union wire rope company manufacturer

Union wire ropes reflect the people who make it. People of character, full of grit and determination. Tough-minded individuals who never cut corners or take shortcuts. We’ve matched science of design with the art of skillful manufacturing craftsmanship to build the best wire rope in the world.

No matter where you are in the world, Union delivers hard-working products, exceptional service and unmatched support. At Union, we’re with you in the field, on the rig and in the mine, getting our hands dirty to supply tough ropes that help you get the job done - better. Being part of the global leader, WireCo WorldGroup, our expertise is unmatched. Whether it"s manufacturing, design, troubleshooting or logistics, Union wire rope support is unsurpassed.

We pride ourselves on providing robust solutions to our customers in the most demanding and diverse applications; with unmatched support, innovation and quality. When customers come to Union they are not just looking for a product, they are looking for our expertise and hands on approach to understand and resolve the issues they encounter in the field.

With nearly 4,000 employees worldwide, WireCo WorldGroup is a great place for you to build a rewarding career. Our professionals enjoy the opportunities of a global manufacturing and distribution leader as well as a culture of open communication, professional growth, and friendly camaraderie that fosters innovation and problem solving.

Union is the industry leader for coated can conveyor wire rope. Since its inception in 1960, Wirelon has proven its superiority in major food canning and can manufacturing operations.

Wirelon with Nylon 11 Coating is recommended for continuous exposure to temperatures below 250° F. Wirelon can be furnished in any standard size needed to fit a particular installation. Available on standard reels or in prespliced and recoated loops, it is designed to replace uncoated wire rope of the same nominal outside diameter with a minimum of preparation.

Acquired Casar, the world’s technical leader in design and production of special wire ropes used in critical load lifting applications for hoists, cranes and underground mining.

We strive to create premium products in a class all their own, but we believe our global impact is so much bigger than that. Press play to learn what makes WireCo a world ahead of other companies.

Since 1951, the family at Union Sling Company in Dallas, Texas has provided rigging products and services to the North Texas area. Our experience allows us to provide dependable, quality service. We sell strong, safe rigging products.Our experience means we have worked with a variety of industries. We don"t just sell products. We can answer questions too. We have the know-how to provide the right rigging for the job.

Union Wire Rope, a WireCo WorldGroup Brand, has been the industry leader in the design and manufacturing of wire ropes and assemblies for more than 100 years, delivering exceptional service and unmatched support worldwide.

Union has a rich history dating back to just before the United States entered World War I. Commodity prices were steadily increasing and headlines such as “Oil Prices Bound to Soar” were typical. Industries were experiencing shortages of supplies and rising prices. The lack of wire rope had become so acute that drilling and production of petroleum products were threatened.

Today, Union remains an industry leader in oil and gas, mining, crane and general-purpose ropes with technical support unmatched in the industry. The Union Cut-Off Program, which is designed to calculate, log and track the service life of Union drill lines is recognized by contractors around the world as the best in the industry.

Union wire ropes reflect the people who make it. People of character, full of grit and determination. Tough-minded individuals who never cut corners or take shortcuts. We’ve matched the science of design with the art of skilful manufacturing craftsmanship to build the best wire rope in the world.

No matter where you are in the world, Union delivers hard-working products, exceptional service and unmatched support. At Union, we’re with you in the field, on the rig and in the mine, getting our hands dirty to supply tough ropes that help you get the job done - better. Being part of the global leader, WireCo WorldGroup, our expertise is unmatched. Whether it"s manufacturing, design, troubleshooting or logistics, Union wire rope support is unsurpassed.

Union Sling Company was founded by Charles W. Dennis Sr.  His story is one of pulling himself up by the bootstraps.  Born Sept. 9th 1916 in Collin County, Texas.  His grandfather had been a teamster, operating a dray wagon in the McKinney, Anna, Celina area of north Texas in the late 1800’s.  His father had been a turn of the century sharecropper in that same area.  Charles grew up picking cotton.  He attended school in McKinney, Texas, and graduated from McKinney High School in 1937.  He played offensive and defensive tackle in football at McKinney they went to the State Play-offs that year.  He was offered athletic scholarships to Southern Methodist University, Texas Christian University, and Baylor University, but chose to go to work rather than go to college.  People with college degrees were without jobs, and having lived The Great Depression, the lure of a job and a little spending money sounded a lot better than more years of school.

In early 1951, approaching 35 years of age, in mind of the friends he had seen walk off buildings, now married with a daughter and a son on the way, and conscious of the Law of Averages, that one day he might make that fatal miss-step; he decided he needed to find work on the ground.  He and an iron working buddy decided to start a partnership hand splicing wire rope slings after hours.

As word of mouth spread, they were getting more orders than they could splice and still hold down their regular jobs.  One day about 6 months in, the partner decided he wanted out, and C.W. bought him out for half of what was on the checkbook…  about fifty bucks.  Soon, C.W. had to quit his ironworkers job and splice full time.  After about a year under the clothesline pole, and splicing in all weathers, he rented a small space from the only wire rope warehouse in Dallas, Union Wire Rope Co. at 147 Howell St. in the Harwood Industrial area near downtown.  There was a coincidence here, because Union Sling Company had been named because Dennis and the partner had been members of the local Iron workers Union, but a lot of people assumed that he was the sling manufacturing branch of Union Wire Rope, which didn’t hurt business any.

