rongsheng shipyard map price

The shipyard, located in the Yangtze River Delta, was founded in 2006, and became the largest private shipbuilder in China, churning out giant valemaxes at its four large dry-docks, before a massive financial collapse forced it to cease operations in 2014.

Broking sources in China tell Splash that the yard’s former chief operating officer David Luan is now preparing to officially reopen the yard, to be known as SPS Shipyard, a reference to ShipParts.com, a business he created in 2015 after quitting Rongsheng.

SPS Shipyard will start to market cape and kamsarmax slots from next week with next available slots being from Q3 2025 onwards. Luan has yet to reply to questions sent by Splash earlier today.

Last October, the company entered into an agreementto sell 98.5% equity interest of Rongsheng Heavy Industries, the entire interest in Rongsheng Engineering Machinery, Rongsheng Power Machinery and Rongsheng Marine Engineering Petroleum Services, to Unique Orient, an investment holding company owned by Wang Mingqing, a creditor of Huarong Energy, for a nominal price of HK$1.

Once the largest private shipyard in China, Rongsheng ceased shipbuilding operations in 2014 after it was hit by a major financial crisis and the shipyard rebranded into Huarong Energy in 2015.

Another once-leading privately-owned yard China Huarong Energy Company, previously and better known as China Rongsheng Heavy Industries, continues to struggle with debts and ongoing talks with its creditors. The shipbuilder with huge yard facilities is now literally a �ghost yard�, where operations have ceased as funds dried up.

Jiangsu Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group Co. used to employ more than 30,000 people in the eastern city of Rugao. Once China�s largest shipbuilder, by 2015 Rongsheng was on the verge of bankruptcy. Orders had dried up and banks are refusing credit. Questions have been raised about the shipyard�s business practices, including allegations of padded order books. And Rongsheng was apparently behind on repaying some of the 20.4 billion yuan in combined debt owed to 14 banks, three trusts and three leasing firms.

Rongsheng is on the ropes now that it had completed a multi-year order for so-called Valemax ships for the Brazilian iron ore mining giant Companhia Vale do Rio Doce. The last of these 16 bulk carriers, the Ore Ningbo, was delivered in January 2015. With a carrying capacity of up to 400,000 tons, Valemaxes are the world�s largest ore carriers. Vale hired Rongsheng to build the ships starting in 2008, and has tolerated the shipyard�s slow pace: The Ore Ningbo was delivered three years late. Rongsheng employees said the Ore Ningbo may have been the shipyard�s last product because no new ship orders are expected and all contracts for unfinished ships have either been canceled or are in jeopardy.

Founder and former chairman Zhang Zhirong started the company in 2005 with money made when he worked as a property developer in the 1990s. The new shipyard stunned the industry by clinching major vessel orders from the start, even at a time when most of the world�s shipyards were slumping. Rongsheng�s success attracted investors and banks to the company�s side, fueling its expansion.

The shipyard, a sprawling facility spread across one-third of Changqingsha Island in the middle of the Yangtze River, suffered from a lack of capacity and management problems. As a result, the company had trouble meeting its contract obligations, including delivery timetables. Rongsheng�s problems were tied to difficulties with delivering ships. Many of Rongsheng�s order cancellations were due to its own delivery delays.

After the global financial crisis of 2008, many ship owners could no longer afford paying in advance for new vessels. So builders such as Rongsheng started arranging up-front financing with Chinese banks that got projects off the ground.

Rongsheng built ships with a combined capacity of 8 million tons in 2010 and was preparing to begin filling US$ 3 billion in new orders the following year. But the company�s 2011 orders wound up totaling only US$ 1.8 billion. That same year, Rongsheng�s customers canceled contracts for 23 new vessels.

In 2012, Rongsheng received orders for only two ships. Layoffs ensued, with some 20,000 workers getting the axe. The company closed the year with a net loss of 573 million yuan, down from a 1.7 billion yuan net profit in 2011 and despite 1.27 billion yuan in government subsidies. The bleeding worsened in 2013, with 8.7 billion yuan in reported losses. Despite a recovery of the Chinese shipbuilding industry in 2014, Rongsheng saw no relief, as its clients canceled orders for 59 vessels that year.

