power tong frame top view made in china

XQ140 micro-marking and no-marking hydraulic power tongs is a special equipment and open power tongs which is applicable to make up or break out 41/2"-51/2" casing during oil field work over operation. Master and back tong device adopts jaw plate type multi-point clamping mechanism.Can choose contour coated rig dies or pyramid tooth , to ensure the column minimum damage, and can improve the pipe thread connection quality, reduce due to improper work over pipe accident etc..

1. The tongs head is the open structure which is quick and convenient for entering and retreating working position. The integral tong head has good hardness and rigidity.

2. Master tong is roller climbing two jaw plate structure，can install arc tooth die ，the contact surface is more larger and clamp no deformation, The assembly and disassembly is very convenient. The optimum tangent-diameter ratio design ensures reliable clamping and easy slope retreating.The back tong is the three-jaw-plate structure pushed by hydraulic cylinder. The structure is simple and the clamping is reliable; The minimum damage to the tubular column can be ensured, and the main body of the pipe string can be clamped.

6. Master and back tong adopt integral frame structure，back tong is floating connection，The master and back tong adjustable distance, reduce the damage of pipe string shackle;

8. Matching torque and speed test system，can accurately control the torque of makeup，can timely display, control, storage, print torque parameters（Suitable for FOX、VAM TOP、BGT1、3SB、NSCC、WSP etc special threaded bushing）.

The Eckel Top Drive Casing Tong is a tool developed for use on hydraulic top drive rigs to provide a high quality connection while reducing tubular damage and providing a safer enviroment for crews. With an operating capacity of 4 1/2 inch through 10 5/8 inch, is connected to the output stem of the power swivel. After installation the tong becomes an integral part of the swivel, raising and lowering as a unit and transfering the power swivel"s RPM and torque to the pipe/connection.

A guide attached beneath the top drive tong simplifies alignment of the collar within the tong. Once the collar of the pipe is enclosed within the top drive tong, the tong will grip the collar by operating the power swivel. Torque and rotational speed are controlled through the operation of the power swivel. Reversal of the power swivel will cause the tong jaws to release. Tong jaws are spring loaded to retract away from the collar.

Utilizing three gripping jaws and a patented Eckel Cam Biting System to grip the pipe collar. The same type of proven biting system found in the industry leading Eckel Power Tongs. These jaws are spaced evenly about the circumference of the collar to provide even distribution of the gripping forces

As shown in figures 1 to 6, of the present invention a kind of without dental impression hydraulic power tongs, mainly by the rotation of dual brake braking device

Turn main pincers 1, the clamping back tongs 2 of fluid cylinder clamped-in style, frame-type back-guiding rod assembly 3 and front guide rod assembly 4 to form；Rotate main pincers 1

Bottom is fixedly connected with frame-type back-guiding rod assembly 3 and front guide rod assembly 4 respectively, and frame-type back-guiding rod assembly 3 is by clamping

Seat 1-16 and brake strap card 1-17 composition is fixed for fixing the brake strap of brake strap 1-10；By mutual between brake strap 1-10 and jaw plate frame

Axle, for fix the axle of carrier pulley of idle wheel 1-5, power input shaft 1-7 and gear mechanism 1-8 composition；Hydraulic motor 1-9 is defeated with power

Screw 2-9 connects seamless block teeth 2-10；The oil inlet and outlet promoting oil cylinder 2-2 is in parallel with back-up tong control valve；Seamless block teeth 2-10

The cross section of inner surface is arc shape, the clamping surface coated with hard alloy-layer of seamless block teeth 2-10；Pitman arm 2-11 and back-up tong

Fagging 3-4 and screw 3-5 composition, the left and right sides of back-guiding rod frame 3-1 is symmetrically arranged with several back-guiding rod pin shaft holes, lower fagging

One end is connected with upper fagging 3-2, and the spring 3-3 other end is connected with lower fagging 3-4, back-guiding rod frame 3-1 top and housing 1-2

