friendship international hotel rongsheng made in china

Good location near downtown attractions and Ancient City for food market. Room was huge, with couch and desk table. Cleaning staff didn"t replace toilet paper, and actual took the little we had already. No English. Hotel says there is a spa and fitness centre, but there isn"t. Breakfast is included and was really good with lots of options and fruit. Price was steep for China at around 700 RMB per night. Gas masks in the room for ??

Survey questions included data on age, ethnicity, education level, local household registration, employment, monthly income and current marital status. In addition to their drug using and sexual behaviour with FSW, the participants were asked about their current non-paid regular and casual sex partnerships and substance use, including injecting heroin, snorting heroin, using club drugs (methamphetamine, ketamine, ecstasy). We used an overall rate of consistent condom use with FSW as a global measure of male clients’ sexual risk behaviour by asking participants the overall frequency of condom use when having sex with FSW on a five-point response option from ‘every time’, ‘most of the time’, ‘half of the time’, ‘rarely’ and ‘never’. This response was dichotomised so that ‘consistent condom use with FSW’ indicated using condoms every time when having sex with FSW. The participants were asked about the commercial sex industry rank of FSW that they most often patronised. Options included FSW who worked in high rank (eg, hotels, VIP club), middle rank (eg, karaoke bars, clubs and massage parlours) and lower rank (eg, hairdressing rooms, on the street) of the commercial sex industry. Alcohol use and genital washing during commercial sex visits, and history of STI were also assessed.

The Commission finds no improvement overall in human rights conditions in China over the past year, and increased government restrictions on Chinese citizens who worship in state-controlled venues or write for state-controlled publications. Citizens who challenge state controls on religion, speech, or assembly continue to face severe government repression. The Commission notes that the Chinese government continued to pursue certain judicial and criminal justice reforms that could result in improved protection of the rights of China"s citizens. Yet these positive steps were clouded by new detentions and government policies designed to protect the Communist Party"s rule and tighten control over society. These detentions and policies violated not only China"s Constitution and laws, but also internationally recognized human rights standards.

The Chinese government engaged the international human rights community over the past year, hosting visits by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, permitting the International Committee of the Red Cross to open a regional office in Beijing, and committing to a visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture in November 2005. During her recent visit to China, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour said, "China has declared its commitment to human rights and has raised expectations for the country to match its growing prosperity with a firm commitment to advancing human rights." Arbour also expressed concern over China"s commitment to human rights and raised several political prisoners of concern with government officials.

Chinese non-profit associations and organizations are growing in number and engaging in valuable educational work and issue advocacy. While some ministries and local governments support these groups, some high-level leaders consider the emergence of an independent civil society a threat to government and Party control. Central authorities use regulations to limit and control the development of civil society in China, forcing many groups to remain unregistered or operate underground. In 2005, Chinese authorities moved to curtail the activities of international and domestic civil society organizations, particularly environmental groups that challenged government policies.

The Chinese government promotes conservation, recycling, and the use of renewable energy sources to address environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources. Weak environmental laws, poor enforcement, and small government budgets for environmental protection hamper these efforts. The Chinese government promotes international cooperation on environmental matters and is receiving foreign technical assistance for environmental projects in China.

The two greatest public health challenges facing China today are infectious diseases and rural poverty. The central government is taking steps to improve the public health infrastructure in rural areas, but China"s poor lack preventive healthcare, and weak implementation of laws that provide for free vaccinations leave many adults and children unprotected. Central government efforts to address China"s HIV/AIDS epidemic continue to expand and deepen, but local governments often harass Chinese activists who work on HIV/AIDS issues. Government controls inhibit the flow of health-related information to the public, potentially affecting public health in China as well as international disease monitoring and response efforts.

Trafficking of women and children in and through China remains pervasive despite government efforts to address the problem. The Chinese government is collaborating with UN agencies and has adopted national measures to control human trafficking, principally by passing criminal laws to punish traffickers and giving public security bureaus the chief responsibility for the elimination of trafficking. The President and the Congress should continue to support international programs to build law enforcement capacity to prevent trafficking in and through China, and should develop and fund additional programs led by U.S.-based NGOs that focus on the protection and rehabilitation of victims, especially legal and educational assistance programs.