Roxen Shipping, a company controlled by Chinese businessman Guan Xiong, reportedly stepped in to rescue some US$ 2 billion worth of ship contracts that were canceled by Rongsheng�s other customers. Without these orders, Rongsheng never would have maintained its status as the No. 1 shipbuilder in China from 2009 to 2013.

Rongsheng�s capital crunch worsened since February 2014, when the China Development Bank (CDB) demanded more collateral after the company failed to make a scheduled payment on a 710 million yuan loan. When Rongsheng refused, the CDB called the loan. Other banks that issued loans to the shipbuilder had taken similar steps.

Rongsheng�s weak financial position was highlighted by a third-quarter 2014 financial report in which the company posted a net loss of 2.4 billion yuan. It also reported 31.3 billion yuan in liabilities, including 7.6 billion yuan worth of outstanding short-term debt.

It would cost at least 5 billion yuan to restart operations at Rongsheng�s facility, plus they have a huge amount of debt. Buying Rongsheng would not be a good deal.

RUGAO, China/SINGAPORE (Reuters) - Deserted flats and boarded-up shops in the Yangtze river town of Changqingcun serve as a blunt reminder of the area"s reliance on China Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group, the country"s biggest private shipbuilder.A view of the Rongsheng Heavy Industries shipyard is seen in Nantong, Jiangsu province December 4, 2013. REUTERS/Aly Song

The shipbuilder this week predicted a substantial annual loss, just months after appealing to the government for financial help as it reeled from industry overcapacity and shrinking orders. Rongsheng lost an annual record 572.6 million yuan ($92 million) last year, and lost 1.3 billion yuan in the first half of this year.

While Beijing seems intent to promote a shift away from an investment-heavy model, with companies reliant on government cash injections, some analysts say Rongsheng is too big for China to let fail.

Local media reported in July that Rongsheng had laid off as many as 8,000 workers as demand slowed. Three years ago, the company had about 20,000 staff and contract employees. This week, the shipbuilder said an unspecified number of workers had been made redundant this year.

A purpose-built town near the shipyard’s main gate, with thousands of flats, supermarkets and restaurants, is largely deserted. Nine of every 10 shops are boarded up; the police station and hospital are locked.

“In this area we’re only really selling to workers from the shipyard. If they’re not here who do we sell to?” said one of the few remaining shopkeepers, surnamed Sui, playing a videogame at his work-wear store. “I know people with salaries held back and they can’t pay for things. I can’t continue if things stay the same.”

In the shadow of the shipyard gate, workers told Reuters the facility was still operating but morale was low, activity was slowing with the lack of new orders and some payments to workers had been delayed.

“Without new orders it’s hard to see how operations can continue,” said one worker wearing oil-spattered overalls and a Rongsheng hardhat, adding he was still waiting to be paid for September. He didn’t want to give his name as he feared he could lose his job.

“Morale in the office is quite low, since we don’t know what is the plan,” said a Rongsheng executive, who declined to be named as he is not authorized to speak to the media. “We have been getting orders but can’t seem to get construction loans from banks to build these projects.”

While Rongsheng has won just two orders this year, state-backed rival Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipbuildinghas secured 50, according to shipbroker data. Singapore-listed Yangzijiang Shipbuildinghas won more than $1 billion in new orders and is moving into offshore jack-up rig construction, noted Jon Windham, head industrials analyst at Barclays in Hong Kong.

Frontline, a shipping company controlled by Norwegian business tycoon John Fredriksen, ordered two oil tankers from Rongsheng in 2010 for delivery earlier this year. It now expects to receive both of them in 2014, Frontline CEO Jens Martin Jensen told Reuters.

Greek shipowner DryShips Inchas also questioned whether other large tankers on order will be delivered. DryShips said Rongsheng is building 43 percent of the Suezmax vessels - tankers up to 200,000 deadweight tons - in the current global order book. That"s equivalent to 23 ships, according to Rongsheng data.

Speaking at a quarterly results briefing last month, DryShips Chief Financial Officer Ziad Nakhleh said Rongsheng was “a yard that, as we stated before, is facing difficulties and, as such, we believe there is a high probability they will not be delivered.” DryShips has four dry cargo vessels on order at the Chinese firm.

Rongsheng declined to comment on the Dryships order, citing client confidentiality. “For other orders on hand, our delivery plan is still ongoing,” a spokesman said.

