workover rig blowout in stock

As the name suggests, a blowout preventer is designed to seal off a well in an emergency so crude oil or natural gas doesn’t spew uncontrollably into the environment. The device gained notoriety in 2010, when the Deepwater Horizon rig’s blowout preventer failed to activate automatically during a leak, causing an explosion that killed 11 people and released millions of barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico.

Years after the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, blowout preventers are back in the national spotlight. The Department of the Interior on Monday released a set of proposed changes to the federal regulations that dictate safety and technical standards for blowout preventers. The Biden administration’s intent is to reinvigorate the rules, which were partially rolled back in 2019 by Louisiana’s own Scott Angelle and the Trump administration.

Nearly five years after the Deepwater Horizon explosion, the Obama administration in 2015 first proposed the “well control rule” to tighten safety standards for blowout preventers, among many other issues.

The lengthy guidelines, which were officially adopted in 2016, helped to standardize technical requirements for blowout preventers and strengthen federal oversight and testing of those devices.

At the time, BSEE said about 80% of the regulations were left intact. Changes included limiting the number of blowout preventer connection spots to reduce potential failure points and requiring an “array” of rams, or steel covers to cut off drill pipes to prevent releases, among other adjustments. While the Trump administration highlighted those changes as updates that made offshore drilling safer, environmentalists said they made platforms more dangerous.

The new rules — which are under a public comment period until November — include requiring blowout preventers to match a well’s kick tolerance, or the maximum amount of oil and gas that can be circulated out of the well without damaging the surrounding geological formation.

“There is no safer environment than an offshore rig platform. It is by far safer than working on land on a rig anywhere in the world,” Moncla said. “Everything is top-of-the-line equipment. It is state-of-the-art technology out there. It is one of the safest environments in the oil and gas industry.”

Eaton said Earthjustice doesn’t have an official stance yet on the proposed changes given their newness. But he called the proposal “a step in the right direction.”

For example, the Biden rules don’t address testing frequency for blowout preventers, Eaton said. Under the 2016 regulations, operators had to test blowout preventers every 14 days. The 2019 changes widened that window to 21 days.

“It looks like these are bringing back some of those initial reforms, focusing on the blowout preventer systems and making sure they’re able to close at all times and that the operators of offshore facilities report failures directly to BSEE,” Hoke said.

The blast occurred on Wednesday at a remote site near Deanville, Texas, about 75 miles (120 km) east of Austin as contractors for Chesapeake Energy were using a workover rig, according to Sergeant Jimmy Morgan, a spokesman with the Texas Department of Public Safety. A workover involves re-entering a well to boost its production.

The fatality was the first in Texas involving a blowout since April 2013, when two Basic Energy Services workers were killed in West Texas, according to data from the Texas Railroad Commission, the state’s energy regulator. A blowout involves a sudden, high-pressure release of oil or gas from a well.

The number of workers in Texas injured during well blowouts has declined in recent years amid the rise in shale drilling. There were nine workers injured in blowouts last year, compared with 14 in 2017 and 21 in 2016, state data showed.

Welcome to Pickett Oilfield’s Blowout Preventers web page. Blowout Preventers otherwise called BOP’s are devices that are used in the drilling industry to seal off and control oil and gas wells. BOP’s are designed to prevent “blowout” which is the unconstrained discharge of oil or gas from the well being drilled. These Preventers are large valves that withstand high pressure in order to safely, and often times remotely, inhibit the uncontrolled release of liquids from the well during operation. Moreover, they are usually installed in stacks and are the second line of defense to safeguard the well and employees.

Our company has been in the oil & gas drilling equipment industry for over 38 years, supplying new and used Blowout Preventers and pressure control equipment to customers in practically every producing region in the world. We are here to serve all your drilling equipment needs – if you don’t see it on this site, just give us a call or email. We can get it, if you need it!

Pickett Oilfield, LLC offers prospective buyers an extensive selection of quality new and used oil & gas drilling equipment, including Blowout Preventers to choose from at competitive prices. Browse our inventory of Preventers and BOP parts for sale at competitive rates.

RME0X5T3–Jun. 06, 1965 - New Supply Vessel To Service North Sea Oil Rig: Continental Oil Company of England, the North Sea exploration subsidiary of Continental Oil Company, has chartered the newly built ""Smit-Lloyd I"". A feature of this vessel is her bridge control, which has the most advanced system of automation for this type of vessel as the engines, bow thruster, fore and aft anchor winches are directly operated from there. Photo shows The Smit-Lloyd I pictured at Tower Stairs, Upper Pool of London, today.

