overshot the runway quotation

The owner of this website (www.airlinepilotcentral.com) has banned the autonomous system number (ASN) your IP address is in (20473) from accessing this website.

I understand its meaning in the context, but what does it exactly mean? I tried to Google the idiom, but I found only one hit in Urban Dictionary whose definition doesn"t seem to fit in the context (I don"t want to put it here).

I can"t find the origin of the idiom. I would like to know when and how the idiom started to mean what it means now. I can just speculate it could have started as a military term.

The incident involved a Korean Air plane and took place at Mactan-Cebu International Airport in the Philippines. The plane was attempting to land for the third time when it overran the runway, a spokesperson for the airline told Insider.

The underbelly of the Airbus A330 was sheared away and the plane came to rest, nose-down, in a grassy area. Pictures shared by the Associated Press show large holes in the nose of the aircraft and appear to show damage to at least one of the plane"s engines.

There were no reports of injuries among the 162 passengers and 11 crew members on Korean Air flight KE631. They were able to escape using the inflatable emergency slides.

"A thorough investigation will be performed together with the local aviation authorities and Korean authorities to determine the cause(s) of this event," he said.

The incident happened during heavy rain at 11:11 p.m. local time, Mactan-Cebu International Airport said in a statement on its official Facebook page in the early hours of Monday morning.

The runway has been temporarily closed to enable the safe removal of the aircraft, and all domestic and international flights are canceled until further notice, the airport said.

Mactan-Cebu International Airport did not immediately respond to Insider"s request for further comment, which came outside of standard business hours.

A damaged Korean Air plane remained stuck in the grass at a central Philippine airport Sunday after it overshot a runway in rainy weather. No injuries were reported among the 162 passengers and 11 crewmembers who escaped from the aircraft using emergency slides.

Dozens of flights have been canceled and Mactan-Cebu International Airport, one of the country’s busiest, remained closed due to the stalled aircraft at the end of its lone usable runway.

The close call prompted a public apology from Korean Air’s president and a vow from one of Asia’s most prominent airlines to take steps to prevent a recurrence.

A security guard walks beside a damaged Korean Air plane on Monday Oct. 24, 2022 after it overshot the runway at the Mactan-Cebu International Airport in Cebu, central Philippines. The Korean Air plane overshot the runway while landing in bad weather(AP Photo/Juan Carlo De Vela / Associated Press)

"We always prioritize safety in all of our operations, and we truly regret the stress and inconvenience brought to our passengers," Korean Air President Woo Keehong said in a statement.

The front underbelly of the plane was sheared off and its nose was heavily damaged. The plane lay tipped forward on a grassy area with its front landing wheel not visible and emergency slides deployed at the doors. A ripped-open hole was also visible at the top of the plane near a front door.

Officials said the plane’s remaining fuel would be siphoned off before efforts begin to remove the aircraft at the runway’s end. Authorities were also assessing if the other aircraft that are stranded at the airport could be allowed to fly out safely.

A boy looks at a damaged Korean Air plane after it overshot the runway at the Mactan-Cebu International Airport in Cebu, central Philippines early Monday.(AP Photo/Juan Carlo De Vela / AP Images)

The Airbus A330 flying from Incheon, South Korea, attempted to land twice before overrunning the runway on the third attempt, Korean Air Lines Co. said in a statement. The plane

In 1981, A Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 jetliner overshot the runway while taking off from Manila’s international airport and skidded to a stop at the edge of a major highway. The accident injured more than a dozen of about 350 people onboard.

The plane hit a concrete fence and skidded to a halt on its belly with its front section frighteningly protruding over a busy side road of a key highway south of metropolitan Manila.

The airline said it was trying to find the cause of the incident. The airport said runway operations would temporarily resume for departures from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. local time.

A man walks beside a damaged Korean Air plane after it overshot the runway at the Mactan-Cebu International Airport in Cebu, central Philippines early Monday Oct. 24, 2022. The Korean Air plane overshot the runway while landing in bad weather in the(AP Photo/Juan Carlo De Vela / Associated Press)

Korean Air was recently ranked ninth in the 2022 World Airline Awards hosted by Skytrax, a British-based international air transport rating organization.

"Korean Air continues to be recognized worldwide for its strong performance throughout the pandemic and efforts to enhance customer service," an airline news release said last week.

A Korean Air plane overshot the runway while landing in bad weather in the Philippines, but authorities said all 173 people on board escaped without serious injury.https://abcn.ws/3Sspfcv

A Korean Air Lines Co Ltd jet with 173 people on board overshot the runway at Cebu International Airport in the Philippines late on Sunday, October 23, the airline said, adding that there were no injuries and all passengers had evacuated safely.

The Airbus SE A330 widebody flying from Seoul to Cebu had tried to land twice in poor weather before it overran the runway on the third attempt at 23:07 local time, Korean Air said in a statement on Monday.

Southwest Airlines Flight 1248 was a scheduled passenger flight from Baltimore, Maryland, to Chicago, Illinois, continuing on to Salt Lake City, Utah, and then to Las Vegas, Nevada. On December 8, 2005, the airplane slid off a runway at Chicago-Midway while landing in a snowstorm and crashed into automobile traffic, killing a six-year-old boy.

