su rongsheng quotation

HONG KONG (Reuters) - Jiangsu Rongsheng Heavy Industries Co Ltd has appointed Morgan Stanleyand JP Morganto finalize plans for its long-awaited IPO in Hong Kong, aiming to raise up to $1.5 billion in the fourth quarter, sources told Reuters on Tuesday.

This is Rongsheng’s latest bid to go public after it failed to raise more than $2 billion from a planned IPO in Hong Kong in 2008, mainly as a result of the global financial crisis.

Rongsheng"s early main shareholders included an Asia investment arm of Goldman Sachs, U.S. hedge fund D.E. Shaw and New Horizon, a China fund founded by the son of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.

The three investors sold off their stakes in Rongsheng for a profit early this year, said the sources familiar with the situation. Representatives for the banks, funds and Rongsheng all declined to comment.

Rongsheng’s revived IPO plan comes at a challenging time. Smaller domestic rival, New Century Shipbuilding, slashed its Singapore IPO in half last week, planning to raise up to $560 million from the originally planned $1.24 billion due to weak market conditions.

Given uncertainty in the global shipbuilding business environment as well as growing concerns over a huge flow of fund-raising events in Hong Kong, investment bankers suggest the potential size for Rongsheng could be $1 billion to $1.5 billion, according to the sources.

Rongsheng is seeking to tap capital markets to fund fast growth and aims to catch up with bigger state-owned rivals such as Guangzhou Shipyard International Co Ltd.

Rongsheng won a $484 million deal to build four ships for Oman Shipping Co last year. The vessels would carry exports from an iron ore pellet plant in northern Oman which is expected to begin production in the second half of 2010.

HONG KONG, Nov 26 (Reuters) - China Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group, the country’s largest private shipbuilder, said its chairman had stepped down just three months after the company posted its sharpest fall in half-year net profit.

Listed in November 2010, Rongsheng was hit by an insider dealing scandal involving a firm owned by Zhang ahead of the $15.1 billion bid for Canadian oil firm Nexen Inc by China offshore oil and gas producer CNOOC.

Rongsheng said earlier this month that investment firm Well Advantage, controlled by Zhang, had agreed to pay $14 million as part of a settlement deal with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

In August, Rongsheng posted an 82 percent drop in half-year profit on a dearth of new orders and warned economic uncertainties would continue to weigh on the global shipping market.

As part of the changes at China Rongsheng, the company said that Zhang De Huang was retiring and had resigned as an executive director and as vice chairman of the board.

(31 March 2015, Hong Kong) - China Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group Holdings Limited ("China Rongsheng Heavy Industries", the "Company" or "We", and together with its subsidiaries, the "Group"; stock code: 01101.HK) announced its audited annual results for the twelve months ended 31 December 2014 (the "Period").

Launched a fresh start, China Rongsheng Heavy Industries implemented its strategy of business transformation in 2014 and completed the acquisition of oilfield project in Kyrgyzstan in September. We are proactively transforming into an oil and natural gas exploitation and production operator.

Meanwhile, we demonstrated the strong production capacity of our shipbuilding facilities and outstanding technical expertise of the Group. Our shipbuilding segment has delivered 11 vessels, with a total volume of 2,059,660 DWT, successfully in 2014. More proactively sorting and optimising our order book, we decisively reduced the number of vessels under construction and cancelled some shipbuilding orders. We believe this action not only was in alignment with the Group"s strategic plan to optimize the production and operation of its shipbuilding business during the Period, but also effectively reduced our burden on working capital and the credit risk of our order book, in spite of the fact that we have recorded a relatively larger amount of comprehensive net loss for the Period and a reversal of revenue of RMB4,530.7 solely resulted from the cancellation of shipbuilding contracts.

non-cash provisions and impairments, supporting us to strive for a strategic transformation towards energy sector and being well-equipped for future challenges.

In 2014, we sorted and optimised our order book by reducing the number of vessels under construction and cancelling some shipbuilding orders. We negotiated proactively with ship owners and reached agreement with them on certain orders on hand, resulting in the cancellation, revision and variation of a number of shipbuilding contracts. We believe that this action will reduce our burden on working capital and effectively reduce the credit risk of our order book. Thus, the shipbuilding segment of the Company recorded a negative revenue of RMB3,891.4 million which is mainly attribute to the reversal of revenue from cancellation of shipbuilding contracts for the Period.

