from the well.

Operators are required to follow American Petroleum Institute (API) rules, OSHA regulations, company safety policies, and other industry standards to control kicks and prevent oil and gas well blowouts. These safety regulations mandate the proper selection and utilization of well control equipment, including mechanical and hydrostatic barriers and blowout preventers, drilling mud, mud monitoring equipment, degassers, and mud mixing systems.

Having successfully represented more than 1,000 oilfield in connection with the worst oil well blowouts and rig and platform explosions in history, we’ve learned that every one of these disasters is entirely preventable and invariably the result of an operator’s refusal to follow industry and company safety policies in an effort to speed up production.

Blowout preventers are designed to seal off the well and withstand the intense pressure that occurs after a kick or uncontrolled flow of hydrocarbons.  When functioning properly, it almost instantaneously closes off the well and prevents a blowout.

While blowout preventers substantially decrease the likelihood of a blowout, they’re only effective when they’re properly maintained and the operator has properly trained its employees and contractors on how to operate them after a kick or loss of well control.

Blowouts don’t happen without warning. At the first sign of a kick, steps should be immediately taken to shut-in the well. Shut-in procedures should also be initiated whenever there’s any doubt as to whether oil or gas is flowing from the well.

There’s no difference between a small flow and a full-flowing well. Any delay in initiating shut-in protocols can result in a massive blowout, regardless of flow strength.

While uncontrolled kicks and blowouts can quickly lead to catastrophic and fatal disasters, they’re—unfortunately—not the only hazards that oilfield workers face when drilling or performing a workover.

The constant presence of highly volatile and combustible hydrocarbons, the use of electricity and fuel to power equipment, and the need to weld and perform other types of hot work each present unique hazards that has the potential to trigger a devastating blowout and explosion.

Fires: because oil, condensate and other hydrocarbons are highly flammable, any spark, fire, or ignition source on a drilling site can lead to a massive explosion. Even static electricity can cause a blowout if proper well control procedures are not in place to prevent hydrocarbons from escaping the well.

Welding and Hot Work: the presence of flammable hydrocarbons in and around a drilling rig makes hot work, such as welding, cutting, and grinding, particularly hazardous while working on or around a land or offshore well.  Without proper well control equipment and procedures in place, a single spark from a welding torch, spark plug, or engine can lead to a catastrophic and fatal explosion.

Defective Equipment: while failure of the blowout preventer is the most common equipment-related causes of a blowout, corroded tubes, rods, and pipes, as well as any damaged or malfunctioning equipment also substantially increase the chances of a catastrophic explosion or blowout.

Electricity: oilfield workers frequently use electric tools while drilling and performing workovers . In addition to being properly maintained, these tools must be certified as “intrinsically safe” by OSHA in order to be used around oil and gas wells or any other volatile hydrocarbons.  Frayed power cords and sparks or heat from equipment that isn’t intended and certified to be used in hydrocarbon environments often serve as the ignition source needed to trigger a blowout or explosion

Our Undefeated Oilfield Blowout and Explosions Lawyers have won Billions, including the #1 Largest Oilfield Accident Settlement in US history, for oilfield workers and their families following the most catastrophic explosions and blowouts in history.

If you or a loved one were injured, catastrophically burned, or tragically killed in connection with an oil or gas blowout or explosion, we’re here to help.  Call 1-888-603-3636, use the Chat form on our website, or Click Here to send us a confidential email via our “Contact Us” form.

Prior to the 1920s, according to Petro-Online, blowouts (also called gushers) were quite common. Today, pressure release systems help control the release of oil, but accidents still happen.

A very common cause of oil blowouts is rock formation pressures around an oil reservoir. Oil can take millions of years to develop. The process involves compression of water and the pressurization of water by layers of sediment on top of carbon-based substances (typically some type of life form). Oil well companies counter the pressure by using mud at the drilling site. If the pressure balance isn’t managed properly, oil, gas, and water can infiltrate the wellbore or even the drill itself. A blowout can then result.

Many of the causes of oil blowouts are well-known within the industry. Oil well companies that fail to plan for these issues should be held accountable for any injuries or fatalities they cause.