The captain was 59-year-old Bruce Sutherland, who had been a U.S. Air Force pilot from 1969 to 1995. He joined Southwest Airlines in August 1995 and had 15,000 flight hours, including 4,500 hours on the Boeing 737. The first officer was 34-year-old Steven Oliver, who had been working for the airline since February 2003, having previously served as a captain for Mesaba Airlines from 1997 to 2003. The first officer had 8,500 flight hours (with 4,000 of them as a captain), with 2,000 of them on the Boeing 737. Neither pilot had been involved in any accident or incident before Flight 1248.: 6–8

On Thursday, December 8, 2005, Southwest Airlines Flight 1248 was scheduled to arrive at Chicago Midway International Airport from Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, and then continue on to Salt Lake City International Airport, then to Las Vegas McCarran International Airport. The flight circled over a small area in northwest Indiana several times before attempting to land in a snowstorm: 1 that had reduced visibility to less than one mile.: 9

At around 7:15 p.m. CST, the pilot attempted a landing with nearly eight inches of snow on the ground in the area. Airport officials stated that the runway was clear of snow prior to the landing. The latest reported weather had the wind from between east and east-southeast (090°) at 11 knots (20 km/h; 13 mph).: 1

A southeasterly wind would normally favor landing into the wind on Runway 13 Center. The runway visual range was reported at 4,500 feet (1,400 m), below the landing minimums for the instrument landing system approach to Runway 13C. The only available runway with lower minimums was the opposite direction on 31C, which the crew selected, with the aircraft"s groundspeed consequentially boosted by the tailwind.: 2

The 737 skidded during landing and, according to witnesses, the nosegear collapsed. The plane came to rest on Central Avenue just south of the 55th Street intersection at the northwestern corner of the airport.: 4 The intersection was full of traffic, and the airplane hit at least three cars, killing six-year-old Joshua Woods, critically injuring five occupants of one car (two adults and three children) and seriously injuring four occupants of a second car.: 6 All were quickly taken to area hospitals. Three passengers from the aircraft were taken to hospitals with minor injuries. A total of 12 people were taken to hospitals after the incident. One other car that was hit was parked and unoccupied.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the accident. Chicago Fire Department commissioner Cortez Trotter said that the aircraft would not be removed from the intersection until the NTSB gave clearance to do so following its on-site investigation. The nose of the aircraft was hoisted onto a flatbed tractor-trailer on Saturday, December 10, and the 737 was towed to a hangar for continued inspection.

The Boeing 737-700 was equipped with the latest anti-skid and braking technology. The report noted that Southwest had only very recently begun actually using the autobrake systems, and that pilot training on proper use of autobrakes had been inadequate.

The NTSB preliminary report determined that the aircraft touched down in the touchdown zone of the runway with 4,500 feet (1,400 m) of its 6,522-foot (1,988 m) length remaining; under the prevailing conditions of weather, wind, speed and weight, the aircraft needed 5,300 feet (1,600 m) of runway to stop safely. It was found that the tailwind was eight knots and exceeded the required limit of five knots.

"The flying pilot (Captain) stated that he could not get the reverse thrust levers out of the stowed position. The first officer, after several seconds, noticed that the thrust reversers were not deployed, and activated the reversers without a problem. Flight data recorder information reveals that the thrust reversers were not deployed until 18 seconds after touchdown, at which point there was only about 1,000 feet (300 m) of usable runway remaining."

Alternately, the crew could have held in the air, waiting for the weather to improve, or they could have diverted to another airport such as Chicago O"Hare International, which had substantially longer runways just 10 minutes away. Each of these options would have entailed considerable additional expense for Southwest, as well as missed connections and significant inconvenience for the flight"s passengers. The NTSB identified the psychological pressure to complete their assigned task as one of the factors contributing to the crew"s decision to land at Midway despite unfavorable conditions. Cockpit voice-recorder transcripts indicate that the pilots had been concerned about the weather and, prior to landing, jokingly alluded to the movie sniffin" glue."

The NTSB discovered that the air traffic controller told the pilots that the braking action for the first half of the runway was good, and poor for the second half. However, investigators found that the controller did not furnish the pilots with all of the available required braking action reports because he did not take the type of aircraft from each report into account. One of these planes was a small plane that reported poor braking conditions. It was found that braking-action reports varied significantly based on aircraft type, changing weather conditions, personnel experience, the type of equipment used and the time of report, and therefore should not be used as conclusive information on runway conditions.

The pilots stated that, based on the calculations that the crew had entered into the on-board performance computer (OPC), they believed that they could land and stop safely. However, investigators determined that the OPC based its stopping margins on two assumptions: that the tailwind would be slower than it actually turned out to be and that the thrust reversers would be deployed when landing. It was found that the pilots were unaware of these assumptions and that Southwest had not provided sufficient recurrent training on them. Therefore, the pilots did not use the critical braking-action term "poor" when assessing the landing performance.

Southwest Airlines had a policy that required pilots to consider more critical braking-action assessments when they receive mixed braking-action reports. However, the accident pilots were unaware of the policy and therefore did not consider it while assessing landing conditions. The NTSB also found that three other company pilots landed before the accident with the same mixed braking-action reports. When interviewed, company pilots revealed that they too either did not adhere to the mixed braking policy or were not aware of it. Southwest also had not routinely trained its pilots on following or understanding the mixed braking-action report policy, and it was not referenced in the company manuals.

