overshot the runway meaning brands

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Let’s cut right to the chase: there is a strong case to be made that many base-to-final accidents may have as a significant factor the pilot’s fear of a runway overshoot, fearing that any runway overshoot can only be disastrous. However, if pilots have flown even one deliberate runway overshoot and seen that the real issue is instead fear of the unknown, then just one five minute traffic pattern with a deliberate runway overshoot has the potential to significantly reduce loss of control accidents. After all, go arounds are routinely taught to reduce fear of the unknown, so why not runway overshoots? One university flight department is currently working to implement deliberate runway overshoots into its pre-solo curriculum.

This all started with the EAA Founder’s Innovation Prize contest, whose first year was 2016. The background research involved was analysis in great detail of 551 NTSB reports of homebuilt aircraft, sometimes reviewing them three or more times, plus supporting information from the docket and other sources. That in turn led to in-flight exercises to familiarize pilots with sight pictures and sensations outside of normal middle of the envelope flight.

Then came a breakthrough. One of the subject pilots severely botched a low speed steep turn and there was digital flight data of the event, thanks to the glass cockpit in the RV-9A. Based on that event, I hypothesized that loss of control in a base-to-final turn was not a problem of lack of information, but rather of not adequately processing all the information already available. That in turn led to the theory of cognitive availability, suspecting that the most effective remedy to loss of control was not teaching technique—which is already well covered—but exposing pilots to sensations and out the windshield pictures without being distracted by watching instruments, so that the pilots would remain cognitively available to process the required information in stressful, unfamiliar situations.

That in turn led to yet another pass through the data and the discovery that not all stall/spins were in fact stall/spins, but some were low speed spirals. But why?

In the development of the Expanded Envelope Exercises®, subject pilots, including retired airline pilots and very senior ex-military test pilots, gave useful information with their body language and facial expressions. On those flights, I didn’t describe the exercises until just before we flew them. The body language when I announced that we were going to deliberately fly through the final approach path spoke volumes.

There was also one very recent flight in which I misjudged the tailwind on base and was overshooting final myself. I could not believe how strong the temptation was to tighten up the turn and not overshoot. Marveling at my own psychology, I chose to overshoot the turn by one runway width rather than tighten it up excessively and unnecessarily. It was amazing that even with all of the research I’ve done and all the times I’ve taught the deliberate overshoot, I myself was still susceptible to very strong pressures not to overshoot. The law of primacy at work?

Pilots were distracted by spending too much attention focusing on runway alignment and were cognitively unavailable to pay attention to pitch and airspeed.

This leaves Hypotheses 1 and 2. There’s no real way of knowing the psychology of a pilot in a fatal accident, but these two hypotheses seem plausible. And Hypothesis 1 has a trivial solution—go out and try it!

First, observe that turning final late has the exact same aerodynamics as turning final at the correct time. The only differences are the psychological aspects and the need to maybe turn a bit more than 90 degrees. Then again, in a traffic pattern with a tailwind on base, the turn to final will be more than 90 degrees anyway. In other words, there is no extra risk to this exercise, aerodynamically.

Here’s the descriptor: Fly base leg to intercept the final approach leg at 500 feet or higher (the same altitude as turns around a point). Do not turn final until crossing the extended runway centerline. Using your normal bank angle, turn final to fly parallel to the extended runway centerline. Then, using the same technique used for S-turns on final, gradually and gracefully align with the runway centerline, and land normally.

Some will suggest that on any runway overshoot, the only acceptable option is to immediately go around. While there may be merit to that argument in real world operations, especially for pilots with limited experience or in very challenging conditions, this exercise is a learning experience, to see the sight picture and to feel the emotions. Doing an early go around while training will compromise that learning experience.

Analysis of the NSTB reports, flight tests and other sources indicate four ways to get into trouble turning base to final. Although the accident mechanisms differ, all four seem to be susceptible to either Hypothesis 1 or 2 as major factors.

