oil rig mud pump explosion in stock

While drilling a coal seam gas well at 28 m the power end covers of the mud pump exploded. Some side cover fragments were ejected up to 8 m away from the mud pump, while other fragments from the drive side of the mud pump damaged the drive belts and cage. The top cover was flipped off, coming to rest upside down at the rear of the mud pump.

Fires were ignited both inside the mud pump and on the exhaust system of the mud pump engine and were extinguished using hand held fire extinguishers.

The internal oil lubrication hose became disconnected from its fitting causing the lubrication pump to dump oil into the sump (Figure 2). Internal piping then failed to lubricate and cool the pump bearings, pistons and crossheads.

Insufficient lubrication within the power end of the mud pump created hot spots (Figure 3) and oil vapour resulting in a low pressure/high volume oil vapour explosion.

Four months prior to the incident problems were experienced with fluctuating oil pressure in the mud pump. Upon inspection it was found that the oil lubrication hose had disconnected from its fitting. This hose was reconnected and tightened by the Rig Manager.

KENNER, Louisiana (Reuters) - For the captain of the Damon B. Bankston, a ship anchored alongside the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig when it exploded, the first sign of trouble was a flood of mud that poured off the rig’s drill deck like black rain.

In testimony on Tuesday before a federal government panel investigating the explosion on the night of April 20 that claimed 11 lives, Alwin Landry also recalled a green flash that preceded the first explosion and a desperate effort to pull 115 survivors from the water.

It was a routine evening on the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, about 42 miles off the Louisiana coast. The Damon Bankston was pumping heavy drilling mud from a three-mile deep well drilled by the rig through a hose. Landry was on the bridge catching up on paperwork.

Swiss-based Transocean Ltd’s Deepwater Horizon rig, under contract with BP, exploded and caught fire on April 20 while it was putting the finishing touches on a well about a mile beneath the ocean surface. It sank two days later.

Drilling mud is poured down the drill pipe to control the powerful pressures within the underground hydrocarbon reservoir and prevent a “kick” of methane gas and oil from rushing up the drillpipe. It was unusual for the mud to be pouring out the well in an uncontrolled flood.

“I was advised they were having trouble with the well,” Landry said, and workers on board advised him to disconnect the hose and move his vessel away. Landry said he registered concern in the rig worker’s voice.

According to accounts from rig workers reviewed by Robert Bea, a University of California Berkeley engineering professor, this was the sound of a surge of methane rushing up the drill pipe which engulfed the rig’s deck in highly-flammable gas.

“I saw the green flash on the main deck of the Horizon to the aft of the derrick.” About 10 minutes later, a distress call went out from the rig’s radio -- “Mayday! Mayday! Mayday! The rig’s on fire. Abandon ship,” Landry said.

The rig’s two lifeboats made it clear of the burning rig but a smaller life raft was hung by a rope and couldn’t get free as fire spread beneath the rig.

According to Landry, the rig’s captain, Curt Kuchta, said his crew had slammed a “kill switch” on the drill deck meant to activate an underwater blowout preventer that is designed as a fail-safe method of shutting off the well.

This article is about the explosion of the drilling rig Deepwater Horizon. For the subsequent oil spill, see Deepwater Horizon oil spill. For other related articles, see Deepwater Horizon (disambiguation).

The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion was an April 20, 2010 explosion and subsequent fire on the semi-submersible mobile offshore drilling unit, which was owned and operated by Transocean and drilling for BP in the Macondo Prospect oil field about 40 miles (64 km) southeast off the Louisiana coast. The explosion and subsequent fire resulted in the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon and the deaths of 11 workers; 17 others were injured. The same blowout that caused the explosion also caused an oil well fire and a massive offshore oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, considered the largest accidental marine oil spill in the world, and the largest environmental disaster in United States history.

Deepwater Horizon was a floating semi-submersible drilling unit — a fifth-generation, ultra-deepwater, dynamically positioned, column-stabilized drilling rig owned by Transocean and built in South Korea. The platform was 396 feet (121 m) long and 256 feet (78 m) wide and could operate in waters up to 8,000 feet (2,400 m) deep, to a maximum drill depth of 30,000 feet (9,100 m).Transocean state the platform had historically been used for deeper wells, including the deepest underwater gas and oil well.$560 million platform was built by Hyundai Heavy Industries in South Korea and completed in 2001. It was owned by Transocean, operated under the Marshalese flag of convenience, and was under lease to BP until September 2013.Deepwater Horizon was on Mississippi Canyon Block 252, referred to as the Macondo Prospect, in the United States sector of the Gulf of Mexico, about 41 miles (66 km) off the Louisiana coast.Minerals Management Service"s lease sale.rig was drilling an exploratory well.subsea producer.casing was being run and cemented at the time of the accident. Once the cementing was complete, it was due to be tested for integrity and a cement plug set to temporarily abandon the well.