Following that deal was almost decade and a half of long hours, often splicing 36 hour days, and a dedication of delivering a quality product, on-time service and a fair price.  He always kept a close eye on inventory, because he would say, “You can’t peddle from an empty wagon!”.  Leroy McCarley, one of his earliest customers, in later years remembered him delivering slings in a “Chachi top Pontiac”; which was Leroy’s description of our first unofficial delivery vehicle, a 1947 Pontiac convertible.  He always answered the phone, “Union Sling, Dennis speaking!”, and a lot of his customers thought his first name was Dennis; using his last name probably was a left-over of how the military would have identified him.

Wirerope Works, Inc. manufactures Bethlehem Wire Rope®, the trade name under which we produce, sell and service our wire rope and strand products. The name "Bethlehem Wire Rope" represents the most complete facility and experienced personnel in North America. Our 46-acre manufacturing complex in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, with over 620,000 square feet under roof, is the single largest wire rope manufacturing facility in North America. Wirerope Works, Inc. manufactures its own wire, wire rope, structural strand, and all fabricated products such as pendants and other assemblies on the same premises.

Bethlehem brand wire rope and strand products have long been recognized worldwide for superior quality. Used for both lifting and stabilizing, Bethlehem Wire Rope products are used in a wide variety of applications ranging from crane and elevator hoist ropes to bridge suspension and anchoring offshore platforms. Wirerope Works, Inc. serves many industries including construction, logging, marine, mining, oil and gas, and steel.

Union Sling Company was founded by Charles W. Dennis Sr.  His story is one of pulling himself up by the bootstraps.  Born Sept. 9th 1916 in Collin County, Texas.  His grandfather had been a teamster, operating a dray wagon in the McKinney, Anna, Celina area of north Texas in the late 1800’s.  His father had been a turn of the century sharecropper in that same area.  Charles grew up picking cotton.  He attended school in McKinney, Texas, and graduated from McKinney High School in 1937.  He played offensive and defensive tackle in football at McKinney they went to the State Play-offs that year.  He was offered athletic scholarships to Southern Methodist University, Texas Christian University, and Baylor University, but chose to go to work rather than go to college.  People with college degrees were without jobs, and having lived The Great Depression, the lure of a job and a little spending money sounded a lot better than more years of school.

In early 1951, approaching 35 years of age, in mind of the friends he had seen walk off buildings, now married with a daughter and a son on the way, and conscious of the Law of Averages, that one day he might make that fatal miss-step; he decided he needed to find work on the ground.  He and an iron working buddy decided to start a partnership hand splicing wire rope slings after hours.

As word of mouth spread, they were getting more orders than they could splice and still hold down their regular jobs.  One day about 6 months in, the partner decided he wanted out, and C.W. bought him out for half of what was on the checkbook…  about fifty bucks.  Soon, C.W. had to quit his ironworkers job and splice full time.  After about a year under the clothesline pole, and splicing in all weathers, he rented a small space from the only wire rope warehouse in Dallas, Union Wire Rope Co. at 147 Howell St. in the Harwood Industrial area near downtown.  There was a coincidence here, because Union Sling Company had been named because Dennis and the partner had been members of the local Iron workers Union, but a lot of people assumed that he was the sling manufacturing branch of Union Wire Rope, which didn’t hurt business any.

Following that deal was almost decade and a half of long hours, often splicing 36 hour days, and a dedication of delivering a quality product, on-time service and a fair price.  He always kept a close eye on inventory, because he would say, “You can’t peddle from an empty wagon!”.  Leroy McCarley, one of his earliest customers, in later years remembered him delivering slings in a “Chachi top Pontiac”; which was Leroy’s description of our first unofficial delivery vehicle, a 1947 Pontiac convertible.  He always answered the phone, “Union Sling, Dennis speaking!”, and a lot of his customers thought his first name was Dennis; using his last name probably was a left-over of how the military would have identified him.

Wire Rope - UnionFrom simple beginnings, Union has grown to be the world"s premier wire rope brand. Part of WireCo World Group, Union is now part of the global leader in manufacturing, engineering and distributing wire rope, assemblies, high carbon wire, and electromechanical cable.

WireCo World Group has grown - and endured - to be the largest producer of wire rope and EM cable in the world, offering the broadest product line and best service. With the global reach of WireCo WorldGroup behind it, Union can deliver the right wire ropes for your machine and application no matter where your worksite may be.

For customers who require peak rope performance levels in mission critical applications, Casar manufactures and supplies highly-engineered ropes that exceed industry standards while providing record-setting service life.

Our proprietary and innovative German-engineered rope designs deliver the highest levels of performance and safety, superior breaking strength values, the highest bending fatigue resistance, superior crushing resistance, and the best rotational resistance characteristics for high lifts.We have decades of global experience and on-site engineering support in the crane, OEM and underground mining sectors.

CASAR has an extensive range of products available and we can customize to your application.Our wire rope specialists will assist customers in design, selection, installation and operation to improve rope performance and maximize service life.

The 18 plaintiffs in this case brought suit in the superior court of Cook County to recover for personal injuries and wrongful deaths suffered on March 19, 1957, when a temporary construction hoist, being operated in conjunction with the erection of a multi-story courthouse in the city of Jacksonville, Florida, plunged a distance of six floors with 19 workmen aboard. Seven were killed and the remainder were severely injured. Two of the plaintiffs, (we use the term to include plaintiffs" decedents,) were employees of George D. Auchter Company, the general contractor which owned and operated the hoist, while the balance were employees of Auchter"s subcontractors on the project. The actions, later consolidated, were brought against Union Wire Rope Company, manufacturer of a cable that broke, Archer Iron Works, designer and manufacturer of the hoist and a safety device thereon which failed to halt the fall, and American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, the workmen"s compensation and public liability carrier for Auchter, which was charged with the *72 negligent performance of gratuitous safety inspections and safety engineering service.