Aggravated low speed spiral: same as above, but the pilot mistakes the low speed spiral for a spin entry and adds forward stick, aggravating the unusual attitude.

Spin out the bottom: pilot applies too much rudder to align with the runway while adding excessive back pressure, resulting in a spin out the bottom, as it used to be called.

Spin over the top: pilot banks too much, uses elevator to tighten the turn and rudder to keep the nose up, resulting in a spin over the top, as it used to be called.

This exercise will probably not solve all base to final loss of control situations, but it will definitely solve some. Given that the cost is only one lap around the pattern and the benefit is the possibility of saving lives, this exercise has much to commend it.

When somebody takes the time to thoroughly analyze stalls after takeoff, they are going to find that existing statistics are at best misleading and well worth a quite colorful description.

For example, in the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) Loss of Control Working Group’s Approach and Landing & Departure and Enroute from October 29, 2014, they studied 85 NTSB reports, of which 29 were experimental, amateur built. I classified eight of those 29 events as primarily traffic pattern events—only one was on takeoff/go around, and that was a pitch up on go around. I classified seven as pilot skills events, two of those being first flights in a homebuilt, one pilot was known to be scared of the plane, and two pilots were unlicensed. Those five egregious events were not called out into a separate category as would have been appropriate. By the way, the GAJSC used this data set to recommend angle of attack indicators, a recommendation that is at best a stretch.

I also generated a set of 40 “stall after takeoff” events, according to the NTSB classification and again, those were experimental, amateur built aircraft. A half dozen of those were STOL aircraft that crashed immediately after takeoff, one of those being an instructor giving dual. He had rudder pedals on his side, but not a control stick. Eight or so of the “stall after takeoff” were more properly classified as failure to achieve sustained flight. One stall after takeoff occurred when the canopy came off the airplane at 1000 feet.

Ever heard the expression, when all you’ve got is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail? Similarly, if the only accident classification you’ve got for events after takeoff is stall, every event after takeoff will become a stall. But just becase a stall occurred after takeoff does not mean that the stall was causal or even that “stall” was an accurate descriptor. It certainly doesn’t mean that all those “stalls” could be remedied in the same way.

Yes, there are stalls after takeoff and in the pattern, but nobody yet has taken the time to classify all these events to appropriately high levels of detail. That analysis will be a major undertaking, and the results will be muddled and confused, but not clear cut.

Both passed breath analysis tests to check for alcohol, according to the police report. When the plane landed, the report said, Mr. Cheney turned to waiting officers and gave a “two thumbs up” sign through the cockpit window.

Officials at the National Transportation Safety Board said they gave a preliminary listen to the plane’s cockpit voice recorder on Friday afternoon, but that may not provide any answers. The recorder, which runs continuously throughout a flight, has only 30 minutes of sound at any one time, and records over itself. The officials said they would interview the pilots over the weekend and would have something to say as early as Monday.

Federal aviation officials said that the last radio communication with the plane was at 6:46 p.m., Central time, and communication did not resume until 8:14 p.m., a gap of 88 minutes, a long time for a commercial jet over the continental United States that has not had a system failure or whose radio is not tuned to the wrong frequency

Pilots normally wear headsets with microphones, or they transfer controllers’ audio to a loudspeaker. Unless the radio was tuned to the incorrect frequency, “if you’re awake, you’re going to hear,” said the former chief executive of a major airline, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

More than a dozen controllers, including those at three radar rooms tracking the flight — one in Denver and two in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area — tried to contact the pilots, said Doug Church, a spokesman for the National Air Traffic Controllers Association. “It was all hands on deck,” Mr. Church said. One Minneapolis-area room made 13 attempts at contact, an official said. The plane was cruising at 37,000 feet about 400 miles west of Minneapolis when the crew stopped responding to air traffic controllers and airline dispatchers an hour and five minutes before its scheduled arrival time of 8:01 p.m., local time.