The rig owner, Transocean, had a "strong overall" safety record with no major incidents for 7 years.Minerals Management Service (MMS) investigation took place on Transocean rigs. However, in the 3 years from 2008 to February 15, 2010, Transocean was the owner of 42% of rigs active in the Gulf, but was responsible for 73% of incidents. Industry surveys saw this as an effect of its November 2007 merger with rival GlobalSantaFe. Transocean was described as having had previous problems with both cement seals (in 2005) and blowout preventers (in 2006), both the suspected cause of the Deepwater Horizon disaster; however, the company stated that cementing was a task completed by third party labourers, and that it had "a strong maintenance program to keep blowout preventers working".

In 2008 and 2009, the surveys ranked Transocean last among deep-water drillers for "job quality" and second to last in "overall satisfaction". For three years before the merger, Transocean was the leader or near the top in both measures. Transocean ranked first in 2008 and 2009 in a category that gauges its in-house safety and environmental policies. There were few indications of any trouble with the Deepwater Horizon before the explosion. The rig won an award from the MMS for its 2008 safety record, and on the day of the disaster, BP and Transocean managers were on board to celebrate seven years without a lost-time accident. A BP spokesman said rigs hired by BP have had better safety records than the industry average for six years running, according to MMS statistics that measure the number of citations per inspection. BP has been a finalist for a national safety award from the MMS for the past two years. [BP spokesperson Toby Odone] wouldn"t comment on BP"s relationship with Transocean after the Gulf disaster but said BP continues to use Transocean rigs.

In February 2009, BP filed a 52-page exploration and environmental impact plan for the Macondo well with the Minerals Management Service (MMS), an arm of the United States Department of the Interior that oversees offshore drilling. The plan stated that it was "unlikely that an accidental surface or subsurface oil spill would occur from the proposed activities".environmental impact study after concluding that a massive oil spill was unlikely.

The BP wellhead had been fitted with a blowout preventer (BOP), but it was not fitted with remote-control or acoustically activated triggers for use in case of an emergency requiring a platform to be evacuated. It did have a dead man"s switch designed to automatically cut the pipe and seal the well if communication from the platform is lost, but it was unknown whether the switch was activated.

The US Coast Guard had issued pollution citations for Deepwater Horizon 18 times between 2000 and 2010, and had investigated 16 fires and other incidents. These incidents were considered typical for a Gulf platform and were not connected to the April 2010 explosion and spill.Deepwater Horizon had other serious incidents, including one in 2008 in which 77 people were evacuated from the platform when it tilted and began to sink after a section of pipe was incorrectly removed from the platform"s ballast system.

In March 2010, the rig experienced problems that included drilling mud falling into the undersea oil formation, sudden gas releases, a pipe falling into the well, and at least three occasions of the blowout preventer leaking fluid.kicked due to resistance from high gas pressure.

According to officials, 126 people were on board, of whom 79 were Transocean employees, seven were from BP, and 40 were contracted; several of the BP and Transocean executives were on board for a tour of the rig, maintenance planning, annual goals review, a "Drops" safety campaign, and to congratulate the senior staff of the rig for 7 years of operations without a lost time incident.

The Coast Guard interviewed the uninjured workers on the Damon Bankston for several hours and then transferred them to another rig; the workers arrived in Port Fourchon, Louisiana, more than 24 hours later. The workers were transported to a hotel in Kenner, Louisiana, where they were provided with food, medical attention, and rooms with showers, and asked to fill out incident response forms. An attorney for a worker who brought suit against Transocean claimed that once the workers got to shore, "they were zipped into private buses, there was security there, there was no press, no lawyers allowed, nothing, no family members" and were coerced into signing the forms before being released; Transocean denied the allegation.