Following an extended trial, judgments were entered on jury verdicts finding the defendants Union Wire and Archer Iron not guilty, and finding defendant American Mutual guilty and liable for damages assessed in a total amount of $1,569,400. On appeal, both by plaintiffs and American Mutual, the Appellate Court for the First District affirmed the judgments in favor of Union Wire and Archer Iron, but reversed outright the judgments against American Mutual. (Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 39 Ill. App.2d 73.) We have allowed the plaintiffs" petition for leave to appeal to further review the matter. In addition, we have granted leave to several insurance groups to file a brief as amici curiae.

As a matter of initial concern it is unnecessary in our opinion to completely detail the respective pleadings, proof, arguments and authorities advanced in relation to the issues on review between plaintiffs and defendants Archer Iron and Union Wire. Although we do not necessarily adopt all that is said by the Appellate Court, particularly with respect to its concepts of various rules of evidence, and we do not approve of some aspects of Archer"s presentation in this court, we are in basic accord with the court"s judgments as to these two defendants and see no beneficial purpose in repetition or further analysis of those phases of the litigation. Gould v. Gould, 408 Ill. 526; Kamienski v. Bluebird Air Service, Inc. 389 Ill. 462.

The substance of plaintiffs" complaint against American Mutual, (hereafter referred to as defendant) and the theory they have consistently adhered to, is that the insurance company had gratuitously undertaken to make safety inspections of the practices and equipment of Auchter, its insured, and had carelessly and negligently performed the said inspections, as the proximate result of which plaintiffs were injured and killed. Other specifications charged that *73 defendant had carelessly and negligently failed to detect and report: that the hoist"s safety mechanism was inadequate and defective; that the tower was improperly designed and manufactured in that it did not have sufficient strength to permit the safety device to function; that the cable was in a worn condition; that the hoist was being used for the transportation of personnel in violation of a city ordinance, and that a sheave on the hoist was of improper size in violation of a city ordinance. A concluding specification charged that defendant had negligently failed to warn Auchter against the unsafe practice of permitting personnel to ride on the hoist. In answer, defendant denied that it had undertaken, gratuitously or otherwise, to make such safety inspections, or that such safety inspections of practices, machinery or hoists had in fact occurred, and denied that it had been guilty of negligence of any kind, or in the respects specifically charged. Further, defendant denied that it had made periodic or regular surveys or inspections of the premises or equipment, and while admitting that an employee had made intermittent and infrequent surveys and inspections of the premises, it denied that they had pertained to or included the hoist, and alleged that they were for the sole purpose of keeping itself advised of the risk it had insured. As a first affirmative defense defendant alleged that, because it was the general contractor"s compensation carrier, it was not subject to suit as a third party tort feasor under the Florida Workmen"s Compensation Act; as a second affirmative defense it was alleged that if it had in fact performed safety inspections as plaintiffs charged, it became a subcontractor and was thus immune from tort liability to plaintiffs by virtue of the Florida act.

*75 Our Appellate Court, in considering the doctrine as stated in the Restatement, concluded that it was "properly applicable only in situations involving active negligence, or misfeasance," (39 Ill. App.2d at 129,) an earlier portion of its opinion indicating that it equated the terms "active negligence" and "misfeasance" as meaning the "creation of a risk, or danger," and its belief that defendant here could not be liable for a gratuitous undertaking unless it was guilty of negligence which "caused the hoist to fall." (39 Ill. App.2d at 122.) In this we believe the court was plainly wrong. The language that a volunteer is liable for failure to use such competence and skill as he possesses does not admit to a conclusion that the only duty of the volunteer is to refrain from positive acts of negligence. Moreover, in those cases, subsequently discussed, where insurers have incurred liability as the result of gratuitous inspections of machines and equipment, liability rested upon a breach of the duty to make the inspections with due care, not upon acts which "created" dangers or defects, or which caused the occurrence by which injury was received. (See: Van Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co. 52 N.J.L. 240, 19 Alt. 472; Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. (7th cir.), 201 Fed. 617.) As is shown by defendant"s own citation of authority, viz., Viducich v. Greater New York Mutual Insurance Co. 80 N.J. Super. 15, 192 A.2d 596, plaintiffs, to support their actions, had only to show (1) that defendant undertook to make safety inspections and to render safety engineering services under circumstances which created a duty on defendant, owed to plaintiffs, to perform its undertakings with due care, and (2) that the gratuitous undertakings were negligently performed, such negligence resulting proximately in plaintiffs" deaths and injuries. See also: McClure v. Hoopeston Gas and Electric Co. 303 Ill. 89, 96; Devaney v. Otis Elevator Co. 251 Ill. 28, 33.