RM2E7MFKN–A man works on a service rig in PetroChina"s Daqing oil field in China"s northeastern Heilongjiang province March 18, 2006. China"s subdued inflation means it is a good time to change the pricing mechanisms for energy and natural resources, Wu Xiaoling, a deputy governor of the People"s Bank of China, said on Saturday. REUTERS/Jason Lee

RMG66J48–Mourners grieve for the 167 live lost in the world"s worst oil rig disaster at the Piper Alpha memorial service at the Kirk of St Nicholas in Aberdeen. The service was relayed outside to those who could not get in and was broadcast live by satellite to oilmen on the piper"s sister platform, Claymore.

RM2CY2B4P–An oil rig lights up Cape Town harbour as the sun sets, August 6, 2011. The city is marketing itself as a service hub for the lucrative oil fields off the west coast of Africa. REUTERS/Mike Hutchings (SOUTH AFRICA - Tags: BUSINESS ENERGY)

RMFFET0J–A drilling rig operates in the prairie grasslands of Southern Alberta next to Jumping Pound Creek near Calgary in a resource based energy economy

RMG4HA3Y–The P&O liner S.S Canton, in her new peace time rig ready for her UK-Far East run. She will sail from London on the first stage of her journey to re-open the Far East service. In 1939 she was taken over by the Admiralty for service as an armed merchant cruiser.

RM2E64YHR–An oil rig lights up Cape Town harbour as the sun sets August 6, 2011. The giant floating platforms are becoming regular visitors to the port as the city is marketing itself as the service hub for the lucrative oil fields off the west coast of Africa.REUTERS/Mike Hutchings (SOUTH AFRICA - Tags: MARITIME BUSINESS ENERGY)

RF2JFKN61–Drawing sketch style illustration of a horizontal directional drilling job site with drill rig boring, mechanical digger laying empty service

RMFFET05–A drilling rig operates on a wellsite on an oil company lease near Grande Prairie, part of the northern Alberta resource extraction energy industry

RF2J6THER–Electrician operator inspect and checking heating ventilated and air conditioning (HVAC), air conditioning service in offshore oil rig platform while

RM2CYDD3P–An oil rig lights up Cape Town harbour as the sun sets August 6, 2011. The giant floating platforms are becoming regular visitors to the port as the city is marketing itself as the service hub for the lucrative oil fields off the west coast of Africa. REUTERS/Mike Hutchings (SOUTH AFRICA - Tags: BUSINESS ENERGY MARITIME)

RFW92RY2–Offshore oil and gas production and exploration, tender rig work over remote platform to completion gases and crude oil wells, Drilling service barge.

RM2CWEA3F–An oil rig lights up Cape Town harbour as the sun sets August 6, 2011. The giant floating platforms are becoming regular visitors to the port as the city is marketing itself as the service hub for the lucrative oil fields off the west coast of Africa. REUTERS/Mike Hutchings (SOUTH AFRICA - Tags: MARITIME BUSINESS ENERGY)

RMHGK8G5–AJAXNETPHOTO. 1989. FRANCE. - AERO RIG CATAMARAN - SAAB TURBO ON SEA TRIALS. YACHT WAS ENTRY IN 1989 ROUND BRITAIN RACE. PHOTO:© DIGITAL IMAGE COPYRIGHT AJAX NEWS & FEATURE SERVICE
 PHOTOGRAPHER UNKNOWN - PRESS HAND-OUT PHOTO. REF:161812 4

RFW92RA5–Offshore oil and gas production and exploration, tender rig work over remote platform to completion gases and crude oil wells, Drilling service barge.

If not properly monitored, changes in pressure that can occur while the well is being drilled can cause combustible hydrocarbons to flow unchecked and at high pressures and flow rates. If this flow of hydrocarbons is not stopped in time, the hydrocarbons can ignite into a deadly firestorm called a blowout. Because of the immense cost and danger associated with oil well blowouts, the bulk of the well control industry revolves around the prevention and avoidance of blowouts. Unfortunately, because a blowout only takes a brief moment to occur, it is necessary that there be methods in place to combat them when the need arises.

In a nutshell, "a blowout is an uncontrolled flow of gas, oil or other formation fluids into the atmosphere or another zone," explained Barry Cooper of Well Control School, an organization, which has offered well control training programs to the oil and gas industry for more than 25 years.

"Blowouts are the most tragic and expensive accidents in the upstream petroleum industry," said Cooper. "They endanger life, the environment and future production from the lost well." On an economic level, an oil well gushing thousands or even millions of barrels of oil is costing a company not only in short term production, but also the long-term profitability of the well itself. It is vital to the profitability of the well that the blowout is stopped and the well put back online as quickly as possible.