The NTSB concluded that even under the poor braking conditions and the tailwind, the plane could have stopped in time had the pilots deployed the thrust reversers on time. Examination of the reverser system found no evidence of malfunction.

Contributing to the accident were Southwest Airlines" 1) failure to provide its pilots with clear and consistent guidance and training regarding company policies and procedures related to arrival landing distance calculations; 2) programming and design of its on-board performance computer, which did not present critical assumption information despite inconsistent tailwind and reverse thrust assessment methods; 3) plan to implement new autobrake procedures without a familiarization period; and 4) failure to include a margin of safety in the arrival assessment to account for operational uncertainties. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the absence of an engineered materials arrestor system, which was needed because of the limited runway-safety area beyond the departure end of Runway 31C.": ix, 67

Presently, it is recommended practice for new runways to be constructed with a clear area at least 1,000 feet (300 m) long at each end, called a "runway safety area," to allow additional space for an aircraft that has overrun the runway to decelerate and stop in relative safety.engineered materials arrestor system, or EMAS, at Chicago Midway, given the lack of adequate overrun areas and the surrounding residential neighborhoods. The city began acquiring land for a buffer zone around the airport after the crash occurred.

This was the first Southwest Airlines accident in the 35-year history of the company to result in a fatality. The previous major incident was in 2000, when Southwest Airlines Flight 1455 overran a runway in Burbank, California, injuring 43 and narrowly avoiding a catastrophe; the aircraft ended up outside a Chevron gas station.

As a direct result of the accident, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration created the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee (TALPA ARC). In 2016, based on the recommendations of TALPA ARC, the FAA implemented a new numerical Runway Condition Code for communication of runway conditions between airport management to flight crew members.

Although the Midway accident killed a person on the ground rather than a passenger or crew member, Southwest followed the tradition of retiring any flight number involved in a fatal crash; flights from Baltimore to Chicago departing at or around 3:55 p.m. were designated Flight 1885 until that flight number was moved to a different flight. Southwest also petitioned the FAA

Sadovi, Carlos; Casillas, Ofelia; Presecky, William; Heinzmann, David; Doyle, Gerry (December 10, 2005). "A father"s horror: He saw jet coming". The Chicago Tribune. Archived from the original on October 6, 2014. Retrieved February 15, 2015.

"Chicago Midway Runway 31C ILS/DME Approach Chart". Instrument Approach Procedures, Illinois & Wisconsin. Aeronautical Charting Office, Federal Aviation Administration. November 24, 2005.

BEIJING (Reuters) - A passenger plane overshot a runway while landing at a new airport in northeast China late on Tuesday, bursting into flames and killing 42 people of 96 on board, the nation’s worst air disaster since 2004.

The accident will be a jolt for China’s fast-growing aviation sector, which has had no major accident in recent years, thanks to stricter safety rules, better training and relatively young fleets of mainly Western-made aircraft.

The Henan Airlines plane crashed at 9.36 p.m. (9:36 a.m. EDT) in Yichun, a remote city of one million in Heilongjiang province surrounded by forests, after flying from provincial capital Harbin, the Civil Aviation Administration of China said.

While the cause of the crash is still being investigated, Caijing magazine cited local rules as saying that Yichun airport is “in principle” not supposed to operate at night.

State media initially said 43 people had died but later revised down the death toll by one. Seven of the 54 survivors were severely injured, Yichun mayor Wang Aiwen was quoted as saying.

“When I looked out the window, I couldn’t see anything. There were no lights at all,” Xinhua quoted survivor Xue Xilai as saying. “Soon after that, the plane bounced heavily on the ground and then broke in two.”

There were 91 passengers, including five children, as well five crew members on board the ERJ-190, built by Brazil’s Embraer, Xinhua said. The passengers appeared to be mainland Chinese, except for one person from Taiwan.

“When the back part of the plane landed, I felt a strong jolt, and then the plane seemed to begin to come apart,” another survivor told state television from his hospital bed.

The report noted that the Communist Party boss of Yichun, Xu Zhaojun, had said the crew reported being able to see lights on the ground and had requested a normal landing.

By daylight on Wednesday police had sealed off the scene of twisted and burned wreckage and the bodies of the dead were wrapped in body bags, waiting to be taken to a morgue, said Xinhua.

Technicians from Embraer, the world’s largest maker of regional jets, flew on Tuesday to China to investigate the crash [ID:nN245116]. Embraer shares tumbled 3.9 percent to 10.42 reais in Sao Paulo.

Henan Airlines is a small regional carrier controlled by Shenzhen Airlines, itself part-owned by Air China. The airline is based in Henan, a poor province in central China, and recently changed its name from Kunpeng Airlines.

China’s last major civilian aircraft crash was in 2004, when a CRJ200 operated by China Eastern Airlines came down in a frozen lake in northern Inner Mongolia shortly after take-off, killing more than 50 people.

Oct 24 (Reuters) - A Korean Air Lines Co Ltd (003490.KS) jet with 173 people on board overshot the runway at Cebu International Airport in the Philippines late on Sunday, the airline said, adding that there were no injuries and all passengers had evacuated safely.

The Airbus SE (AIR.PA) A330 widebody flying from Seoul to Cebu had tried twice to land in poor weather before it overran the runway on the third attempt at 23:07 (1507 GMT), Korean Air said in a statement on Monday.

"Passengers have been escorted to three local hotels and an alternative flight is being arranged," the airline said of flight KE361. "We are currently identifying the cause of the incident."