As at 31 December 2014, our total orders on hand consisted of 35 vessels, representing a total volume of approximately 4,203,700 DWT with a total contract value of approximately USD1,668.4 million. They included 18 Panamax bulk carriers, 1 very large ore carrier, 1 Panamax crude oil tanker, 12 Suezmax crude oil tankers, 1 very large crude oil carrier, and 2 7,000-TEU containerships.

We utilised existing facilities and technical expertise to construct the No. 28 and No. 29 steel caisson projects of the Shanghai Yangtze River Bridge and successfully delivered them during the Period, demonstrating our ability in building non-vessel steel structures and securing new sources of revenue. The No. 29 steel caisson, weighing approximately 15,000 tons, is the largest steel caisson of its kind in the world.

On 11 September 2014, we completed the acquisition of 60% interest in the project (the "Kyrgyzstan Project") involving four oilfields located in the Fergana Valley of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which marked our breakthrough in the energy exploration and development sector. The Kyrgyzstan Project comprises of five oilfield zones namely, Maili-Su IV, Eastern Izbaskent, Izbaskent, Changyrtash and Chigirchik. The first three oilfield zones are located at the northeastern part of the Fergana Valley while the latter two are located at the Southeastern part of Fergana Valley. The total area covered by these five fields is approximately 545 square kilometres. The remaining recoverable reserves is estimated to be around 638 million barrels (MMbbl) of oil. Under the agreements entered into with the national oil company of Kyrgyzstan, Kbprb3>KepHeq:nera3 ("Kyrgyzjer Neftegaz" Limited Liability Company*), our indirect wholly-owned subsidiary was granted rights to cooperate with the national oil company of Kyrgyzstan in the operation of the five oilfields zones.

From 11 September 2014 to 31 December 2014, we have made satisfactory progress in the project. As at 31 December 2014, we had successfully completed drilling of 10 wells and had produced 16,260 barrels (bbl) of light crude oil, our daily production rate being about 252 bbl of light crude oil, even though only part of the oil wells were in operation. After initial drilling and production, we further understood and acknowledgedt the geological condition of the project. We will continue the process of perforating, testing and fracturing of the new wells to ramp up production. Since the project is still at the initial development stage, the sales of oil has not been reflected as revenue for the Period under relevant accounting treatment.

We have taken certain measures to mitigate the liquidity pressure and to improve financial position. In 2014, we completed issue of convertible bonds amounted to a total net proceeds of HKD3,985 million to strategic investors. In October, we has signed debt optimization framework agreements with a syndicate of domestic banks in Hefei of

Anhui Province. Plus, the debt optimization framework agreement we have entered into with a syndicate formed by more than ten banks in Jiangsu Province, including Bank of China, The Export-Import Bank of China and China Minsheng Bank, such measures effectively mitigated liquidity pressure of the Company.

Global economic recovery will remain a challenging course in 2015. Freight fees will remain at lower levels as any fundamental improvements to the situation of surplus capacity in the shipping market will be unlikely. It is well within expectations that the China"s shipbuilding industry will generally enter into a stage of structural realignment and rebuilding of strengths.

In September 2014, we obtained the rights to co-operate with the national oil company of Kyrgyzstan in respect of five oilfield zones in Kyrgyzstan by way of the allotment of shares as consideration. Central Asia is a region subject mainly to the influence of Russia, whose export oil prices have not plunged in tandem with international oil prices and have remained apart from the international price level. Local domestic oil prices of Kyrgyzstan have not changed significantly despite the dramatic decline in international oil prices. In view of the low costs and stable local oil prices, we are of the view that, under the current adverse market conditions of the shipbuilding industry, exposure to the energy sector will enable us to diversify our operations and broaden our source of revenue, as well as drive our active transformation from a manufacturer to a supplier in the energy service sector, thereby enhancing contributions to the overall interests of our shareholders.

Privately owned unaffiliated refineries, known as “teapots,”[3] mainly clustered in Shandong province, have been at the center of Beijing’s longtime struggle to rein in surplus refining capacity and, more recently, to cut carbon emissions. A year ago, Beijing launched its latest attempt to shutter outdated and inefficient teapots — an effort that coincides with the emergence of a new generation of independent players that are building and operating fully integrated mega-petrochemical complexes.[4]

The changing roles played by China’s independent refineries are reflected in their relations with Middle East suppliers. In the battle to ensure their profitability and very survival, smaller Chinese teapots have adopted various measures, including sopping up steeply discounted oil from Iran. Meanwhile, Middle East suppliers, notably Saudi Aramco, are seeking to lock in Chinese crude demand while pursuing new opportunities for further investments in integrated downstream projects led by both private and state-owned companies.