It is fixedly connected with the front bearing rotating main pincers 1；The front guide rod 4-7 other end is according to being embedded with back-up tong body 2-the most successively

1, front guide rod spring pad two 4-4, front guide rod spring 4-3 and front guide rod spring pad one 4-2, back-up tong body 2-1 and front guide rod spring

Rotating, the first erection device on jaw plate frame offsets jaw plate frame stress deformation in clamping process, it is therefore prevented that opening tooth

Wheel 1-15 stress deformation in clamping process, promotes clamping back tongs 2 control valve, when promoting the piston rod of oil cylinder 2-2 to stretch out, turns

As the first and leading exhibition manufacturer who specialized in researching, developing, and producing exhibition system products in China, Lingtong Exhibition System Co., Ltd has more than 35 years of history and experience in the exhibition industry and worked with more than 10,000 customers all over the world.

Below in conjunction with the embodiment of accompanying drawing to the utility model tong security protection door frame device, be described further.

Below in conjunction with the embodiment of accompanying drawing to the utility model tong security protection door frame device, be described further.

1. high-grade air clutch, 2. low-grade air clutch, 3. vent valve, 4. threeway air cock, the 5. normally closed top rod valve of two-bit triplet, 6. shuttle valve, 7. three position three-way change valve, the 8. total air bag of drill pipe tong, 9. air gauge.6 liang of air inlet ports of shuttle valve connect respectively top rod valve 5 gas outlets and three position three-way change valve 7 gas outlets, shuttle valve 6 gas outlet connecting tee air cock 4 air inlet ports, the air inlet port position that can switch shuttle valve 6 while handling three position three-way change valve 7 handle, by top rod valve 5 air inlets, are normal operation position to shuttle valve 6, directly from three position three-way change valve 7 air inlets, belong to the emergency power operating position to shuttle valve 6 when top rod valve 5 damages.

In the schematic diagram of Fig. 2, three position three-way change valve 7 is pushed to trouble free service position (being the I position in Fig. 1), shut the drill pipe tong safety protective door, door frame afterbody cam compression top rod valve 5, handle threeway air cock 4 and can connect the gas circuit of the high-grade air clutch 1 of tong or low-grade air clutch 2, realize Power Tong high and low shift handover operation.Pull open doorframe (or doorframe forget shut), top rod valve 5 is obstructed, the total air bag 8 of drill pipe tong is also obstructed to threeway air cock 4 gas circuits, threeway air cock 4 is directly connected top rod valve 5 steam vents, now high-grade or gas low-grade air clutch is directly drained by rapid-release valve, drill pipe tong can"t engage a gear, and binding clip does not turn round, and has realized the out-of-operation requirement of not closing the door.When top rod valve damages, three position three-way change valve 7 can be pushed to emergency position (being the II position in Fig. 1), now the total air bag 8 of tong is switched to the gas circuit of threeway air cock 4 by three position three-way change valve 7 another gas outlets and shuttle valve 6 another air inlet ports, opening and closing of doorframe do not play control action to gas path on-off, this position should not be used for a long time, should repair in time or change top rod valve 5.When drill pipe tong is not worked three position three-way change valve 7 being pushed to fastening position (in Fig. 1 0).

During the 361 years of civil war after the Han dynasty (202 BC – 220 AD), there was a partial restoration of feudalism when wealthy and powerful families emerged with large amounts of land and huge numbers of semi-serfs. They dominated important civilian and military positions of the government, making the positions available to members of their own families and clans.Tang Dynasty extended the imperial examination system as an attempt to eradicate this feudalism.Guangdong is represented by chenpi, aged ginger and hay.Hangzhou), which include tea leaf, bamboo shoot trunk, and hickory nut.li". The 31 provincial-level divisions of the People"s Republic of China grouped by its former administrative areas from 1949 to 1980, which are now known as traditional regions.