Korean Air President Keehong Woo issued an apology on the airline"s website, saying a thorough investigation would be carried out by Philippine and South Korean authorities to determine the cause.Response crews gather around a Korean Air Airbus A330 widebody flying from Seoul to Cebu, which tried to land twice in poor weather before it overran the runway on the third attempt on Sunday, in Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, Philippines October 24, 2022 in this picture obtained from social media. Randyl Dungog/via REUTERS

The A330-300 jet involved in the accident was delivered new to Korean Air in 1998, according to flight tracking website FlightRadar24, which said that other flights to Cebu had diverted to other airports or returned to their origin.

The Cebu airport said on its Facebook page that it had temporarily closed the runway to allow for the removal of the plane, meaning all domestic and international flights were cancelled until further notice.

The airline had a poor safety record at that time but sought outside help from Boeing Co (BA.N) and Delta Air Lines Inc (DAL.N) to improve its standards.

As hard as we"ve tried over the years, we can"t seem to come up with a definitive way of translating the condition of a runway into a number that we can plug into tables and charts to figure out our likelihood of stopping the airplane in the amount of runway in front of us. Our most recent attempt is known as a "Runway Condition Code" taken from a "Runway Condition Assessment Matrix." So that"s what is shown here. (If this is news to you, it was first unveiled with SAFO 16009.) I"ll follow that with some of the older systems in case you run into them.

Landing overruns that occur on wet runways typically involve multiple contributing factors such as long touchdown, improper use of deceleration devices, tailwind and less available friction than expected. Several recent runway-landing incidents/accidents have raised concerns with wet runway stopping performance assumptions. Analysis of the stopping data from these incidents/accidents indicates the braking coefficient of friction in each case was significantly lower than expected for a wet runway as defined by Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25 § Section 25.109 and Advisory Circular (AC) 25-7D methods. These incidents/accidents occurred on both grooved and un-grooved runways. The data indicates that applying a 15% safety margin to wet runway time-of-arrival advisory data, as recommended by SAFO 06012 (or current guidance), may be inadequate in certain wet runway conditions. Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) procedures implemented by the FAA on October 1, 2016, added new insight as to how flightcrews can evaluate runway braking performance prior to landing. TALPA defines WET as “Includes damp and 1/8-inch depth or less of water,” while CONTAMINATED is “greater than 1/8-inch of water.”

To comply with § 139.339, the airport operator must utilize the NOTAM system as the 5.1.3primary method for collection and dissemination of airport information to air carriers and other airport users. When disseminating airport condition information there are three methods available to airport operators. The first and preferred method is NOTAM Manager, a direct-entry system.

The NOTAM Manager is a web-based application available to airport operators that directly inputs NOTAMs into the U.S. NOTAM system. It is important to note that the system is accessed through pull down menus that limit the airport operator"s options on what can be inputted. This essentially "ties their hands" and can lead to some confusion if pilots don"t understand the constraints of the NOTAM system. (More on that below.)

If you hear your runway is reporting a "3/3/3" is that good? Well it means all three segments of the runway are "medium" so I guess that"s better than a "2/2/2" but not as good as a "5/5/5" as you might suspect. But this is the system we have now and it is actually better than those "mu" or "RCR" numbers of the past in that they are supposed to be more accurate. I"m not so sure, but here is what the book says followed by some added information from the airport management side of the house.

Aircraft braking coefficient is dependent upon the surface friction between the tires on the aircraft wheels and the pavement surface. Less friction means less aircraft braking coefficient and less aircraft braking response.

Runway condition code (RwyCC) values range from 1 (poor) to 6 (dry). For frozen contaminants on runway surfaces, a runway condition code reading of 4 indicates the level when braking deceleration or directional control is between good and medium.

Numerical readings may be obtained by using the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM). The RCAM provides the airport operator with data to complete the report that includes the following:

Assessments for each zone (see 4−3−9c1(c)) will be issued in the direction of takeoff and landing on the runway, ranging from “1” to “6” to describe contaminated surfaces.

When runway condition code reports are provided by airport management, the ATC facility providing approach control or local airport advisory must provide the report to all pilots.

Pilots should use runway condition code information with other knowledge including aircraft performance characteristics, type, and weight, previous experience, wind conditions, and aircraft tire type (such as bias ply vs. radial constructed) to determine runway suitability.

The Runway Condition Assessment Matrix identifies the descriptive terms “good,” “good to medium,” “medium,” “medium to poor,” “poor,” and “nil” used in braking action reports.

It seems like we"ve replaced highly subjective words ("good," "medium," "poor," and "nil") for seven numbers that may seem equally subjective. It also seems we gave up the science of the "Mu" number that is still used with the ICAO SNOWTAM system. But the change actually has more good than bad. We pilots don"t understand the process as well as we should and are too quick to hear the three magic numbers and stop listening. If you understand how the numbers are produced and the importance of the language that follows, you might have some very useful decision making tools. AC 150/5200-30D is what airport operators use to manage runway and taxiway reporting and snow removal. It has a lot of good information for pilots who want to "read between the lines" when it comes to an RCC.