When the plane should have been descending, it was still flying at a constant altitude, according to FlightAware, a company that provides real-time tracking of airplanes based on radar data from the Federal Aviation Administration. It showed that the plane flew northeast at constant altitude from 7:13 p.m. to 7:53 p.m., Central time, making one 19-degree turn in that period.

An Air India Express plane landing at Kozhikode Calicut International Airport (CCJ), which serves metropolitan areas in India"s southern state of Kerala — Kozhikode and Malappuram. The airport opened on April 13, 1988.

Aircraft can and do overrun the ends of runways — sometimes with disastrous consequences. To minimise the hazards of overruns, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires a safety area 1,000 feet in length beyond the end of the runway.

This "safety area" is now an FAA standard. Many runways were built before its adoption. For those locations that do not have the space for a full safety area, "soft ground arrestors" provide an engineered solution to restore a margin of safety.

Kerala, Aug 08 (ANI): Wreckage of Air India Express flight at Kozhikode International Airport in Karipur on Saturday. 18 people including two pilots lost their lives when the Dubai-Kozhikode Air India flight (IX-1344) crash landed at Kozhikode International Airport on Friday night. (ANI Photo)

"Soft ground" of an "arrestor bed" means any material that will deform readily and reliably under the weight of an aircraft tyre. As the tyres crush the material, the drag forces decelerate the aircraft.

Civil aviation industry experts have developed mathematical models that aid in the design of these arrestor beds and predict aircraft stopping distances.

Full-scale aircraft testing validated the models and set the stage for installation of these arrestor beds at major airports. The US has mandated it for all airports. It has at least three airports listed as having "table-top" runways.

Made out of "engineered materials", an arrestor (also "arrester") bed is a surface made of special materials — a type of "soft" concrete used to stop aircraft that overrun a runway — designed to reduce the severity of the consequences of a runway overshot.

In 2016, a plane carrying then-Republican vice-presidential nominee Mike Pence overshot a runway in New York"s La Guardia airport. Experts say a disaster was prevented by the "arrestor bed" the end of the runway.

In the past decade, experts have recommended the installation of such a safety system on India"s so-called table-top runways. It"s been reported that Indian authorities "ignored" at least two such recommendations, made following an investigation report into the 2010 crash of another Air India Express jet, also on another table-top runway.

It would simply mean that a runway overshooting incident would be risky and potentially fatal, especially in wet conditions, when coupled with a tailwind.

The runway at Kozhikode, where the latest crash took place, had no adequate safety mechanism. The reason: recommendations made by civil aviation officials for a ground arrestor system was deemed too costly.

MAY 1999: A SAAB 340 aircraft with 30 on board was brought to a safe stop after an overrun on runway 4R at JFK International Airport. The aircraft sustained only minor damage and only one minor ankle sprain was reported.

MAY 22, 2010: a Boeing 737-800 passenger jet operating Air India Express Flight 812 from Dubai to Mangalore, India, crashed on landing at the table-top Mangalore airport, after the aircraft overshot the runway, falling down a hillside and bursting into flames. Of the 160 passengers and six crew members on board, 158 were killed (all crew members and 152 passengers) and only eight survived. It was the first fatal accident involving Air India Express.

OCTOBER 28, 2016: The plane of then-vice-presidential candidate overshot the runway during heavy rain over New York"s La Guardia Airport. The plane avoided a disaster overshot after it traveled through an "arrestor bed."

AUGUST 7, 2020: A Boeing 737 operating as Flight 1344 from Dubai skidded off the table-top Kozhikode runway in Kerala, India, after touching down with a tail wind. The plane broke apart. Apart from the 18 people killed, more than 100 others were injured, some critically.

A table-top airport simply means an aviation facility set on a hilltop, usually with limited space at the end of the runway, with one or both ends of the runway overlooking a "drop".

It"s been reported that several international airlines had stopped flying bigger aircraft including Boeing 777 and Airbus SE A330 jets into the city — due to safety issues.