China’s “teapot” refineries[5] play a significant role in refining oil and account for a fifth of Chinese crude imports.[6] Historically, teapots conducted most of their business with China’s major state-owned companies, buying crude oil from and selling much of their output to them after processing it into gasoline and diesel. Though operating in the shadows of China’s giant national oil companies (NOCs),[7] teapots served as valuable swing producers — their surplus capacity called on in times of tight markets.

Yet, the Chinese government has spent the better part of two decades trying to consolidate the country’s sprawling independent refining sector by starving private operators of access to imported crude oil and targeting the smallest, least efficient plants for closure.[8] In 2011, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued guidelines to eliminate small refineries to achieve economies of scale and improve efficiencies. Nevertheless, policies meant to discourage activity had the opposite effect, as most of the units that were earmarked for suspension expanded to stay open.[9]

2021 marked the start of the central government’s latest effort to consolidate and tighten supervision over the refining sector and to cap China’s overall refining capacity.[14] Besides imposing a hefty tax on imports of blending fuels, Beijing has instituted stricter tax and environmental enforcement[15] measures including: performing refinery audits and inspections;[16] conducting investigations of alleged irregular activities such as tax evasion and illegal resale of crude oil imports;[17] and imposing tighter quotas for oil product exports as China’s decarbonization efforts advance.[18]

The politics surrounding this new class of greenfield mega-refineries is important, as is their geographical distribution. Beijing’s reform strategy is focused on reducing the country’s petrochemical imports and growing its high value-added chemical business while capping crude processing capacity. The push by Beijing in this direction has been conducive to the development of privately-led mega refining and petrochemical projects, which local officials have welcomed and staunchly supported.[20]

Yet, of the three most recent major additions to China’s greenfield refinery landscape, none are in Shandong province, home to a little over half the country’s independent refining capacity. Hengli’s Changxing integrated petrochemical complex is situated in Liaoning, Zhejiang’s (ZPC) Zhoushan facility in Zhejiang, and Shenghong’s Lianyungang plant in Jiangsu.[21]

As China’s independent oil refining hub, Shandong is the bellwether for the rationalization of the country’s refinery sector. Over the years, Shandong’s teapots benefited from favorable policies such as access to cheap land and support from a local government that grew reliant on the industry for jobs and contributions to economic growth.[22] For this reason, Shandong officials had resisted strictly implementing Beijing’s directives to cull teapot refiners and turned a blind eye to practices that ensured their survival.

But with the start-up of advanced liquids-to-chemicals complexes in neighboring provinces, Shandong’s competitiveness has diminished.[23] And with pressure mounting to find new drivers for the provincial economy, Shandong officials have put in play a plan aimed at shuttering smaller capacity plants and thus clearing the way for a large-scale private sector-led refining and petrochemical complex on Yulong Island, whose construction is well underway.[24] They have also been developing compensation and worker relocation packages to cushion the impact of planned plant closures, while obtaining letters of guarantee from independent refiners pledging that they will neither resell their crude import quotas nor try to purchase such allocations.[25]

To be sure, the number of Shandong’s independent refiners is shrinking and their composition within the province and across the country is changing — with some smaller-scale units facing closure and others (e.g., Shandong Haike Group, Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Corp, and Shandong Chambroad Group) pursuing efforts to diversify their sources of revenue by moving up the value chain. But make no mistake: China’s teapots still account for a third of China’s total refining capacity and a fifth of the country’s crude oil imports. They continue to employ creative defensive measures in the face of government and market pressures, have partnered with state-owned companies, and are deeply integrated with crucial industries downstream.[26] They are consummate survivors in a key sector that continues to evolve — and they remain too important to be driven out of the domestic market or allowed to fail.