Following the overrun accident of a Boeing-737 in December of 2005, the FAA found that the current state of the industry practices did not have adequate guidance and regulation addressing operation on non-dry, non-wet runways, i.e., contaminated runways. As such, the FAA chartered an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to address Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) requirements for the appropriate parts 23, 25, 91 subpart K, 121, 125, 135, and 139. In formulating recommendations, it became clear to the ARC that the ability to communicate actual runway conditions to the pilots in real time and in terms that directly relate to expected aircraft performance was critical to the success of the project.

The ARC got it mostly right but we need to keep in mind this was an industry-wide effort and though the business aviation community was represented, the largest users (the airlines) obviously carried more weight. So we got a system that is tailored towards large airports with sophisticated snow removal equipment. The system is also "one size fits all," so terms like "ice" on a runway in Alaska (dry and compacted and therefore rough) is equal to "ice" in New England (covered with a film of supercooled water). So let"s tackle this. Is the RCC a subjective measure? To find out, we should look at the RCAM presented above in AIM (a pilot"s manual) to what the airport operator is given. But you can"t do that unless you understand μ . . .

A Newton is the International System of Units (SI) derived unit of force. One Newton is equal to the force needed to accelerate a mass of one kilogram one meter per second per second. For more about this: Mechanics.

There are several kinds of friction but there are two in particular of interest to us pilots: static and dynamic. If the tires of your wheels are making good contact with the surface and not sliding in relation to the surface, you have static friction. If, on the other hand, the wheels are skidding or hydroplaning, there is motion of the tire in relation to the surface and that is dynamics friction. The only way to stop the airplane is to maintain static friction, so that"s what we will concentrate on here.

How about in English? If the surface is very "grippy" and will not allow the object to slide, it can have a coefficient of friction of 1.0 — meaning it would take just as much force to lift the object as it would to push it. If the surface is extremely slippery, it could theoretically have a coefficient of 0.0 — meaning it takes no effort at all the push the object. The coefficient of friction can be greater than 1.0. (Imagine the object velcroed to the surface, for example.)

So it would seem that having a good μ for a surface would make everything easy. The problem is that we don"t really have an easy way of figuring out μ with absolute precision. There are two ways around this problem. You can drag the object with a force scale and divide that by the object"s weight, or you can come up with some kind of gizmo to approximate everything.

As you can imagine these things can be less than accurate, though they have improved over the years. We pilots will not hear the term "Mu" (μ) from a U.S. facility because it has been excised from AIM and the Pilot-Controller Glossary. The following used to appear in the U.S. AIM:

MU (friction) values range from 0 to 100 where zero is the lowest friction value and 100 is the maximum friction value obtainable. For frozen contaminants on runway surfaces, a MU value of 40 or less is the level when the aircraft braking performance starts to deteriorate and directional control begins to be less responsive. The lower the MU value, the less effective braking performance becomes and the more difficult directional control becomes.

When the MU value for any one-third zone of an active runway is 40 or less, a report should be given to ATC by airport management for dissemination to pilots.

Even back then, the U.S. Aeronautical Information Manual seemed to discount any connection between Mu and good/fair/poor/nil qualifiers and you hardly hear the term "mu" in the United States any more. But airport operators use it. How?

FAA-approved friction measuring equipment may be employed to help in determining the effects of friction-enhancing treatments, in that it can show the trend of a runway as to increasing or decreasing friction. Airport operators should not attempt to correlate friction readings (Mu numbers) to Good/Medium (previously known as Fair)/Poor or Nil runway surface conditions, as no consistent, usable correlation between Mu values and these terms has been shown to exist to the FAA’s satisfaction. It is important to note that while manufacturers of the approved friction measuring equipment may provide a table that correlates braking action to Mu values, these correlations are not acceptable to the FAA. To ensure that data collected are accurate, qualified personnel should use FAA-approved equipment and follow the manufacturer’s instructions for use. Note: It is no longer acceptable to report or disseminate friction (Mu) values to aircraft operators. This includes informal dissemination outside of the NOTAM system. In support of this change the NOTAM system will no longer allow for the reporting of this information. Airplane braking performance cannot be directly related to Friction (Mu) values. Runway Condition Codes, which will be included in the runway condition NOTAM, where applicable, are directly relevant to the determination of required landing distances.

There are two basic types of friction measuring equipment that can be used for conducting friction surveys on runways during winter operations: Continuous Friction Measuring Equipment (CFME) and Decelerometers (DEC).

Continuous Friction Measuring Equipment (CFME). CFME devices are recommended (over Decelerometers) for measuring friction characteristics of pavement surfaces covered with contaminants, as they provide a continuous graphic record of the pavement surface friction characteristics with friction averages for each one-third zone of the runway length.

Decelerometers. Decelerometers are recommended (over CFMEs) for airports where the longer runway downtime required to complete a friction survey is unacceptable and for busy airports where it is difficult to gain access to the full length of a runway crossed by another runway. Decelerometers should be of the electronic type due to the advantages noted below. Mechanical decelerometers may be used, but should be reserved as a backup. Airports having only mechanical devices should plan to upgrade as soon as possible. Neither type of decelerometer will provide a continuous graphic record of friction for the pavement surface condition. They provide only a spot check of the pavement surface. On pavements with frozen contaminant coverage of less than 25 percent, decelerometers are used only on the contaminated areas. For this reason, a survey taken under such conditions will result in a conservative representation of runway braking conditions. This should be considered when using friction values as an input into decisions about runway treatments. In addition, any time a pilot may experience widely varying braking along the runway, it is essential that the percentage of contaminant coverage be noted in any report.