There is respectable authority, old and new, that gratuitous *76 inspections by insurers may be made under such circumstances as to create an enforceable duty to persons known and unknown. The latest of these is Smith v. American Employers" Insurance Co. 102 N. H. 530, 163 A.2d 564, a decision which our Appellate Court erroneously dismissed as being based solely on a contract agreement. In that case the complaint of the plaintiff alleged that the employer"s workmen"s compensation carrier, for some time prior to the accident, had gratuitously conducted monthly inspections at the insured"s plant, which extended to an air compressor that exploded and injured plaintiff, an employee of the insured. The New Hampshire court, in sustaining the validity of plaintiff"s tort action against the carrier, held such gratuitous conduct created a duty to use due care which clearly extended to the injured employee. In Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co. (7th cir.) 201 Fed. 617, where boilers gratuitously inspected by the insurer exploded, the policy had been in force for 15 months and it was held that the insurer"s continuous conduct of inspection and report (the last being in the month prior to the explosion,) coupled with the representations of its advertising as to the broad scope and value of its inspections, (see: 201 F. at 629), were of "probative force to show both the undertaking of duty and the relation of the parties upon which the action for negligence in the performance thereof may be predicated." Following this the court said: "Inspection of the boilers necessarily requires care and skill in its performance for safety in their use, and, when thus undertaken by the Insurance Company to serve as a benefit to the assured, the duty arises, with or without contract obligation to inspect, to exercise reasonable care and skill in each inspection so made, * * *." (201 Fed. at 629.)

Van Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co. 52 N.J.L. 240, 19 Atl. 472, presented a situation where the insurance company issued a policy covering a boiler owned by *77 Ivanhoe Paper Co. and reserved to itself the right to inspect and examine such boiler. It subsequently blew up and damaged the building of Van Winkle, adjacent to that of Ivanhoe, who brought suit against the insurer. The New Jersey court, after first stating it was obvious plaintiff could not predicate his suit on the contract between Ivanhoe and the insurance company, concluded that the issue before it was the legal effect of the acts done by the insurer under the contract, insofar as they affected the rights of plaintiff, a stranger to the contract. The court commented that the insurer was not bound to inspect the boiler, and that if it had not done so no liability to plaintiff could arise. However, the facts of the case disclosed that the insurer had gratuitously made repeated inspections and had also undertaken to furnish its insured with a certificate stating the load that could be put on the safety valve, which conduct caused the court to conclude the insurer had become obligated to make a careful inspection. It was stated (at page 475 of 19 Atl.): "And it would seem that there is a broader ground than the one above defined, on which the present case can be based. It is this: that in all cases in which any person undertakes the performance of an act, which if not done with care and skill, will be highly dangerous to the persons or lives of one or more persons, known or unknown, the law, ipso facto, imposes, as a public duty, the obligation to exercise such care and skill." (Emphasis ours.) While recently analyzing the Van Winkle case in Viducich v. Greater New York Mutual Insurance Co. 80 N.J. Super. 15, 192 A.2d 596, a New Jersey appeals court again manifested the view that the repeated inspections and the furnishing of certificates for the guidance of Ivanhoe"s engineer were circumstances which created a duty upon the insurer to inspect with due care.

In Sheridan v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 3 Wash. 2d 423, 100 P.2d 1024, the insurer issued an insurance policy on an elevator, the policy reserving the right to inspection. *78 Thereafter, the insurer made periodic inspections, making reports to the owner and also to the city as an ordinance required. An employee of a tenant in the building was injured by a defective elevator door and brought suit against the insurer, who defended that plaintiff had no rights under the policy and that it was not liable by reason of the inspections made. After reviewing numerous cases holding that the voluntary assumption of a duty renders one liable for its negligent performance, the court concluded (100 P.2d at 1031): "Our conclusion is that respondent"s action is maintainable, not by virtue of any obligation imposed by the policy of insurance, but because of the legal responsibility attaching to its voluntary assumption, as the owner"s agent, of the duty of proper inspection and reporting to the city." To the same effect is Bollin v. Elevator Construction & Repair Co. 361 Pa. 7, 63 A.2d 19.

After each visit or inspection, McClain made various reports to his own company and wrote a letter to Auchter, the insured. His first visit after construction started took place over October 10 and 11, 1955, and his engineering report on this occasion stated: "A visit has been scheduled in November 1955. * * * At that time the engineer prepares to continue his accident prevention work and to assist the assured in making the job safe." The next formal report followed a visit by McClain on January 10, 1956, wherein he wrote: "Service plans have been set forth in previous reports and bi-monthly service upon a regular basis has been scheduled to this job until completion." Thereafter, formal reports were submitted showing visits in March, June, September and October of 1956, and in February of 1957. In the September 1956 report it was said: "The purpose of this visit was a periodic maintenance visit to observe continued operations on this project and to maintain *82 policy holder service." On each occasion his engineering reports represented that he had inspected and analyzed "catastrophe" and "serious" hazards, including "Machine hazards." On a separate report form, McClain listed the machinery and equipment being used on the job and described their use and operation. After June, 1956, this form noted that there were "elevators" on the project, which were "typed" as builder"s hoists, owned by the insured.

Turning to the material facts, Auchter purchased the construction hoist from Archer Iron in late 1955, and erected it at the courthouse project in May, 1956, ten months before the occurrence which led to plaintiffs" actions. The hoist bail, with the platform attached, was raised and lowered by a steel cable and moved along vertical guide rails on each side, the guide rails being attached to the tubular metal pipes which made up the hoist tower. Built into the bail was a device known as a "broken rope safety," consisting of two serrated jaws, or "dogs," opposite the two guide rails. The dogs remained retracted so long as the weight of the car hanging from the cable exerted pressure on the top of the bail, but, through the action of cams and springs, would extend out and engage the guide rails as soon as pressure was released on the cable. The pressure and traction exerted by the dogs on the guide rails was thus supposed to arrest the gravitational fall of the platform. As is explained in greater detail in the opinion of the Appellate Court, a new 3/4-inch cable manufactured by Union Wire was installed, and a one-part line was rigged between the hoist and a drum, activated by a motor, upon which the cable was wound. To accomplish this rigging, two new sheaves furnished by Archer Iron were employed. These *89 sheaves had an outer diameter of 19 inches, and an inner diameter of 16 incres at the bed of the groove. Within a short time after the hoist had gone into operation, Auchter, to slow down the speed of the platform, re-rigged the cable and made a two-part line by affixing a third sheave to the top of the bail. This sheave, which was used and had been obtained from Auchter"s construction yard, had an inner diameter of slightly less than 10 inches. It was in plain view, and easily accessible for inspection.

