overshot the runway factory

A federal investigator says Southwest Airlines pilots on a flight into Burbank, California, overshot the ideal touchdown point and should have aborted the landing before the plane skidded off a wet runway in December 2018.

The findings by an expert in aircraft performance were included in documents posted Thursday by the National Transportation Safety Board, which is investigating the incident.

The plane was stopped by absorbent material shortly before a fence and a street bordering Hollywood Burbank Airport. None of the 117 passengers and crew on the flight from Oakland, California, were injured.

Burbank has relatively short runways, and air traffic controllers warned the pilots of heavy rain at the airport. A small jet before them had aborted a landing.

“Yeah, it’s wet with a tailwind and (expletive) short runway,” said the co-pilot, Peter Van Pelt, according to an NTSB transcript of the cockpit conversation.

The pilots warned passengers to expect hard braking after landing. Welinski told investigators that he set the plane’s automatic brakes to maximum and used thrust reversers, but the plane still didn’t feel like it was slowing after touchdown. He considered turning at an intersection with a taxiway, but the plane only drifted to the left, as if the nose wheel were in a skid.

NTSB specialist John O’Callaghan wrote in a report on the plane’s performance that a tailwind, the landing point and a fast approach speed all contributed to the plane leaving the runway. “However, of the three, the long touchdown is the most significant contributor,” he said.

O’Callaghan wrote that the plane touched down at least 1,000 feet too far down the runway, and under Southwest’s own guidelines, “a go-around (was) the better option.” In a go-around, pilots pull up and circle before making another attempt to land.

Both pilots flew for many years in the military before joining Southwest, had extensive experience and clean records with no previous accidents or incidents, according to NTSB documents.

HALIFAX — Confusing runway instructions, an unexpected tailwind and crew fatigue were factors that contributed to a 2018 runway overshoot that destroyed a Boeing 747 cargo jet at Halifax Stanfield International Airport, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada says.

In an investigation report released Tuesday, the independent agency also cited insufficient braking on a wet runway, noting that the aircraft was wrecked as it slid down a grassy embankment 270 metres past the end of the runway. All three crew members received minor injuries, but the sole passenger – a deadheading pilot – was not injured.

The massive aircraft, operated by Sky Lease Cargo based in Miami, Fla., started its ill-fated flight at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago early on Nov. 7, 2018. The crew had planned to pick up live lobsters in Halifax, which were destined for markets in China.

The board’s investigation found that a confusing notice to pilots – known as a Notice to Airmen or NOTAM – led the crew to wrongly believe the longer of the two runways in Halifax – Runway 23 – was not available for landing. As a result, they planned to land on Runway 14, which is 2,347 metres long.

As the aircraft approached the runway in the dark just after 5 a.m., air traffic control failed to tell the crew about the availability of Runway 23, although an automated information system was broadcasting that information, the report said.

Less than 90 seconds before the jet crossed the threshold, the crew realized there was a tailwind to contend with, as well as a rain-slicked runway. Airplanes typically take off and land into the wind, which offers pilots more lift and, as a result, more control. But tailwind landings are possible within certain limits.

“Upon landing, a series of events prevented the aircraft from decelerating as expected and caused the aircraft to drift to the right of the runway,” the report said.

The document said that for some unknown reason, the thrust lever for the No. 1 engine was moved forward of the idle position, causing the speed brakes to retract and the autobrake system to disengage. Those changes increased the distance required to bring the aircraft to a stop.

“The pilot monitoring ? was focused on the lateral drift and, as a result, the required call-outs regarding the position of the deceleration devices were not made,” the report said.

The brakes were applied eight seconds after touchdown, but maximum braking effort did not occur until 15 seconds later, the report said. At that point, the 183,500-kilogram jumbo jet was about 240 metres from the end of the runway

As the plane skidded down the embankment, it hit a large localizer antenna, its landing gear collapsed, two of its four engines were torn off and there was a small fire under the tail section, caused by a severed engine.

The board identified two risk factors for fatigue that would have degraded the crew’s performance: the early morning timing of the flight and insufficient time for restorative sleep in the 24-hour period leading up to the overrun.

Because of “acute sleep disruption” and the timing of the landing, “the performance of the flight crew at the time of the accident would likely have been degraded by fatigue,” the report said.

The safety board also noted that the uneven terrain where the aircraft came to rest was beyond the runway’s 150-metre runway end safety area, which is designed to reduce the risk of damage to aircraft that land short of the runway or overshoot it.

The report said that in 2007, the board recommended Transport Canada require all runways longer than 1,800 metres to have a 300-metre runway end safety area or a means of stopping aircraft that provides an equivalent level of safety.

An airport serving France"s southern Mediterranean coast is closed indefinitely after a cargo plane overshot its runway on landing and finished nose-down in the water of an adjacent lake before dawn on Saturday.

The three people aboard were rescued unharmed from the Boeing 737 that was laden with air freight and came to a stop in reeds, grass and water at the airport outside the city of Montpellier, regional authorities said.

(Only the headline and picture of this report may have been reworked by the Business Standard staff; the rest of the content is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.)

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NEW DELHI (Reuters) - At least 18 people died and 16 were severely injured in southern India on Friday after a Boeing-737 overshot a runway known as a “table-top” in the aviation industry.Officials inspect the site where a passenger plane crashed when it overshot the runway at the Calicut International Airport in Karipur, in the southern state of Kerala, India, August 8, 2020. REUTERS/Stringer

The Air India Express plane, which was repatriating Indians stranded in Dubai due to the coronavirus pandemic, overshot the runway of the Calicut International Airport in heavy rain near the southern city of Kozhikode on Friday.

Such runways have steep drops at one or both ends, increasing the possibility of injuries and fatalities if pilots under or overshoot their approach, either through human error or mechanical failure.

They are most commonly found in mountainous areas where flat land is scarce, or in low-lying areas like Kozhikode where space is at a premium or there is fear of waterlogging at ground level.

The table-top runway at Kozhikode is around 2,700 metres (8,858 feet) long, shorter than the 4,430 metres (14,534 feet) runway in the Indian capital New Delhi, though it is long enough for narrowbody aircraft like the Boeing-737 to land.

In May 2010, an Air India flight landing at Mangalore airport overshot the table-top runway there, falling down a hillside and bursting into flames. Of the 166 people on board, only eight survived. The inquest into the crash later blamed pilot error.