In 2016, during the period of frenzied post-licensing crude oil importing by Chinese independents, Saudi Arabia began targeting teapots on the spot market, as did Kuwait. Iran also joined the fray, with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) operating through an independent trader Trafigura to sell cargoes to Chinese independents.[27] Since then, the coming online of major new greenfield refineries such as Rongsheng ZPC and Hengli Changxing, and Shenghong, which are designed to operate using medium-sour crude, have led Middle East producers to pursue long-term supply contracts with private Chinese refiners. In 2021, the combined share of crude shipments from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, and Kuwait to China’s independent refiners accounted for 32.5%, an increase of more than 8% over the previous year.[28] This is a trend that Beijing seems intent on supporting, as some bigger, more sophisticated private refiners whose business strategy aligns with President Xi’s vision have started to receive tax benefits or permissions to import larger volumes of crude directly from major producers such as Saudi Arabia.[29]

The shift in Saudi Aramco’s market strategy to focus on customer diversification has paid off in the form of valuable supply relationships with Chinese independents. And Aramco’s efforts to expand its presence in the Chinese refining market and lock in demand have dovetailed neatly with the development of China’s new greenfield refineries.[30] Over the past several years, Aramco has collaborated with both state-owned and independent refiners to develop integrated liquids-to-chemicals complexes in China. In 2018, following on the heels of an oil supply agreement, Aramco purchased a 9% stake in ZPC’s Zhoushan integrated refinery. In March of this year, Saudi Aramco and its joint venture partners, NORINCO Group and Panjin Sincen, made a final investment decision (FID) to develop a major liquids-to-chemicals facility in northeast China.[31] Also in March, Aramco and state-owned Sinopec agreed to conduct a feasibility study aimed at assessing capacity expansion of the Fujian Refining and Petrochemical Co. Ltd.’s integrated refining and chemical production complex.[32]

Commenting on the rationale for these undertakings, Mohammed Al Qahtani, Aramco’s Senior Vice-President of Downstream, stated: “China is a cornerstone of our downstream expansion strategy in Asia and an increasingly significant driver of global chemical demand.”[33] But what Al Qahtani did notsay is that the ties forged between Aramco and Chinese leading teapots (e.g., Shandong Chambroad Petrochemicals) and new liquids-to-chemicals complexes have been instrumental in Saudi Arabia regaining its position as China’s top crude oil supplier in the battle for market share with Russia.[34] Just a few short years ago, independents’ crude purchases had helped Russia gain market share at the expense of Saudi Arabia, accelerating the two exporters’ diverging fortunes in China. In fact, between 2010 and 2015, independent refiners’ imports of Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) blend accounted for 92% of the growth in Russian crude deliveries to China.[35] But since then, China’s new generation of independents have played a significant role in Saudi Arabia clawing back market share and, with Beijing’s assent, have fortified their supply relationship with the Kingdom.

Smaller Chinese independents have been less fortunate, hit hard not just by tougher domestic regulation but by soaring crude oil prices.[36] US-led sanctions flowing from the war in Ukraine have compounded the pressure on teapots, which prior to the conflict had sourced about a fifth of their crude oil from Russia. Soaring oil tanker freight rates and the refusal of Chinese banks to issue letters of credit for Russian crude have choked off much of this supply, though some private refiners have compensated by using cash transfers to pay for Russian ESPO blend crude.[37]

Meanwhile, though, enticed by discounted prices Chinese independents in Shandong province have continued to scoop up sanctioned Iranian oil, especially as their domestic refining margins have thinned due to tight regulatory scrutiny. In fact, throughout the period in which Iran has been under nuclear-related sanctions, Chinese teapots have been a key outlet for Iranian oil, which they reportedly unload from reflagged vessels representing themselves as selling oil from Oman and Malaysia.[38] China Concord Petroleum Company (CCPC), a Chinese logistics firm, remained a pivotal player in the supply of sanctioned oil from Iran, even after it was blacklisted by Washington in 2019.[39] Although Chinese state refiners shun Iranian oil, at least publicly, because of US sanctions, private refiners have never stopped buying Iranian crude.[40] And in recent months, teapots have been at the forefront of the Chinese surge in crude oil imports from Iran.[41]

China’s small-scale, inefficient “first generation” teapot refiners have come under mounting market pressure, as well as closer government scrutiny and tightened regulation. Though some have already been shuttered and others face imminent closure, dozens of China’s teapots, concentrated mainly in Shandong province, continue to operate thanks to the creative defensive measures they have employed and the important role they play in local economies.