Once in operation the hoist was used to transport building materials and, except for the period during which it was being re-rigged, the uncontroverted proof in the record is that personnel of all categories on the project, laborers, supervisors and company executives, constantly rode on the hoist up to the time it fell. There was evidence that stairways in the building under construction were ill-lit, cluttered with scaffolds, waste and materials, and sometimes closed; and it further appears that the greatest use of the hoist by personnel was at starting and quitting times. On the day of the occurrence, at quitting time, the 18 plaintiffs and another workman got on the platform at fifth floor level. After they had done so, the cable broke and the platform plunged to the ground.

Following the accident the cable, the sheave added by Auchter, and portions of the hoist tower were sent to the Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories, an impartial testing agency agreed upon by all parties. From tests and inspections made it was the virtually uncontradicted testimony of the experts participating that excessive cable wear due to a faulty sheave and the inadequacy of the broken rope safety device were contributing causes of the tragedy. Examination of the cable revealed that it was practically disintegrated for a distance of 21 feet, and it was ascertained that the break had occurred at a point where the cable passed over all three sheaves. The bed of the groove in the sheave added by Auchter was found to be worn and corrugated in *90 a herringbone pattern, and when measured with a gauge the groove was found to be out of contour due to uneven wear patterns on the groove walls. This condition, according to an expert witness, would subject the cable to abnormal forces and skidding actions which would hasten its wear. Since wire cable bends around sheaves at an angle of 90 degrees, all witnesses agreed that there was a direct relation between cable wear and the size and condition of the sheave, and, in such regard, there was expert testimony that a cable passing over a 10-inch sheave, would wear out 2 1/2 to 5 times faster than one passing over a 16-inch sheave.

Scientific tests of the tower and its broken rope safety device, which we deem it unnecessary to detail, revealed that the forces exerted on the guide rails by the serrated jaws, or dogs, caused the rails to deflect outwards to such a degree that the safety device, with the platform falling from fifth floor level, could halt only a fall of 1300 pounds, which was but 300 pounds in excess of the weight of the hoist platform.

When queried directly as to the relationship between his periodic visits and the hoist, McClain stated: "I did not inspect this equipment as a man employed by Auchter or as *91 a man employed by any sub-contractor. I was interested in this piece of equipment as it related to the job as a whole, to whatever exposure was on the job. By exposure I mean injury or property damage." His activities bear out these admissions. In June, 1956, on his first visit after the hoist went into operation, McClain did many things which extended beyond casual observation. He determined the kind and operation of the safety device on the hoist; sighted to see if the guide rails, essential to the functioning of the safety device, were in good alignment; ascertained from Hodge that a drop test of the safety device had been made; discussed with Hodge the anticipated loading; determined the size and breaking point of the cable being used; calculated that the cable had a safety factor of seven times loaded capacity; determined the rigging of the hoist and how it had been changed; and discussed with Hodge the lubrication and maintenance of the cable. On the same visit, McClain, by his version, "suggested" to Hodge that the tower be grounded against lightning, although Hodge put it this way: "Early on the job McClain told me to get the tower grounded. I did that." Indeed, the proof shows without contradiction that every recommendation made by McClain was complied with.

On other occasions McClain checked to see if the tower had guy wires to keep it from toppling over, and inspected the brake drums for the presence of oil that might cause the brakes to slip. Further, it appears that he gave his attention to the hoist on every visit after it started operating, his specific testimony being: "On February 12 (the last visit before the occurrence) I made my usual visual observation of the tower. I saw the lift platforms going up and down and they seemed reasonably smooth. I didn"t notice anything out of order. * * * It was my custom when I visited the job to look at the cable between the swivel deflector sheave and the engine. I noticed nothing that gave me any particular concern." And while McClain"s trial *92 characterization of his conduct was "visual observation," the reports he made after each visit, before the question of liability arose, represented that he made inspections and surveys of machine hazards, one report form indicating that the insured was operating two builder"s hoists. In short, the tenor and intendment of all the evidence is that defendant"s gratuitous engineering services did extend to the hoist.

There is uncontradicted evidence in the record, including testimony of McClain himself, that in order to inspect a cable adequately it is necessary to clean off the grease at intervals, to run the hand along the cable feeling for spurs, to use a magnifying glass for close inspection and to use a spike to separate the strands in order to locate breaks in the valley of the rope. Similarly, there is evidence that a complete inspection of a sheave would entail the use of a groove guage, and of a hammer and a magnifying glass to test and seek for cracks. McClain did none of these things. Instead, he merely examined the sheave at the top of bail only insofar as he could see it from the ground and, as noted, only looked at the cable "between the deflector sheave and the motor." An experienced passenger elevator inspector for his company, McClain explained his failure to make a detailed inspection of the cable and sheaves by stating that the hoist was not classified and rated as an elevator. Apropos of this explanation, McClain testified he had been initially told by Hodge that there would be no riding on the hoist, denied that he had ever ridden the hoist or had seen men riding it, and stated that had he known of this practice he would have recommended against it. As opposed to this, two workmen on the project testified they had seen McClain riding the hoist, while Avent, the project manager, Hodge, and two workmen testified that men were riding the hoist while McClain was on the premises. Many impartial witnesses testified that men rode the hoist all day long from the time the hoist went into operation, and it likewise appears that it was the custom in Jacksonville for workmen *93 to ride construction hoists. The jury, whose function it was to determine where the truth lies, could with reason conclude from all of the evidence that McClain knew, or should have known, that personnel were riding the hoist, and in fact using it as a passenger elevator.