Surface blowouts.This is the most common kind of oil well blowout. It can harm the oil rig and the surrounding area. It may even cause a deadly or catastrophic explosion. Relief wells are used to control the pressure and fluid balance.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Summary Finding 2.1: The flow of hydrocarbons that led to the blowout of the Macondo well began when drilling mud was displaced by seawater during the temporary abandonment process.

Summary Finding 2.2: The decision to proceed to displacement of the drilling mud by seawater was made despite a failure to demonstrate the integrity of the cement job even after multiple negative pressure tests. This was but one of a series of questionable decisions in the days preceding the blowout that had the effect of reducing the margins of safety and that evidenced a lack of safety-driven decision making.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 2.6: Evidence available before the blowout indicated that the flapper valves in the float collar probably failed to seal, but this evidence was not acted on at the time.

Finding 2.10: Although data were being transmitted to shore, it appears that no one in authority (from BP onshore management or a regulatory agency) was required to examine test results and other critical data and render an opinion to the personnel on the rig before operations could continue.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Observation 2.5: Had the path of the blowout been up the annulus, a liner top or the rupture discs could have failed and allowed flow to escape the well into a shallow formation. This would result in a downhole blowout that could breach at the seafloor under the correct conditions. Future well construction could avoid this possibility by running one of the deeper casing strings back to the wellhead where it can be sealed. For example, in this well the 13 ⅝-inch liner could have been run back to the wellhead. This would protect the shallower liner tops and rupture discs from potential exposure to high pressure from flow up the annulus from a deeper reservoir.

Recommendation 2.2: During drilling, rig personnel should maintain a reasonable margin of safety between the equivalent circulating density and the density that will cause wellbore fracturing.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 3.2: The crew did not realize that the well was flowing until mud actually exited and was expelled out of the riser by the flow at 21:40. Early detection and control of flow from a reservoir are critical if an impending blowout is to be prevented by a BOP whose use against a full-flowing well is untested.

Finding 3.3: Once mud began to flow above the rig floor, the crew attempted to close the upper annular preventer of the BOP system, but it did not seal properly. The BOP system had been used in the month previously to strip 48 tool joints, and apparently it was untested for integrity afterwards. Annulars are often unable to seal properly after stripping. In addition, the flowing pressure inside the well may have been larger than the preset annular closing pressure could overcome. What tests of sealing against flow have been done on this design of annular are unknown.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 3.4: The crew also closed the VBRs. The damaged pipe under the upper annular demonstrated its failure to seal, and the well was only sealed, resulting in the final pressure spike, when these VBRs were closed. The DNV investigation also found that these rams closed, and they could only be closed by command from the rig control panels and not by an ROV. At this point the flow from below the VBRs would have been closed off, but gas and oil had already flowed into the marine riser above the BOP system and continued to rise to the surface, where the gas exploded.

Finding 3.6: Once the fire started on the rig, an attempt was made (after 7 minutes) to activate the EDS, which should have closed the BSR and disconnected the LMRP. This appears to have failed because the MUX communication cables were destroyed by the explosion or fire.

Finding 3.7: Once hydraulic and electrical connection with the rig was lost at the BOP, the AMF should have activated the BSR. It might have failed at this time because of a low battery charge in one control pod and a mis-wired solenoid valve in the other, but both these points are in dispute. However, no short-term reduction in hydrocarbon flow from the well was observed after the initial fire and explosion. Such a reduction would necessarily have resulted from the VBRs sealing the annulus in the BOP and the failed BSR shearing action effectively choking, at least for a brief period of time, virtually the entire cross section of the 5½-inch drill string. Viewed in total, the evidence appears more supportive of the autoshear activation of the BSR.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 3.15: Unfortunately, even if the BSR had functioned after being activated by the EDS or the AMF, it would not likely have prevented the initial explosions, fire, and resulting loss of life, because hydrocarbons had already flowed into the marine riser above the BOP system. If the BOP system had been able to seal the well, the rig might not have sunk, and the resulting oil spill would likely have been minimized.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 3.17: Regulations in effect before the incident required the periodic testing of the BOP system. However, they did not require testing under conditions that simulated the hydrostatic pressure at the depth of the BOP system or under the condition of pipe loading that actually occurred under dynamic flow, with the possible entrained formation rock, sand, and cement, and no such tests were run. Furthermore, because of the inadequate monitoring technology, the condition of the subsea control pods at the time of the blowout was unknown.