On the morning of April 22, Coast Guard Petty Officer Ashley Butler stated that "oil was leaking from the rig at the rate of about 8,000 barrels (340,000 US gallons; 1,300,000 litres) of crude per day."remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) were sent down in an attempt to cap the well but were unsuccessful.Rear Admiral Mary Landry expressed cautious optimism of zero environmental impact, stating that no oil was emanating from either the wellhead or the broken pipes and that oil spilled from the explosion and sinking was being contained.

On November 8, 2010, the inquiry by the Oil Spill Commission revealed its findings that BP had not sacrificed safety in attempts to make money, but that some decisions had increased risks on the rig.

Valves to prevent cement backflow did not close. Weatherford"s Auto-Fill float collar, which includes two flapper-type check valves, was installed at Macondo 180 ft above the reamer shoe at casing bottom. The valves are held open by a 2-inch diameter auto-fill tube to allow the casing to fill with mud while it is lowered down the well.

Pressure test wrongly interpreted. Drill pipe was run to 8,367 ft, and was thought to be ready for mud displacement. During the "negative pressure test", for which there was no detailed procedure, a "no flow" result from the kill line was accepted, while a 1,400 psi result on the drill pipe was ignored.

Leak not spotted soon enough. While displacing the mud with seawater, reservoir fluids rising up the casing should have been detected by water inflow and mud outflow monitoring before arrival of hydrocarbons at the rig floor, but no reasonably accurate outflow versus inflow observations were made.

Mud–gas separator failure. Instead of venting mud and gas directly off the rig, the crew allowed it to flow through a device to separate gas from the flow of mud, which was overwhelmed.

On April 21, 2011, BP filed $40 billion worth of lawsuits against rig owner Transocean, cementer Halliburton and blowout-preventer manufacturer Cameron. The oil firm alleged that failed safety systems and irresponsible behaviour of contractors had led to the explosion, including claims that Halliburton "negligently" failed to use cement-modelling software OptiCem properly to analyze safe well requirements. Part of the modelling concern was about the number of stabilising devices, known as centralisers, the well required; 21 were called for, but only 6 were used.

In October 2011, Anadarko Petroleum agreed to pay BP $4 billion and the two companies settled all claims between them.U.S. Oil Pollution Act, among other costs.

On September 4, 2014, U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier ruled BP was guilty of gross negligence and willful misconduct under the Clean Water Act (CWA). He described BP"s actions as "reckless," while he said Transocean"s and Halliburton"s actions were "negligent". He apportioned 67% of the blame for the spill to BP, 30% to Transocean, and 3% to Halliburton. Fines would be apportioned commensurate with the degree of negligence of the parties, measured against the number of barrels of oil spilled. Under the Clean Water Act fines can be based on a cost per barrel of up to $4,300, at the discretion of the judge. The number of barrels was in dispute at the conclusion of the trial with BP arguing 2.5 million barrels were spilled over the 87 days the spill lasted, while the court found that 4.2 million barrels were spilled. BP issued a statement disagreeing with the finding, and saying the court"s decision would be appealed.

In 2011, Dispatches aired March 28, 2011, a documentary by James Brabazon, BP: In Deep Water, about the oil company, BP, covering oil spills in the gulf of Mexico and other incidents and its relationship with governments.

In 2014, Vanishing Pearls: The Oystermen of Pointe a la Hache, Louisiana, documented the town of nearly 300 struggling to survive following the BP Oil Spill that left their crop dead and finances in ruin.

In 2015, After the Spill,Jon Bowermaster investigates how the disaster affected local economies and the health of humans, animals, and food sources, and with Corexit, where all the oil went, as a follow-up to the pre-spill SoLa, Louisiana Water Stories, in post-production when the Deepwater Horizon exploded.

"BP confirms that Transocean Ltd issued the following statement today" (Press release). BP. April 21, 2010. Archived from the original on April 25, 2010. Retrieved April 21, 2010.

"Central Gulf of Mexico Planning Area Lease Sale 206 Information". US Minerals Management Service. August 8, 2008. Archived from the original on June 7, 2010. Retrieved June 6, 2010.

Gold, Russell; Casselman, Ben; Chazan, Guy (April 28, 2010). "Leaking Oil Well Lacked Safeguard Device". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved May 26, 2010.

Jordans, Frank; Burke, Garance (April 30, 2010). "Rig had history of spills, fires before big 1". Huffington Post. Associated Press. Retrieved May 1, 2010.