As previously stated, a jury of reasonable and fair-minded men could reach the conclusion from all of the evidence that the interest and activity of defendant with respect to the hoist were not limited to its post-accident claim of casual observation, but in fact extended, as McClain once testified, to whatever exposure to injury and property damage attended the operation of the hoist on the project. The *94 Auchter company employed no safety engineer or safety inspector of its own, and this was the company"s first experience with a manufactured metal hoist. As opposed to this, McClain was a trained and practicing safety engineer, and as a qualified elevator inspector was fully aware of the relationship between cable wear and proper sheaves and of the only sure and safe way to inspect both. Under all of the circumstances, most particularly the circumstance that McClain knew, or should have known, personnel were riding the hoist, we think the same jury of reasonable and fair-minded men could conclude that the exercise of ordinary care, or of the skill and competence the safety engineer possessed, would have required McClain to adequately and properly inspect the cable and sheave, or at least to insure that such inspections were being made. In regard to the latter, McClain did ascertain whether defendant"s insured was inspecting the hoist, but clearly made no effort to see that safe and adequate inspections were made. While there was some conflict as to whether Auchter was inspecting the cable at all, the employee who testified that he did so had no special training or instruction, conceded that he did not examine the sheaves, and testified that his cable inspections were accomplished by getting on the platform and merely looking at the cable as the operator slowly ran the platform to the top of the tower and down again. This, according to expert testimony, was tantamount to no inspection at all.

Claiming the privilege of supporting its judgment in the Appellate Court upon any basis appearing in the record, (see: Becker v. Billings, 304 Ill. 190; Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co. 310 Ill. 38,) defendant asserts, admittedly for the first time in this court, that it cannot be guilty of negligence because there is no evidence that a reasonably careful inspection of the cable by McClain would have disclosed that it was unsafe. While it is our opinion there is no proper basis in the record to permit this contention *95 to be made, (see: In re Estate of Leichtenberg, 7 Ill. 2d 545, 548-549,) it is equally untenable on its merits. The whole body of the evidence discloses that the small and defective sheave added by Auchter caused excessive cable wear and damage.

We are in accord with plaintiffs that the jury could also reasonably find from the evidence that McClain, under the circumstances of the case, failed to exercise due care with respect to the safety device on the hoist. The most important circumstances are, again, that McClain, unlike the manufacturer of the hoist, was chargeable under the evidence with knowledge that personnel were riding the hoist, and that McClain was trained and experienced in the matter of testing such devices, whereas Auchter"s employees were not. There is evidence that a proper testing of the safety device would have been to make two drop tests with the platform bearing 120% of the manufacturer"s rated load. As opposed to this, Hodge testified he made but one test and that by merely raising the unloaded platform to a height of six to eight feet and letting it fall. McClain knew the importance of the safety device, and, as previously detailed, once the hoist was put into operation took steps to determine the type of safety device, the alignment of the rails and whether functional tests had been made. He did not, however, concern himself with the adequacy of the test then or later, even though he knew, or should have known, that the hoist was in effect being utilized as a passenger elevator. Had an adequate test been made, and had McClain exercised the safety engineering skill the situation demanded, it would have been discovered that the safety factor of the device was only 300 pounds in excess of platform weight.

Again, in Jones v. Florida Power Corp. (Fla. 1954), 72 So. 2d 285, where the power company claimed tort immunity as the "common employer" of the employees of two independent *98 contractors engaged in a construction project for the company, the court said at page 289: "The record does not show, nor is there any allegation, that the Corporation, as to the construction project in which plaintiff was employed, was liable for and required to secure compensation for the employees of Burns and Grinnell as an `employer" engaged in this particular construction job. And, as heretofore noted, if there was no liability as an employer under the Act, there was no immunity from suit as a third party tort-feasor." (Emphasis ours.)

A second and even more recent case is Mays v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, (3rd cir. 1963) 323 F.2d 174, to which we have previously alluded. There, in reaching a conclusion that the subrogation and lien provisions of the Pennsylvania compensation act did not confer upon the employer"s insurer immunity from suit as a third party tort-feasor, the court adopted the reasoning of Fabricius, quoted above, and likewise held that the article dealing with subrogation and lien "relates solely to procedure" and in no manner modified the section of the act which defined "employer" to the exclusion of the insurance carrier.

Section 440.41 (F.S.A. sec. 440.41) reads as follows: "In any case where the employer is not a self insurer, in order that the liability for compensation proposed by this chapter may be most effectively discharged by the employer, and in order that the administration of this chapter in respect of such liability may be facilitated, the Commission shall by regulation provide for the discharge, by the carrier for such employer, of such obligations and duties of the employer in respect of such liability, imposed by this chapter upon the employer, as it considers proper in order to effectuate the provisions of this chapter. For such purposes (1) notice to or knowledge of an employer of the occurrence of the injury shall be notice to or knowledge of the carrier; (2) jurisdiction of the employer by the Commission or any court under this chapter shall be jurisdiction of the carrier, and (3) any requirement by the Commission, or any Court under any compensation order, finding or decision shall be binding upon the carrier in the same manner and to the same extent as upon the employer."