During its third landing attempt on runway 22, weather conditions at the airport were still challenging, and the aircraft ran off the runway during landing. The aircraft struck the ILS localizer antenna array for runway 22 after overrunning the end of the runway. The aircraft crossed the runway end at about 80 knots over the ground and came to a stop about 360 metres past the runway end close to the airport perimeter fence.The nose landing gear appears to have collapsed prior to the aircraft hitting the antenna array.

Early reports from the scene do not mention any injuries or casualties. However, aircraft damage is considerable (collapsed nose gear, damage to the nose underbelly and penetrations to the cockpit)and the aircraft might be written off.

The aircraft involved in this landing accident is Airbus A330-322 HL7525, a 24-year-old aeroplane. The aircraft made its first flight in 1998 and was delivered factory fresh to Korean Air in June 1998.Happening Now: A Korean Air A330 has reportedly overshot the runway at Mactan Cebu International Airport. More to follow. pic.twitter.com/PCukqbg7ut

Due to weather and plane malfunctions Korean Air #KE631 (likely due to an earlier landing attempt) we were informed to prepare for emergency landing procedures in Cebu at around 11:10-11:25pm local time 10/23/22. We braced ourselves and the pilot landed as best as possible pic.twitter.com/txDqLV6CcT

PARIS (AP) — An airport serving France’s southern Mediterranean coast is closed indefinitely after a cargo plane overshot its runway on landing and finished nose-down in the water of an adjacent lake before dawn on Saturday.

The three people aboard were rescued unharmed from the Boeing 737 that was laden with air freight and came to a stop in reeds, grass and water at the airport outside the city of Montpellier, regional authorities said.

"Then the plane veered off toward some trees on the side and then the cabin filled with smoke. I got caught in some cables but managed to scramble out," said Farooq who had burns to his arms, legs, and face.

It was the first major plane crash in India since 2000, when 61 people were killed after a passenger plane crashed into a residential area near the eastern city of Patna.

Karnataka Home Minister V.S. Acharya called for local people"s cooperation in what he called "this hour of crisis" and urged them to stay away from the crash site.

V.P. Agrawal, chairman of the Airport Authority of India told reporters in New Delhi that there had been no distress call to suggest a technical fault.

Television images showed the plane had partially broken up, with smoke billowing from the main fuselage, as rescue workers sought to douse the fire with foam.

The airport is located some 20 kilometres outside the coastal city of Mangalore, which is around 320 kilometres west of the Karnataka state capital, Bangalore.

Many Indians from Karnataka and other southern states work in Gulf cities such as Dubai as construction workers, domestic staff and in other low-paid jobs.

"Boeing wishes to express its profound condolences to the friends and family of those lost... as well as its wish for the recovery of those injured," it said on its website.

India"s worst aviation accident occurred in 1996 when two passenger planes collided in mid-air near New Delhi with the loss of all 349 on board both flights.

The crash was blamed on a Kazakhstan Airlines plane descending below its assigned altitude, putting it in the path of a Saudi Arabian Airlines plane that had taken off minutes earlier from the Indian capital"s airport.

There was the time a jet overran the runway in February 2005, breaking through a fence and crossing six lanes of Route 46 traffic before colliding with two cars and a clothing warehouse. Twenty people were injured.  Six years later, five people — including 45-year-old Manhattan executive Jeffrey F. Buckalew, his wife, their two children, and the family dog — were killed days before Christmas when their single-engine plane exploded in dramatic fashion in an I-287 crash in Morris Township.

September 1950: A single-engine plane that had just taken off from Teterboro nose-dived into the intersection of Queen Anne Road and Cherry Lane in Teaneck, narrowly missing homes. The pilot was killed and his passenger injured.

June 1966 A two-engine plane headed to Teterboro crashed in a neighborhood in Hasbrouck Heights. The plane missed homes, but struck a tree. The pilot, who was injured, had been carrying film for Eastman Kodak.

September 1981 A plane and a helicopter, both headed to Teterboro, collided in the air over East Rutherford. The helicopter crashed in the parking lot of the Meadowlands Sports Complex and the two people on board died. The airplane skidded into the marshes, seriously injuring the pilot.

1985 A Teterboro-bound corporate jet hit a small plane in the skies over Fairview, killing six people, including one on the ground. The jet destroyed a row of multifamily homes in Cliffside Park, leaving 35 homeless and raining wreckage over eight blocks.

March 2002 A single-engine plane struggled after takeoff, plunging to the ground and skidding hundreds of feet before it burst into flames inside the airport fence. The pilot was killed.

August 2009 A small two-engine plane crashed in the parking lot of Mohawk Industries on Route 46 as it attempted to abort a landing at Teterboro Airport. The pilot and co-pilot were seriously injured.

The airport’s neighbors have long been concerned about safety at the airport. Connie Bovino, chairwoman of Hackensack’s condo and co-op advisory board, said Monday that she’s worried about the low-flying planes hitting nearby schools or the Hackensack University Medical Center.

LAPA Flight 3142 was a scheduled Buenos Aires–Córdoba flight operated by the Argentine airline Líneas Aéreas Privadas Argentinas.Boeing 737-204C, registration LV-WRZ,take off from Aeroparque Jorge Newbery and failing to get airborne. The crash resulted in 65 fatalities — 63 of the occupants of the aircraft and 2 on the ground — as well as injuries, some serious, to at least a further 34 people.Aerolíneas Argentinas Flight 644 38 years prior.

The aircraft was a Boeing 737-204C, registered in Argentina as LV-WRZ, production number 20389, line 251, with JT8D-9A engines.Boeing to Britannia Airways on 17 April of that year. It was registered in the United Kingdom as G-AXNB.

Finally, LAPA took possession of the plane on 21 December 1996, and flew it under the Argentine tail number LV-WRZ. At the time of the accident, it had accumulated 64,564 hours of flight time and 38,680 take-off/landing cycles. The aircraft was 29 years and 139 days old at the time the accident took place.

The captain of the flight was Captain Gustavo R. Weigel (45) and the co-pilot was Luis Etcheverry (31). The captain had 6,500 hours of flying experience, of which 1,700 had been in a Boeing 737, the type of aircraft that was in the accident. The co-pilot had flown about 600 of his 4,000 hours in the 737. Both pilots died in the accident.

With regard to the two pilots, the JIAAC report said that "the records of their flight and simulator training showed repeated negative flying characteristics, and if they had been able to move away from these characteristics in the face of difficulties, their poor attitude manifested itself once again in relaxed attitudes such as that seen in the cockpit of flight 3142".