2. While individual subsystems of various BOP designs have been studied on an ad hoc basis over the years, the committee could find no evidence of a reliability assessment of the entire BOP system, which would have included functioning at depth under precisely the conditions of a dynamic well blowout. Furthermore, the committee could find no publicly available design criteria for BOP reliability.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 3.21: When a signal is sent from the drilling rig to the BOP (on the seafloor) to execute a command, the BOP sends a message back that the signal has been received. However, there are no transducers that detect the position or status of key components, and there are no devices to send a signal that any command has been executed (such as pressure or displacement sensors confirming that the hydraulics have been actuated, that rams have moved, or that pipe has been cut). Furthermore, there are no sensors to communicate flow or pressures in the BOP to the rig floor.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Summary Recommendation 3.1: BOP systems should be redesigned to provide robust and reliable cutting, sealing, and separation capabilities for the drilling environment to which they are being applied and under all foreseeable operating conditions of the rig on which they are installed. Test and maintenance procedures should be established to ensure operability and reliability appropriate to their environment of application. Furthermore, advances in BOP technology should be evaluated from the perspective of overall system safety. Operator training for emergency BOP operation should be improved to the point that the full capabilities of a more reliable BOP can be competently and correctly employed when needed in the future.

Summary Recommendation 3.5: Instrumentation and expert system decision aids should be used to provide timely warning of loss of well control to drillers on the rig (and ideally to onshore drilling monitors as well). If the warning is inhibited or not addressed in an appropriate time interval, autonomous operation of the BSRs, EDS, general alarm, and other safety systems on the rig should occur.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Recommendation 3.8: A reliable and effective EDS is needed to complete the three-part objective of cutting, sealing, and separating as a true “dead man” operation when communication with the rig is lost. The operation should not depend on manual intervention from the rig, as was the case with the Deepwater Horizon. The components used to implement this recommendation should be monitored or tested as necessary to ensure their operation when needed.

Finding 4.1b: The rig was not designed to prevent explosion or fire once it was surrounded by the extent of combustible atmosphere facing the Deepwater Horizon.

Finding 4.1c: Hydrocarbon flow was not redirected overboard. Overboard discharge of the blowout might have delayed the explosion and fire aboard the rig.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 4.2a: The rig’s dynamic positioning system operated as designed until the loss of power disabled the rig’s ability to maintain station or reposition under control.

Finding 4.3: Alarm and indication systems, procedures, and training were insufficient to ensure timely and effective actions to prevent the explosions or respond to save the rig.

Finding 4.3a: The rig design did not employ automatic methods to react to indications of a massive blowout, leaving reactions entirely in the hands of the surviving crew.

Finding 4.3e: The training routine did not include any full rig drills designed to develop and maintain crew proficiency in reacting to major incidents.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 4.3g: Crew members lacked cross-rate training to understand rig total systems and components. As a result, many of the crew were inadequately prepared to react to the incident.

Finding 4.4: Confusion existed about decision authority and command. Uncertainty as to whether the rig was under way or moored to the wellhead contributed to the confusion on the bridge and may have impaired timely disconnect.

Finding 4.5: The U.S. Coast Guard’s requirement for the number and placement of lifeboats was shown to be prudent and resulted in sufficient lifeboat capacity for effective rig abandonment. The Coast Guard’s investigation report (USCG 2011) notes a lack of heat shielding to protect escape paths and life-saving equipment.

Finding 4.6: The above findings indicate that the lack of fail-safe design and testing, training, and operating practices aboard the rig contributed to loss of the rig and loss of life. The chain of events that began downhole could have been interrupted at many points, such as at the wellhead by the BOP or aboard the rig, where the flow might have been directed overboard or where the rig itself might have been disconnected from the well and repositioned. Had the rig been able to disconnect, the primary fuel load for the fire would have been eliminated.