We think it clear that these sections do not reflect a legislative intent to place primary liability for compensation upon the insurer, or to permit the liability of the insurer to be substituted for the liability of the employer. In the first place, the sections simply do not deal with the subject matter, which was dealt with early in the act when the *107 legislature stated in section 440.10: "(1) Every employer coming within the provisions of this chapter, * * * shall be liable for and shall secure the payment to his employees of the compensation payable under sections." (F.S.A., sec. 440.10(1).) Instead, section 440.41 is, on its face, no more than an administrative provision relating to procedure wherein the legislature has authorized the Florida Commission, as it deems proper, to make regulations whereby the insurer may most effectively discharge the liability "imposed by this chapter on the employer." (Emphasis ours.) Liability is not transferred to the insurer, but an administrative facility is provided whereby the carrier may discharge the liability of the employer. Manifestly, if it had been the legislative intent to make the insurer primarily liable for compensation, there would have been no need to supply an administrative means for the insurer to discharge the insured"s liability. The insurer is substituted for the employer, not as to the liability for and duty to secure compensation placed solely upon the employer in section 440.10, but only with respect to notice, jurisdiction and compliance with commission orders. As the court indicated in Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co. (Iowa 1963) 121 N.W.2d 361, 366, under a comparable situation, such limited substitution for procedural purposes cannot be construed as taking away an employee"s common-law action.

As was true in the Mays, Fabricius and Smith cases, the defendant and amici curiae press the argument that it would be contrary to public policy to permit recovery against a compensation carrier as a third party tort-feasor, contending that the result will be a curtailment of safety inspections to the ultimate detriment of working men and their families. This appeal has been soundly rejected in the cited cases and we see little purpose in repeating or expanding upon the reasoning and logic found in them, except to add that the scope and value of the safety inspections, represented thus in an effort to sustain this contention, are highly inconsistent with defendant"s claims under the negligence phase of the case that the activity of its safety engineer was only "casual observation," for its own purposes. Furthermore, whether we look to the law *111 of Florida or Illinois, such a question of public policy is for the legislature not for the courts. General Properties Co. v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814, 18 So. 2d 908; Illinois Western Electric Co. v. Town of Cicero, 282 Ill. 468; People ex rel. Carruthers v. Cooper, 404 Ill. 395.

It is abundantly clear that this court possesses the power and jurisdiction to determine the remaining issues. Section 75 of the Civil Practice Act provides that judgments of the Appellate Court are final, except when a certificate of importance is granted by that court or leave to appeal is granted by this court, and then continues: "In any such case as is hereinbefore made final in the Appellate Court it is competent for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal for its review and determination with the same power and authority in the case, and with like effect, as if it had been carried by appeal to the Supreme Court." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 110, par. 75(2); emphasis ours.) Again in section 92 of the act, entitled "Powers of reviewing courts," it is provided: "(1) In all appeals the reviewing court may, in its discretion, and on such terms as it deems just, * * * (e) Give any judgment and make any order which ought to have been given or made, * * * that the case may require." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 110, par. 92(1)(e); emphasis ours.) Further it has frequently been indicated that where this court acquires jurisdiction for any reason, it has jurisdiction to pass upon all questions, except those requiring a weighing of the evidence, proper to be passed upon and disposed of in the case. (Goodrich v. Sprague, 376 Ill. 80; Bowman v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 11 Ill. 2d 186.) Aside from considerations *113 going to the avoidance of multiplicity of appeals, there are in our opinion unique circumstances here which, as a matter of discretion and justice, impel us to use our powers on review to the utmost and to finally dispose of the case.

Prior to the occurrence here the city of Jacksonville, *114 Florida, passed an ordinance which adopted by reference a building code known as the "National Building Code," and also an ordinance adopting by reference the "American Standard Safety Code for Elevators, Dumbwaiters and Escalators" compiled by the American Standards Association. These ordinances were introduced in evidence by plaintiffs, and counsel for plaintiffs and the co-defendants Union Wire and Archer Iron were permitted to read portions thereof to the jury, over repeated objections by defendant American Mutual, first, that neither code applied to construction hoists, and second that the ordinances were invalid and did not come into effect because a State statute had pre-empted the field of elevator regulation. The ruling on this evidence is complained of, the defendant raising the same contentions on appeal. The first point, however, was not raised in defendant"s written motion for a new trial so as to preserve it for review and will not be considered. Where a party files a motion in writing for a new trial, specifying therein the grounds or reasons for such motion, he will be restricted, in a court of review, to the grounds or reasons specified in such written motion and will be deemed to have waived all other grounds or reasons for a new trial. (County Board of School Trustees v. Batchelder, 7 Ill. 2d 178, 183-184; Lukich v. Angeli, 31 Ill. App.2d 20, 28.) As the matter comes to us, the ruling of the trial court that the ordinances had application to construction hoists cannot be questioned.