Even though the aforementioned report stated that "the pilots had fulfilled technical and psychological requirements", and that "their experience, both in general flight, and with this kind of aircraft was suitable for the job they were performing", the lawsuit later determined that Weigel was not fit to fly, since his license had expired.

Even though these personal issues surrounding the pilots had a very significant influence on the accident, the legal investigation performed in the following years centered on proving that the pilots were not entirely to blame, but that the lack of controls by the Air Force and LAPA"s organizational culture also played a role in the events leading to the crash.

As the aircraft started its takeoff run, the take-off warning system (TOWS) sounded an alarm in the cockpit, indicating that the aircraft was not correctly configured for the maneuver. The crew ignored the warning and continued the takeoff, not realising that the flaps were not at the required take-off position and were instead fully retracted, thus preventing the aircraft from lifting off. The jet overshot the runway, breaking through the airport"s perimeter fence, crossed a road, hitting an automobile in the process, and finally collided with road construction machinery and a highway median. Fuel spilling over the hot engines and gas leaking from a damaged gas regulation station resulted in a fire that destroyed the aircraft.

The penal prosecution focused on proving that the company"s policies and organization, lacking the Argentine Air Force"s controls, were the main factors that led to the accident. For instance, it was mentioned that a pilot was allowed to fly without a license by the company. Because of these perceived flaws, some of LAPA"s directors and the Air Force staff responsible for monitoring the airline were taken to jury trial.

The evening of the accident, the captain arrived at the Aeroparque Jorge Newbery one hour before take-off, as usual, in order to perform a regular commercial flight (LAPA 3142), on which 95 passengers and 5 crew members were to be transported to the destination airport Ingeniero Ambrosio Taravella in the city of Córdoba.

He arrived before the first officer and had an informal conversation with the flight dispatcher on duty. The aforementioned briefing started with the rest of the flight"s crew, and when the first officer arrived, they went back over the weather conditions –which were good– and the NOTAMs for the destination airport as well as for alternative ones. Both pilots controlled the flight plan. Having seen the good weather conditions, the captain selected Aeroparque Jorge Newbery as the alternative airport and decided on the fuel requirements for the flight. The first officer went to the aircraft and the captain followed him shortly after.

There were no unusual incidents during the briefing. There were no comments or attitudes outside the norm from either of the two pilots during the briefing.

The first officer notified one of the mechanics assisting the aircraft that the total fuel requirement was 8,500 kilograms (18,700 lb), all to be stored in tanks on the wings. The mechanic corroborated loading fuel into the main tank. In this case, as required by the technical documentation of the time, the fuel was to be moved to the wing tanks. The mechanic started that job when the captain arrived at the aircraft.

Before entering the cockpit, he threw the flight technical record to the floor, showing annoyance, confirming that attitude by later shutting off the fuel transfer faucet between the main tank and the wing tanks, a job that was being performed at that precise moment by the assistant flight mechanic.

During their first four minutes on board, the captain, the co-pilot and the commissioner talked about trivial matters in good spirits, focusing on the commissioner"s personal issues. When the commissioner left the cockpit, the conversation changed tone and matter as they discussed a controversial situation about their relationship. The captain said, after a reproach from the co-pilot, that he was "going through bad times", to which the copilot replied that he was also having a bad day.

Without interrupting the conversation and as part of it, the reading of the Procedures Control List (PCL) for the aircraft started, mixed with the personal issues that worried them and that led them to misread the procedure checklist.

This confusing situation, in which the PCL was interspersed with conversation irrelevant to the crew"s task, persisted during "push back", engine start and taxiing, up to the moment of take-off, which was delayed by other aircraft waiting ahead of the LAPA flight and heavy arriving traffic.

Take-off started on Runway 13 of the Aeroparque at 20:53 hours, and in spite of overpassing rotation (Vr) and take-off security (V2) speeds, the aircraft did not succeed in taking off, continuing straight along its path uncontrollably, hitting several obstacles and finally impacting an embankment.

"In its final run after failing to take off, the aircraft hit a Chrysler Neon car that was travelling on the Rafael Obligado road that crosses the projection of Runway 13. The car"s fuel in contact with sparks from the sliding fuselage against the tarmac and the dragged automobile possibly ignited a fire on the left front side of the aircraft, which grew from rupture of the wings which spilled jet fuel of type JP-1. Also, as a result of a gas regulator plant being hit, a gas leak developed. The fire moved to the back of the aircraft, covering it entirely."

After impact against the embankment, but before catching fire, a flight attendant attempted to hold and operate a fire extinguisher, but she didn"t succeed because it was already very hot. She also unsuccessfully tried to open the rear right door that was jammed —probably due to deformation. Finally, another flight attendant succeeded in opening the rear left door allowing several passengers to be evacuated before the fire propagated itself. The right side of the fuselage showed an opening, through which a few passengers escaped.

On the doors, preliminary versions of the report added that "the front left slide L1, of grey colour, was found deployed but unpressurised", which means a much greater effort was needed to open the door. The early reports also considered that the absence of a food or drinks trolley in the rear galley of the aircraft helped, since walking distance to the exit was notably reduced.

Fire units from the airport, as well as the Federal Police, and the Naval Prefecture fought the fire. The evacuation operation was directed by the city"s Medical Emergency Attention Service (SAME), which used 15 ambulances of their own as well as some from private hospitals. Based on the severity of their injuries, the casualties were taken to different treatment centres.

During the three days after the accident, the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) sent a team to assist the JIAAC in their investigation. This team consisted of an NTSB representative and technicians from Boeing, Pratt & Whitney, and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). While in Argentina, these investigators worked with JIAAC personnel, forming teams according to their areas of expertise.

The data from the flight data recorder (FDR) and the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) were read at the NTSB headquarters in Washington. With this information, a computerized animation of the failed take-off attempt was constructed.

Another aspect that was studied and analyzed was the adherence to the maintenance plan in the available technical documentation. The analysis led investigators to believe that the aircraft, its components and its engines complied with the requirements set out in the maintenance plan and the approved operational specifications of the Dirección Nacional de Aeronavegabilidad (National Board of Airworthiness).