Because of their intensity and the very particular circumstances that set blowouts and oil well fires apart from regular conflagrations, unique and specially trained firefighters must be employed to fix them. Myron M. Kinley, the father of blowout control and oil well firefighting, founded the MM Kinley Company in 1923, which set the trend toward an industry devoted to oil well firefighting. By 1946, the famous oil well firefighter Red Adair had joined the company, and by 1959, he had founded the Red Adair Company.

Today, companies like Boots & Coots, which variously spun off from the Red Adair Company, continue in the same tradition. While the technology has improved significantly over the past 85 years, the basic methods and strategies employed to battle blowouts have remained the same.

Most commonly, when a well is lost to a blowout, the drilling package will have collapsed around the well, making proper assessment of the situation difficult. Firefighters arrive as quickly as possible and use machinery to remove the damaged rig and associated debris so they can assess the situation and choose the best method to fight the blowout.

In the early days of fighting oil well fires, the most common technique to smother a blowout was to snuff it with a dynamite blast. Pioneered by Myron Kinley, the intention is to blast fuel and oxygen away from the flame, effectively eliminating the fuel source, similar to snuffing out a candle. Although the first instance of this method dates back to 1913, dynamite blasting continues to be one of the most frequently employed methods.

A more complicated method for bringing a blown-out well under control involves carefully capping the well with a new blowout preventer, or "BOP." BOPs are essentially large valves on the surface of the well that quickly shut off the well as a last ditch precaution to prevent a blowout from occurring.

In this procedure, the detritus of the collapsed rig is carefully removed and a high-pressure abrasive cutter is used to sever the damaged BOP and wellhead for removal. A long boom assembly - at the end of which is a replacement BOP - is maneuvered into position. Large amounts of water are sprayed on the replacement BOP to combat the flames and to keep the replacement BOP from getting too hot. The BOP is quickly lowered onto the well and bolted into place, thus capping the blowout.

Not all blowouts necessarily ignite into towering infernos. Sometimes, the hydrocarbons merely blow into the air, which can actually be more dangerous. Often, firefighters will deliberately ignite the blowout as a precaution.

In addition to other safety issues, concerns for the effects on the environment have become increasingly important over the last 30 years. Companies must be careful to prevent the blowout from leaking hydrocarbons. This is another reason firefighters deliberately ignite a blowout that is blowing hydrocarbons: a burning blowout will consume the leaking hydrocarbons rather than allowing them to blow into the environment.

Blowout control and oil well firefighting are based on tradition and apprenticeship. Advances in technique and technology only underscore the inherent consistency in the industry.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Summary Finding 2.1: The flow of hydrocarbons that led to the blowout of the Macondo well began when drilling mud was displaced by seawater during the temporary abandonment process.

Summary Finding 2.2: The decision to proceed to displacement of the drilling mud by seawater was made despite a failure to demonstrate the integrity of the cement job even after multiple negative pressure tests. This was but one of a series of questionable decisions in the days preceding the blowout that had the effect of reducing the margins of safety and that evidenced a lack of safety-driven decision making.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 2.6: Evidence available before the blowout indicated that the flapper valves in the float collar probably failed to seal, but this evidence was not acted on at the time.

Finding 2.10: Although data were being transmitted to shore, it appears that no one in authority (from BP onshore management or a regulatory agency) was required to examine test results and other critical data and render an opinion to the personnel on the rig before operations could continue.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Observation 2.5: Had the path of the blowout been up the annulus, a liner top or the rupture discs could have failed and allowed flow to escape the well into a shallow formation. This would result in a downhole blowout that could breach at the seafloor under the correct conditions. Future well construction could avoid this possibility by running one of the deeper casing strings back to the wellhead where it can be sealed. For example, in this well the 13 ⅝-inch liner could have been run back to the wellhead. This would protect the shallower liner tops and rupture discs from potential exposure to high pressure from flow up the annulus from a deeper reservoir.

Recommendation 2.2: During drilling, rig personnel should maintain a reasonable margin of safety between the equivalent circulating density and the density that will cause wellbore fracturing.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 3.2: The crew did not realize that the well was flowing until mud actually exited and was expelled out of the riser by the flow at 21:40. Early detection and control of flow from a reservoir are critical if an impending blowout is to be prevented by a BOP whose use against a full-flowing well is untested.