The Kozhikode airport opened on April 13, 1988. As early as 2011, a member of the aviation regulator"s Civil Aviation Safety Advisory Council already wrote to top bureaucrats about the need for the system, Bloomberg reported.

Runway safety-related accidents continue to represent the most significant source of aviation accidents worldwide and remain aviation’s number one safety risk category.

Data from the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) data show that about half of all aviation accidents reported to ICAO were runway-safety related.

The recommendation followed the fatal 2010 crash of an Air India Express Boeing 737, which overshot the runway at Mangalore — also a table top — and burst into flames, killing 158 people.

As recently as 2017, a SpiceJet-operated Bombardier Inc. Q-400 plane, with 75 on board, veered off the same runway and struck the lights at the edge. This incident also happened on a wet runway, according to the final incident report.

In 2012, airport authorities rejected proposals to implement additional safety measures, citing "high operational and maintenance cost", the Hindu newspaper reported citing the airport"s director.

Yes. The Kozhikode airport has 240 meters of safety area on both ends, as required by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulations, and the airport has been certified, according to an Airports Authority of India official.

All mandatory regulations on runway end safety areas were complied with after the DGCA recommendations following the Mangalore crash, the official added.

The accident statistics prove it: The base-to-final turn continues to be one of the big killers in general aviation. Most often, troubles arise when a pilot realizes too late that he is overshooting the runway and so tightens the turn while simultaneously hauling back on the yoke. That’s a recipe for a rarely survivable stall-spin accident.

The key to avoiding putting the airplane in a dangerous position when you’re already low and slow is to heed a few simple tips. The first is to know what the wind is doing. If it’s blowing left to right across the runway, it means you’ll have a tailwind on a left base and will have to start your turn to final sooner.

Even if the wind is blowing from the opposite direction or there’s no wind at all, you should start the base-to-final turn early with a gentle bank. You can always increase the bank angle as needed, but the idea is to ease into the turn. I like to start every turn to final as though I’m going to land on the near edge of the runway. Once I’m certain I won’t overshoot, I adjust the turn to roll out right on the centerline. Remember, too, that in order to stall the airplane, you need to be loading up the wing. Forward pressure as you turn will help you remember to fight the tendency to pull into a risky situation.

Which leads us to a final point. When flying the approach, you should focus your attention not just on the runway, but rather on a specific touchdown point. On final, line up with the centerline by putting it exactly between your heels, as though you’re going to slide your feet onto the runway with one foot on either side of the centerline. In the flare, don’t fixate on the centerline. Instead, keep an eye on the edges of the runway a distance in front of the airplane, which gives a better height perspective than the centerline does.

An inbound 747-400 cargo plane overshot the designated runway area at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport at about 4:30 p.m. Monday, amid snowy conditions and blustery winds.

The incident came during the region"s first snowstorm of the season, which also caused major traffic disruptions and caused many school districts to close or dismiss early.

At Sea-Tac, the China Airlines cargo aircraft passed the designated runway but managed to stop before leaving the pavement. The aircraft arrived at the terminal under its own power, said Port of Seattle spokeswoman Terri-Ann Betancourt. The plane arrived from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York.

Earlier in the day, Cooper said officials expected no Thanksgiving holiday delays from snow Monday and Tuesday, though he said the airport has shifted to “snow alert” status.

Aircraft are expensive. With the cost of a new A380 coming in at $444 million USD list price, airlines are incredibly reluctant to ever take an aircraft out of service. But, throughout history, airlines have either been forced to write off an aircraft (sometimes even brand new) or in some special cases, spent millions of dollars more than the aircraft is worth to not write it off.

Before we dive into the specifics of what it takes for an airline to write off an aircraft, we first need to understand what the term "written off" means.