With the rise of European economic and military power beginning in the mid-19th century, non-Chinese systems of social and political organization gained adherents in China. Some of these would-be reformers totally rejected China"s cultural legacy, while others sought to combine the strengths of Chinese and European cultures. In essence, the history of 20th-century China is one of experimentation with new systems of social, political, and economic organization that would allow for the reintegration of the nation in the wake of dynastic collapse.

The ancient written standard was Classical Chinese. It was used for thousands of years, but was mostly used by scholars and intellectuals who forms the "top" class of the society called "shi da fu (士大夫)". It was difficult but possible for ordinary people to enter this class by passing written exams. Calligraphy later became commercialized, and works by famous artists became prized possessions. Chinese literature has a long past; the earliest classic work in Chinese, the Warring States period produced such noteworthy works as Confucius"s Laozi"s Chinese classics) Dynastic histories were often written, beginning with Sima Qian"s seminal poetic flowering, while the Four Great Classical Novels of Chinese literature were written during the Ming and Qing dynasties. Printmaking in the form of movable type was developed during the Song dynasty. Academies of scholars sponsored by the empire were formed to comment on the classics in both printed and handwritten form. Royalty frequently participated in these discussions as well.

The Chinese paper lantern (紙燈籠, 纸灯笼) is a lantern made of thin, brightly colored paper.paper bag with a candle placed inside, although more complicated lanterns consist of a collapsible bamboo or metal frame of hoops covered with tough paper. Sometimes, other lanterns can be made out of colored silk (usually red) or vinyl. Silk lanterns are also collapsible with a metal expander and are decorated with Chinese characters and/or designs. The vinyl lanterns are more durable; they can resist rain, sunlight, and wind. Paper lanterns do not last very long, they soon break, and silk lanterns last longer. The gold paper on them will soon fade away to a pale white, and the red silk will become a mix between pink and red. Often associated with festivals, paper lanterns are common in China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and similarly in Chinatowns with large communities of Overseas Chinese, where they are often hung outside of businesses to attract attention. In Japan the traditional styles include chōchin and there is a special style of lettering called sky lanterns, and are often released into the night sky for aesthetic effect at lantern festivals.

A folding screen (simplified Chinese: 屏风; traditional Chinese: 屏風) is a type of free-standing furniture. It consists of several frames or panels, which are often connected by hinges or by other means. It can be made in a variety of designs and with different kinds of materials. Folding screens have many practical and decorative uses. It originated from ancient China, eventually spreading to the rest of East Asia, Europe, and other parts of the world. Screens date back to China during the Eastern Zhou period (771–256 BCE).Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE).Zhucheng, Shandong Province.

Loongs, also known as Chinese Dragon, are legendary creatures in Chinese mythology, Chinese folklore, and East Asian culture. Chinese dragons have many animal-like forms such as turtles and fish, but are most commonly depicted as snake-like with four legs. They traditionally symbolize potent and auspicious powers, particularly control over water, rainfall, typhoons, and floods. The dragon is also a symbol of power, strength, and good luck for people who are worthy of it. During the days of Imperial China, the Emperor of China usually used the dragon as a symbol of his imperial power and strength.Son of Heaven, the Mandate of Heaven, the Celestial Empire and the Chinese Tributary System during the history of China.

Xuanwu (Chinese:玄武) is one of the Four Symbols of the Chinese constellations. Despite its English name, it is usually depicted as a turtle entwined together with a snake. It is known as Genbu in Japanese and Hyeonmu in Korean. It represents the north and the winter season. In Japan, it is one of the four guardian spirits that protect Kyoto and it is said that it protects the city on the north. Represented by the Kenkun Shrine, which is located on top of Mt Funaoka in Kyoto. The creature"s name is identical to that of the important Taoist god Xuanwu, who is sometimes (as in