Electronic decelerometers eliminate potential human error by automatically computing and recording friction averages for each one-third zone of the runway. They also provide a printed record of the friction survey data.

Mechanical decelerometers may be used as a backup to an electronic decelerometer. The runway downtime required to complete a friction survey will be longer than with an electronic decelerometer. Mechanical decelerometers do not provide automatic friction averages or a printed copy of data.

We used to do these as pilots in the Air Force at some northern bases. The unit is mounted in the vehicle so as to measure longitudinal deceleration. You fire up the vehicle to a certain speed and jam on the brakes. The way I recall it, you floored it until the speedometer was pegged going as fast as you can on a very slippery surface, and then stomped on the brakes and tried not to soil your pants. Just to be sure, I asked someone who does these for a living and he said they go to 20 mph. Some of the meters output Mu (μ) directly, others put out G-units that have to be converted using a table.

Asking around various airport managers, there is a lot of technique involved to get consistent results. But the system can put out reliable deceleration values to enter into their version of the RCAM table (shown below) with a μ value. But there is more to it than that.

Lateral Location. On runways that serve primarily narrow-body airplanes, runway friction surveys should be conducted approximately 10 feet (3 m) from the runway centerline. On runways that serve primarily wide-body airplanes, runway friction surveys should be conducted approximately 20 feet (6 m) from the runway centerline. Unless surface conditions are noticeably different on the two sides of the runway centerline, only one survey is needed, and it may be conducted on either side.

The RCAM is the method by which an airport operator reports a runway surface assessment when contaminants are present. Use of the RCAM is only applicable to paved runway surfaces. Once an assessment has been performed, the RCAM defines the format for which the airport operator reports and receives a runway condition “Code” via the NOTAM System. The reported information allows a pilot to interpret the runway conditions in terms that relate to airplane performance. This approach is a less subjective means of assessing runway conditions by using defined objective criteria. Aircraft manufacturers have determined that variances in contaminant type, depth, and air temperature can cause specific changes in aircraft braking performance. At the core of the RCAM is its ability to differentiate among the performance characteristics of given contaminants.

Conditions Acceptable to Use Decelerometers or Continuous Friction Measuring Equipment to Conduct Runway Friction Surveys on Frozen Contaminated Surfaces.

5.1.4.1. The data obtained from such runway friction surveys are considered to be reliable only when the surface is contaminated under any of the following conditions:

Ice or wet ice. Ice that is melting or ice with a layer of water (any depth) on top. The liquid water film depth of .04 inches (1 mm) or less is insufficient to cause hydroplaning.

5.1.4.2. It is not acceptable to use decelerometers or continuous friction measuring equipment to assess any contaminants outside of these parameters.

The RCAM is the method by which an airport operator reports a runway surface assessment when contaminants are present. Use of the RCAM is only applicable to paved runway surfaces. Once an assessment has been performed, the RCAM defines the format for which the airport operator reports and receives a runway condition “Code” via the NOTAM System. The reported information allows a pilot to interpret the runway conditions in terms that relate to airplane performance. This approach is a less subjective means of assessing runway conditions by using defined objective criteria.

Airport operators normally access the system through the "NOTAM Manager" application. The first question will be "Is greater than 25% of the overall runway length and width, or cleared width (if not cleared from edge to edge), contaminated?" If the answer is no the only option will be to report contaminant percentage, type, and depth, when applicable, for each third of the runway, as well as any treatment. No Runway Condition Code is reported.

So you"ve got more than 25% coverage. The next thing to do is look at the left column on the RCAM and look for the type and depth of contaminant as well as temperature. Do that for each third of the runway. If only a portion of the runway is cleared (such as the center 75"), you only have to consider that portion. Unless you have upgrades and downgrades, the Runway Condition Codes will enter the system. Notice you didn"t have to do anything with the decelerometer.

If the airport operator thinks the RCC can be upgraded or should be downgraded, they can take a drive with an approved decelerometer. But only RCCs of 1 or 2 can be upgraded and even then they can only be upgraded up to a 3. You can take the decelerometer"s μ reading to upgrade or downgrade the RCC. What about pilot reports? Pilot reports can only be used to downgrade an RCC and only for the portion of the runway experienced.

Downgrade Assessment Criteria. When data from the shaded area in the RCAM (i.e., CFME/deceleration devices, pilot reports, or observations) suggest conditions are worse than indicated by the present contaminant, the airport operator should exercise good judgment and, if warranted, report lower runway condition codes than the contamination type and depth would indicate in the RCAM. While pilot reports (PIREPs) of braking action provide valuable information, these reports rarely apply to the full length of the runway as such evaluations are limited to the specific sections of the runway surface in which wheel braking was utilized. It is not appropriate to use downgrade assessment criteria to upgrade contaminant based assessments of condition codes (e.g., from 2 to 3).

The correlation of the Mu (μ) values with runway conditions and condition codes in the RCAM are only approximate ranges for a generic friction measuring device and are intended to be used for an upgrade or downgrade of a runway condition code. Airport operators should use their best judgment when using friction measuring devices for downgrade assessments, including their experience with the specific measuring devices used.

Pilot Reported Braking Action. This is a report of braking action on the runway, by a pilot, providing other pilots with a degree/quality of expected braking. The braking action experienced is dependent on the type of aircraft, aircraft weight, touchdown point, and other factors.