Specifically, if an aircraft is split in two and its parts spread over a runway then its likely that this is a hull loss. But if an aircraft is damaged through use, an incident or just requires extensive maintenance, airlines might choose to just write off the aircraft and replace it with a (sometimes cheaper) new aircraft.

However... it also depends on who is paying for these repairs. If an aircraft was grounded due to a fault (such as the Boeing 737 MAX groundings) would the airline actually pay for the aircraft being written off? Or would the manufacturer? Depending on insurance, it is possible that the aircraft will be rebuilt, recertified, repainted and back in the skies on someone else"s dime.

There have been some incidences where an airline has straight up had to write off an aircraft; Etihad had to give up on a brand new Airbus A340-600 (Tail number F-WWCJ) after the test pilot ran it into a wall at the Airbus factory. The forward section of the aircraft actually split off and the whole aircraft had to just be scrapped.

In 1999, Qantas QF1 was landing at Bangkok airport during a heavy rainstorm, when it overshot the runway. According to the crash report, it was a combination of pilot error, low visibility, problems with the flaps and the aircraft hydroplaning on the wet runway. The Boeing 747-400 overshot the runway, collapsing its nose and right landing gear and damaging two of its engines. Fortunately, beyond the runway was an empty golf course (due to the rain) and no one was seriously injured.

By all accounts, the entire Qantas Boeing 747-400 was a write-off. It would cost Qantas more than the book value of the aircraft to get in back in the sky. But there is something worth more to Qantas than money, and that"s its reputation for never losing an aircraft.

Thus Qantas footed the bill for the incident, spending the cost of a brand new Boeing 747 to get their older one back in the sky. The Boeing 747-400 in question, tail number VH-OJH, would go on to serve the airline until September 2012 (essentially another 13 years!).

The incident occurred when Korean Air flight KE631 from Incheon, South Korea, landed in poor weather on Mactan Island in central Cebu province late on Sunday, 23 October.

Dozens of flights from the Cebu province were cancelled, including some by Philippine Airlines, which announced more than 50 domestic services would be cancelled.

The airline said following the incident: “Passengers have been escorted to three local hotels and an alternative flight is being arranged. We are currently identifying the cause of the incident.”

Korean Air President Woo Kee-hong released a statement on the airline’s website, assuring that the incident would be thoroughly investigated by Korean authorities and local aviation authorities.

I understand its meaning in the context, but what does it exactly mean? I tried to Google the idiom, but I found only one hit in Urban Dictionary whose definition doesn"t seem to fit in the context (I don"t want to put it here).

I can"t find the origin of the idiom. I would like to know when and how the idiom started to mean what it means now. I can just speculate it could have started as a military term.

Four of the five runway excursions reported this year happened within 72 hours in late June and early July, according to information the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has provided under the Right to Information (RTI) act filed by this correspondent.

An Air India Express flight veered off the taxiway after landing on June 30 and got stuck in soft ground at the Mangalore airport. A SpiceJet flight from Bhopal to Surat overshot the runwayafter landing the same day. Runway excursions happen when an aircraft veers off the runway while taking off or landing.

On July 1, another SpiceJet flight from Jaipur overshot the runway after landing due to heavy rains in Mumbai. Air traffic was affected for the next four days as the aircraft remained stuck on the runway.

A day later, a SpiceJet flight from Coimbatore overshot the runway in Mumbai. Another SpiceJet flight from Delhi had an unstabilised final approach and overshot the runway at Shirdi on April 29.

They have been rare in recent years with an exception in 2017 when five such cases were reported. As per DGCA, one case each of runway excursion was reported in 2014 and 2018 while two in 2015 and three in 2016.

Experts blame unstabilised approaches, late touchdowns and wet runways for such excursions, which can cause deaths, injuries and also damage to the aircraft.

Aviation safety expert Mohan Ranganathan said the increasing number of runway excursions also shows a lack of training and understanding of pilots regarding correct landing procedures.

“This also means checking standards are poor as the flight safety department should be able to identify potential overruns by monitoring digital flight data recorders,” Ranganathan said.