To complete the detailed investigation, the JIAAC technicians reassembled the main components of the aircraft in a hangar in the Aeroparque. They also cleaned, identified and analyzed the boards, actuators, electronic equipment, the cockpit pedestal, etc. that were recovered from the accident site, and dismantled the engines of the plane as much as possible given the state of destruction they faced. The technicians inspected the hydraulic system on thrust reversers of both engines, and the braking system of the landing gear, all of which were found to be in sufficient working order.

The investigation concluded that the engines almost certainly functioned until the final impact, though their behaviour at that particular moment could not be precisely determined. Nevertheless, from the reading of the FDR it was observed that both engines had equal thrust and were set to provide thrust for take-off before power was reduced and the thrust reversers were applied. In order to determine if there was a bird strike, the National Institute for the Investigation of Natural Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones de las Ciencias Naturales) performed a study with negative results.

The thrust reversers—which are located behind the engine and direct the exhaust forward to slow the aircraft down quickly after landing (see image)—were found seriously damaged, but the hydraulic mechanism of the left engine was set for reverse thrust, while the right one was set for forward thrust. The investigation was unable to determine if the thrust reversers were intentionally activated and later deactivated.

It was important for the investigation to establish the position of the mechanical activators on the flaps, since their lack of deployment was a fundamental cause of the accident. A special investigation was carried out to establish what had happened with the flaps. The extended flaps alter the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft, giving the aircraft lift to get off the ground at a lower speed over a shorter distance than would be possible without flaps. This is why in practice, there are no runways that would allow the take-off of medium- to large- size aircraft without flaps.

The flaps on this Boeing 747 are the surfaces that extend behind the wings, thus permitting the airplane to maintain sufficient lift to fly at lower speeds, during takeoff, initial ascent, approach, and landing.

The main finding within the remains of the plane was that all of the examined flaps" worm gear operators were in the unwound position indicating that the flaps were not deployed. This tallies with the flap command in the cockpit that was also in the no-flaps position, that the readings at the FDR indicate they were retracted, and that the flap lights were off indicating that they were not activated.

The alarm sound recorded by the CVR indicated that there was a problem with the departure configurations. The recording showed that at the time of departure the flaps were not in the correct position for lift-off.

A study was performed on the electrical circuitry to determine the position of the electrical breakers on the take-off warning system. Also, a study was performed on the slat indicator lights" filaments.

The indicator lights were found to be off, the only fire alarm was off, and the main warning indicators (Master Caution) were found on. The latter could be activated by any one of a long list of possible faults resulting in the destruction of the aircraft.

According to the investigative commission, the immediate cause of the accident was "that the flight crew of LAPA flight 3142 forgot to extend the wing flaps to initiate take-off, and ignored the alarm that advised them of the error in configuration for take-off."

Lack of crew discipline, who did not make the logical reaction of aborting take-off and checking for errors when the alarm sounded as the engines started and as it continued to sound until the take-off attempt.

Excess conversations irrelevant to the flight, and moments of significant emotional intensity between the pilots that were mixed with the reading of the flight checklist, resulting in the omission of the part of the procedures where flaps for take-off are to be extended.

Insufficient psychological screening, resulting in the inability to detect when the pilots were suffering from personal problems that influenced their ability as pilots.

Knowledge and discussion of very personal and non-work-related affairs among the pilots and with the flight crew that fostered an atmosphere lacking in the necessary focus and concentration for operational tasks.

Aggravation of the captain"s previous negative in-flight behaviour by his personal situation and interactions within the cockpit before and during the emergency.

Previous negative flight characteristics of the first officer that manifested themselves during the reading of the list of control procedures, all occurring in a cockpit whose occupants had their attention on personal issues unrelated to the flight.

Lack of immediate recognition or corroboration by the pilots of the relationship between the type of audible alarm and the improper take-off configuration, and the failure to employ the flaps correctly for take-off.

Design of the alarm system in the Boeing 737 that did not ensure that the crew respond to the information it was feeding them and allowing them to continue with take-off regardless.

After the accident, the criminal case remained in the hands of Federal Judge Gustavo Literas, who, during the first months received the preliminary report of the JIAAC and took testimony from dozens of LAPA mechanics.

At the beginning of March 2000, the judge called 540 people to testify, most of them LAPA pilots, copilots, and flight attendants. From this point the investigation centered on the theory that, in addition to pilot error, the ultimate cause of the accident was structural problems in the management of flight operations. During the first two weeks of March, testimony was taken from some 140 people and by this time almost all the survivors had also given testimony.

On 14 May 2000, Judge Carlos Liporaci, who replaced Judge Literas (who was on leave) ordered a search of LAPA headquarters and their operations room at Aeroparque, seizing the files of the company"s pilots. The court secretary, Pablo Bertussi, said, "When the accident happened, we took only the files of the pilots of that flight. Now we want to review those of the other pilots of this company."

On 18 May 2000, the JIAAC delivered its final report on the accident to the judge. The report was questioned by judicial sources because it focused solely on laying blame on the pilots.La Nación said the next day:

Even so, according to judicial sources, the dossier is still one more expert"s report, and Judge Gustavo Literas, who is investigating the case, asked the Air Force to send him the files that prompted the report"s conclusions. The judge wants all of the allegations to be based upon and supported by documents, according to our sources."

The following week, on 24 May 2000, the judge called for the indictment of 32 people including Gustavo Andrés Deutsch, President of LAPA; the former head of the Air Force, Brigadier General Rubén Montenegro (retired); the former head of the National Division of Aeronavigability, Brigadier Juan Baigorria (retired); the former head of the Division of Aeronautical Permits, Commodore Damián Peterson (retired); the former head of the National Institute of Aeronautical and Space Medicine, Commodore Diego Lentino (retired); and the former head of the Command of Aerial Regions, Brigadier Major Enrique Dutra. Literas also ordered the seizure of the assets of Deutsch and 11 other LAPA leaders in the amount of 60 million pesos.

The investigation highlighted the lack of a human resources policy in LAPA. "There must have been more expertise and thoroughness in pilot"s tests. We detected negligence and flexibility," a senior judicial source explained to Página/12. None of the Air Force inspections that Weigel underwent – who died in the accident – served to detect his proven abnormal performance. "It is unacceptable that they continue to do the same psychophysical tests that they did to me when I did my military service," said an outraged grey-haired official.

A little less than one month afterward, on 22 June 2000, Gustavo Deutsch—president of LAPA—appeared for his declaration and responded to over 100 questions from the judge and attorneys general. La Nación reported that according to a judicial source, Deutsch "did not reveal useful information to the investigation." Even so, Deutsch was the only LAPA official who responded to the questions, as the others elected not to respond.