At least two law firms in Shanghai and Singapore are acting for shipowners seeking compensation from Rongsheng for late or cancelled orders. “I’m now dealing with several cases against Rongsheng,” said Lawrence Chen, senior partner at law firm Wintell & Co in Shanghai.

Billionaire Zhang Zhirong, who founded Rongsheng in 2005 and is the shipyard"s biggest shareholder, last month announced plans to privatize Hong Kong-listed Glorious Property Holdingsin a HK$4.57 billion ($589.45 million) deal - a move analysts said could raise money to plug Rongsheng"s debts.

Meanwhile, Rongsheng’s shipyard woes have already pushed many people away from nearby centers, and others said they would have to go if things don’t pick up. Some said they hoped the local government might step in with financial support.

The Rugao government did not respond to requests for comment on whether it would lend financial or other support to Rongsheng. Annual reports show Rongsheng has received state subsidies in the past three years.

Rongsheng Heavy Industries have admitted that it has delayed payments to suppliers and workers through an official announcement today, in response to a worker protest in its shipyard earlier this week.

“Demand in the global shipbuilding market has continued to decline and prices for new vessels have failed to rebound. Throughout the shipbuilding industry, banks and other financial institutions have tightened credit facilities available to shipbuilders, and many shipowners have delayed, renegotiated or defaulted on payments to shipbuilders. These factors have caused higher pressure on the group’s working capital in recent months, and the group has tightened cash outflow by delaying its payment to its suppliers and workers,” Rongsheng said in the release.

Rongsheng said it is currently in discussions with a number of banks and financial instituations for renewing exisiting credit facilities while it is also actively seeking financial support from the government and the substantial shareholders of the company.

China Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group Holdings Ltd. (1101), which hasn’t announced any 2012 ship orders, may find winning deals even harder as a company owned by its billionaire chairman faces an insider-trading probe. Bloomberg reports. Rongsheng, based in Shanghai, has tumbled 86 percent since a November 2010 initial public offering because of concerns about delivery delays and a global slump in ship orders caused by a glut of vessels. The shipbuilder, which operates facilities in Jiangsu and Anhui provinces, also said yesterday that first- half profit probably dropped “significantly” because of falling prices and slowing orders. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-07-30/rongsheng-faces-order-slump-as-sec-probes-chairman-s-companyUpload News

The world coal and iron ore trade demand depends very much on the biggest purchaser China. Coal import increased to 100 million tons in 2009 and tends to rise upwards until 2020. In 2009, iron ore import demand to China reached 2/3 of the world’s iron ore trade. The second biggest purchaser in the world is India that is looking for new suppliers in Russia and Latin America seeking to fill increased needs. Despite the fact that bulker market shows recovery signals since the end of 2009 the nearest future of shipbuilders focused on bulker carriers is not yet safe. During the first four months of 2010, it contracted 185 new bulk carriers (15 million dwt). Though prices of new building incentives have fallen by 30% the order book for 2010-2014 is overfilled: 3286 new bulkers (43.6% of existing bulker fleet) totalling 287.1 million dwt (59.7%)(CESA AR, 2010). This means that shipyards of China, S. Korea, Japan and new players focused on production of bulkers should turn to the building of other ship types. Consequently, the competition among high added value shipbuilders should be more intense.

Such a danger as “tenth wave” is poising now over the global shipbuilding industry. What shipyards of what countries will survive it? It might be that some countries will decide to reduce shipbuilding capacity or even close it before their shipyards collapse.

Productivity is influenced by technology, facilities, management competence, work organization, work practice, the level of workers’ skills and motivation. The level of the shipyard’s technology is one of the most important factors influencing the cost competitiveness, especially for the large enterprise.

