saudi aramco rongsheng price

Saudi Aramco today signed three Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) aimed at expanding its downstream presence in the Zhejiang province, one of the most developed regions in China. The company aims to acquire a 9% stake in Zhejiang Petrochemical’s 800,000 barrels per day integrated refinery and petrochemical complex, located in the city of Zhoushan.

The first agreement was signed with the Zhoushan government to acquire its 9% stake in the project. The second agreement was signed with Rongsheng Petrochemical, Juhua Group, and Tongkun Group, who are the other shareholders of Zhejiang Petrochemical. Saudi Aramco’s involvement in the project will come with a long-term crude supply agreement and the ability to utilize Zhejiang Petrochemical’s large crude oil storage facility to serve its customers in the Asian region.

Saudi Aramco CEO, Amin Nasser said: “The agreements demonstrate our commitment to the Chinese market and help enhance the strategic integration of our downstream network in Asia. They will further strengthen our relationship with China and the Zhejiang province, setting the stage for more cooperation in the future.”

SHANGHAI, Nov 10 (Reuters) - China’s private chemical group Hengli Petrochemical said it has entered an annual crude purchase deal with Saudi Aramco for 2019 supplies of 130,000 barrels per day, which marks the top OPEC producer’s second major marketing alliance with a private Chinese refiner.

This is Aramco’s second major crude supply pact with a private Chinese refiner. Aramco earlier agreed to supply Zhejiang Rongsheng Group 170,000 bpd of crude oil under a term agreement with an intent also to take a stake in the Rongsheng refinery in east China.

Saudi Aramco has allocated full-term crude volumes to most Asia-Pacific refiners, with some buyers seeking incremental volumes to take advantage of the recent sharp cuts in official selling prices, sources at refineries in China, Japan, Malaysia and India told S&P Global Platts Oct. 11.

"Demand increase versus incrementals, if Saudi and AG producers give enough to cover demand increase, market wont get support [and] vice versa," a crude oil trader in Singapore said.

"Saudi allocation will keep the spot market in a reasonable range, but the risk is demand, such as RongSheng tender, demand maybe very good this month," another crude oil trader in Singapore said.

Rongsheng"s recent spot tender seeking December-arrival crude could indicate an end to the wait for import quotas for Chinese independent refineries, the second trader said.

Saudi Aramco signed three Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) on Friday to purchase a 9 percent stake in Chinese Zhejiang Petrochemical"s integrated refinery and petrochemical complex in the city of Zhoushan, and to invest in a retail fuel network in the eastern region of China, the Saudi state-run energy giant announced.

Saudi Aramco"s involvement in the project will come with a long-term crude supply agreement and the ability to utilize Zhejiang Petrochemical"s large crude oil storage facility to serve its customers in the Asian region, according to the statement.

Saudi Aramco and Zhejiang Energy plan to build a large-scale retail network over the course of the next five years in the province, the statement added. The retail business will be integrated with the Zhejiang Petrochemical complex as an outlet for the facility"s refined products.

Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser said the agreements demonstrate the company"s commitment to the Chinese market and would help enhance the strategic integration of its downstream network in Asia.

Plans for a joint Saudi Arabia-China refining and petrochemical complex to be built in northeast China that were shelved in 2020 are now being discussed again, according tosources close to the deal. The original deal for Saudi Aramco and China’s North Industries Group (Norinco) and Panjin Sincen Group to build the US$10 billion 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) integrated refining and petrochemical facility in Panjin city was signed in February 2019. However, in the aftermath of the enduring low prices and economic damage that hit Saudi Arabia as a result of the Second Oil Price War it instigated in the first half of 2020 against the U.S. shale oil threat, Aramco pulled out of the deal in August of that year.

The fact that this landmark refinery joint venture is back under serious consideration underlines the extremely significant shift in Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical alliances in the past few years – principally away from the U.S. and its allies and towards China and its allies. Up until the 2014-2016 Oil Price War, intended by Saudi Arabia to destroy the then-nascent U.S. shale oil sector, the foundation of U.S.-Saudi relations had been the deal struck on 14 February 1945 between the then-U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Saudi King Abdulaziz. In essence, but analyzed in-depth inmy new book on the global oil markets,this was that the U.S. would receive all of the oil supplies it needed for as long as Saudi had oil in place, in return for which the U.S. would guarantee the security both of the ruling House of Saud and, by extension, of Saudi Arabia.

