saudi aramco rongsheng supplier
Saudi Aramco today signed three Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) aimed at expanding its downstream presence in the Zhejiang province, one of the most developed regions in China. The company aims to acquire a 9% stake in Zhejiang Petrochemical’s 800,000 barrels per day integrated refinery and petrochemical complex, located in the city of Zhoushan.
The first agreement was signed with the Zhoushan government to acquire its 9% stake in the project. The second agreement was signed with Rongsheng Petrochemical, Juhua Group, and Tongkun Group, who are the other shareholders of Zhejiang Petrochemical. Saudi Aramco’s involvement in the project will come with a long-term crude supply agreement and the ability to utilize Zhejiang Petrochemical’s large crude oil storage facility to serve its customers in the Asian region.
Saudi Aramco CEO, Amin Nasser said: “The agreements demonstrate our commitment to the Chinese market and help enhance the strategic integration of our downstream network in Asia. They will further strengthen our relationship with China and the Zhejiang province, setting the stage for more cooperation in the future.”
Other buyers across Asia and Europe have also said they would cut back on purchases of Iranian oil, unleashing a burst of demand for West African and other crudes rich in distillates, such as grades from Saudi Arabia or the North Sea.
Saudi Aramco signed three Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) on Friday to purchase a 9 percent stake in Chinese Zhejiang Petrochemical"s integrated refinery and petrochemical complex in the city of Zhoushan, and to invest in a retail fuel network in the eastern region of China, the Saudi state-run energy giant announced.
Saudi Aramco"s involvement in the project will come with a long-term crude supply agreement and the ability to utilize Zhejiang Petrochemical"s large crude oil storage facility to serve its customers in the Asian region, according to the statement.
Saudi Aramco and Zhejiang Energy plan to build a large-scale retail network over the course of the next five years in the province, the statement added. The retail business will be integrated with the Zhejiang Petrochemical complex as an outlet for the facility"s refined products.
Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser said the agreements demonstrate the company"s commitment to the Chinese market and would help enhance the strategic integration of its downstream network in Asia.
Saudi Aramco has signed agreements to acquire a 9% stake in the Zhejiang petrochemical project in the Chinese province of Zhejiang for an undisclosed price.
The Arabian company has signed a second agreement with Rongsheng Petrochemical, Juhua Group, and Tongkun Group, the other shareholders of Zhejiang Petrochemical, the holding company of the Chinese petrochemical project.
Saudi Aramco said that its involvement in the project will come with a long-term crude supply agreement and the ability to use Zhejiang Petrochemical’s large crude oil storage facility to cater to its customers in Asia.
Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser said: “The agreements demonstrate our commitment to the Chinese market and help enhance the strategic integration of our downstream network in Asia. They will further strengthen our relationship with China and the Zhejiang province, setting the stage for more cooperation in the future.”
Last week, Saudi Aramco entered into a joint venture agreement with NORINCO Group and Panjin Sincen to develop a fully integrated refining and petrochemical complex in Panjin in another Chinese province Liaoning.
The joint venture, called Huajin Aramco Petrochemical is expected to invest over $10bn to build what will be a 300 thousand barrel per day refinery, equipped with a 1.5 million metric tons per annum (mmtpa) ethylene cracker and a 1.3 mmtpa PX unit.
Aramcofinalised deals to export 1.67 million barrels per day of oil to China, whose top oil supplier is Russia. The agreements were signed at the first China International Import Expo in Shanghai.
“Not only is this [agreement] … unprecedented for China, but rarely has a single country in Saudi Aramco’s history bought so much oil,” the company said on its website.
“The new supply contracts make it very likely that Saudi Aramco next year will become China’s largest supplier, a position it also held from 2006 until 2016.”
“They are critical to diversifying Saudi Aramco’s customer base and capturing a large share of China’s future incremental oil demand, which will increasingly come from private refiners.”
SINGAPORE/BEIJING/DUBAI, Nov 28 (Reuters) - Saudi Arabia is set to expand its market share in China this year for the first time since 2012, with demand stirred up by new Chinese refiners pushing the kingdom back into contention with Russia as top supplier to the world’s largest oil buyer.
Saudi Arabia, the biggest global oil exporter, has been surpassed by Russia as top crude supplier to China the past two years as private “teapot” refiners and a new pipeline drove up demand for Russian oil.
Now fresh demand from new refineries starting up in 2019 could increase China’s Saudi oil imports by between 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) and 700,000 bpd, nudging the OPEC kingpin back towards the top, analysts say.
Saudi Aramco said last week it will sign five crude supply agreements that will take its 2019 contract totals with Chinese buyers to 1.67 million bpd.
“With the recent crude oil supply agreements and potential increase of refinery capacity, the Saudis could overtake the Russians and reclaim (the) crown as the biggest crude exporter to China,” Rystad Energy analyst Paola Rodriguez-Masiu said.