He said the trend of unstabilised approaches or late touchdown can be understood from that and the regulator can identify pilots, who have such tendencies. Ranganathan said airport conditions like wet runways contribute to such cases after touchdowns. He added if a touchdown is late, it constitutes pilot error.

DGCA chief Arun Kumar said they have taken measures like directives on operations during monsoon and runway friction tests to avoid runway excursions. He added no such incident has been reported since the series of incidents in June and July.

The DGCA issued anair safety circular in the first week of July asking airlines and airport operators to take extra precautions to avoid such cases during the monsoon season.

The number of aircraft in India was 620 as on July 31, 2018, up from 448 in March 2016, according to DGCA’s annual report. The number of annual flights grew to 26.05 lakh in 2018-19, against 23.24 lakh in 2017-18 and 20.49 lakh in 2016-17, according to the annual traffic report of the civil aviation ministry.

As many as 4.60 lakh flights took off and landed at the Delhi airport alone in 2018-19, up from 4.41 lakh in 2017-18 and 3.97 lakh in 2016-17. In Mumbai, there were 3.21 lakh flight movements in 2018-19, against 3.20 lakh in 2017-18 and 3.05 lakh in 2016-17.

A DGCA circular on August 6 asked airports handling over 210 aircraft per runway daily to do friction tests once weekly. Those handling 151 to 210 aircraft will have to do the friction tests once in two weeks, it said. During an audit last year, DGCA found that at some airports, the runway friction values were found below the minimum level, which according to experts lead to skidding of planes.

The aviation regulator alsoissued a checklist for airlines and airport operators on August 9. It has said it will do an audit in two months and then every quarter to ensure the checklist is being followed to avoid skidding.

Faizan Haidar writes on the Delhi government, city politics, transport, aviation, and social welfare. A journalist for a decade, he also tracks issues such as trafficking and labour exploitation in Delhi and other states.

NEW DELHI: At least 18 people died and 16 were severely injured in Kozhikode, Kerala on Friday after a Boeing-737 overshot a runway known as a "table-top" in the aviation industry.

The Air India Express plane, which was repatriating Indians stranded in Dubai due to the coronavirus pandemic, overshot the runway of the Calicut International Airport in heavy rain near the southern city of Kozhikode on Friday.

* Such runways have steep drops at one or both ends, increasing the possibility of injuries and fatalities if pilots under or overshoot their approach, either through human error or mechanical failure.

* They are most commonly found in mountainous areas where flat land is scarce, or in low-lying areas like Kozhikode where space is at a premium or there is fear of waterlogging at ground level. Other examples include the international airport of Nepal in mountainous Kathmandu.

* The table-top runway at Kozhikode is around 2,700 metres (8,858 feet) long, shorter than the 4,430 metres (14,534 feet) runway in New Delhi, though it is long enough for narrowbody aircraft like the Boeing-737 to land.

* The airport is unsafe and landing should not be allowed here, especially during wet conditions, Captain Mohan Ranganathan, a member of a safety advisory committee, had warned more than nine years ago.

* It is a tabletop runway with a downslope. The buffer zone at the end of the runway is inadequate, he said. Given the topography, he pointed out, the airport should have a buffer of 240 metres at the end of the runway, but it has only 90 metres (which the DGCA had approved).

* Airports Authority of India chairman Arvind Singh said that tabletop runways are there at four airports operated by it. They are at Kozhikode, Mangalore (Karnakata), Shimla (Himachal Pradesh) and Pakyong (Sikkim).

* The Kozhikode airport is located on a hill with limited space at the end of the runway, and several international airlines had stopped flying bigger aircraft including Boeing 777 and Airbus SE A330 jets into the city due to safety issues.

* The runway at Kozhikode, where the latest crash took place, doesn’t have an adequate safety mechanism, a member of the aviation regulator’s civil aviation safety advisory council had written in a letter to the government in 2011.