"Accident Investigation Report" (PDF). Minerals Management Service. May 26, 2008. Archived from the original (PDF) on May 20, 2010. Retrieved April 22, 2010.

"Transocean Deepwater Horizon Explosion-A Discussion of What Actually Happened?". Drilling Ahead. April 26, 2010. Archived from the original on October 24, 2011. Retrieved October 11, 2011.

Resnick-Ault, Jessica; Klimasinska, Katarzyna (April 22, 2010). "Transocean Oil-Drilling Rig Sinks in Gulf of Mexico". Bloomberg L.P.Retrieved April 22, 2010.

"Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report" (PDF). BP. September 8, 2010. Archived from the original (PDF) on October 6, 2016. Retrieved October 4, 2016.

USCG & MMS Joint Investigation of Deepwater Horizon Explosion, Haire and Ezell Testimony May 28, 2010 (digital media). C-Span. May 28, 2010. Event occurs at 38:30, 1:01:05, 1:20:37. Retrieved June 5, 2010.

Kirkham, Chris (April 22, 2010). "Rescued oil rig explosion workers arrive to meet families at Kenner hotel". New Orleans Metro Real-Time News. The Times-Picayune. Retrieved April 22, 2010.

McGill, Kevin (April 22, 2010). "11 missing in oil rig blast may not have escaped". Salon Media. Associated Press. Archived from the original on June 3, 2010. Retrieved April 22, 2010.

RAW: Interview with Rear Adm. Mary Landry. Clip Syndicate. WDSU NBC. April 23, 2010. Archived from the original on February 24, 2021. Retrieved April 30, 2010.

"Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling" (PDF). National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. p. 4. Retrieved May 23, 2021.

Weber, Harry R.; Kunzelman, Michael; Cappiello, Dina (September 8, 2010). "All eyes on BP report on Gulf". Oil Spill News/Artesia News. Associated Press. Archived from the original on July 23, 2011. Retrieved March 16, 2016.

Lee, Yong Gyo; Garza-Gomez, Xavier; Lee, Rose M. (January 8, 2018). "Ultimate Costs of the Disaster: Seven Years After the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill". Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance. 29: 69–79. doi:10.1002/jcaf.22306.

DP/30: The Oral History Of Hollywood (October 30, 2014). "The Great Invisible, Margaret Brown". Archived from the original on November 18, 2021. Retrieved July 9, 2017 – via YouTube.

The Aspen Institute (September 5, 2014). "The Great Invisible (Post-Screening Discussion)". Archived from the original on November 18, 2021. Retrieved July 9, 2017 – via YouTube.

"Meet David Murphy: The Next Generation of Scientists (Gulf Dispatches)". Archived from the original on November 18, 2021. Retrieved February 11, 2020 – via www.youtube.com.

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The Baoji/Bomco F1000 Triplex mud pump has a max. working pressure of 5,000PSI and a 6-3/4" liner size. This model is the first choice for the medium and deep dr... More Info

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ON THE GULF OF MEXICO — BP embarked Tuesday on an operation that could seal the biggest offshore oil leak in U.S. history once and for all, forcing mud down the throat of its blown-out well in a tactic known variously as "bullheading" or a "static kill."

The pressure in the well dropped quickly in the first 90 minutes of the procedure, a sign that everything was going as planned, wellsite leader Bobby Bolton told The Associated Press aboard the Q4000, the vessel being used to pump in the mud.

The 122 crew members on the Q4000 were excited about being part of what could be the final resolution to a drama that started with the April 20 explosion on the offshore drilling rig Deepwater Horizon, Capt. Keith Schultz said.

A 75-ton cap placed on the well in July has been keeping the oil bottled up inside over the past three weeks, but that is considered only a temporary measure. BP and the Coast Guard want to plug up the hole more securely with a column of heavy drilling mud and cement.

The static kill involves slowly pumping mud down lines running from a ship to the top of the ruptured well a mile below. BP said that may be enough by itself to seal the well.

But retired Coast Guard Adm. Thad Allen, the government"s point man for the spill, made it clear that to be safe, the gusher will have to be plugged up from two directions. He said the 18,000-foot relief well that BP has been drilling over the past three months will be used later this month to execute a "bottom kill," in which mud and cement will be injected into the bedrock 2½ miles below the sea floor.