After the end of the 2014-2016 Oil Price War, Saudi Arabia had not only lost the upper hand in global oil markets that it had established alongside other OPEC member states with the 1973 Oil Embargo but it had also prompted a catastrophic breach of trust with its former allies in Washington. Consequently, the U.S. changed the effective terms of 1945 to: the U.S. will safeguard the security both of Saudi Arabia and of the ruling House of Saud for as long as Saudi not only guarantees that the U.S. will receive all of the oil supplies it needs for as long as Saudi has oil in place but also that Saudi Arabia does not attempt to interfere with the growth andprosperity of the U.S. shale oil sector. Shortly after that (in May 2017), the U.S. assured the Saudis that it would protect them against any Iranian attacks, provided that Riyadh also bought US$110 billion of defense equipment from the U.S. immediately and another US$350 billion worth over the next 10 years. However, the Saudis then found out that none of these weapons were able to prevent Iran from launchingsuccessful attacksagainst its key oil facilities in September 2019, or several subsequent attacks.

Concomitant with this weakening of relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. came a drift towards Russia first and then China. Given the reputational damage done to the perceived power of Saudi Arabia and its OPEC brothers by their inability to destroy or disable the growing threat from U.S. shale oil to their former dominance in the global oil markets, their attempts to pull oil prices back up to levels at which they could begin to repair thedamage done to their economiesby the 2014-2016 Oil Price War towards the end of 2016 also failed. At that point, fully cognisant of the enormous economic and geopolitical possibilities that were available to it by becoming a core participant in the crude oil supply/demand/pricing matrix, Russia agreed to support the OPEC production cut deal in what was to be called from then-on ‘OPEC+’, albeit in its own uniquely self-serving and ruthless fashion, again analyzed in-depth inmy new book on the global oil markets.

Given Russia’s significant leverage in the Middle East by dint of its pivotal position in making the OPEC deal credible in terms of being able to affect global oil prices, China also began to more aggressively leverage its own power with the group and in the region by dint of its being the world’s biggest net importer of crude oil and its increasing use of checkbook diplomacy. Nowhere were the two elements more in evidence than in China’s offer to buy the entire 5 percent stake of Aramco in a private placement. This was designed to enable Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to save face, given hisunsuccessful attempts from 2016 to 2020to persuade serious Western investors to have any significant part in the company’s initial public offering. Shortly after the offer was made,China was referred toby Saudi’s then-vice minister of economy and planning, Mohammed al-Tuwaijri, as: “By far one of the top markets” to diversify the funding basis of Saudi Arabia. He added that: “We will also access other technical markets in terms of unique funding opportunities, private placements, panda bonds and others.” In a similar vein, andjust last year, Saudi Aramco’s chief executive officer, Amin Nasser, said: “Ensuring the continuing security of China’s energy needs remains our [Saudi Aramco’s] highest priority — not just for the next five years but for the next 50 and beyond.”

Between the end of the 2014-2016 Oil Price War and now, there have been multiple high-level visits back and forth between Saudi Arabia and China, beginning most notably with the trip of high-ranking politicians and financiers fromChina in August 2017 to Saudi Arabia, which featured a meeting between King Salman and Chinese Vice Premier, Zhang Gaoli, in Jeddah. During the visit, Saudi Arabia first mentioned seriously that it was willing to consider funding itself partly in Chinese yuan, raising the possibility of closer financial ties between the two countries. At these meetings, according to comments at the time from then-Saudi Energy Minister, Khalid al-Falih, it was also decided that Saudi Arabia and China would establish a US$20 billion investment fund on a 50:50 basis that would invest in sectors such as infrastructure, energy, mining, and materials, among other areas. The Jeddah meetings in August 2017 followed a landmark visit to China by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman in March of that year during which around US$65 billion of business deals were signed in sectors including oil refining, petrochemicals, light manufacturing, and electronics.