Observation 4.1: The actions of some crew members in requiring due consideration of additional survivors before launching lifeboats, despite the fearsome fires engulfing the rig, are commendable and were important in the highly successful evacuation.

Observation 4.3: Conditions of explosion, fire, loss of lighting, toxic gas, and eventual flooding and sinking could have resulted in many more injuries or deaths if not for the execution of the rig"s evacuation.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Summary Recommendation 4.1: Instrumentation and expert system decision aids should be used to provide timely warning of loss of well control to drillers on the rig (and ideally to onshore drilling monitors as well). If the warning is inhibited or not addressed in an appropriate time interval, autonomous operation of the BSRs, EDS, general alarm, and other safety systems on the rig should occur.

Recommendation 4.2: Rigs should be designed so that their instrumentation, expert system decision aids, and safety systems are robust and highly reliable under all foreseeable normal and extreme operating conditions. The design should account for hazards that may result from drilling operations and attachment to an uncontrolled well. The aggregate effects of cascading casualties and failures should be considered to avoid the coupling of failure modes to the maximum reasonable extent.

Recommendation 4.3: Industry and regulators should develop fail-safe design requirements for the combined systems of rig, riser, BOP, drilling equipment, and well to ensure that (a) blowouts are prevented and (b) if a blowout should occur the hydrocarbon flow will be quickly isolated and the rig can disconnect and reposition. The criteria for these requirements should be maximum reasonable assurance of (a) and (b) and successful crew evacuation under both scenarios.

Recommendation 4.4: Industry and regulators should implement a method of design review for systemic risks for future well design that uses a framework with attributes similar to those of the Department of Defense Standard Practice for System Safety (DoD 2000), which articulates standard practices for system safety for the U.S. military, to address the complex and integrated “system of systems” challenges faced in safely operating deepwater drilling rigs. The method should take into consideration the coupled effects of well design and rig design.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Recommendation 4.12: Drilling rig contractors should require realistic and effective training in operations and emergency situations for key personnel before assignment to any rig. Industry should also require that personnel aboard the rig achieve and maintain a high degree of expertise in their assigned watch station, including formal qualification and periodic reexamination.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Recommendation 4.15: Regulators should require that all permanent crew on a rig achieve a basic level of qualification in damage control and escape systems to ensure that all hands are able to contribute to resolving a major casualty.

Recommendation 4.21: Industry and regulators should develop and implement a certification to ensure that design requirements, material condition, maintenance, modernization, operating and emergency instructions, manning, and training are all effective in meeting the requirements of Recommendation 4.3 throughout the rig’s service life.

Recommendation 4.22: Regulators should require that the rig, the entire system, and the crew be examined annually by an experienced and objective outside team to achieve and maintain certification in operational drilling safeguards. The consequence of unsatisfactory findings should be suspension of the crew’s operation except under special supervisory conditions.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Summary Finding 5.1: The actions, policies, and procedures of the corporations involved did not provide an effective system safety approach commensurate with the risks of the Macondo well. The lack of a strong safety culture resulting from a deficient overall systems approach to safety is evident in the multiple flawed decisions that led to the blowout. Industrial management involved with the Macondo well–Deepwater Horizon disaster failed to appreciate or plan for the safety challenges presented by the Macondo well.

Observation 5.4: The operating leaseholder company is the only entity involved in offshore drilling that is positioned to manage the overall system safety of well drilling and rig operations.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Summary Recommendation 5.1: Operating companies should have ultimate responsibility and accountability for well integrity, because only they are in a position to have visibility into all its aspects. Operating companies should be held responsible and accountable for well design, well construction, and the suitability of the rig and associated safety equipment. Notwithstanding the above, the drilling contractor should be held responsible and accountable for the operation and safety of the offshore equipment.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Recommendation 5.3b: In addition to rig personnel, onshore personnel involved in overseeing or supporting rig-based operations should have sufficient understanding of the fundamental processes and risks involved.

Recommendation 5.3c: A research process is needed for establishing standardized requirements for education, training, and certification of everyone working on an offshore drilling rig. Additional standardized requirements should be established for education, training, and certification of key drilling-related personnel working offshore and onshore.

