clear overshot cards made in china

The clear overshot card for roll crimps. You"ll know instantly what is inside every load. This is an excellent topcard for spreader wads. The material is frangible and breaks up immediately upon shot thrust. The stable platform offers a near-perfect surface for ideal roll crimps -- every time. Use in any overshot card application. Designed with a pressure-relief notch for high-speed loading.

Place an overshot card on top of the shot charge just before crimping to improve overall crimp quality and seal in small shot and/or buffer. Excellent for use with BPI Roll Crimpers.

Our testing lab has proven that poor crimps can alter the performance of an otherwise good load. Overshot cards always produce better, more consistent crimps and this consistency is demonstrated in the standard deviation of loads in our lab. Our ballistic lab recommends overshot cards for better crimps in all loads.

Clear Overshot Disks(either plain or printed with shot size) are also offered for great roll crimping options. See pictures in Additional Images or click on this link.

Shotshell size selection: Use the same size gauge as your hull. Smaller diameter cards also work if your particular size is out of stock. For example, a 20ga overshot card works in a 16-gauge shotshell and so on.

1. Plastic must be stiff and thick enough to give good closure, but “frangible”– it has to shatter if you hit it without much force. The plastic covers for CDs are perfect. I have a box of “jewel cases” for CDs from Best Buy, colored clear/blue/orange/yellow/green/red, exact same stuff, for like 4$ for 50– you can make whatever color you want.

I thought this could be a good thread to list the other parts/tools for making homemade fillers like OS cards, wad inserts of felt and thick cardboard. Here’s the ideas I’ve read or come up with:

Here’s a link to larger hollow punch, it has 9/16 (.56″) and 5/8 (.625). The 9/16 should work for 20ga OS while the 5/8 for 20ga nitrocards (used for 12ga load spacers).

The clear overshot card for roll crimps. You"ll know instantly what is inside every load. This is an excellent topcard for spreader wads. The material is frangible and breaks up immediately upon shot thrust. The stable platform offers a near-perfect surface for ideal roll crimps -- every time. Use in any overshot card application. Designed with a pressure-relief notch for high-speed loading.

The clearest area of concern for China is corporate debt. Over 80 percent of the rise in China’s debt-to-GDP ratio can be attributed to the explosive growth of corporate debt, which rose from 96 percent of GDP in 2007 to 142 percent of GDP in 2012.6 It is much more menacing than household debt, and it now makes up 60 percent of China’s total debt. As of 2014, China has one of the highest corporate-debt-to-GDP ratios in the world, even compared to major developed economies like the United States (see figure 3). Even so, the risks associated with rising corporate debt in China are mitigated by the fact that much of it is concentrated in state-dominated sectors where government support is available and industrial profitability has remained acceptable.

Although corporate leverage in China has risen significantly, it is not clear that it has reached crisis levels. The IMF estimates that in 2012, China’s nonfinancial corporate debt had reached just over 100 percent of equity, slightly above the Asian median of 96 percent.7 Yet this is still quite modest compared to median debt-to-equity ratios of the East Asian financial crisis countries, which were 240 percent in Thailand, 190 in Indonesia, and a shocking 350 in South Korea in the year before the crisis.8

Although overall public debt is not particularly worrisome and the government is clearly solvent, LGFVs and the localities that support them do face short-term-liquidity challenges. Much of the debt they have incurred is in the form of short-term loans from banks or borrowing through the shadow-banking system, which involves loans of short maturities. Over 40 percent of local government debt will come due within the coming year according to the recent audit. Meanwhile, many of their investments will not produce returns for years. As a result, many are experiencing liquidity shortages. The ratings firm Moody’s and Nomura Securities estimate that up to half of all local governments have insufficient cash flows to cover their debt repayments due in 2014, and Macquarie Capital estimates that 29 percent of new borrowing by LGFVs is used to discharge existing debts.29

Estimates of local government debt vary widely, since those governments do not provide clear and comprehensive statements. This lack of transparency manifests itself not only in the rapidly rising level of debt but also in the way it is managed. The 2011 audit revealed that “of thirty one provincial governments, seven haven’t created debt management systems . . . 14 haven’t established debt repayment funds, and as many as 24 of them haven’t installed risk monitoring and control systems.”33 This dearth of risk management systems has made it easy for unmonitored risks to accumulate.

What is less clear is how the leadership intends to improve the transparency of local government debt. China’s leaders have acted on their intention to use more local government bonds, which will help because bond financing involves ratings agencies and formal audits. In early 2014, the government selected a few localities and cities to launch a pilot bond-financing program to supplement their revenue needs. However, the local governments included thus far were specifically selected because of their relatively stronger financial positions. This leaves unresolved how to improve the transparency of the localities most in need of reforms.

As with the broader debt, concerns about China’s shadow-banking system often focus on debt’s rapid growth rather than its absolute level. Shadow-banking activities in China have expanded dramatically since the end of the bank-credit stimulus in 2009. Goldman Sachs estimates shadow banking’s share of the flow of new credit has doubled in recent years, from 22 percent in 2008 to 42 percent by June 2013, at which point it accounted for roughly a quarter of the outstanding credit stock.41 In the first quarter of 2014, shadow banking was scaled back modestly,42 although it is unclear whether this is a temporary deviation from the trend toward increased shadow-banking activities or something more permanent.

Yet, these regulations are still insufficient to curb the risks WMPs could pose to financial stability if they continue to grow at their current pace. The China Banking Regulatory Commission must find a way of clearly distinguishing WMPs from deposits to put an end to implicit guarantees, or it should recognize the inherently deposit-like structure of WMPs and begin to regulate them as such. Creating a clear divide seems implausible given banks’ incentives to maintain investor confidence in the WMP market and the government’s concerns that isolated protests over failed WMPs might get out of hand. Thus it would be more practical for the China Banking Regulatory Commission to treat WMPs as a form of deposit subject to capital and reserve requirements similar to those on traditional bank deposits and lending.

Over the past decade, land prices in China have surged fivefold according to the Wharton/NUS/Tsinghua Chinese Residential Land Price Index (see figure 12), while the construction sector has expanded from 10 to 13 percent of GDP.86 With such a dramatic increase in land and property prices and a potential glut of housing in the cards, this has understandably led to concerns that China may be experiencing a property bubble. These concerns have been brought to a boil by deteriorating sales figures and media accounts of large price cuts during the first few months of 2014. In April 2014, Nomura Securities declared that it is no longer a question of “if” or “when” but “how severe” the property correction will be.87

Thanks to easing urbanization pressures and a construction boom following the global financial crisis, Gavekal now believes that China is entering a period of modest oversupply, but it still expects strong fundamental demand of around 10 million units a year (see figure 13).93 It is fairly clear that China’s housing supply has overshot the market, but it is not clear that it has done so by a dramatic margin.

That downturn is likely to happen soon. Given that underlying demand totals roughly 10 million units a year, and 11 million units came onto the market last year, it seems clear that construction volume must slow by roughly 10 percent. UBS estimates that such a decline could subtract 2.5 percentage points from GDP growth.102

China’s credit boom fundamentally differs from those that preceded it. The initial debt surge was the result of a deliberate, state-driven stimulus program undertaken in response to the global financial crisis. Although it was clearly overdone, it succeeded in staving off an imminent economic collapse.

In its quarterly report released Thursday evening, the PBOC seemed more worried about the upside risks to inflation than about a sudden weakening in the economy - implying that the report was written well before April’s signals became clear.