Paifang, also known as a Pailou, is a traditional style of Chinese architectural arch or gateway structure that is related to the Indian paifang (Chinese: 牌坊; pinyin: páifāng) was originally a collective term for the top two levels of administrative division and subdivisions of ancient Chinese cities. The largest division within a city in ancient China was a fang (坊; fāng), equivalent to a current day ward. Each fang was enclosed by walls or fences, and the gates of these enclosures were shut and guarded every night. Each fang was further divided into several pai (牌; pái; "placard"), which is equivalent to a current day (unincorporated) community. Each pai, in turn, contained an area including several hutongs (alleyways). This system of urban administrative division and subdivision reached an elaborate level during the Tang dynasty, and continued in the following dynasties. For example, during the Ming dynasty, Beijing was divided into a total of 36 fangs. Originally, the word paifang referred to the gate of a fang and the marker for an entrance of a building complex or a town; but by the Song dynasty, a paifang had evolved into a purely decorative monument.

The old character for yuan is a small picture of a garden; it is enclosed in a square which can represent a wall, and has symbols which can represent the plan of a structure, a small square which can represent a pond, and a symbol for a plantation or a pomegranate tree.Shiji, one of the most famous features of this garden was the Wine Pool and Meat Forest (酒池肉林). A large pool, big enough for several small boats, was constructed on the palace grounds, with inner linings of polished oval shaped stones from the sea shores. The pool was then filled with wine. A small island was constructed in the middle of the pool, where trees were planted, which had skewers of roasted meat hanging from their branches. King Zhou and his friends and concubines drifted in their boats, drinking the wine with their hands and eating the roasted meat from the trees. Later Chinese philosophers and historians cited this garden as an example of decadence and bad taste.: 11 During the Spring and Autumn period (722–481 BC), in 535 BC, the Terrace of Shanghua, with lavishly decorated palaces, was built by King Jing of the Zhou dynasty. In 505 BC, an even more elaborate garden, the Terrace of Gusu, was begun. It was located on the side of a mountain, and included a series of terraces connected by galleries, along with a lake where boats in the form of blue dragons navigated. From the highest terrace, a view extended as far as Lake Tai, the Great Lake.: 12

Chinese cuisine is a very important part of Chinese culture, which includes cuisine originating from the diverse regions of China, as well as from Chinese people in other parts of the world. Because of the Chinese diaspora and historical power of the country, Chinese cuisine has influenced many other cuisines in Asia, with modifications made to cater to local palates.Seasoning and cooking techniques of Chinese provinces depend on differences in historical background and ethnic groups. Geographic features including mountains, rivers, forests and deserts also have a strong effect on the local available ingredients, considering climate of China varies from tropical in the south to subarctic in the northeast. Imperial, royal and noble preference also plays a role in the change of Chinese cuisines. Because of imperial expansion and trading, ingredients and cooking techniques from other cultures are integrated into Chinese cuisines over time. The most praised "Four Major Cuisines" are Chuan, Lu, Yue and Huaiyang, representing West, North, South and East China cuisine correspondingly.Anhui, Cantonese, Fujian, Hunan, Jiangsu, Shandong, Sichuan, and Zhejiang cuisines.Chopsticks are the main eating utensils for Chinese food, which can be used to cut and pick up food.

Photo showing serving chopsticks (gongkuai) on the far right, personal chopsticks (putongkuai) in the middle, and a spoon. Serving chopsticks are usually more ornate than the personal ones.

Manhan Quanxi, literally Manchu Han Imperial Feast was one of the grandest meals ever documented in Chinese cuisine. It consisted of at least 108 unique dishes from the Manchu and Han Chinese culture during the Qing dynasty, and it is only reserved and intended for the Emperors. The meal was held for three whole days, across six banquets. The culinary skills consisted of cooking methods from all over Imperial China.Manchus conquered China and founded the Qing dynasty, the Manchu and Han Chinese peoples struggled for power. The Kangxi Emperor wanted to resolve the disputes so he held a banquet during his 66th birthday celebrations. The banquet consisted of Manchu and Han dishes, with officials from both ethnic groups attending the banquet together. After the Wuchang Uprising, common people learned about the imperial banquet. The original meal was served in the Forbidden City in Beijing.