By the end of August, near the one-year anniversary of the tragedy, the investigation had accumulated 1,600 pages of findings in 80 sections, it had heard 1,500 witnesses, and 34 indictments were carried through the judicial process. At this point, the various sources of information had rendered enough evidence to show that, although the direct cause of the accident was human error, the pilot was in no condition to command an airplane; thus, the responsibility also fell partly on company officials and various high-level heads of the Air Force.

In early November 2000, the second session of the Federal Court of Appeal annulled the confiscation of 60 million pesos that the judge had ordered against the LAPA officials.

On 22 December 2000, in a 1200-page resolution, Judge Literas charged four LAPA officials and three members of the Air Force. The LAPA officials were charged with estrago culposo seguido de muerte (similar to "catastrophic criminal negligence leading to death") and included:

When the resolution was released, it also called for seizing the assets of LAPA president Gustavo Deutsch in the amount of 40,000,000 pesos, 500 thousand for Director General Ronaldo Boyd, and 100 thousand for each of the other managers. All of the accused escaped incarceration.

There are by now enough prima facie elements to sustain that the accused negligently performed those duties and obligations that were assigned to them, consequently creating a dangerous situation that ultimately produced the disaster investigated, from the arrival of commander Gustavo Weigel to the company, allowing the development of his career within it, to the moment of the assembly of the crew that was in charge of flight 3142 on 31 August 1999.

The daily Clarín added that the resolution states that "a large fraction of the pilots were in violation of their annual vacation periods. As for the activities of the directors of the LAPA corporation, there is evidence of sloppy procedure in the areas of security and especially personnel selection."

With respect to the motive behind accusing the military personnel, the judge made the following comment about the Command of Aerial Regiones (CRA) of the Air Force:

The CRA has not yet established a clear policy for the selection of inspectors, nor plans for the initial and periodical instructions of its personnel that would contemplate the minimum requirements to perform their functions in the areas of license handling and operation supervision.

Two years after its inception, the case"s file had 110 sections, over a thousand testimonies, and seven accused individuals who awaited the ruling of the Federal Court as to whether they would be brought to jury trial proceedings. The judge also accepted Nora Nouche, the copilot"s partner, as a plaintiff and recognized her as another victim rather than one of the responsible persons.

Roughly eight months later, on 15 July 2002, the second session of the Federal Court of Appeals confirmed the accusations of Deutsch, Boyd, and Chionetti, as well as revoking the accusation against Nora Arzeno. It also revoked the dismissal of Alfredo De Víctor and Valerio Diehl, the predecessors of Chionetti in operations management at LAPA, as well as José María Borsani, head of the Boeing 737 division of LAPA. At the same time, it recognized the lack of merit of flight instructors Vicente Sánchez, Alberto Baigorria, José Héctor García, and Juan Carlos Ossa.

Among the military officials, the Federal Court decided to revoke the accusations levelled initially against Enrique Dutra, Damián Peterson, and Diego Lentino.

The central point of the resolution of Congressmen Horacio Cattani, Martín Irurzun, and Eduardo Luraschi is the analysis of Weigel"s professional background. Beginning with this evaluation, they sustained, "one can affirm the existence of negligent actions of those persons (the accused) who, in one way or another, allowed the pilot (Weigel) to be in command of an airliner."

The judges understood that, taking it as a given that one of the basic principles of aeronautical activity is safety, "one ought not pass over nor minimize the errors committed by the crew during initial exams or follow-ups (skill re-certification exams), whether in flight or in a simulator, which provide observations like those that appeared in the dossier of the deceased pilot (Weigel)."

Thus, they enumerated a long series of errors and lack of attentiveness committed by the pilot during his exams. According to the material contained in the file that was incorporated into the judicial review, it was noted as early as April 1994 that Weigel "appeared slow" and that "he should improve his command of lists and procedures...He passed his pilot exam with the minimum score" and was subsequently certified by his instructors.

In that same year, his file claimed that Weigel needed to improve his in-cockpit coordination and his use of the checklists. "One evaluation shows that he was uninformed about his appropriate role; as a consequence of this, he does not lead well and there is a lack of security and coordination in the cockpit," according to his file.

On 17 October, federal officials requested a renewed accusation against Dutra, Petersen, Lentino, and Arzeno, whose charges the Federal Court had revoked.

The following day, Clarín revealed that federal officials "in a 40-page letter, presented to Federal Judge Sergio Torres, stated that at the time of the LAPA accident, they did not have a revised and approved Operations Manual provided by the Command of Aerial Regions" and that "this document was required and should have regulated the organizational and administrative structure of the airline, the minimum equipment that a plane should have, and even the procedures to be followed in the case of an accident."

At the same time, La Nación claimed that "Arzeno was responsible for a little-known fact: Weigel, while he should have not been permitted to fly after his previous actions, also should not have been in command of an airplane on the day of the tragedy because his license was expired."

A little over a year later, on 1 December 2003, the second session of the Federal Court confirmed the accusations against Dutra, Peterson, and Lentino, accusing them of the crimes of "abuse of authority and failure to fulfill the responsibilities of public office." Among the reasons cited by the judges were the lack of controls and that "the evaluations taken of the crew were totally insufficient to present a clear profile of the subjects."

Additionally, it revoked the dismissal of Arzeno and charged him with negligence. The judges, according to the information taken from La Nación, said that "human behavior does not occur in a vacuum, but is rather a reflection of the corporate and regulatory environment in which it takes place. For the congressmen, there was a "clear relationship" between the courses that Pilot Weigel had not completed and "the violations that occurred in the cockpit" on that fateful day, something that was not caught by the managers who controlled the process.

On 10 September 2004, the Federal official Carlos Rívolo required the accused to stand trial in public jury trial proceedings. The request, roughly 600 pages in length, called for a judgment on Gustavo Deutsch, Ronaldo Boyd, Fabián Chionetti, Nora Arzeno, Valerio Diehl, and Gabriel Borsani for estrago culposo (catastrophic criminal negligence). In a similar vein, it requested the judgement of Enrique Dutra, Damián Peterson, and Diego Lentino, asking that they be charged for "failure to fulfill the duties of public office."

Concerning this request, the daily Infobae said that "among other considerations, Rívolo emphasized that the pilot of the destroyed plane, Gustavo Weigel, killed in the accident, had a "regulationally expired" pilot"s license and acknowledged that the aviator, before take-off, "had not checked that the doors were closed" and "said that he always forgot to close the doors."