Later, the first discussions about the joint Saudi-China refining and petrochemical complex in China’s northeast began, with a bonus for Saudi Arabia being that Aramco was intended to supply up to 70 percent of the crude feedstock for the complex that was to have commenced operation in 2024. This, in turn, was part of a multiple-deal series that also included three preliminary agreements to invest in Zhejiang province in eastern China. The first agreement was signed to acquire a 9 percent stake in the greenfield Zhejiang Petrochemical project, the second was a crude oil supply deal signed with Rongsheng Petrochemical, Juhua Group, and Tongkun Group, and the third was with Zhejiang Energy to build a large-scale retail fuel network over five years in Zhejiang province.

This latest Aramco-Norinco-Panjin Sincen deal, though, carries with it even broader ramifications of a much more overtly testing nature for U.S. President Joe Biden in terms of where he draws the line on supposed allies blurring trade considerations and security considerations. All Chinese companies function as part of the State apparatus – without any exception – and Norinco has the added troubling element for the U.S. that it is one of China’s major defense contractors, specializing in the full range of research, development, and production of military equipment, technology, systems, and weapons. This runs alongside ongoing concerns from Washington about Saudi Arabia’s on again-off again agreement with Russia tobuy its S-400 missile defense system, and much more recent news in December 2021 that Saudi Arabia is now actively manufacturing itsown ballistic missiles with the help of China.

Saudi Aramco has signed agreements to acquire a 9% stake in the Zhejiang petrochemical project in the Chinese province of Zhejiang for an undisclosed price.

The Arabian company has signed a second agreement with Rongsheng Petrochemical, Juhua Group, and Tongkun Group, the other shareholders of Zhejiang Petrochemical, the holding company of the Chinese petrochemical project.

Saudi Aramco said that its involvement in the project will come with a long-term crude supply agreement and the ability to use Zhejiang Petrochemical’s large crude oil storage facility to cater to its customers in Asia.

Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser said: “The agreements demonstrate our commitment to the Chinese market and help enhance the strategic integration of our downstream network in Asia. They will further strengthen our relationship with China and the Zhejiang province, setting the stage for more cooperation in the future.”

Last week, Saudi Aramco entered into a joint venture agreement with NORINCO Group and Panjin Sincen to develop a fully integrated refining and petrochemical complex in Panjin in another Chinese province Liaoning.

The joint venture, called Huajin Aramco Petrochemical is expected to invest over $10bn to build what will be a 300 thousand barrel per day refinery, equipped with a 1.5 million metric tons per annum (mmtpa) ethylene cracker and a 1.3 mmtpa PX unit.

Other buyers across Asia and Europe have also said they would cut back on purchases of Iranian oil, unleashing a burst of demand for West African and other crudes rich in distillates, such as grades from Saudi Arabia or the North Sea.

State oil giant Saudi Aramco signed an agreement on Thursday to invest in a refinery-petrochemical project in eastern China, part of its strategy to expand in downstream operations globally.

Zhejiang Petrochemical, 51 percent owned by textile giant Zhejiang Rongsheng Holding Group, is building a 400,000-barrels-per-day refinery and associated petrochemical facilities that was expected to start operations by the end of this year.

This is the third such project in China that Saudi Aramco has set its sight on as it seeks to lock in long-term outlets for its crude oil and produce fuel and petrochemicals to meet rising demand in Asia and cushion the risk of a slowdown in oil consumption.

The oil giant had not yet finalised the size of its stake in the project and still needed to complete due diligence, Aramco’s Senior Vice President of Downstream, Abdulaziz al-Judaimi, told Reuters on the sidelines of the event.

Aramco also owns part of the Fujian refinery-petrochemical plant with Sinopec and Exxon Mobil Corp, and has plans to build a 300,000-bpd refinery with China’s Norinco. It is also in talks with PetroChina to invest in a refinery in Yunnan.

State oil giant Saudi Aramco plans to ink an agreement later on Thursday to take a stake in a refinery-petrochemical project in eastern China, a senior official said on Thursday.

"We will have a signing ceremony later today with the Zhejiang government to invest in the Zhejiang refinery-petrochemical project," Aramco"s Senior Vice President of Downstream, Abdulaziz al-Judaimi told an industry event.

Zhejiang Petrochemical, 51 percent owned by textile giant Rongsheng Holding Group, plans to start its 400,000-barrels-per-day refinery-petrochemical project in eastern China in late 2018.