The Cuisinart CPT-720 2-Slice Digital Toaster has a memory-set feature, which allows you to save your preferred shade settings for up to four types of bread. Unfortunately, this toaster’s shallow slots couldn’t completely fit a bagel, leaving an entire section un-toasted. It also toasted bread unevenly—the top half of the slice would be nicely browned, but it would get more pale toward the bottom of the slice.

The SMEG 2-Slice Toaster produced mostly even results in our back-to-back tests, aside from the two batches that were practically burned. We liked the looks of this toaster, but the lever doesn"t allow you to lift your carbs up out of the slot, which means you have to risk burning your finger (or use tongs) to retrieve them.

The heating elements on the Breville BTA735BSS the Toast Select Luxe weren’t consistently flush with the interior, and sections of them didn’t fully illuminate. The lift lever didn’t raise toast as high as our picks did, and the toast shade wasn’t as even from edge to edge. The top and sides of this model get very hot when it’s operating, so we wouldn’t recommend it if you have young kids at home.

Initially, we liked the design of the Dash DVTS501 Clear View 2-Slice Toaster, which allows you to toast a long slice of sourdough bread. Unfortunately, we found its long, slender shape awkward to use and not conducive to every space. Like the Zwilling, this model toasted inconsistently from batch to batch and completely failed to toast during one round of our back-to-back tests. Occasionally, it popped toast out of the slots so aggressively that they ended up on the floor.

Although our previous two-slot pick, the Oster Jelly Bean (an older version of the Oster 2-Slice Toaster), still browned bread better than most other budget toasters, it paled in comparison with the Cuisinart. Despite having slots that are deeper than those of the Black + Decker and Hamilton Beach toasters we tested, the Jelly Bean still left pure white crowns on otherwise nicely toasted bread. These white tops get even bigger if you forget to push the bread down as far as it will go in the slot—something we found irritating and hard to remember.

The 2-slice Cuisinart toasted the entire slice of Wonder bread; our previous pick, the Oster Jelly Bean, left raw tops because the slots weren’t deep enough. Photo: Michael Hession

The glass-paneled Magimix by Robot Coupe toasted less evenly than the now-discontinued Cuisinart ViewPro, leaving large white patches and burnt edges. Photo: Michael Hession

The 2-slice Cuisinart toasted the entire slice of Wonder bread; our previous pick, the Oster Jelly Bean, left raw tops because the slots weren’t deep enough. Photo: Michael Hession

We also tested the $250 Magimix, which has glass sides that allow you to watch your bread turn into toast. Like the Dualit, the Magimix is inconveniently large for a two-slice toaster. The Magimix did produce mostly even toast, but each piece had a few white streaks around the top and bottom. When filled with two slices, the Magimix’s long-slot design produced toast with white edges and patchy, overly toasted centers.

Though it was a company best-seller when we tested it in 2018, the Hamilton Beach Keep Warm 2-Slice Toaster (22816) gave us pale bagels and streaky toast with white tops. The toaster also beeps loudly three times before your toast pops up, which gets annoying fast.

The Black + Decker T2707S 2-Slice Toaster left slices of toast soft and pallid. Even at darker heating levels, the toaster didn’t reach the top of the bread, resulting in doughy white crowns.

The Krups KH732D 2-Slice Toaster did poorly in just about all of our tests. Its chrome exterior is wrapped around a cheap, lightweight interior frame that doesn’t sit securely on a countertop. If you push the lever to bring the toast up to the top, the machine tips over.

The Breville BTA840XL Die-Cast 4-Slice Smart Toaster was hands down the best toaster we tested, but we’re not confident it will last long enough to justify its exorbitant price. The model we’ve been long-term testing since 2018 is still working like new. However, we’ve read customer reviews that say it fails prematurely, so we’re hesitant to recommend it, especially since it costs $180 (at the time of writing). It has the same functionality as our two-slot Breville pick, the Bit More, as well as a button that automatically lifts and lowers your toast (this might be nicer in theory than it is in practice, since pressing a lever would be faster than waiting for your toast to lower). We preferred this toaster over the four-slice version of the Breville Bit More (the BTA730XL), which has two long slots that did not toast as evenly. The Smart Toaster is more expensive and will take up a considerable chunk of your countertop. But its exterior is built like a tank, and it offers more features than any other two- or four-slot model we considered.