Saudi Arabia has already gained ground this year. China imported 1.04 million bpd of Saudi crude in the first 10 months of 2018, China customs data showed. This is equivalent to 11.5 percent of total Chinese imports, up from 11 percent in 2017, Reuters calculations showed.
Saudi’s market share in China could jump to nearly 17 percent next year, if buyers requested full contractual volumes, analysts from Rystad Energy and Refinitiv said, while growth in Russian oil supply to China could slow.
The biggest boost to Saudi exports to China comes from contracts inked with new refineries starting up this year and next, owned by companies other than state oil giants Sinopec or PetroChina.
Beijing-based consultancy SIA Energy expects Saudi crude imports to rise by just 300,000 bpd in 2019, raising its market share to 13.7 percent, but leaving it behind Russia.
“We expect lower Saudi crude demand from Hengli and Rongsheng as it is unlikely for them to run their refineries at full rate in 2019,” analyst Seng Yick Tee said.
Still, a source familiar with Aramco’s export plans said there is tremendous appetite from China’s independents, and that it needed to be more aggressive in its marketing strategy.
Aramco’s first deal with Hengli was to supply 20 million barrels of crude, about 55,000 bpd, in 2018, said a senior source with direct knowledge of the deal.
Hengli is designed to process 90 percent Saudi crude, a mix of Arab Medium and Arab Heavy, while the remaining 10 percent is Brazilian Marlim crude. Rongsheng’s plant is identical to Hengli, the industry sources said.
Aramco is also supplying PetroChina’s refinery in China’s southwestern Yunnan province with about 4 million barrels a month of crude via a pipeline from Myanmar between July and November, Eikon data showed, although sources said talks for Saudi Arabia to acquire a stake in the refinery have stalled.
Saudi Aramco’s Chief Executive Amin Nasser said on Monday the company will push to expand its market share in China and is still looking for new refining deals there despite OPEC’s likely limits on output next year.
Saudi Aramco will supply up to 70 percent of the oil required at its 300,000-bpd joint venture refinery in Malaysia with Petronas. Between China and Malaysia alone, Saudi Arabia will have to increase exports to Asia by more than 500,000 bpd next year.
Between balancing global supplies and increasing market in Asia, Aramco may decide to “forgo market share in other markets like the United States, where the surge in domestic production will make it difficult for the Saudis to retain market share anyway,” Rystad’s Rodriguez-Masiu said.
Saudi’s oil shipments to the United States have risen recently to above 1 mln bpd, but U.S. output is also increasing, said the source familiar with Saudi Aramco’s export plans.
“You need to lessen the inventories in the U.S.,” the source said, adding that Aramco will likely divert oil supply from the United States to Asia to meet rising demand there.
SINGAPORE (Reuters) - Saudi Aramco plans to deliver the first crude oil cargo to its joint-refinery project with Petronas in Malaysia in October as the companies prepare for trial runs at the new plant, several sources with knowledge of the matter said on Tuesday.FILE PHOTO: An Aramco employee walks near oil tank at Saudi Aramco"s Ras Tanura oil refinery and oil terminal in Saudi Arabia May 21, 2018. REUTERS/Ahmed Jadallah/File Photo
Saudi Arabia has increased its oil production to above 10 million bpd since June to meet rising global demand. It is also in talks with new Chinese refiners Dalian Hengli Petrochemical and Zhejiang Rongsheng Petrochemical to supply long-term crude.
The changing roles played by China’s independent refineries are reflected in their relations with Middle East suppliers. In the battle to ensure their profitability and very survival, smaller Chinese teapots have adopted various measures, including sopping up steeply discounted oil from Iran. Meanwhile, Middle East suppliers, notably Saudi Aramco, are seeking to lock in Chinese crude demand while pursuing new opportunities for further investments in integrated downstream projects led by both private and state-owned companies.