Apparently confirming the view of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) that the U.S. is now regarded as just another one of its partners in a new global order that would see Beijing and its allies share the leadership position with Washington, Saudi Arabia last week reiterated its commitment to China as its “most reliable partner and supplier of crude oil,” along with broader assurances of its ongoing support in several other areas. That MbS seemingly now sees the U.S. as a partner just for its security considerations, with no meaningful quid pro quo on Saudi Arabia’s part, whilst regarding China as its key partner economically and Russia as its key partner in energy matters, should not surprise the U.S.

Back in March last year it was made clear enough at the annual China Development Forum hosted in Beijing, when Aramco chief executive officer, Amin Nasser said: “Ensuring the continuing security of China’s energy needs remains our highest priority - not just for the next five years but for the next 50 and beyond.” And yet, the U.S. is surprised by the apparent finalisation of the transition of Saudi Arabia away from Washington and towards China, which effectively marks the end of the 1945 core agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia that defined their relationship up until extremely recently. This transition has been seen most recently in the refusal of MbS to take a telephone call from President Joe Biden in which he was to ask for his help in bringing down economy-crimping high energy prices and then in the huge cut in collective OPEC oil production that has only added to energy-driven inflationary fears for global economies.

Given the peremptory way in which the core 1945 agreement was ended by MbS, Washington is angry too, as was evidenced in the highly pointed comments from several senior U.S. officials at the time of the OPEC cut, including from Biden himself, who said that: “There’s going to be some consequences for what they’ve done, with Russia [supporting oil prices by leading OPEC’s 2 million barrel per day (bpd) collective output cut]…I’m not going to get into what I’d consider and what I have in mind. But there will be – there will be consequences.” Just before Biden’s comments, John Kirby, the national security council spokesperson, echoed official doubts on the future of the U.S.-Saudi security relationship, as he said that Biden believed that the U.S. ought to “review the bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia and take a look to see if that relationship is where it needs to be and that it is serving our national security interests,…in light of the recent decision by OPEC, and Saudi Arabia’s leadership [of it].”

Apparently careless of these ramifications, Saudi Arabia last week stated that, in addition to continuing in its role as China’s partner of choice in the oil market, the two countries would continue “close communication and strengthen co-operation to address emerging risks and challenges,” according to a joint communique from Saudi Energy Minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman and Beijing"s National Energy Administrator, Zhang Jianhua. In the context of crude oil, according to Chinese Customs data, Saudi Arabia delivered 1.76 million bpd in shipments to China over the January to August period, marking an increase in its market share to 17.7 percent from 16.9 percent a year earlier.

Additionally, last week saw the two countries pledge to continue discussions on developing joint integrated refining and petrochemical complexes and to cooperate on the use of nuclear energy. Although flagged by Saudi Arabia and China as being ‘the peaceful use of nuclear energy’, the news just before Christmas 2021 that U.S. intelligence agencies had found that Saudi Arabia is now manufacturing its own ballistic missiles with the help of China – and given China’s long-running and extensive ‘assistance’ to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, as analysed in full in my latest book on the global oil markets - ongoing U.S. fears about what Beijing’s endgame might be in building out the nuclear capabilities of key states in the Middle East will not have been alleviated.

This latest round of talks and agreements comes very shortly after the signing of a multi-pronged memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Saudi Arabian Oil Company – formerly the Saudi Arabian American Oil Company – ‘Aramco’, and the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), which can be regarded as a critical step in China’s ongoing strategy to secure Saudi Arabia as a client state. As the president of Sinopec, Yu Baocai, himself put it: “The signing of the MoU introduces a new chapter of our partnership in the Kingdom…The two companies will join hands in renewing the vitality and scoring new progress of the Belt and Road Initiative [BRI] and [Saudi Arabia’s] Vision 2030.”