As a general rule any statement, written or not, made by a party or in his behalf which is inconsistent with his present position may be introduced in evidence against him. (Conrad, Modern Trial Evidence, vol. 1, sec. 454; Cleary, Handbook of Illinois Evidence, sec. 13.10; Brown v. Calumet River Railway Co., 125 Ill. 600.) Where the question has arisen, authorities are in accord that advertisements, brochures, newspaper items, catalogs, and the like are admissible and relevant to the subject matter of the suit where they contain statements of a party inconsistent with a claim or a position asserted by such party in the action. (Henkle v. Smith, 21 Ill. 237; 20 Am. Jur. Evidence, 1960 Supp. p. 152; 44 A.L.R.2d 1031; Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co. (7th cir.) 201 F. 617, 629; Fryer v. New York Brokerage Co. 152 Iowa 688, 133 N.W. 110; cf. Mahlstedt v. Ideal Lighting Co. 271 Ill. 154.) In the present case the scope and purposes of the visits of defendant"s safety engineers as alleged in its answer to the complaint were completely inconsistent with *116 its representations in the advertisements. Under the rule stated above, the advertisements became relevant and material and were properly admitted into evidence.

Defendant pleaded as a defense that plaintiffs "without the exercise of due care for their own safety, voluntarily assumed the risk" of riding the hoist alleging they knew it was unsafe for the transportation of passengers because of the "total absence" of handrails, barriers, gates and other safeguards, because of the nature, design and construction of said materials hoist, and because of its location on the exterior of the building and it was not enclosed within a shaft. Error is now claimed because the trial court struck this defense on plaintiffs" motion, made at the close of plaintiffs" evidence, and because it denied defendant"s motion, *117 made at the close of all the evidence, to vacate its order. Some merit attaches, we believe, to plaintiffs" assertion that defendant"s pleading erroneously commingles the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. (See: Byers v. Gunn, (Fla. 1955) 81 So. 2d 723, 727; Florida Gravel Co. v. Davis, 126 Fla. 64, 170 So. 660, 663.) However, it is enough to say that the defense was properly stricken when we look to the controlling Florida decisions. In Bartholf v. Baker, (Fla. 1954) 71 So. 2d 480, 483, it was said: "Voluntary exposure is the bed rock upon which the doctrine of assumed risk rests. Appreciation of danger is an essential to the defense of assumption of the risk, * * * as is knowledge of the condition which creates the risk." (See also: City of Williston v. Cribbs, (Fla. 1955) 82 So. 2d 150; Wilson-Toomer Fertilizer Co. v. Lee 90 Fla. 632, 106 So. 462, 465-466; Gallespie v. Thornton, 95 Fla. 5, 117 So. 714, 717.) Here, there was neither pleading nor proof that plaintiffs had knowledge of the unsafe cable and sheaves or of the inadequate safety devices which created the risk. Without knowledge of such defects, and a condition of mental willingness to ride the hoist despite them, plaintiffs cannot be said to have legally assumed the risk. Smith v. Kelly, Inc. (D.C. cir.) 275 F.2d 169; Youngblood v. Beck Co. 93 Ga. App. 451, 91 S.E.2d 796.

For the reasons stated the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed insofar as it relates to defendants Union Wire Rope Corporation and Archer Iron Works. As to the defendant American Mutual, however, its judgment is reversed and the judgments of the superior court in favor of plaintiffs are affirmed.

I concur in the opinion of the court with respect to its disposition of the actions against Union Wire Rope Corporation and Archer Iron Works, but I dissent from its disposition of the action against American Mutual Liability Insurance Company.

As the opinion of the appellate court pointed out, (39 Ill. App.2d at 125, 187 N.E.2d at 449) the evidence in this case did not establish that either the contractor or the plaintiffs relied upon the inspections made by the defendant. The opinion of this court eliminates this obstacle to recovery by dispensing with the necessity for any element of reliance, holding that the plaintiffs may recover without proof that *119 anyone relied upon the defendant to inspect the hoist. The result is that an insurer who makes supplemental inspections, designed to minimize potential losses by diminishing the likelihood of injury, is penalized by the imposition of full responsbility for all losses that might have been revealed by the most complete inspection, even though no one concerned relied upon the insurance company for complete inspection.

The opinion thus apparently announces a kind of "all or nothing" rule of law that will frustrate the possibility of limited inspection services by requiring that if any inspections are undertaken, complete inspections must be made. In the absence of proof of reliance, or of what may be the same thing, proof that the defendant caused the contractor to refrain from performing its duty to inspect, I would not hold that because the insurance company made a partial inspection of the hoist it is liable for failing to discover and disclose that which a complete inspection should have revealed.

In Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 201 Fed. 617, 628-9 (C.C.A. 7, 1912) the circuit court of appeals stated: "The law casts upon the owner of the boilers when in use, as instrumentalities of danger, the duty to inspect and care for their safety, for protection of the public; and, of course, the owner may delegate the inspection and care to competent employees or other agency (or both) remaining answerable for their negligent performance. As foundation for the present charge of liability, however, it is contended that the duty of inspection was assumed by the Insurance Company, as an undertaking outside the insurance contract and its purposes, to relieve the Brewing Company of performance thereof, and all inspections were so made and relied upon for safety in use of the boiler up to the time of the explosion. Thus the question arises: Can liability be so predicated, at the side of the insurance contract, and without other consideration, for alleged negligent inspection? * * * We are of opinion that these facts of continuous conduct on the part of the Insurance Company in reference to the inspections and their purpose if relied upon by the Brewing Company and so understood by the Insurance Company, as alleged are of probative force to show both the undertaking of duty and relation of the parties upon which the action for negligence in performance thereof may be predicated." (Emphasis supplied.) In the case before us there was no reliance, nor was there any indication that the activities of the insurance company were to relieve the contractor of its duty to inspect.

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