Over the past few months, with each failed attempt to stop the leak, the American public has learned some of the oil industry"s lingo, including "top kill," which is similar to the static kill, "top hat," and "junk shot," an attempt to clog up the well with golf balls and rubber scraps.

Before the cap was lowered onto the well, 172 million gallons of crude flowed into the sea, unleashed by the April 20 explosion aboard the drilling rig Deepwater Horizon that killed 11 workers.

Drilling and well control equipment that are not designed for hydrogen sulfide use could suffer a loss of structural integrity following exposure, which could impede their function and operation during an emergency. Hydrogen sulfide is extremely toxic to humans at minute concentrations. At higher concentrations it is flammable, as well as corrosive to metals. A surface breakout of this gas, if not responded to and controlled immediately, can result in injuries and/or fatalities, fire and explosion. Hydrogen sulfide should be anticipated in all areas of the rig where drilling fluid and associated equipment is present. Those areas include the rig floor, substructure, shale shakers, mud cleaners, mud pit room, mud pump room and well test equipment. Being heavier than air, hydrogen sulfide will settle in low-lying and poorly ventilated areas and will dissolve in oil and water present in those areas.

D) Flowing well testing. During well test operations involving flaring of formation fluids, hydrogen sulfideand sulfur dioxide should be anticipated around the rig.

Many things go into getting the most life out of your mud pump and its components — all important to extend the usage of this vital piece of equipment on an HDD jobsite. Some of the most important key points are covered below.

The most important thing you can do is service your pump, per the manufacturer’s requirements. We get plenty of pumps in the shop for service work that look like they have been abused for years without having basic maintenance,  such as regular oil changes. You wouldn’t dream of treating your personal vehicle like that, so why would you treat your pump like that.

Check the oil daily and change the oil regularly. If you find water or drilling mud contamination in the oil, change the oil as soon as possible. Failure to do so will most likely leave you a substantial bill to rebuild the gear end, which could have been avoided if proper maintenance procedures would have been followed. Water in the oil does not allow the oil to perform correctly, which will burn up your gear end. Drilling mud in your gear end will act as a lapping compound and will wear out all of the bearing surfaces in your pump. Either way it will be costly. The main reasons for having water or drilling mud in the gear end of your pump is because your pony rod packing is failing and/or you have let your liners and pistons get severely worn. Indication of this is fluid that should be contained inside the fluid end of your pump is now moving past your piston and spraying into the cradle of the pump, which forces its way past the pony rod packing. Pony rod packing is meant to keep the oil in the gear end and the liner wash fluid out of the gear end. Even with brand new packing, you can have water or drilling fluid enter the gear end if it is sprayed with sufficient force, because a piston or liner is worn out.

Monitor your oil and keep your pistons, liners and pony rod packing in good condition. If a liner starts to leak, identify the problem and change it as soon as possible.

There is also usually a valve on the inlet of the spray bar. This valve should be closed enough so that liner wash fluid does not spray all over the top of the pump and other components.

Liner wash fluid can be comprised of different fluids, but we recommend just using clean water. In extremely cold conditions, you can use RV antifreeze. The liner wash or rod wash system is usually a closed loop type of system, consisting of a tank, a small pump and a spray bar. The pump will move fluid from the tank through the spray bar, and onto the inside of the liner to cool the liner, preventing scorching. The fluid will then collect in the bottom of the cradle of the pump and drain back down into the collection tank below the cradle and repeat the cycle. It is important to have clean fluid no matter what fluid you use. If your liners are leaking and the tank is full of drilling fluid, you will not cool the liners properly — which will just make the situation worse. There is also usually a valve on the inlet of the spray bar. This valve should be closed enough so that liner wash fluid does not spray all over the top of the pump and other components. Ensure that the water is spraying inside the liner and that any overspray is not traveling out of the pump onto the ground or onto the pony rod packing where it could be pulled into the gear end. If the fluid is spraying out of the cradle area and falling onto the ground, it won’t be long before your liner wash tank is empty. It only takes a minute without the cooling fluid being sprayed before the liners become scorched. You will then need to replace the pistons and liners, which is an avoidable costly repair. Make a point to check the liner wash fluid level several times a day.