* A ground arrestor system, similar to those maintained at Air Force bases, should be installed at table top airports to bring any skidding aircraft to a halt, an investigation report into the 2010 crash of another Air India Express jet recommended.

* In May 2010, an Air India flight landing at Mangalore airport overshot the table-top runway there, falling down a hillside and bursting into flames.

Oct 24 (Reuters) - A Korean Air Lines Co Ltd (003490.KS) jet with 173 people on board overshot the runway at Cebu International Airport in the Philippines late on Sunday, the airline said, adding that there were no injuries and all passengers had evacuated safely.

The Airbus SE (AIR.PA) A330 widebody flying from Seoul to Cebu had tried twice to land in poor weather before it overran the runway on the third attempt at 23:07 (1507 GMT), Korean Air said in a statement on Monday.

"Passengers have been escorted to three local hotels and an alternative flight is being arranged," the airline said of flight KE361. "We are currently identifying the cause of the incident."

Korean Air President Keehong Woo issued an apology on the airline"s website, saying a thorough investigation would be carried out by Philippine and South Korean authorities to determine the cause.Response crews gather around a Korean Air Airbus A330 widebody flying from Seoul to Cebu, which tried to land twice in poor weather before it overran the runway on the third attempt on Sunday, in Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, Philippines October 24, 2022 in this picture obtained from social media. Randyl Dungog/via REUTERS

The A330-300 jet involved in the accident was delivered new to Korean Air in 1998, according to flight tracking website FlightRadar24, which said that other flights to Cebu had diverted to other airports or returned to their origin.

The Cebu airport said on its Facebook page that it had temporarily closed the runway to allow for the removal of the plane, meaning all domestic and international flights were cancelled until further notice.

The airline had a poor safety record at that time but sought outside help from Boeing Co (BA.N) and Delta Air Lines Inc (DAL.N) to improve its standards.

Nigeria’s aviation authorities said Wednesday they had launched an investigation into how a passenger plane overshot the runway while landing in the southern city of Port Harcourt.

The incident involving a Dana Air Boeing MD-83 jet happened at about 7:30 pm (1830 GMT) on Tuesday. None of the 44 passengers and six crew on board was injured.

But Sam Adurogboye, of the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA), told AFP the plane was “badly damaged”, adding: “We have launched an investigation.”

It was the second incident involving domestic airliner Dana Air this month: on February 7, an emergency exit door fell off as the plane as it landed in Abuja from Lagos.

The Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) said Tuesday’s overshoot “was suspected to have been caused by heavy rain, which was accompanied by strong wind and a storm”.

Oct 24 (Reuters) - A Korean Air Lines Co Ltd jet with 173 people on board overshot the runway at Cebu International Airport in the Philippines late on Sunday, the airline said, adding that there were no injuries and all passengers had evacuated safely.

The Airbus SE A330 widebody flying from Seoul to Cebu had tried twice to land in poor weather before it overran the runway on the third attempt at 23:07 (1507 GMT), Korean Air said in a statement on Monday.

"Passengers have been escorted to three local hotels and an alternative flight is being arranged," the airline said of flight KE361. "We are currently identifying the cause of the incident."

Korean Air President Keehong Woo issued an apology on the airline"s website, saying a thorough investigation would be carried out by Philippine and South Korean authorities to determine the cause.

The A330-300 jet involved in the accident was delivered new to Korean Air in 1998, according to flight tracking website FlightRadar24, which said that other flights to Cebu had diverted to other airports or returned to their origin.

The Cebu airport said on its Facebook page that it had temporarily closed the runway to allow for the removal of the plane, meaning all domestic and international flights were cancelled until further notice.

The airline had a poor safety record at that time but sought outside help from Boeing Co and Delta Air Lines Inc to improve its standards. (Reporting by Jamie Freed in Sydney and Karen Lema in Manila; Editing by Mark Porter and Diane Craft)