Finding 3.3: Once mud began to flow above the rig floor, the crew attempted to close the upper annular preventer of the BOP system, but it did not seal properly. The BOP system had been used in the month previously to strip 48 tool joints, and apparently it was untested for integrity afterwards. Annulars are often unable to seal properly after stripping. In addition, the flowing pressure inside the well may have been larger than the preset annular closing pressure could overcome. What tests of sealing against flow have been done on this design of annular are unknown.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 3.4: The crew also closed the VBRs. The damaged pipe under the upper annular demonstrated its failure to seal, and the well was only sealed, resulting in the final pressure spike, when these VBRs were closed. The DNV investigation also found that these rams closed, and they could only be closed by command from the rig control panels and not by an ROV. At this point the flow from below the VBRs would have been closed off, but gas and oil had already flowed into the marine riser above the BOP system and continued to rise to the surface, where the gas exploded.

Finding 3.6: Once the fire started on the rig, an attempt was made (after 7 minutes) to activate the EDS, which should have closed the BSR and disconnected the LMRP. This appears to have failed because the MUX communication cables were destroyed by the explosion or fire.

Finding 3.7: Once hydraulic and electrical connection with the rig was lost at the BOP, the AMF should have activated the BSR. It might have failed at this time because of a low battery charge in one control pod and a mis-wired solenoid valve in the other, but both these points are in dispute. However, no short-term reduction in hydrocarbon flow from the well was observed after the initial fire and explosion. Such a reduction would necessarily have resulted from the VBRs sealing the annulus in the BOP and the failed BSR shearing action effectively choking, at least for a brief period of time, virtually the entire cross section of the 5½-inch drill string. Viewed in total, the evidence appears more supportive of the autoshear activation of the BSR.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 3.15: Unfortunately, even if the BSR had functioned after being activated by the EDS or the AMF, it would not likely have prevented the initial explosions, fire, and resulting loss of life, because hydrocarbons had already flowed into the marine riser above the BOP system. If the BOP system had been able to seal the well, the rig might not have sunk, and the resulting oil spill would likely have been minimized.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 3.17: Regulations in effect before the incident required the periodic testing of the BOP system. However, they did not require testing under conditions that simulated the hydrostatic pressure at the depth of the BOP system or under the condition of pipe loading that actually occurred under dynamic flow, with the possible entrained formation rock, sand, and cement, and no such tests were run. Furthermore, because of the inadequate monitoring technology, the condition of the subsea control pods at the time of the blowout was unknown.

2. While individual subsystems of various BOP designs have been studied on an ad hoc basis over the years, the committee could find no evidence of a reliability assessment of the entire BOP system, which would have included functioning at depth under precisely the conditions of a dynamic well blowout. Furthermore, the committee could find no publicly available design criteria for BOP reliability.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 3.21: When a signal is sent from the drilling rig to the BOP (on the seafloor) to execute a command, the BOP sends a message back that the signal has been received. However, there are no transducers that detect the position or status of key components, and there are no devices to send a signal that any command has been executed (such as pressure or displacement sensors confirming that the hydraulics have been actuated, that rams have moved, or that pipe has been cut). Furthermore, there are no sensors to communicate flow or pressures in the BOP to the rig floor.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Summary Recommendation 3.1: BOP systems should be redesigned to provide robust and reliable cutting, sealing, and separation capabilities for the drilling environment to which they are being applied and under all foreseeable operating conditions of the rig on which they are installed. Test and maintenance procedures should be established to ensure operability and reliability appropriate to their environment of application. Furthermore, advances in BOP technology should be evaluated from the perspective of overall system safety. Operator training for emergency BOP operation should be improved to the point that the full capabilities of a more reliable BOP can be competently and correctly employed when needed in the future.

Summary Recommendation 3.5: Instrumentation and expert system decision aids should be used to provide timely warning of loss of well control to drillers on the rig (and ideally to onshore drilling monitors as well). If the warning is inhibited or not addressed in an appropriate time interval, autonomous operation of the BSRs, EDS, general alarm, and other safety systems on the rig should occur.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Recommendation 3.8: A reliable and effective EDS is needed to complete the three-part objective of cutting, sealing, and separating as a true “dead man” operation when communication with the rig is lost. The operation should not depend on manual intervention from the rig, as was the case with the Deepwater Horizon. The components used to implement this recommendation should be monitored or tested as necessary to ensure their operation when needed.

Finding 4.1b: The rig was not designed to prevent explosion or fire once it was surrounded by the extent of combustible atmosphere facing the Deepwater Horizon.

Finding 4.1c: Hydrocarbon flow was not redirected overboard. Overboard discharge of the blowout might have delayed the explosion and fire aboard the rig.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 4.2a: The rig’s dynamic positioning system operated as designed until the loss of power disabled the rig’s ability to maintain station or reposition under control.

Finding 4.3: Alarm and indication systems, procedures, and training were insufficient to ensure timely and effective actions to prevent the explosions or respond to save the rig.

Finding 4.3a: The rig design did not employ automatic methods to react to indications of a massive blowout, leaving reactions entirely in the hands of the surviving crew.