Drilling fluid — whether pumping drilling mud, straight water or some combination of fluid — needs to be clean. Clean meaning free of solids. If you are recycling your fluid, make sure you are using a quality mud recycling system and check the solids content often throughout the day to make sure the system is doing its job. A quality mud system being run correctly should be able to keep your solids content down to one quarter of 1 percent or lower. When filling your mud recycling system, be sure to screen the fluid coming into the tanks. If it is a mud recycling system, simply make sure the fluid is going over the scalping shaker with screens in the shaker. If using some other type of tank, use an inline filter or some other method of filtering. Pumping out of creeks, rivers, lakes and ponds can introduce plenty of solids into your tanks if you are not filtering this fluid. When obtaining water out of a fire hydrant, there can be a lot of sand in the line, so don’t assume it’s clean and ensure it’s filtered before use.

Cavitation is a whole other detailed discussion, but all triplex pumps have a minimum amount of suction pressure that is required to run properly. Make sure this suction pressure is maintained at all times or your pump may cavitate. If you run a pump that is cavitating, it will shorten the life of all fluid end expendables and, in severe cases, can lead to gear end and fluid end destruction. If the pump is experiencing cavitation issues, the problem must be identified and corrected immediately.

The long and the short of it is to use clean drilling fluid and you will extend the life of your pumps expendables and downhole tooling, and keep up with your maintenance on the gear end of your pump. Avoid pump cavitation at all times. Taking a few minutes a day to inspect and maintain your pump can save you downtime and costly repair bills.

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What would you find during a �hazard hunt� focused on explosion-proof electrical boxes on your rig? In this incident, a damaged explosion-proof box near the shale shakers became the ignition source for gas breaking out of the non-aqueous mud returns,

High gas was present around the shakers because a bottoms-up after a bit trip was not circulated through the choke manifold and the mud-gas separator to manage the increased gas contained in the mud. Instead, the system relied on gas breaking out in the

flowline and venting to the mud-gas separator. Is your system plumbed so that it can accommodate occasional higher gas concentrations? Are your crews trained to anticipate such situations and to respond properly?

Unconventional oil-producer. Drilling assembly was pulled out of hole, new drilling assembly tripped back to bottom. Production hole drilling operations resumed, no bottoms-up circulated prior to recommencing drilling operations. While drilling ahead, shortly

shakers and substructure area, then observed smoke in the vicinity of the rig floor / substructure / drawworks; then a fire was observed at the shakers. The driller ceased rotation of the drilling assembly and turned the mud pumps off, departed the rig floor

and secured the well by functioning the annular preventer closed from the accumulator unit. All on-duty personnel were mustered. Pipe rams were functioned closed from the accumulator unit to further secure the well, the rig was powered down, fuel sources isolated.

The 2,200-hp mud pump for offshore applications is a single-acting reciprocating triplex mud pump designed for high fluid flow rates, even at low operating speeds, and with a long stroke design. These features reduce the number of load reversals in critical components and increase the life of fluid end parts.

The pump’s critical components are strategically placed to make maintenance and inspection far easier and safer. The two-piece, quick-release piston rod lets you remove the piston without disturbing the liner, minimizing downtime when you’re replacing fluid parts.

According to BP"s September 2010 report, the accident started with a "well integrity failure". This was followed by a loss of control of the pressure of the fluid in the well. The "blowout preventer", a device which should automatically seal the well in the event of such a loss of control, failed to engage. Hydrocarbons shot up the well at an uncontrollable rate and ignited, causing a series of explosions on the rig.

According to the final progress report from the Deepwater Horizon study group, 10 different techniques were used to try to plug the leak. This began with efforts to close the blowout preventer with a remotely operated vehicle. Successive efforts involved capturing oil spewing from the riser by lowering a "top hat" over it. Next, engineers attempted to "kill" the well by injecting heavy mud into the blowout preventer. All of these efforts failed. Finally, engineers were successful by bolting a sealing cap on top of the blowout preventer. This provided a temporary fix until engineers could pump heavy kill mud and cement into the well to reduce pressure at the well head and permanently seal off the flow paths.

It depends who you ask. BP contracted Polaris to assess the area affected and provide recommendations for cleanup. The shoreline cleanup technical adviser, Ed Owens, believes all of the oil is on the surface and only 10% of the oil actually reached the shoreline. His team surveyed about 4,000 miles of coastline, and on their first assessment they found that about 1,000 miles of shoreline had been affected. Of this stretch, about 200 miles were heavily oiled – meaning that the oil covering them was more than three-foot wide and covered 50% distribution. This included about 80 miles of heavily oiled wetland. Now, he says, 15 miles of heavily oiled beach remain, along with "some tens of miles" of moderately oiled coastline.