Crucially for China’s long-term plans in Saudi Arabia, it also covers opportunities for the construction of a huge manufacturing hub in King Salman Energy Park that will involve the ongoing, on-the-ground presence on Saudi Arabian soil of significant numbers of Chinese personnel: not just those directly related to the oil, gas, petrochemicals, and other hydrocarbons activities, but also a small army of security personnel to ensure the safety of China’s investments. At that point in early 2021, Aramco had a 25 percent stake in the 280,000 bpd Fujian refinery in south China through a joint venture with Sinopec (and the U.S.’s ExxonMobil) and had also earlier agreed (in 2018) to buy a 9 percent stake in China’s 800,000 bpd ZPC refinery from Rongsheng. Several other joint projects between China and Saudi Arabia that had been agreed in principle were delayed due to a combination of the ongoing effects of Covid-19, Aramco’s crushing dividend repayment schedule, and concern from both countries – especially China – on how Washington might react to this clear threat to the U.S.’s own long-running interests in, and geopolitical relationship with, Saudi Arabia.

Just prior to this, June saw Saudi Aramco’s senior vice president downstream, Mohammed Y. Al Qahtani, announce the creation of a ‘one-stop shop’ provided by his company in China’s Shandong. “The ongoing energy crisis, for example, is a direct result of fragile international transition plans which have arbitrarily ignored energy security and affordability for all,” he said. “The world needs clear-eyed thinking on such issues. That’s why we highly admire China’s 14th Five Year Plan for prioritising energy security and stability, acknowledging its crucial role in economic development,” he added. The megaproject in Shandong, which is home to around 26 percent of China’s refining capacity and is a key destination for Saudi Aramco’s crude oil exports, will broadly involve the flagship Saudi oil and gas giant creating “stronger ties with the world’s largest oil exporter [that] would enhance China’s energy security, especially as we work on increasing our production capacity to 13 million barrels per day,” according to Al Qahtani. Aside from the fact that Saudi Arabia still cannot produce anywhere near 13 million barrels per day of crude oil, closer cooperation between Aramco and China will mean Saudi Arabia investing heavily in the build-out of a large, integrated downstream business across the country in tandem with its Chinese partners

Given the transition of Saudi Arabia away from the U.S. and towards China – and the senior Saudis do look at the issue in these terms, whatever they say publicly – there is also every reason to expect Riyadh to continue to back China’s efforts to undermine the power of the U.S. dollar in the global energy markets as well. Not only is Saudi Arabia now a prime mover in advancing the China-GCC Free Trade Agreement (FTA) – a key aim of which is to forge a “deeper strategic cooperation in a region where U.S. dominance is showing signs of retreat” – but also the Kingdom is now a prime advocate for switching away from the hegemony of U.S. dollars in the pricing of global oil and gas.

Just after China made a crucial face-saving offer to MbS to privately buy the entire 5 percent stake in Saudi Aramco that he originally wanted to float but could not entice Western investors to buy, the then-Saudi Vice Minister of Economy and Planning, Mohammed al-Tuwaijri, told a Saudi-China conference in Jeddah that: “We will be very willing to consider funding in renminbi and other Chinese products.” He added: “China is by far one of the top markets’ to diversify the funding…[and] we will also access other technical markets in terms of unique funding opportunities, private placements, panda bonds and others.” Moreover, recent reports state that long-running talks between Saudi Arabia and China for Saudi to price and receive payments for some of its oil sales in Chinese renminbi rather than in U.S. dollars have intensified in the past few months.

(Yicai Global) Feb. 25 -- The national petroleum and oil giant of Saudi Arabia will purchase a minority stake in Zhejiang Petrochemical along with two other deals to expand its downstream business in eastern China.

Saudi Arabian Oil Company, also known as Saudi Aramco, penned three memorandums of understanding in eastern Zhejiang province, one of them with the Zhoushan municipal government involving a purchase of a 9 percent stake in ZP, the Asian division of the Dhahran-based parent posted on its official WeChat account on Feb. 23.

The deals show Saudi Aramco"s commitment to the Chinese market and will help to enhance the strategic integration of its downstream business network in Asia, Amin Nasser, the president and chief executive of Saudi Aramco said in the post.

Saudi Aramco will provide ZP with crude oil for refining in the latter"s new plant in Zhoushan for the long-term while making use of ZP"s large storage facilities to serve customers in Asia. ZP aims to provide 6 million tons of refined oil each year at the project in its hometown with with an investment of CNY173 billion (USD25.8 billion). The target firm can process 800,000 barrels of crude oil a day, Saudi Aramco"s post added.