Finding 4.3e: The training routine did not include any full rig drills designed to develop and maintain crew proficiency in reacting to major incidents.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Finding 4.3g: Crew members lacked cross-rate training to understand rig total systems and components. As a result, many of the crew were inadequately prepared to react to the incident.

Finding 4.4: Confusion existed about decision authority and command. Uncertainty as to whether the rig was under way or moored to the wellhead contributed to the confusion on the bridge and may have impaired timely disconnect.

Finding 4.5: The U.S. Coast Guard’s requirement for the number and placement of lifeboats was shown to be prudent and resulted in sufficient lifeboat capacity for effective rig abandonment. The Coast Guard’s investigation report (USCG 2011) notes a lack of heat shielding to protect escape paths and life-saving equipment.

Finding 4.6: The above findings indicate that the lack of fail-safe design and testing, training, and operating practices aboard the rig contributed to loss of the rig and loss of life. The chain of events that began downhole could have been interrupted at many points, such as at the wellhead by the BOP or aboard the rig, where the flow might have been directed overboard or where the rig itself might have been disconnected from the well and repositioned. Had the rig been able to disconnect, the primary fuel load for the fire would have been eliminated.

Observation 4.1: The actions of some crew members in requiring due consideration of additional survivors before launching lifeboats, despite the fearsome fires engulfing the rig, are commendable and were important in the highly successful evacuation.

Observation 4.3: Conditions of explosion, fire, loss of lighting, toxic gas, and eventual flooding and sinking could have resulted in many more injuries or deaths if not for the execution of the rig"s evacuation.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Summary Recommendation 4.1: Instrumentation and expert system decision aids should be used to provide timely warning of loss of well control to drillers on the rig (and ideally to onshore drilling monitors as well). If the warning is inhibited or not addressed in an appropriate time interval, autonomous operation of the BSRs, EDS, general alarm, and other safety systems on the rig should occur.

Recommendation 4.2: Rigs should be designed so that their instrumentation, expert system decision aids, and safety systems are robust and highly reliable under all foreseeable normal and extreme operating conditions. The design should account for hazards that may result from drilling operations and attachment to an uncontrolled well. The aggregate effects of cascading casualties and failures should be considered to avoid the coupling of failure modes to the maximum reasonable extent.

Recommendation 4.3: Industry and regulators should develop fail-safe design requirements for the combined systems of rig, riser, BOP, drilling equipment, and well to ensure that (a) blowouts are prevented and (b) if a blowout should occur the hydrocarbon flow will be quickly isolated and the rig can disconnect and reposition. The criteria for these requirements should be maximum reasonable assurance of (a) and (b) and successful crew evacuation under both scenarios.

Recommendation 4.4: Industry and regulators should implement a method of design review for systemic risks for future well design that uses a framework with attributes similar to those of the Department of Defense Standard Practice for System Safety (DoD 2000), which articulates standard practices for system safety for the U.S. military, to address the complex and integrated “system of systems” challenges faced in safely operating deepwater drilling rigs. The method should take into consideration the coupled effects of well design and rig design.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Recommendation 4.12: Drilling rig contractors should require realistic and effective training in operations and emergency situations for key personnel before assignment to any rig. Industry should also require that personnel aboard the rig achieve and maintain a high degree of expertise in their assigned watch station, including formal qualification and periodic reexamination.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Recommendation 4.15: Regulators should require that all permanent crew on a rig achieve a basic level of qualification in damage control and escape systems to ensure that all hands are able to contribute to resolving a major casualty.

Recommendation 4.21: Industry and regulators should develop and implement a certification to ensure that design requirements, material condition, maintenance, modernization, operating and emergency instructions, manning, and training are all effective in meeting the requirements of Recommendation 4.3 throughout the rig’s service life.

Recommendation 4.22: Regulators should require that the rig, the entire system, and the crew be examined annually by an experienced and objective outside team to achieve and maintain certification in operational drilling safeguards. The consequence of unsatisfactory findings should be suspension of the crew’s operation except under special supervisory conditions.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Summary Finding 5.1: The actions, policies, and procedures of the corporations involved did not provide an effective system safety approach commensurate with the risks of the Macondo well. The lack of a strong safety culture resulting from a deficient overall systems approach to safety is evident in the multiple flawed decisions that led to the blowout. Industrial management involved with the Macondo well–Deepwater Horizon disaster failed to appreciate or plan for the safety challenges presented by the Macondo well.