Emeritus Senior Minister (ESM) Goh Chok Tong delivered remarks virtually at the 3rd Hong Kong Forum on US-China Relations on 19 January, organised by the China-United States Exchange Foundation and the China Center for International Economic Exchanges. The theme of the conference is“Beyond Differences, Towards Cooperation”.

2. If trust is the currency of the realm, then the main deficit in the geopolitical ledger is the mutual strategic distrust between the US and China. It stems from a difference in values, ideologies, worldviews, political systems, and perspectives on global governance. If this distrust cannot be overcome, the world will be condemned like Sisyphus to roll the boulder of a contentious US-China relationship up a hill for eternity.

3. The US has assessed that China is, in President Biden’s words, “deadly earnest about becoming the most significant, consequential nation in the world”. It views China as its main strategic competitor and a threat to American national security and values. The US has therefore bolstered its military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific, and strengthened its alliances and partnerships through platforms like the Quad and AUKUS. It has also drawn attention to alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, as well as to what it views as China’s coercive behaviour in other parts of the world. From Washington’s perspective, China is not following the established rules of the global order despite being a chief beneficiary. Instead, China is seeking to rewrite these rules in its favour.

4. At best, China sees this as a US containment strategy to prevent its rise as a global power. At worst, it sees this as a long-term strategy to weaken China and break it up. It sees the US’ framing of “democracy versus autocracy” as a move to undermine China’s political system and the dominance of the CPC. A similar ideological battle brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union.

5. The Chinese leadership takes the view that foreign powers managed to exploit China in the past because it was not strong enough. Till today, Chinese leaders frequently remind its people of China’s Century of Humiliation, including on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC. Hence, China is building up multiple defensive and offensive capabilities – at sea, in the air, out at space, and through cyber warfare. The ultimate weapon will be nuclear. The threat of mutually assured destruction is the best deterrence.

8 What now? Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said that the US’ approach to China will be “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be and adversarial when it must be”. Building on this frame, I suggest that the US and China should “Avoid Conflict over Differences, Embrace Healthy Competition, and Maximise Cooperation”.

13. The US and China will have to address what exactly healthy competition will look like, in accordance with international law and the existing international rules-based order. There are many pressing global issues that require both the US and China to cooperate closely as global powers. Free trade, climate change, global pandemic preparedness, and religious extremism, are a few of them.

17. Your forum, too, is a meaningful Voice of Moderation. I hope that when CUSEF and CCIEE convene the next forum, both major powers would have made good headway in managing their mutual strategic distrust. Doing so will require wisdom and statecraft of the highest order. I believe both Presidents Biden and Xi possess these qualities. I pray that they will be able to build up strategic trust between their countries and peoples.

It is no great insight to suggest that the differences between China and the United States are approaching irreconcilable. In July, Beijing slammed Washington’s “gangster logic” after President Trump ordered the end of Hong Kong’s special economic status with the U.S.—itself a retaliation for the mainland’s new national security law. One month prior, China’s foreign ministry warned of “consequences” over a new American law to punish Chinese officials over the mass detention of minority Muslim Uighurs in western China. On social media, Chinese citizens have mocked Trump as a “joker” for proclaiming victory against COVID-19. There’s anger that the United States is taxing imports from the mainland, denying visas to Chinese researchers, and pursuing criminal prosecution against the vice president of tech titan Huawei, whose smartphone sales last year leapfrogged those of the iPhone. The perceived slights have turbocharged Chinese nationalism. “If you look carefully at the Huawei logo,” a cabbie in Shenzhen told me last summer, grinning from his rearview mirror, “it looks like a sliced-up apple.”