Saudi Aramco also agreed with Zhejiang Provincial Energy Group to establish a large refined oil retail network in Zhejiang province within five years to integrate resources and make the Chinese firm into a competitive distribution channel.

Founded in 2015, ZP has a mixed ownership structure. Privately owned Rongsheng Petrochemical has a 51 percent stake while the two state-owned shareholders include Zhejiang Juhua Investment with a 20 percent stake as well as Zhoushan Ocean Comprehensive Development and Investment with a 9 percent stake.

The changing roles played by China’s independent refineries are reflected in their relations with Middle East suppliers. In the battle to ensure their profitability and very survival, smaller Chinese teapots have adopted various measures, including sopping up steeply discounted oil from Iran. Meanwhile, Middle East suppliers, notably Saudi Aramco, are seeking to lock in Chinese crude demand while pursuing new opportunities for further investments in integrated downstream projects led by both private and state-owned companies.

In 2016, during the period of frenzied post-licensing crude oil importing by Chinese independents, Saudi Arabia began targeting teapots on the spot market, as did Kuwait. Iran also joined the fray, with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) operating through an independent trader Trafigura to sell cargoes to Chinese independents.[27] Since then, the coming online of major new greenfield refineries such as Rongsheng ZPC and Hengli Changxing, and Shenghong, which are designed to operate using medium-sour crude, have led Middle East producers to pursue long-term supply contracts with private Chinese refiners. In 2021, the combined share of crude shipments from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, and Kuwait to China’s independent refiners accounted for 32.5%, an increase of more than 8% over the previous year.[28] This is a trend that Beijing seems intent on supporting, as some bigger, more sophisticated private refiners whose business strategy aligns with President Xi’s vision have started to receive tax benefits or permissions to import larger volumes of crude directly from major producers such as Saudi Arabia.[29]

The shift in Saudi Aramco’s market strategy to focus on customer diversification has paid off in the form of valuable supply relationships with Chinese independents. And Aramco’s efforts to expand its presence in the Chinese refining market and lock in demand have dovetailed neatly with the development of China’s new greenfield refineries.[30] Over the past several years, Aramco has collaborated with both state-owned and independent refiners to develop integrated liquids-to-chemicals complexes in China. In 2018, following on the heels of an oil supply agreement, Aramco purchased a 9% stake in ZPC’s Zhoushan integrated refinery. In March of this year, Saudi Aramco and its joint venture partners, NORINCO Group and Panjin Sincen, made a final investment decision (FID) to develop a major liquids-to-chemicals facility in northeast China.[31] Also in March, Aramco and state-owned Sinopec agreed to conduct a feasibility study aimed at assessing capacity expansion of the Fujian Refining and Petrochemical Co. Ltd.’s integrated refining and chemical production complex.[32]

Commenting on the rationale for these undertakings, Mohammed Al Qahtani, Aramco’s Senior Vice-President of Downstream, stated: “China is a cornerstone of our downstream expansion strategy in Asia and an increasingly significant driver of global chemical demand.”[33] But what Al Qahtani did notsay is that the ties forged between Aramco and Chinese leading teapots (e.g., Shandong Chambroad Petrochemicals) and new liquids-to-chemicals complexes have been instrumental in Saudi Arabia regaining its position as China’s top crude oil supplier in the battle for market share with Russia.[34] Just a few short years ago, independents’ crude purchases had helped Russia gain market share at the expense of Saudi Arabia, accelerating the two exporters’ diverging fortunes in China. In fact, between 2010 and 2015, independent refiners’ imports of Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) blend accounted for 92% of the growth in Russian crude deliveries to China.[35] But since then, China’s new generation of independents have played a significant role in Saudi Arabia clawing back market share and, with Beijing’s assent, have fortified their supply relationship with the Kingdom.

As Chinese private refiners’ number, size, and level of sophistication has changed, so too have their roles not just in the domestic petroleum market but in their relations with Middle East suppliers. Beijing’s import licensing and quota policies have enabled some teapot refiners to maintain profitability and others to thrive by sourcing crude oil from the Middle East. For their part, Gulf producers have found Chinese teapots to be valuable customers in the spot market in the battle for market share and, especially in the case of Aramco, in the effort to capture the growth of the Chinese domestic petrochemicals market as it expands.