In 2016, during the period of frenzied post-licensing crude oil importing by Chinese independents, Saudi Arabia began targeting teapots on the spot market, as did Kuwait. Iran also joined the fray, with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) operating through an independent trader Trafigura to sell cargoes to Chinese independents.[27] Since then, the coming online of major new greenfield refineries such as Rongsheng ZPC and Hengli Changxing, and Shenghong, which are designed to operate using medium-sour crude, have led Middle East producers to pursue long-term supply contracts with private Chinese refiners. In 2021, the combined share of crude shipments from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, and Kuwait to China’s independent refiners accounted for 32.5%, an increase of more than 8% over the previous year.[28] This is a trend that Beijing seems intent on supporting, as some bigger, more sophisticated private refiners whose business strategy aligns with President Xi’s vision have started to receive tax benefits or permissions to import larger volumes of crude directly from major producers such as Saudi Arabia.[29]
The shift in Saudi Aramco’s market strategy to focus on customer diversification has paid off in the form of valuable supply relationships with Chinese independents. And Aramco’s efforts to expand its presence in the Chinese refining market and lock in demand have dovetailed neatly with the development of China’s new greenfield refineries.[30] Over the past several years, Aramco has collaborated with both state-owned and independent refiners to develop integrated liquids-to-chemicals complexes in China. In 2018, following on the heels of an oil supply agreement, Aramco purchased a 9% stake in ZPC’s Zhoushan integrated refinery. In March of this year, Saudi Aramco and its joint venture partners, NORINCO Group and Panjin Sincen, made a final investment decision (FID) to develop a major liquids-to-chemicals facility in northeast China.[31] Also in March, Aramco and state-owned Sinopec agreed to conduct a feasibility study aimed at assessing capacity expansion of the Fujian Refining and Petrochemical Co. Ltd.’s integrated refining and chemical production complex.[32]
Commenting on the rationale for these undertakings, Mohammed Al Qahtani, Aramco’s Senior Vice-President of Downstream, stated: “China is a cornerstone of our downstream expansion strategy in Asia and an increasingly significant driver of global chemical demand.”[33] But what Al Qahtani did notsay is that the ties forged between Aramco and Chinese leading teapots (e.g., Shandong Chambroad Petrochemicals) and new liquids-to-chemicals complexes have been instrumental in Saudi Arabia regaining its position as China’s top crude oil supplier in the battle for market share with Russia.[34] Just a few short years ago, independents’ crude purchases had helped Russia gain market share at the expense of Saudi Arabia, accelerating the two exporters’ diverging fortunes in China. In fact, between 2010 and 2015, independent refiners’ imports of Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) blend accounted for 92% of the growth in Russian crude deliveries to China.[35] But since then, China’s new generation of independents have played a significant role in Saudi Arabia clawing back market share and, with Beijing’s assent, have fortified their supply relationship with the Kingdom.
As Chinese private refiners’ number, size, and level of sophistication has changed, so too have their roles not just in the domestic petroleum market but in their relations with Middle East suppliers. Beijing’s import licensing and quota policies have enabled some teapot refiners to maintain profitability and others to thrive by sourcing crude oil from the Middle East. For their part, Gulf producers have found Chinese teapots to be valuable customers in the spot market in the battle for market share and, especially in the case of Aramco, in the effort to capture the growth of the Chinese domestic petrochemicals market as it expands.
Plans for a joint Saudi Arabia-China refining and petrochemical complex to be built in northeast China that were shelved in 2020 are now being discussed again, according tosources close to the deal. The original deal for Saudi Aramco and China’s North Industries Group (Norinco) and Panjin Sincen Group to build the US$10 billion 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) integrated refining and petrochemical facility in Panjin city was signed in February 2019. However, in the aftermath of the enduring low prices and economic damage that hit Saudi Arabia as a result of the Second Oil Price War it instigated in the first half of 2020 against the U.S. shale oil threat, Aramco pulled out of the deal in August of that year.
The fact that this landmark refinery joint venture is back under serious consideration underlines the extremely significant shift in Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical alliances in the past few years – principally away from the U.S. and its allies and towards China and its allies. Up until the 2014-2016 Oil Price War, intended by Saudi Arabia to destroy the then-nascent U.S. shale oil sector, the foundation of U.S.-Saudi relations had been the deal struck on 14 February 1945 between the then-U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Saudi King Abdulaziz. In essence, but analyzed in-depth inmy new book on the global oil markets,this was that the U.S. would receive all of the oil supplies it needed for as long as Saudi had oil in place, in return for which the U.S. would guarantee the security both of the ruling House of Saud and, by extension, of Saudi Arabia.
After the end of the 2014-2016 Oil Price War, Saudi Arabia had not only lost the upper hand in global oil markets that it had established alongside other OPEC member states with the 1973 Oil Embargo but it had also prompted a catastrophic breach of trust with its former allies in Washington. Consequently, the U.S. changed the effective terms of 1945 to: the U.S. will safeguard the security both of Saudi Arabia and of the ruling House of Saud for as long as Saudi not only guarantees that the U.S. will receive all of the oil supplies it needs for as long as Saudi has oil in place but also that Saudi Arabia does not attempt to interfere with the growth andprosperity of the U.S. shale oil sector. Shortly after that (in May 2017), the U.S. assured the Saudis that it would protect them against any Iranian attacks, provided that Riyadh also bought US$110 billion of defense equipment from the U.S. immediately and another US$350 billion worth over the next 10 years. However, the Saudis then found out that none of these weapons were able to prevent Iran from launchingsuccessful attacksagainst its key oil facilities in September 2019, or several subsequent attacks.