This correlates with reports from a spokesman for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA), who told the Guardian earlier this month that about 60 miles of coastline remain oiled.

Not everyone agrees. Samantha Joye"s research team from the University of Georgia believes that more oil is lurking beneath the surface of the water. They found a 22-mile plume of oil and gas droplets in the depths of the Gulf of Mexico in May last year. Their findings were recorded in a report published in the peer-reviewed journal Science.

In December, Joye discovered a thick coating of oil, dead starfish and other organisms over an area of 2,900 square miles on the bottom of the ocean. She told the Guardian earlier this month: "I think it is not beyond the imagination that 50% of the oil is still floating around out there."

Tony Hayward, who was BP"s chief executive at the time of the explosion, said in a statement that the initial well integrity failure was down to a "bad cement job" by oil and gas equipment company Halliburton. Halliburton said that it had noticed "a number of substantial omissions and inaccuracies" in the BP report, and said that it was "confident that all the work it performed with respect to the Macondo well was completed in accordance with BP"s specifications."

In its report on the disaster, BP blamed the rig owners, Transocean, for failing to adequately maintain the blowout preventer. The report said: "The BOP [blowout preventer] maintenance records were not accurately reported in the maintenance management system. The condition of critical components in the yellow and blue pods and the use of a non-OEM [original equipment manufacturer] part, which were discovered after the pods were recovered, suggest the lack of a robust Transocean maintenance management system for Deepwater Horizon BOP."

It has been argued by commentators that the failure of Deepwater Horizon was the inevitable result of years of deregulation of the oil industry. However, the independent Deepwater Horizon study group final report, published in March this year, suggests that the real root of the problem was BP"s own laissez-faire approach to safety.

There were also reports that BP knew about a fault in the blowout preventer – the piece of equipment that ultimately failed, triggering an explosion – but did nothing to fix it.

In addition, BP"s contingency plan for dealing with a catastrophic oil spill contained many errors and miscalculations, according to an analysis by the Associated Press. The mistakes included listing animals not found in the Gulf region (including seals and walruses) as potential victims of an oil spill, and the recommendation of a long-deceased scientist as an expert on wildlife contamination.

BP was accused by a senior US politician of lying to Congress to reduce its liabilities, after an internal document showed that the company"s own worst-case assessment of the size of the oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico was 20 times its public estimate.

The spill temporarily wiped out half the company"s value. BP"s share price plummeted from 653 pence per share on 15 April to a nadir of 303 pence per share on 29 June. Recovery has been steady since then but has stalled at around 480 pence per share since January. This can be partly attributed to its floundering efforts to partner with Rosneft, the state-controlled Russian oil major, and the related threat of a $10bn lawsuit from joint venture TNK-BP.

One of the major concerns for the cleanup team at the moment is oil buried beneath the sand. With hurricane season approaching, Owens is concerned "that storms might remobilise some buried oil that we haven"t yet found".

The cleanup operation will not be able to remove every last drop of oil, however. Polaris will rely upon natural processes of weathering, microbial activity and evaporation to break down residual oil.

The NOAA produced an "oil budget" in November 2010 that showed that almost one-quarter of the oil evaporated or dissolved; 17% was sucked up by the "top hat" lowered onto the broken riser pipe or otherwise directly recovered; 16% was chemically dispersed by more than 8m litres of chemical dispersants; a further 13% was naturally dispersed; 5% was burned (which equated to up to 11,000 barrels a day), and 3% was skimmed. On the coast, teams used beach-cleaning machines and flushing techniques in the marshes.

State officials are currently in the process of tallying and logging the harm done to wildlife; however, the indications are that the spill has not been as catastrophic as the worst predictions. According to data published by the US Fish and Wildlife Service in November 2010, the spill has affected thousands of birds and dozens of sea turtles. State and federal workers and contractors for BP recorded more than 6,100 dead birds, 2,200 of which were visibly oiled. They also recorded more than 600 dead sea turtles, 18 of which were visibly oiled. Not all of the deaths were thought to have been caused by the oil spill.

153 dead dolphins have washed up on the shore across the Gulf, at least eight of which were smeared with crude oil that has been traced to BP"s well. It is yet to be established whether the oil killed them.