Recommendation 5.5b: Effective response to a crisis situation requires teamwork to share information and perform actions. Training should involve on-site team exercises to develop competent decision making, coordination, and communication. Emergency team drills should involve full participation, as would be required in actual emergency situations, including a well blowout. Companies should approach team training as a means of instilling overall safety as a high priority.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Summary Recommendation 5.6: Efforts to reduce the probability of future blowouts should be complemented by capabilities of mitigating the consequences of a loss of well control. Industry should ensure timely access to demonstrated well-capping and containment capabilities.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Recommendation 6.10: BSEE should review existing codes and standards to determine which should be improved regarding requirements for (a) use of state-of-the-art technologies, especially in areas related to well construction, cementing, BOP functionality, and alarm and evacuation systems, among others, and (b) approval and certification incumbent to management of changes in original plans for well construction.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

should be held responsible and accountable for well design, well construction, and the suitability of the rig and associated safety equipment. Notwithstanding the above, the drilling contractor should be held responsible and accountable for the operation and safety of the offshore equipment.

DNV. 2011a. Forensic Examination of Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer, Vols. 1 and 2 (Appendices). Final Report for U. S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. Re-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

DNV. 2011b. Addendum to Final Report: Forensic Examination of Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer. Report No. EP030842. http://www.boemre.gov/pdfs/maps/AddendumFinal.pdf. Most recently accessed Jan. 17, 2012.

An oil well blowout is when an amount of crude oil is released uncontrollably and accidentally from the well. These days, this occurs only after pressure release systems have failed, but prior to the 1920s, such systems were not in existence. This meant that such an occurrence was fairly commonplace and was colloquially referred to as a “gusher”.

If an open flame or even a single spark is accidentally allowed to come into contact with the oil during the blowout, catastrophic disasters can ensue.

There are several factors that contribute to causing blowouts, all of which oil drillers go to great pains to accommodate and counter. The first factor to consider is the enormous pressure of the rock formations around an oil reservoir. Oil naturally occurs over a period of millions of years, during which all of the water is compressed and pressurised out of the carbon-based substance (normally life-forms of one type or another) by the layers of sediment that form on top of it. Thus, when drilling into the rock, drillers must first be wary of its extremely pressurised state.

This pressure is counteracted by the use of mud around the drilling site, which helps to balance the hydrostatic pressure. If this balance is upset, water, gas or oil can infiltrate the wellbore or even the drill itself – a phenomenon known as a “kick” – and this can quickly escalate into a blowout if not promptly identified and addressed.

If a kick is detected, the first thing that must be done is to isolate the drill entry point by closing in the well, thus reducing the chances of a blowout. A heavier fluid will then be introduced to try and raise the hydrostatic pressure and achieve a balance. Meanwhile, the fluid or gas that infiltrated the wellbore will slowly be evacuated in a controlled and safe manner.

Surface Blowouts.The most common type of blowouts, these are at risk of damaging the rig and surrounding terrain, as well as the even more serious risk of ignition and explosion. If a surface blowout is particularly forceful, it cannot be controlled alone; and so, other nearby wells (known as “relief wells”) will be drilled to introduce heavier balancing fluid at depth.

Underground Blowouts.These are uncommon blowouts where fluid from deep, high-pressurised formations flow upwards, unchecked, to shallow, low-pressurised formations. This may not necessarily result in the release of oil above ground.

Underwater Blowouts.Due to their location, these are the hardest blowouts to deal with. The biggest and deepest underwater blowout in history occurred in 2010 at the Deepwater Horizon well in the Gulf of Mexico. The accident was so serious that it forced the industry to contemplate re-evaluating its safety procedures, as can be seen in the article: BP Disaster Should Prompt Blowout Redesign.

A Weld County Sheriff dispatcher received a call from a resident at 3:13 p.m. Friday, agency spokesman Matt Turner said. “The caller stated there was oil coming out of one of the rigs and spilling onto the road. … They just said it was coming over the top and spilling over into the street.”

A contact phone number listed on the state report was dysfunctional, but Anadarko spokeswoman Robin Olsen responded to an e-mail Monday evening confirming the blowout has stopped.