Concomitant with this weakening of relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. came a drift towards Russia first and then China. Given the reputational damage done to the perceived power of Saudi Arabia and its OPEC brothers by their inability to destroy or disable the growing threat from U.S. shale oil to their former dominance in the global oil markets, their attempts to pull oil prices back up to levels at which they could begin to repair thedamage done to their economiesby the 2014-2016 Oil Price War towards the end of 2016 also failed. At that point, fully cognisant of the enormous economic and geopolitical possibilities that were available to it by becoming a core participant in the crude oil supply/demand/pricing matrix, Russia agreed to support the OPEC production cut deal in what was to be called from then-on ‘OPEC+’, albeit in its own uniquely self-serving and ruthless fashion, again analyzed in-depth inmy new book on the global oil markets.
Given Russia’s significant leverage in the Middle East by dint of its pivotal position in making the OPEC deal credible in terms of being able to affect global oil prices, China also began to more aggressively leverage its own power with the group and in the region by dint of its being the world’s biggest net importer of crude oil and its increasing use of checkbook diplomacy. Nowhere were the two elements more in evidence than in China’s offer to buy the entire 5 percent stake of Aramco in a private placement. This was designed to enable Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to save face, given hisunsuccessful attempts from 2016 to 2020to persuade serious Western investors to have any significant part in the company’s initial public offering. Shortly after the offer was made,China was referred toby Saudi’s then-vice minister of economy and planning, Mohammed al-Tuwaijri, as: “By far one of the top markets” to diversify the funding basis of Saudi Arabia. He added that: “We will also access other technical markets in terms of unique funding opportunities, private placements, panda bonds and others.” In a similar vein, andjust last year, Saudi Aramco’s chief executive officer, Amin Nasser, said: “Ensuring the continuing security of China’s energy needs remains our [Saudi Aramco’s] highest priority — not just for the next five years but for the next 50 and beyond.”
Between the end of the 2014-2016 Oil Price War and now, there have been multiple high-level visits back and forth between Saudi Arabia and China, beginning most notably with the trip of high-ranking politicians and financiers fromChina in August 2017 to Saudi Arabia, which featured a meeting between King Salman and Chinese Vice Premier, Zhang Gaoli, in Jeddah. During the visit, Saudi Arabia first mentioned seriously that it was willing to consider funding itself partly in Chinese yuan, raising the possibility of closer financial ties between the two countries. At these meetings, according to comments at the time from then-Saudi Energy Minister, Khalid al-Falih, it was also decided that Saudi Arabia and China would establish a US$20 billion investment fund on a 50:50 basis that would invest in sectors such as infrastructure, energy, mining, and materials, among other areas. The Jeddah meetings in August 2017 followed a landmark visit to China by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman in March of that year during which around US$65 billion of business deals were signed in sectors including oil refining, petrochemicals, light manufacturing, and electronics.
Later, the first discussions about the joint Saudi-China refining and petrochemical complex in China’s northeast began, with a bonus for Saudi Arabia being that Aramco was intended to supply up to 70 percent of the crude feedstock for the complex that was to have commenced operation in 2024. This, in turn, was part of a multiple-deal series that also included three preliminary agreements to invest in Zhejiang province in eastern China. The first agreement was signed to acquire a 9 percent stake in the greenfield Zhejiang Petrochemical project, the second was a crude oil supply deal signed with Rongsheng Petrochemical, Juhua Group, and Tongkun Group, and the third was with Zhejiang Energy to build a large-scale retail fuel network over five years in Zhejiang province.
This latest Aramco-Norinco-Panjin Sincen deal, though, carries with it even broader ramifications of a much more overtly testing nature for U.S. President Joe Biden in terms of where he draws the line on supposed allies blurring trade considerations and security considerations. All Chinese companies function as part of the State apparatus – without any exception – and Norinco has the added troubling element for the U.S. that it is one of China’s major defense contractors, specializing in the full range of research, development, and production of military equipment, technology, systems, and weapons. This runs alongside ongoing concerns from Washington about Saudi Arabia’s on again-off again agreement with Russia tobuy its S-400 missile defense system, and much more recent news in December 2021 that Saudi Arabia is now actively manufacturing itsown ballistic missiles with the help of China.
ZHOUSHAN, China (Reuters) - State oil giant Saudi Aramco
"We will have a signing ceremony later today with the Zhejiang government to invest in the Zhejiang refinery-petrochemical project," Aramco"s Senior Vice President of Downstream, Abdulaziz al-Judaimi told an industry event.
Zhejiang Petrochemical, 51 percent owned by textile giant Rongsheng Holding Group, plans to start its 400,000-barrels-per-day refinery-petrochemical project in eastern China in late 2018.