On 9 June 2005, the Federal Court of Appeals rejected the nullification motions that several of the accused had proposed, and it ordered them to jury trial. Infobae commented:

The defense, led by Jorge Sandro, dismissed the fiscal accusation as "incongruent" and declared that the accused had not been given "a clear, precise, and detailed description" of the crimes of which they were accused and therefore were denied "the guarantees of due process and right to defense."

He added that Deutsch and Boyd "did not have the authority of selection, instruction, and control of the pilots and crew members" and Chionetti "adduced that he had gained the relevant authority mere months before the incident."

However, Judges Horacio Cattani and Eduardo Luraschi ratified the nullification of those appeals. "Such questions, in a way, pertain to the nullifying declaration and represent a mere complaint of the defense against the treatment given to the group," they said in a statement.

The Court maintained that from a "simple reading" of the fiscal accusation there emerged a clear description of how the events occurred and the accusations against the directors, in relation "to the errors committed by the pilot and copilot of the destroyed flight as a reflection of the "recklessness" that incurred disregard of the principle of flight security."

"No doubt remains that, now that this phase of the investigation has come, it is an opportune moment to pose questions during the discussions of the jury trial phase," the statement underscored.

On 5 July 2005, Judge Torres ruled the process complete and elevated all of the accused to jury trial, consequently forming a tribunal to try them. Nine persons ended up being accused: six LAPA officials and three members of the Argentinian Air Force (FAA). Charged with estrago culposo were Gustavo Deutsch (former president of LAPA), Ronaldo Boyd (Director General of LAPA), Fabián Chionetti, and Valerio Diehl (Operations Managers of LAPA), Gabriel Borsani (head of the B-737 Line at LAPA) and Nora Arzeno (Human Resources Manager of LAPA). For dereliction of duty in public office, the charged were Enrique Dutra (former Commander of Aerial Regions of the FAA), Damián Peterson (former Director of Aeronautical Permits), and Diego Lentino (former Director of the national Institute of Aeronautical and Aerospace Medicine).

In the resolution, the judge reiterated that the determining factors allowing the accident to occur were "the lack of effective control and subsequently taking measures by the responsible persons of the firm LAPA S.A. at the decision-making level, with respect to the aspects relevant to flight security."

In this way he placed responsibility on the airline directors for having completed "in a negligent manner" the responsibilities of their posts including contracting the pilot Gustavo Weigel, allowing the development of his career path at the business.

The judge highlighted "the constant and permanent contact and direct participation that Deutsch and Boyd had in the politics of advancement in the business" and he reproached them for "the lack of effective control that might have made it possible for the pilots to overcome the errors committed."

The accused face million-dollar asset seizures and charges that have accrued to them from the commercial court that conducted the public examination of the airline.

As for the members of the Air Force, they will be tried for neglecting to observe the law pertaining to content control of the Operations Manual of the airline industry and the norms for training airplane pilots.

Accordingly, the judge reiterated that Lentino was accused of not having completed his principal duty adequately, namely running control checks on the psychophysiological fitness of pilots.

The crime of which the former officials stand accused carries a penalty of up to two years of prison and special incarceration can double the time when the offense is committed while in public office.

The final judgement of the case was delayed by motions filed by the defense of several accused in order to slow the jury trial process, all of which were finally rejected weeks later by the Federal Court in Buenos Aires.

On 23 July 2005, one of the accused, Enrique Dutra, was found dead in a car parked in his garage, in the Cordoban neighborhood of Villa Carlos Paz. It was widely believed to be a suicide.

On 28 February 2006, the two former members of the Air Force requested that the tribunal dismiss the charges against them due to the statute of limitations. According to their request, which was accepted, the case against them should have been shelved because more than four years passed between the first accusations and the sentencing, and the crime of which they were accused had a maximum sentence of two years.

The trial at the high court took place at the "Tribunal Oral Federal Nº 4" starting on 28 March 2007. The court was designated to be composed by judges Leopoldo Bruglia, María Cristina Sanmartino and Horacio Vaccare, but the last one decided to recuse himself after relatives of the victims disputed his impartiality. His colleagues will decide if they accept his resignation.

On 2 February 2010, Fabián Chionetti (the Operations manager) and Nora Arzeno (the Human resources manager) were both found guilty of criminal negligence and were both sentenced to three years in prison, while the rest were acquitted of the charges. However, on 11 February 2014, the convictions of Chionetti and Arzeno were overturned by the IV Chamber of the Federal Chamber of Cassation, as the amount of time it took to bring all of the accused people to trial exceeded the legal deadlines.impunity.

The film is a fictional reproduction of the background of the accident as seen through the eyes of Piñeyro himself, who was actually a LAPA pilot from 1988 to 1999. Piñeyro resigned from his position in June 1999—just two months before the accident—after voicing his concerns about the airline"s safety policy. Concerning his motivation for making the film, Piñeyro said:

I was personally interested in recounting how the accident came to occur, not the fact that the pilots forgot about the flaps and the plane blew up, but why they forgot the flaps. And what was the process, because forgetting the flaps was the straw that broke the camel"s back in a series of tremendous violations of regulations. I was interested in portraying what isn"t apparent about the accident, not just the final link (the pilot). Because all the links that came before were conveniently hidden because they compromised the establishment, the business.

The accident was covered in the 9th episode of the 17th season of Air Crash Investigation, Air Emergency, and Air Disasters. The episode is titled "Deadly Discussions".

Teterboro Airport (IATA: TEB, ICAO: KTEB, FAA LID: TEB) is a general aviation relief airport in the boroughs of Teterboro, Moonachie, and Hasbrouck Heights in Bergen County, New Jersey.Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and operated by AFCO AvPORTS Management. The airport is in the New Jersey Meadowlands, 12 miles (19 km) from Midtown Manhattan, which makes it popular for private and corporate aircraft. The airport has a weight limit of 100,000 pounds (45,000 kg) on aircraft, making it nonviable as an airline airport.

The airport takes up almost all of Teterboro and consists of 827 acres (3.35 km2): 90 acres (0.36 km2) for aircraft hangar and offices, 408 acres (1.65 km2) for aeronautical use and runways, and 329 acres (1.33 km2) undeveloped. The airport has more than 1,137 employees, of whom more than 90% are full-time.