Technology benchmark provided by T. Lamb shows very interesting results forcing to think what is more valuable for the shipyards competing in the market. It compares typical production elements such as steelwork and outfitting production, other pre-erection, ship construction, layout & environment, design & drafting, and organisation/operating of the main shipbuilding countries/regions. The highest overall level has Japan (4.43), the second – S. Korea (4.00), then Europe (3.4), and the lowest is of China (2.88) (Lamb, 2007). Is China a winner just because of low labour price? Or is Chinese labour cost lower because of small investment? Another reason impacting (more specifically – distorting) the competitiveness of shipyards is State support that goes to increasing of the national shipbuilding capacity. For example, over the past decade Korea almost quadrupled its production capacities while Japan and Europe kept stable production volumes. Since 1998 to 2009, S. Korean shipbuilding capacity grew by 10.8 million CGT and Chinese - by 7.9 million CGT (ECORYS SCS, 2009). China and S. Korea continues to follow a highly aggressive expansion path. Under Chinese "Shipbuilding industry adjustment promotion plan" the government has defined provision of operating funds to shipyards and expansion of financial support to owners who order export ships. Not only these countries but also new players such as Brazil, Turkey, India, etc provide huge amounts of support and financial assistance to their domestic producers by using various forms of subsidies including investment aid, loans and payment guarantees to shipbuilders, suppliers, governmental bailouts, subsidies on ship prices for domestic ocean going ships’ buyers, mandatory requirements to order ships at domestic yards and subsidized loans for domestically built ships, direct loans and debt guarantees to ship-owners, etc.

In such conditions, keeping a competitive edge of European shipyards becomes more and more complicate. Despite of the reduced order book Europe chooses quality and excellence over the low costs as the main strategic point of further development of the shipbuilding industry.

Since Beijing appears intent on telling investors it is serious about changing the investment-led growth model of the world’s second-biggest economy and controlling a credit splurge, it may seem like the writing is on the wall for China Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group.

Yet analysts say the government is more likely than not to judge that Rongsheng, which employs around 20,000 workers and has received state patronage, is too big and well connected to fail.

Supporting Rongsheng will not mean China’s economic reform plans are derailed, they say. Instead, it will mean reforms will be gradual and the government will cherry-pick firms it wants to support, which will exclude the small, private shipbuilders that have been folding in waves.

“Rongsheng is a flagship in the industry,” said Lawrence Li, an analyst with UOB Kay Hian in Shanghai. “The government will definitely provide assistance if companies like this are in trouble.”

Analysts say Rongsheng is possibly the largest casualty of a sector that has grown over the past decade into the world’s biggest shipbuilding industry by construction capacity. Amid a global shipping downturn, new orders for Chinese builders fell by half last year. In Rongsheng’s case, it won orders worth $55.6 million last year, compared with a target of $1.8 billion.

Rongsheng appealed for government aid on Friday, saying it was cutting its workforce and delaying payments to suppliers to deal with tightened cash flow.

In the prospectus for its initial public offer, Rongsheng said it received 520 million yuan of subsidies from the Rugao city government in the southern province of Jiangsu, where the company is based.

The state funds paid for research and development of new types of vessels, and were based in part on the “essential role we play in the local economy”, Rongsheng said.

As the world’s largest shipbuilder, it had 1,647 shipyards in 2012, data from China Association of the National Shipbuilding Industry showed. Over 60 percent of its shipbuilders are based in Rongsheng’s province of Jiangsu.

Despite this, the government is providing support for the industry, a sign it will also support Rongsheng given its prominence in the sector, analysts said.

Analysts say what separates Rongsheng from many other companies are its connections with the government and state banks. Rongsheng’s Chief Executive Chen Qiang, for example, enjoys “special government allowances” granted by China’s cabinet, the firm’s annual reports say.

Rongsheng also said in its IPO prospectus that it has two five-year financing deals with Export-Import Bank of China that end in 2014 and in 2015, and a 10-year agreement with Bank of China starting from 2009.

After all, local government coffers will suffer the biggest blow if Rongsheng goes bust. The firm had 168 million yuan of deferred income taxes in 2012.

“Do people expect one of the largest shipyards in the world is going to stop building ships completely with state-of-the-art, brand new facilities?” said Martin Rowe, managing director of global shipping services provider Clarkson Asia Ltd. “I think it’s highly unlikely.” (Reporting by Yimou Lee in HONG KONG and Koh Gui Qing in BEIJING; Editing by Neil Fullick)

At Mitsubishi Heavy Industries" Nagasaki shipyard, construction of its new liquefied natural gas carrier Sayaendo, the Japanese word for peapod, is at full steam. The company has so far nabbed contracts to supply seven such vessels, which sport improved fuel efficiency owing to the innovative peapod-like design.