Antagonism is rising in tandem with the two superpowers’ carbon emissions. As the Earth warms, the two largest greenhouse gas emitters are navigating toward a Cold War rather than toward a carbon-free 2050. As the Trump administration prepares to exit the Paris Agreement, U.S. climate collaboration with China at a federal level—diplomatic meetings, ministerial level communications—has largely shut down. Cooperation seems implausible. “What we’ve seen is a decoupling not just in business and trade but across the board,” Orville Schell, director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society, told me. “Under Nixon and Kissinger, when they went in 1972 of course the common danger was the Soviet Union. Now the common danger is climate. Can we reorganize ourselves to confront that common enemy? I’m not so sure.”

The question is whether this doom and gloom presents an opportunity. Is there a way to harness this ill will to fuel great power competition? To stoke a “race to the top” in cleantech innovation, as a report from the Center for Security and International Studies (CSIS) think tank puts it? Already, U.S.-China relations are being framed as having entered a new era: of competition. “The era of engagement with China has come to an unceremonious close,” Kurt Campbell, a top East Asia diplomat in the Obama administration, wrote last fall in an influential essay co-authored with Jake Sullivan in Foreign Affairs. “Coexistence means accepting competition as a condition to be managed rather than a problem to be solved.”

A jog back to the actual superpower Space Race of the 1950s and 60s suggests that yes, Cold War enmity did yield technology breakthroughs, not only Lasik eye surgery and the development of LED lighting and early solar cells. With the right policies and investments, the argument goes, Space Race 2.0 could accelerate the development of essential yet still immature green technologies. The International Energy Agency has declared that several such innovations are not yet on track to displace incumbent fossil solutions: energy from ocean waves, geothermal power, biofuels as alternatives to petroleum, and capturing carbon emissions from fossil fuel plants and sticking the pollution underground forever.

Ladislaw adds that the Trump administration already has sought to reduce U.S. dependency on China and pursue homegrown breakthroughs in critical minerals, nuclear energy, semiconductors and the power grid. Investments in these areas by federal and state governments and American industry are already framed, to some degree, as “beating China.” As far as mobilizing private sector capital, the United States and China rank #1 and 2 as the most attractive countries for renewables investments, according to the consultancy EY.

As for China, the aspiration to dominate key industries, including cleantech, is well documented. When I first moved to Shanghai in late 2006 to open my news organization’s first bureau there, the catch phrase I heard countless times at factories across China was “indigenous innovation,” a program of procurement rules and tax breaks to coax domestic science and tech breakthroughs. Its policy descendent, the “Made in China 2025” plan, names new energy vehicles, power equipment, and modern high-speed rail as pillar sectors for which 70 percent of the core content should be domestic. Beijing has declared intentions to become a global technology superpower by 2049. To be sure, this program has helped create the underlying ill will with the United States, fueling accusations that Beijing is freezing out U.S. competition, extracting American technology, and violating free-trade pledges. It is clear, however, that China has joined the green race.

There is one additional way to channel superpower hostilities into planetary good: tariffs on goods with large carbon footprints. Already, trade walls have gone up around the world against Korean washing machines, Chinese solar panels, European commercial plants, and American soybeans. These import barriers have reinvigorated European Union plans for a carbon border tax in its COVID-19 economic recovery plan. The idea is to tax products from climate laggards, including the United States. This levy, a top priority for European Commission head Ursula von der Leyen, is designed to tackle the pernicious problem of “free riding” that has long bedeviled climate talks: key countries enjoy the benefits of lower emissions and cleaner air, yet don’t pull their weight and in the process encourage others to ride without paying, too.

To most observers, climate competition would likely have to occur in a context of global cooperation. Extreme decoupling, pitting the United States and China on opposite sides of an industrial iron curtain, could backfire, threatening a tried-and-true model of producing green solutions—manufacturing globalization. It’s not unlike the production of a Samsung Galaxy S20 phone or the latest crop top from Zara: making world-beating solar panels and wind turbines depends on global supply chains to connect ideas, equipment, money, talent, and scale. This combination is helping solar and wind increasingly undercut fossil energy on price.