In April 2009, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reported that the airport had the third highest rate of wildlife strikes of any airport in the United States, based on takeoffs and landings (43 per 100,000).

Teterboro Airport is the oldest operating airport in the New York City area. Walter C. Teter (1863–1929) acquired the property in 1917.North American Aviation operated a manufacturing plant on the site during World War I. After the war, the airport served as a base of operations for Anthony Fokker, the Dutch aircraft designer. The first flight from the present airport site was made in 1919.Colonial Air Transport at Teterboro was the first private company to deliver mail by air.

During World War II, the United States Army operated the airport. The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey purchased it on April 1, 1949, from Fred L. Wehran, a private owner, and later leased it to Pan American World Airways (and its successor organization Johnson Controls) for 30 years until December 1, 2000, when the Port Authority assumed full responsibility for the operation of Teterboro.

In 2003, U.S. Congressman Steve Rothman helped authorize a federal bill to retain a ban on aircraft exceeding a weight of 100,000 pounds (45 t) from taking off from Teterboro because of excessive noise in the surrounding residential areas.

In 2019, Teterboro Airport trailed Republic Airport in total number of aircraft operations by 46,047 (173,625 at TEB vs 219,672 at FRG), making it the second busiest general aviation airport in the region and fifth busiest airport when including operations from Kennedy Airport (463,198), Newark Airport (449,543), and LaGuardia Airport (374,539).

In 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, the airport saw a significant drop in total number of aircraft operations, with a reduction in traffic to 86,465 (difference in 87,160 flights); Teterboro leads Republic Airport in transient flights, however, while Republic has more local general aviation traffic and had 165,250 flights during the pandemic.

Two large office buildings are centrally located, one at 90 Moonachie Avenue and the other on Fred Wehran Drive, which houses the Department of Homeland Security. Both buildings have a total area of 133,418 square feet (12,394.9 m2).

Additional office and shop space totals an area of 165,611 square feet (15,385.8 m2). There is also an operations building, maintenance facility and two fuel farms.

Runway 6-24 is 6,013 feet (1,833 m) long and 150 feet (46 m) wide, with High Intensity Runway Lights (HIRL). Runway 6 approach has an Instrument Landing System (ILS) and a Medium Approach Lighting System-R (MALS-R). Runway 24 approach is equipped with both a Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) and Runway End Identification Lights (REIL) systems. Runway 6-24 underwent complete overlay and grooving in 1987.

Runway 1-19 is 7,000 feet (2,100 m) long and 150 feet (46 m) wide, with HIRL. Both runways 1 and 19 are equipped with REIL systems. Runway 1 approach is equipped with a VASI system. Runway 19 approach has an ILS and a Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI). Runway 1-19 was overlaid and grooved in the summer of 2000, and included the installation of centerline and touchdown zone lighting. Runway 19 is the preferred runway for noise abatement procedures.

In 2017 the airport had 178,369 aircraft operations, averaging 488 per day: 65.6% general aviation, 34% air taxi, 0.3% military, and <1% airline. 121 aircraft were then based at this airport: 81% jet, 10.7% helicopter, 6.6% single-engine, and 1.7% multi-engine.

The Aviation Hall of Fame of New Jersey is on the airport grounds. Founded in 1972, it is the first state aviation hall of fame in the nation, honoring the men and women who brought outstanding aeronautical achievements to the state. The museum offers visitors an opportunity to view historic air and space equipment and artifacts, photographs, fine art and an extensive model collection. The library has more than 4,000 volumes and hundreds of aviation video tapes.

Teterboro Airport can be reached from the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Midtown Manhattan on New Jersey Transit bus routes 161 (regular service), 165 (limited weekday service) and 144 (peak periods weekdays).Teterboro station is the closest rail station along NJ Transit"s Pascack Valley Line, but the Wood-Ridge station is also close to the southwest of the airport.

In 1956 and again in 1958, Thomas Fitzpatrick flew stolen aircraft from Teterboro and landed them along city streets in the Hudson Heights, Manhattan neighborhood.

In June 1966, in Hasbrouck Heights, a two-engine Piper Aztec going to Teterboro Airport crashed, striking a tree and narrowly missing homes on Burton Avenue near U.S. Route 46 (US 46). The pilot sustained injuries including a skull fracture and was taken to Hackensack Hospital by ambulance. He was carrying film for Eastman Kodak.

On September 23, 1981, a Ronson Aviation Bell 206B helicopter and a Seminole Air Charier Piper PA-34 airplane collided in flight over East Rutherford, about 2 nautical miles (3.7 km; 2.3 mi) south of Teterboro Airport. The airplane had a flight plan to Teterboro from Syracuse, New York. The helicopter was inbound to Teterboro from Woodbridge, NJ. The two collided at an altitude of about 650 feet (200 m). The helicopter fell into the Meadowlands Sports Complex parking lot, and both persons aboard were killed. The airplane, with about 8 feet (2.4 m) of its left wing and its right engine missing, made a gear-up landing in a marsh about 0.7 nautical miles (1.3 km; 0.81 mi) east of the collision point. The pilot was seriously injured, and the passenger received minor injuries.

On December 9, 1999, a small plane crashed between two houses in neighboring Hasbrouck Heights, killing all four people aboard, injuring three people on the ground and setting a garage on fire.

On March 9, 2002 a single-engine Cessna 210 with a flight plan to Montauk, NY, crashed shortly after takeoff about 2 p.m. killing the only occupant and pilot. Upon impact the plane skidded about 225 feet (69 m) before it burst into flames, narrowly missing cars on US 46 about 100 yards (90 m) away.

On September 9, 2002, a Piper Saratoga carrying a Canadian family took off from Teterboro Airport and crashed into a housing development in Hunterdon County 10 minutes later. The parents were killed, and the two children were critically injured. The incident caused millions in damage.

On February 2, 2005 at 7:18 a.m., a Bombardier Challenger CL-600-1A11, N370V, hurtled off a runway at Teterboro Airport, skidded across US 46 and slammed into a warehouse during the morning rush, injuring 20 people, 11 of them on the plane. It was mere coincidence – a red traffic signal – that thwarted a full-scale disaster. A moment later, and the intersection would have been swarming with commuter traffic. Forty-five minutes later classes would have been in session at the nearby Teterboro campus of Bergen County Technical High School. An hour later the warehouse would have been filled with 200 workers. The two pilots were seriously injured, as were two occupants in a vehicle. The cabin aide, eight passengers, and one person in the building received minor injuries. Five people remained hospitalized, one of them gravely injured. A 66-year-old Paterson man who was riding in a car the jet struck was on life support, authorities said.Frank Lautenberg that directed the FAA to install 1,000 feet (300 m) arrestor beds at all U.S. airports.