Observation 5.4: The operating leaseholder company is the only entity involved in offshore drilling that is positioned to manage the overall system safety of well drilling and rig operations.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Summary Recommendation 5.1: Operating companies should have ultimate responsibility and accountability for well integrity, because only they are in a position to have visibility into all its aspects. Operating companies should be held responsible and accountable for well design, well construction, and the suitability of the rig and associated safety equipment. Notwithstanding the above, the drilling contractor should be held responsible and accountable for the operation and safety of the offshore equipment.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Recommendation 5.3b: In addition to rig personnel, onshore personnel involved in overseeing or supporting rig-based operations should have sufficient understanding of the fundamental processes and risks involved.

Recommendation 5.3c: A research process is needed for establishing standardized requirements for education, training, and certification of everyone working on an offshore drilling rig. Additional standardized requirements should be established for education, training, and certification of key drilling-related personnel working offshore and onshore.

Recommendation 5.5b: Effective response to a crisis situation requires teamwork to share information and perform actions. Training should involve on-site team exercises to develop competent decision making, coordination, and communication. Emergency team drills should involve full participation, as would be required in actual emergency situations, including a well blowout. Companies should approach team training as a means of instilling overall safety as a high priority.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Summary Recommendation 5.6: Efforts to reduce the probability of future blowouts should be complemented by capabilities of mitigating the consequences of a loss of well control. Industry should ensure timely access to demonstrated well-capping and containment capabilities.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Recommendation 6.10: BSEE should review existing codes and standards to determine which should be improved regarding requirements for (a) use of state-of-the-art technologies, especially in areas related to well construction, cementing, BOP functionality, and alarm and evacuation systems, among others, and (b) approval and certification incumbent to management of changes in original plans for well construction.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

should be held responsible and accountable for well design, well construction, and the suitability of the rig and associated safety equipment. Notwithstanding the above, the drilling contractor should be held responsible and accountable for the operation and safety of the offshore equipment.

DNV. 2011a. Forensic Examination of Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer, Vols. 1 and 2 (Appendices). Final Report for U. S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. Re-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Findings, Observations, and Recommendations." National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13273.

DNV. 2011b. Addendum to Final Report: Forensic Examination of Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer. Report No. EP030842. http://www.boemre.gov/pdfs/maps/AddendumFinal.pdf. Most recently accessed Jan. 17, 2012.

n: a portable servicing or workover rig that is self-propelled, using the hoisting engines for motive power. Because the driver"s cab is mounted on the end opposite the mast support, the unit must be backed up to the wellhead.

n: 1. the pressure at the bottom of a borehole. It is caused by the hydrostatic pressure of the wellbore fluid and, sometimes, by any backpressure held at the surface, as when the well is shut in with blowout preventers. When mud is being circulated, bottomhole pressure is the hydrostatic pressure plus the remaining circulating pressure required to move the mud up the annulus. 2. the pressure in a well at a point opposite the producing formation, as recorded by a bottomhole pressure measuring device.

(pronounced "tower") v: to begin operating 24 hours a day. Moving the rig and rigging up are usually carried on during daylight hours only. When the rig is ready for operation at a new location, crews break tour.

n: on a drilling rig, a large metal bin that usually holds a large amount of a certain mud additive, such as bentonite, that is used in large quantities in the makeup of the drilling fluid.

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The Well Control System or the Blowout Prevention System on a drilling rig is the system that prevents the uncontrolled, catastrophic release of high-pressure fluids (oil, gas, or salt water) from subsurface formations. These uncontrolled releases of formation fluids are referred to as Blowouts. Due to the explosive nature of oil and gas, any spark on the surface can result in the ignition of the fluids and an explosion on the rig. An explosive blowout and the failure of the Well Control System were the causes of the Mocondo Well disaster that killed eleven of the rig crew on the Deep Water Horizon Rig on April 20, 2010 and resulted in 35,000 to 60,000 bbl/day of crude oil to spill into the Gulf of Mexico. We will discuss this later in the lesson.

The blowout preventers are the principal piece of equipment in the well control system and are operated hydraulically; pressurized fluids are used to operate pistons and cylinders to open or close the valves on the BOP. The Accumulators (Item 18 in Figure 9.02) are used to store pressurized, non-explosive gas and pressurized hydraulic fluid to run the hydraulics systems on the rig. The accumulators store enough compressed energy to operate the blowout preventers even if the Power System of the rig is not operating.

The blowout preventer is a large system of valves each of which is capable of isolating the subsurface of the well from the rig to provide control over the well. These valves are typically stacked as shown in the Figure 9.11 and sit below the rig floor on land wells or some offshore wells; or they may sit on the seabed on other offshore wells.

In Figure 9.13, the blue area represents the doughnut-shaped bladder. As mentioned earlier, in the open position, (A), the drill pipe can be rotated or can be run up or down; while in the closed position, (B), the bladder pushes out, closing off the drill pipe, kelly, or open hole. The bladder based sealing element is not as effective as the ram type sealing elements; however, almost all blowout preventer stacks include at least one annular preventer.