Vertical integration along the value chain has become a global trend in the petrochemical industry, specifically in refining and chemical operations. China’s drive to self-sufficiency in chemicals is a key factor powering this worldwide trend.[42] And it is the emergent “second generation” of independent refiners that it is helping make China the frontrunner in developing massive liquids-to-chemicals complexes. Following Beijing’s lead, Shandong officials appear determined to follow this trend rather than risk being left in its wake.

As Chinese private refiners’ number, size, and level of sophistication has changed, so too have their roles not just in the domestic petroleum market but in their relations with Middle East suppliers. Beijing’s import licensing and quota policies have enabled some teapot refiners to maintain profitability and others to thrive by sourcing crude oil from the Middle East. For their part, Gulf producers have found Chinese teapots to be valuable customers in the spot market in the battle for market share and, especially in the case of Aramco, in the effort to capture the growth of the Chinese domestic petrochemicals market as it expands.

EPS 1 anno fa0,270,311,270,69Ricavi stimatiTrim. attuale (dic 2022)Trim. successivo (mar 2023)Anno attuale (2022)Anno successivo (2023)Numero di analisti101718

% sorpresa-22,90%-6,10%-38,90%-96,90%Tendenza utili per azioneTrim. attuale (dic 2022)Trim. successivo (mar 2023)Anno attuale (2022)Anno successivo (2023)Stima corrente0,180,450,691,16

90 giorni fa0,270,380,791,24Revisioni utili per azioneTrim. attuale (dic 2022)Trim. successivo (mar 2023)Anno attuale (2022)Anno successivo (2023)Rialzo ultimi 7 ggN/DN/DN/D1

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We propose Implicit Quote Extractor, an end-to-end unsupervised extractive neural summarization model for conversational texts. When we reply to posts, quotes are used to highlight important part of texts. We aim to extract quoted sentences as summaries. Most replies do not explicitly include quotes, so it is difficult to use quotes as supervision. However, even if it is not explicitly shown, replies always refer to certain parts of texts; we call them implicit quotes. Implicit Quote Extractor aims to extract implicit quotes as summaries. The training task of the model is to predict whether a reply candidate is a true reply to a post. For prediction, the model has to choose a few sentences from the post. To predict accurately, the model learns to extract sentences that replies frequently refer to. We evaluate our model on two email datasets and one social media dataset, and confirm that our model is useful for extractive summarization. We further discuss two topics; one is whether quote extraction is an important factor for summarization, and the other is whether our model can capture salient sentences that conventional methods cannot.

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1.Su Rongsheng, Wang Rongmei, Cao Huabin, Tang Zhaoxin et al. High copper levels promotes broiler hepatoctye mitochondrial permeability transition in vivo and in vitro. Biologcial Trace Element Research, 2011, 12 (144): 636-646.

2. Su Rongsheng, Wang Rongmei, Cao Huabin, Tang Zhaoxin et al. In vitro effect of copper chloride exposure on reactive oxygen species generation and respiratory chain complexes activities of mitochondria isolated from broile liver. Biological Trace Element Research, 2011, 12 (144): 668-677.

3.Su Rongsheng, Cao Huabin, Li Heping, Tang Zhaoxin, et al. Effect of copper on membrane permeability and respiration of mitochondria from broiler hepatocyte. Veterinary Science in China, 2007, 37 (04): 342-345. ( in Chinese)

4.Su Rongsheng, Cao Huabin, Li Heping, Tang Zhaoxin, et al. Effect of copper on hydrogen peroxide generation of mitochondria from broiler hepatocyte. Chinese Journal of Veterinary Science, 2009, 1(29): 92-96. ( in Chinese)

5.Cao Huabin, Su Rongsheng, Li Heping, Tang Zhaoxin, et al. Effect of high-copper diet on activities of respiratory chain compiexes in liver mitochondria of broilers. Chinese Veterinary Science, 2009, 1(29): 155-159. ( in Chinese)

6. Su Rongsheng, Liu Haopeng, Hu Jingjing, Tang Zhaoxin, et al. Effect of copper stress on respiration function of mitochondria from broiler hepatocyte in vitro. Chinese Journal of Veterinary Science, 2011, 10(31): 1496-1499. ( in Chinese)

7. Su Rongsheng, Yan Wenlong, Pan Jiaqiang, Tang Zhaoxin, et al. Protective Effect of glutathione on copper exposure to liver mitochondria of broilers. Chinese Journal of Veterinary Science, 2012, 32(4): 602-605. ( in Chinese)

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