On September 2, 2005 at 21:22 local time, a Cessna 177A, N30491, crashed in South Hackensack during an emergency landing at Teterboro airport. A Teterboro employee observed the plane descending toward runway 24, lost sight of it as it descended below the horizon, then saw two or three bright flashes. The pilot sustained fatal injuries and the passenger serious injuries.

On October 11, 2006 a Cirrus SR20 took off from Teterboro and crashed in New York City at 2:42 pm local time. The aircraft struck the north side of an apartment building on the Upper East Side of Manhattan; it caused a fire in two apartments on the 40th and 41st floors, which was extinguished within an hour. The aircraft was owned and piloted by New York Yankees pitcher Cory Lidle, who died in the accident along with his flight instructor. As a result of this accident the FAA established restrictions on flying up the East River.

On January 15, 2009, Teterboro Airport was suggested as a potential landing site for the crippled US Airways Flight 1549, whose engines were disabled on takeoff from nearby LaGuardia Airport after a flock of birds flew into the plane. The pilots determined that they did not have enough altitude to make it to Teterboro, instead choosing to attempt a landing in the Hudson River. The successful landing is referred to as the Miracle on the Hudson.

On August 21, 2009, around 3:00 a.m., a Beechcraft Baron crashed while attempting to land. The pilot and passenger survived but sustained burns requiring the attention of Saint Barnabas Medical Center"s burn unit, the only one in the state of New Jersey. The plane was believed to have originated at Reading, PA, and was carrying blood samples for Quest Diagnostics, which has a lab on property adjacent to Teterboro Airport.

On October 1, 2010, at about 1:45 p.m., a G-4 Gulfstream overshot the runway. It was stopped by an arrester bed. Seven passengers and two pilots were on the plane. No one was injured. The cause of the accident has not been determined.

On December 20, 2011, a single-engine TBM700 crashed on Interstate 287 near Morristown after leaving Teterboro Airport headed for Georgia. Five people, including a family of four and one other passenger, were killed.

On May 15, 2017 at about 3:30 p.m., a Learjet 35 crashed about 1⁄4 mile (400 m) away while approaching Runway 1. The pilot and co-pilot were killed; no others were on board. It had departed Philadelphia International Airport shortly before. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendations from this accident included a requirement for "operators to establish programs for flight crewmembers who have demonstrated performance deficiencies or experienced failures during training and administer additional oversight and training to address and correct performance deficiencies."

On August 21, 2018, a Gulf Stream IV jet transporting musician Post Malone took off from Teterboro Airport on its way to London Luton Airport in Luton, England. Shortly after takeoff, the pilots discovered that the two left main tires of the landing gear had blown out. After circling the airport for nearly an hour, in hopes of making an emergency landing, the plane was diverted to Westfield-Barnes Regional Airport in western Massachusetts where it once again circled the airspace, burning fuel before its descent attempt in order to lighten the plane"s weight. Once again, the plane was diverted to Stewart International Airport, a public/military airport equipped with longer runways, meaning pilots would not need to engage reverse thrusters or spoilers, thereby lessening the weight on the landing gear and the plane"s remaining tires. Ultimately, the plane landed on the approximately 12,000 foot long Runway 9, which is nearly double the length of the longest runway at Teterboro Airport. All passengers and crew members survived the landing with no injuries.

In January 1954, Arthur Godfrey buzzed the Teterboro control tower with his Douglas DC-3, resulting in a six-month suspension of his license.Wabash Cannonball", was released as a 45-inch single by Contempo Records.

On July 24, 1973, Bob Gruen photographed Led Zeppelin in front of Boeing 720 passenger jet, before it departed for a gig at Three Rivers Stadium in Pittsburgh. The photo is considered an iconic shot of the band.

In the final scene of the 1994 film Michelle Pfeiffer"s character, Laura Alden, tells detectives that Jack Nicholson"s character, Will Randall, is most likely on his way to Teterboro Airport. Moments later, a detective confirms that a plane chartered by Alden is waiting at the airport.

The airport can be seen in two episodes of the first episode of the second season, the airport can be seen in the background of a driving scene, doubling as Newark Liberty International Airport.the series finale.

In 2003, Jay-Z coined the nickname "clearport" for Teterboro on his song "Excuse Me Miss", in reference to Teterboro having less traffic than other major commercial airports in the New York metropolitan area.

In the 2022 film Nathan Drake and Victor Sullivan travel to Barcelona via Teterboro Airport.Netflix comedy series, Mike Myers character, Ken Scarborough, is remotely controlled to land at Teterboro Airport.New Fantastic Four, published by Marvel Comics in June 2022, Wolverine informs Spider-Man that he has a cab waiting to bring them to Teterboro Airport.

Directions to and from the Airport, Port Authority of New York & New Jersey. Accessed July 7, 2008. "Teterboro Airport is located in the Boroughs of Teterboro, Moonachie, and Hasbrouck Heights in Bergen County, New Jersey."

JAY LEVIN. "The Name-Dropper: Teterboro Airport and the Bendix Diner". NorthJersey.com. Archived from the original on 10 March 2016. Retrieved 26 April 2016.

"Three pilots for Colonial Air Transport, Inc. are congratulated by Managing Director Juan T. Trippe following their successful first airmail trip between Boston and New York". Bettman Archive at Corbis. 1926. Archived from the original on 2012-07-30. Retrieved 2009-11-27. Pilots (l-r) Leroy Thompson, H.I. Wells, and Major T.O. Freeman are congratulated alongside one of the three airmail Fokker planes at Teterboro Airport in Teterboro, New Jersey. This was the first of such services between the U.S. Mail and private companies.

House Of Representatives Approves Rothman Measure To Keep Boeing Business Jet Out Of Teterboro Archived 2007-04-28 at the Wayback Machine, Steve Rothman press release dated September 10, 2003, accessed April 30, 2007. "In a critical step forward in his efforts to protect the quality of life of the people of Northern New Jersey, Congressman Steve Rothman (D-NJ9) last night got the U.S. House of Representatives to approve a measure he authored to stop the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) from lifting the 36-year-old, 100,000 pound weight limit at Teterboro Airport."