A blowout begins as a Kick (entry of subsurface formation fluids into the wellbore). What distinguishes a kick from a blowout is that a kick can be controlled while a blowout is uncontrollable. We have already discussed two of the defenses against kicks when we discussed drilling fluids when we listed the objectives of the drilling fluid:

change in the apparent weight-on-bit (secondary indicator of a kick):If the weight-on-bit indicator in the rig’s Dog House shows a change in the weight-on-bit that is not explainable by the current drilling operations, then this may be an indication of a kick. The apparent weight-on-bit is affected by the buoyance caused by the wellbore fluid, which in turn, is affected by the density of the wellbore fluid. If a lighter formation fluid begins to replace the heavier, more dense drilling fluid, then an apparent increase in the weight-on-bit will occur.

reduction in the mud weight (secondary indicator of a kick):The Mud Man may observe a reduction or Cut in the mud density at the rig-site mud laboratory. This again may be an indication of a kick.

When a kick occurs, the Operating Company and Drilling Company always have well-specific plans in-place for all wells to ensure that any controllable kick does not turn into an uncontrollable blowout. I cannot go into the details of a well-specific procedures, but they will include some of the following features if a kick occurs during drilling operations:

Pick the drill bit off-bottom and Space Out (Spacing out refers to pulling the drill pipe out the hole so that the top connection – the thickest part of the drill string containing the threads and joints – is several feet above the rig floor. Spacing out ensures that the smaller diameter section of the drill string is inside the BOP, so that pipe rams can close and seat properly or blind rams or shear rams are opposite the smallest diameter section of steel. See Figure 9.15B)

So, we have discussed the role of drilling fluid to exert pressure on porous and permeable formations and to coat them with an impermeable filter cake to help prevent kicks from occurring. We have also discussed the role of the blowout preventer and company procedures to control a kick once one occurs. So, how do blowouts happen?

Perhaps you remember the Macondo Blowout (Deep Water Horizon Rig) disaster. The name Macondo was the Prospect name (remember, we discussed prospects and well proposals in a previous lesson) while the Deep Water Horizon was the name of the rig. This was the largest oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. When the disaster occurred, eleven members of the rig crew were killed by the explosion when the natural gas ignited.

After learning about offshore drilling rigs, drilling crews, components of the drilling rig, kicks, and blowouts, I would highly recommend watching the movie “Deep Water Horizon” and use your knowledge about oil and gas well drilling to identify some of the technical aspects of the film. Ask yourselves some technical questions:

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This article is about the explosion of the drilling rig Deepwater Horizon. For the subsequent oil spill, see Deepwater Horizon oil spill. For other related articles, see Deepwater Horizon (disambiguation).

The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion was an April 20, 2010 explosion and subsequent fire on the semi-submersible mobile offshore drilling unit, which was owned and operated by Transocean and drilling for BP in the Macondo Prospect oil field about 40 miles (64 km) southeast off the Louisiana coast. The explosion and subsequent fire resulted in the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon and the deaths of 11 workers; 17 others were injured. The same blowout that caused the explosion also caused an oil well fire and a massive offshore oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, considered the largest accidental marine oil spill in the world, and the largest environmental disaster in United States history.

Deepwater Horizon was a floating semi-submersible drilling unit — a fifth-generation, ultra-deepwater, dynamically positioned, column-stabilized drilling rig owned by Transocean and built in South Korea. The platform was 396 feet (121 m) long and 256 feet (78 m) wide and could operate in waters up to 8,000 feet (2,400 m) deep, to a maximum drill depth of 30,000 feet (9,100 m).Transocean state the platform had historically been used for deeper wells, including the deepest underwater gas and oil well.$560 million platform was built by Hyundai Heavy Industries in South Korea and completed in 2001. It was owned by Transocean, operated under the Marshalese flag of convenience, and was under lease to BP until September 2013.Deepwater Horizon was on Mississippi Canyon Block 252, referred to as the Macondo Prospect, in the United States sector of the Gulf of Mexico, about 41 miles (66 km) off the Louisiana coast.Minerals Management Service"s lease sale.rig was drilling an exploratory well.subsea producer.casing was being run and cemented at the time of the accident. Once the cementing was complete, it was due to be tested for integrity and a cement plug set to temporarily abandon the well.