The airline — which operated the Boeing 737 on behalf of courier firm DHL — told NBC News in an email that the two crew members on board were uninjured.

According to the Aviation Herald, the flight came from Paris and landed at 4 a.m. local time (10 p.m. ET Thursday) during thunderstorms and poor weather.

a passenger on the American Airlines flight from Miami which overshot a runway while landing during a heavy rainstorm in Kingston, Jamaica Tuesday night, injuring more than 40 people

2004, Donella Meadows; Jorgen Randers; Dennis Meadows, “Author"s preface”, in Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update,With appropriate choice and action such uncontrolled decline could be avoided; overshoot could instead be resolved by a conscious effort to reduce humanity"s demand on the planet.

2020, Karen Cheng, Designing Type, second edition, page 88:The bowl of the D and the O are usually not identical, as most D forms do not have overshoot or undershoot.

1961 November, “Talking of Trains: Aircraft on rail tracks”, in Trains Illustrated, page 650:As a result of the accident at Southend Airport when a Hermes aircraft overshot the runway and fouled the down Shenfield to Southend Victoria line between Rochford and Prittlewell, the Eastern Region is considering warning arrangements, which have already been provided on some lines running past aerodromes.

2021 December 15, Paul Clifton, “There is nothing you can do”, in RAIL, number 946, page 37:A ScotRail Driver: [...] A good friend of mine overshot two stations back-to-back a couple of years ago. He tried to stop at one station and slid by it. Tried to stop at the next station. He slid by that, too.

2004, Donella Meadows; Jorgen Randers; Dennis Meadows, “Author"s preface”, in Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update,Measured this way humanity was last at sustainable levels in the 1980s. Now it has overshot by some 20 percent.

That runway, one of two at La Guardia, is a 7,000-foot stretch of asphalt and concrete, partially laid on steel piers that extend out over the water. The runway can freeze fast in winter, but even in good weather, there is little room for error.

On Thursday, at the height of a snowstorm, Delta Air Lines Flight 1086 touched down on Runway 13 shortly after 11 a.m., veering out of control almost instantly.

It skidded off to the left and then careened up an earthen berm, crashed through a fence, and came to a stop just moments before plunging into the frigid bay.

Steve Blazejewski, who was in a window seat on the left side, said the plane felt “out of control” almost as soon as it touched down. He said it seemed to veer at an angle of about 20 degrees as it bumped along the runway.

“We were skidding forward but veering off to the left,” said Mr. Blazejewski, 39, a real estate executive with Prudential who was traveling on business from his home in Georgia. He said he began to worry as the bay quickly got closer.

He said he recalled the US Airways flight that landed in the Hudson River six years ago. Then, because he was sitting next to an emergency exit door, he said, “My next thought was: How do I get this door open?”

Mr. Blazejewski, a veteran of the United States Navy, never had to answer that question because the wing beside him was damaged. Flight attendants guided him and the other passengers to exit onto the right wing, which also was damaged, as were the plane’s nose and tail, he said.

ImageA New York police boat approaching the plane. Passengers exited onto the right wing after the jet crashed through a fence.Credit...New York Police Department

“We just crash landed at LGA. I’m terrified,” Jaime Primak, a blogger and publicist, wrote on Twitter, using the airport’s abbreviation. In a second post, sent later, she wrote: “We have all been evacuated. Everyone is safe.”

Another passenger, Jared Faellaci, posted a picture to Facebook from his first-class seat looking out the window, showing how close the plane came to the bay — the water lapping against the shoreline only yards away.

“The wheels felt like they just didn’t take, and we were going so fast,” he said. “One or two seconds later we skidded off to the left side of the runway. We skidded for about 20 seconds, and you could feel that we had gone off the pavement. It wasn’t a smooth surface anymore, it was very bumpy.”

ImageA Delta Air Lines flight from Atlanta skidded off a runway after landing at La Guardia Airport in New York on Thursday.Credit...Larry Donnell, via Reuters

What we consider before using anonymous sources. Do the sources know the information? What’s their motivation for telling us? Have they proved reliable in the past? Can we corroborate the information? Even with these questions satisfied, The Times uses anonymous sources as a last resort. The reporter and at least one editor know the identity of the source.

“I think the pilot did everything he could to slow the aircraft down,” Mr. Foye said, who also noted that the runway was plowed shortly before the plane landed.

A passenger on the Delta Air Lines flight that skidded off the runway at La Guardia Airport described the scene and an official from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey gave a statement.SOUNDBITE (English) Marc Klafter, passenger from Atlanta, Georgia:

“I’m not even really sure what went through my mind because you’re not really sure what’s happening when it’s happening. And then it wasn’t until the plane came to a stop that all of a sudden you’re like, holy cow we just skidded off the runway. It was just a surreal experience.”

“Even when we were bouncing through the grass and skidding off the runway nobody was screaming or freaking out and when we came to a dead stop people were actually really calm. Nobody was really panicked, nobody was crying, nobody was screaming. Everybody was just kind of a little stunned trying to figure out what just happened.”

“Everybody was unbelievably calm, that was kind of crazy thing that I said earlier was that even when we were bouncing through the grass it’s getting through the grass nobody was screaming, nobody was really freaking out and when we came to a dead stop people were actually really calm. Nobody was really panicked nobody was crying, nobody was screaming. Everybody was just kind of a little stunned trying to figure out what just happened.”