Finished Chinese panels find customers at home, as well as countries that have made commitments to purchase large amounts of renewable power, including Germany, Spain, Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, Brazil, and India. Key states in the United States—notably California Nevada, Hawaii, and New Jersey—made similar pledges. By Gallagher’s reckoning, global trade in cleantech in the first decade of the 2000s grew by 259 percent, more than double the growth rate of total manufactured goods. “As we look back on the remarkable cost reductions in solar and wind,” she said, “we can attribute that largely to the globalization process.”

“If we want to have an impact on carbon emissions in a short time frame, I don’t see a way to replicate China’s skills,” Nahm told me. To be sure, global trading partners have legitimate reasons to complain about Beijing’s industrial rules and contentious home-field economic advantages. “But if we [the United States and China] spend ten years arguing, we will lose Florida.”

The upshot: the world’s two climate superpowers may have to find ways to compete and yet collaborate at the same time. It would be challenging, for instance, for an American electric vehicle producer to gain market share without access to Chinese middle-class drivers. It’s worth noting that in many sectors, despite trade frictions and tariffs, China-centric global supply chains tend to be sticky. Of note: China is home to 90 percent of the world’s critical minerals, 50 percent of electric vehicles, and 60 percent of solar panels, by one estimate from the New America.

Superpower collaboration also comes into play with global climate negotiations. Back in 2015, delegations from Beijing and Washington played key roles in sealing the Paris climate accord when they jointly announced emissions targets a year in advance. This laid the groundwork for other nations to follow suit.

The Trump administration, of course, plans to bail on the Paris deal, and is loosening domestic rules on power plant and auto emissions. If the United States remains on the sidelines, many analysts argue it could take the pressure off China, providing space for Beijing to underperform as well. In fact, China’s COVID-19 stimulus efforts appear more brown than green to many observers; coal plant approvals are said to be on the rise.

Of course, Xi Jinping’s government could step into the void and assert global leadership on climate, as it has in global institutions including the World Health Organization. But those signs are less clear. Angel Hsu, an environmental studies researcher at Yale-NUS College in Singapore, has spent years interacting with Chinese climate researchers and negotiators. During the November 2016 UN climate summit in Morocco, Hsu was with the Chinese delegation when word came that Donald Trump, who’d called climate change a “hoax,” was elected. Would China step forward to lead, Hsu asked a top Chinese negotiator? “He said ‘no,’ the typical Chinese stance,” Hsu said, adding “‘we are still a developing country behind the West, still waiting for the U.S. to show leadership.’”

Is it realistic to imagine great power competition, and collaboration, on climate issues? For proponents, there may be some hope from history: In the 1930s, during the ugliest trade war of the 20th century, which would later drag the world into a Great Depression, the international community nevertheless found ways to work together on several environmental initiatives: to protect fauna and flora, limit fishing nets, and set standards for whaling and wildlife preservation. And even in the Cold War 1950s, the United States and Soviet Union were able to collaborate on the development of a polio vaccine. At least back then, the world’s existing and emerging superpowers found ways to argue and chew gum at the same time.

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Model XQ28/2.6 hydraulic power tong is an improved type of XYQ1.8 which is used to make up and break out sucker rod thread in Well Service. This product has the following features:

A. The structure is compact, concise and light. Master tong is driven by a low-speed large torque hydraulic motor that matches with a manual control valve. The backup tong is just like a spanner. The total weight is approximately equal to XYQ1.8.

B. The operating is briefness and convenience with high efficiency. Put the respondence size jaw set into master tong and the respondence size glutting into backup tong, turning the reset knob incorrect direction then can make up and break out sucker rod by operating manual control valve. Two speed, snapping at low speed, spinning at high speed.