The rig owner, Transocean, had a "strong overall" safety record with no major incidents for 7 years.Minerals Management Service (MMS) investigation took place on Transocean rigs. However, in the 3 years from 2008 to February 15, 2010, Transocean was the owner of 42% of rigs active in the Gulf, but was responsible for 73% of incidents. Industry surveys saw this as an effect of its November 2007 merger with rival GlobalSantaFe. Transocean was described as having had previous problems with both cement seals (in 2005) and blowout preventers (in 2006), both the suspected cause of the Deepwater Horizon disaster; however, the company stated that cementing was a task completed by third party labourers, and that it had "a strong maintenance program to keep blowout preventers working".

In 2008 and 2009, the surveys ranked Transocean last among deep-water drillers for "job quality" and second to last in "overall satisfaction". For three years before the merger, Transocean was the leader or near the top in both measures. Transocean ranked first in 2008 and 2009 in a category that gauges its in-house safety and environmental policies. There were few indications of any trouble with the Deepwater Horizon before the explosion. The rig won an award from the MMS for its 2008 safety record, and on the day of the disaster, BP and Transocean managers were on board to celebrate seven years without a lost-time accident. A BP spokesman said rigs hired by BP have had better safety records than the industry average for six years running, according to MMS statistics that measure the number of citations per inspection. BP has been a finalist for a national safety award from the MMS for the past two years. [BP spokesperson Toby Odone] wouldn"t comment on BP"s relationship with Transocean after the Gulf disaster but said BP continues to use Transocean rigs.

The BP wellhead had been fitted with a blowout preventer (BOP), but it was not fitted with remote-control or acoustically activated triggers for use in case of an emergency requiring a platform to be evacuated. It did have a dead man"s switch designed to automatically cut the pipe and seal the well if communication from the platform is lost, but it was unknown whether the switch was activated.

In March 2010, the rig experienced problems that included drilling mud falling into the undersea oil formation, sudden gas releases, a pipe falling into the well, and at least three occasions of the blowout preventer leaking fluid.kicked due to resistance from high gas pressure.

An April draft of a BP memo warned that the cementing of the casing was unlikely to be successful.Halliburton has said that it had finished cementing 20 hours before the blowout, but had not yet set the final cement plug.nitrogen-foamed cement was used which is more difficult to handle than standard cement.

Transocean employees on the vessel stated that the electric lights flickered, followed by two strong vibrations. Jim Ingram stated that "on the second [thud], we knew something was wrong."marine riser and as it came up it "expanded rapidly and ignited."methane gas escaped from the well and shot up the drill column, expanding quickly as it burst through several seals and barriers before exploding.blowout.

According to officials, 126 people were on board, of whom 79 were Transocean employees, seven were from BP, and 40 were contracted; several of the BP and Transocean executives were on board for a tour of the rig, maintenance planning, annual goals review, a "Drops" safety campaign, and to congratulate the senior staff of the rig for 7 years of operations without a lost time incident.

The Coast Guard interviewed the uninjured workers on the Damon Bankston for several hours and then transferred them to another rig; the workers arrived in Port Fourchon, Louisiana, more than 24 hours later. The workers were transported to a hotel in Kenner, Louisiana, where they were provided with food, medical attention, and rooms with showers, and asked to fill out incident response forms. An attorney for a worker who brought suit against Transocean claimed that once the workers got to shore, "they were zipped into private buses, there was security there, there was no press, no lawyers allowed, nothing, no family members" and were coerced into signing the forms before being released; Transocean denied the allegation.

On the morning of April 22, Coast Guard Petty Officer Ashley Butler stated that "oil was leaking from the rig at the rate of about 8,000 barrels (340,000 US gallons; 1,300,000 litres) of crude per day."remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) were sent down in an attempt to cap the well but were unsuccessful.Rear Admiral Mary Landry expressed cautious optimism of zero environmental impact, stating that no oil was emanating from either the wellhead or the broken pipes and that oil spilled from the explosion and sinking was being contained.

On November 8, 2010, the inquiry by the Oil Spill Commission revealed its findings that BP had not sacrificed safety in attempts to make money, but that some decisions had increased risks on the rig.

4. Leak not spotted soon enough. While displacing the mud with seawater, reservoir fluids rising up the casing should have been detected by water inflow and mud outflow monitoring before arrival of hydrocarbons at the rig floor, but no reasonably accurate outflow versus inflow observations were made.

On April 21, 2011, BP filed $40 billion worth of lawsuits against rig owner Transocean, cementer Halliburton and blowout-preventer manufacturer Cameron. The oil firm alleged that failed safety systems and irresponsible behaviour of contractors had led to the explosion, including claims that Halliburton "negligently" failed to use cement-modelling software OptiCem properly to analyze safe well requirements. Part of the modelling concern was about the number of stabilising devices, known as centralisers, the well required; 21 were called for, but only 6 were used.

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