As soon as we came to a stop we lost all power on the plane so the captain couldn’t really communicate with us. The flight attendants had a portable bullhorn that they were talking to everybody with saying stay in your seats, stay off your cell phone we’re going to evacuate the line. All the stuff that you would expect them to say.”

“This morning at Laguardia Airport abot 11:05 am flight 1068 from Atlanta to laguardia veered off runway 13 it was approaching from the northwest, the plane was landing. The runway’s about 7 thousand feet approximately 45 to 5 thousand feet down the runway the aircraft veered to the left. It never made contact with the water. the aircraft was carrying 127 passengers and five crew members. Happily, there are only minor injuries that have been reported at this point we believe two passengers have been transported to hospitals, that number may change.”

“Shortly before the incident at approximately 11:05 two planes landed and reported quote ‘good braking action on the runways.’ The runway, this particular runway had been plowed shortly before the incident and pilots on other planes reported good braking action.”

“I think the pilot did everything he could to slow the aircraft down. Obviously, the pilot and the copilot’s good efforts were reflected in the fact that there were only minor injuries.”

Mr. Foye said the plane skidded off the runway after about 4,000 feet. At the end of each runway, the Federal Aviation Administration mandates that there be a so-called engineered materials arrestor system to stop a plane should it overshoot its landing. The plane’s wheels sink into the crushable substance to slow it down.

Flight 1086, however, veered off in the middle of the runway and was slowed from plunging into the water by an earth berm “designed to keep Flushing and Bowery Bays from flooding the airport during times of tidal surge,” according to a New York State website.

A veteran Delta pilot who flies into La Guardia frequently said the two main hazards encountered in winter landings are crosswinds and ice on the runway.

ImageNone of the 132 people on board were seriously hurt, though 28 had minor injuries. Five were taken to hospitals.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

Runway 13 begins atop piers over the bay, so it “ices up really quickly, sooner than you would think,” said the pilot, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he did not have permission from Delta to speak to a reporter.

He said that the plane would have been moving at close to 100 miles per hour, and that at that speed, “when you start sliding, there’s really not much you can do.”

If there was a crosswind, that would have made the situation worse, the pilot said, because it could have caused the plane to turn like a weather vane into the wind.

On March 2, 1994, again in a snowstorm, a Continental Airlines jet taking off on the same runway skidded to the edge of the bay after the pilot aborted the takeoff. That plane wound up balanced on top of the berm with its nose tipped downward, just shy of the waterline. About 30 passengers reported minor injuries.

Two years earlier, a Cleveland-bound USAir jetliner crashed as it tried to take off from La Guardia in a snowstorm. The plane tumbled off the runway into Flushing Bay, and 27 people died.

161) For the first time since we seriously began the project in 2004, I watched the world"s first manned commercial spaceship landing on the runway at Mojave Air and Space Port and it was a great moment.

165) Many designers are opting for lower-cost presentations -- installations where guests wander among models who are fixed in place -- rather than high-priced runway shows.

170) Prior to takeoff, the pilot performs the flight check routine, pushes back the aircraft from the terminal"s gate, and taxis out to the designated takeoff runway.

172) A cheetah ambling across a field is among the most beautiful animals on Earth, long-legged and slim, shoulders rolling, lithe as a fashion model on the runway.

173) Stretch a few hundred meters on the runway has become a fire trace the aircraft landing light guide, a large number of aircraft landed safely in turn.

174) Previous glitches included a Jetstar flight taking off from Launceston Airport without runway lights in March 2008 and a 60m near-miss between a Virgin Blue flight and a light aircraft in 2003.

178) A Miami-bound plane overshot the runway and slammed into this busy street in the Honduran capital. A pilot and a passenger were killed; more than a dozen others were hurt.

179) You must have either positive cash flow or so much cash in the bank that even the most skeptical analyst believes your runway is long enough for you to lift off.

180) The road, about six kilometers from the aerodrome, "was approximately 600m long and was positioned in the same east-west direction as Runway 27 at Shobdon, " said the report.

TEHRAN: An Iranian passenger plane overshot a runway as it landed yesterday in the southwestern city of Bandar-e Mahshahr, barrelling into an adjacent highway without causing casualties, state TV reported. “Arriving at Mahshahr airport, the pilot landed the aircraft too late and this caused him to miss the runway,” the broadcaster quoted the head of Khuzestan province’s aviation authority as saying. This “caused the aircraft to overshoot the runway and stop in a boulevard” next to the airport, Mohammadreza Rezaeia said.

The McDonnell Douglas jet, belonging to Iran’s Caspian Airlines, was flying from Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport with 135 passengers plus the plane’s crew. State TV reported that all were safe. A state TV reporter travelling on the plane told the broadcaster that the aircraft’s “back wheel had broken off, as we saw it was left on the runway” and said the plane had been moving with no wheels before it ground to a halt. Iran’s aviation authority said “the cause of the incident is being investigated”.

The Islamic republic had been planning to upgrade its decrepit fleet after long-standing US sanctions were lifted following the 2015 nuclear deal between Tehran and world powers. But when US President Donald Trump pulled out of the accord in 2018 and reimposed crippling economic sanctions, the treasury department revoked licenses for Boeing and Airbus to sell passenger jets to Iran. – AFP