The freedom to believe and to practice one"s religious faith is a universal and essential right, and the Chinese leadership should allow true freedom of religion for all Chinese citizens. The President and the Congress should foster and support the development of the freedom of religion in China by continuing longstanding U.S. diplomacy on the importance of religious freedom, and urging Chinese government engagement with the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance and a continuing dialogue with the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom.

The rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press are internationally recognized and are guaranteed in the Chinese Constitution, but Chinese citizens generally do not know that they have these rights. The President should propose, and the Congress should appropriate, funds to support U.S. programs to develop technologies that would help Chinese citizens access Internet-based information currently unavailable to them, as well as educational materials about their rights under international law to freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

The Chinese government forcibly repatriates North Koreans seeking refuge in China and denies the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to this vulnerable population, contravening its obligations under the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well its 1995 Agreement with the United Nations. The President and the Congress should press the Chinese government to uphold its international agreements and grant the UNHCR unimpeded access to screen North Koreans" refugee petitions.

China"s ethnic makeup is complex.1 Fifty-five minority groups speak more than 60 languages2 and practice a variety of religions. Though they constitute less than 9 percent of the total population, minorities are spread across almost two-thirds of the Chinese landmass, chiefly along international borders. More than 30 minority groups have ethnic counterparts in neighboring countries,3 and Communist Party policies in minority areas stress loyalty to China. Government concerns over the loyalty of minorities have increased with the growth of popular movements in neighboring Central Asian states.4

Since the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 and independent states were established in Central Asia, the Chinese government has tightened controls over Uighur expressions of ethnic identity.96Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Chinese government has equated peaceful expressions of Uighur identity with "subversive terrorist plots."97The Xinjiang government has increased surveillance and arrests of Uighurs suspected of "harboring separatist sentiments" since popular movements ousted Soviet-era leaders in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan.98In May 2005, the Xinjiang government intensified its "strike hard" campaign against activities it characterizes as ethnic separatism, religious extremism, or international terrorism.99In September 2005, Chinese authorities declared the "East Turkestan forces" the primary terrorist threat in China, and acknowledged that Xinjiang authorities have increased police surveillance and political controls throughout the region this year.100

18REAL, art. 9. Authorities sentenced four Uighur boys to three and a half years in prison after a schoolhouse brawl in April 2005, on the charge of "undermining the friendship of the nationalities." "Uighur Youths, Teacher Detained After School Brawl, Residents Say," Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 June 05.

Law enforcement officials continued to stress the need for both greater efficiency and more accountability. Responding to criticism that the wrongful conviction cases were in part the product of poor investigative work, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) reportedly launched a nationwide campaign to improve investigative capacity.14 China has significantly fewer police officers per capita than the international average,15 and some law enforcement agencies focused on hiring personnel and deploying more officers on the street.16 Beijing established blacklists of underperforming districts to encourage better policing.17 Senior Chinese officials also publicized efforts to crack down on corruption and abuses in the criminal justice system and stressed the need to balance "strike hard" efforts and the protection of suspect rights.18 In December 2004, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) noted that official statements on the importance of human rights represented a positive development.19

The Chinese government took a few positive steps on issues related to political crimes. Late in 2004, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that the government had formed a "special task force" on ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).27In addition to the prisoner releases noted above, in January 2005, the Chinese government provided new information on paroles, sentence reductions, and potential sentence reductions for a number of Chinese political prisoners.28In April 2005, the U.S. State Department announced a Chinese government clarification that there is not a stricter standard for evaluating sentence reductions and parole for "security" crimes. Chinese authorities also pledged to conduct a national review of cases involving political acts that are no longer crimes under Chinese law.29China announced the last two steps shortly before the UN Human Rights Commission met in Geneva in March 2005.

Chinese law does not meet minimal international standards for prompt judicial review of criminal detention and arrest. Under the ICCPR, anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge must be brought before a judge or judicial officer promptly for review of the lawfulness of his detention or arrest.36In December 2004, the UNWGAD found that China"s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) and related regulations on pretrial detention fail to meet this basic standard because (1) Chinese suspects continue to be held for too long without judicial review; (2) procurators, who review arrest decisions, only examine case files and do not hold a hearing; and (3) a procurator cannot be considered an independent judicial officer under applicable international standards.37

Public security agencies administer RETL and other forms of administrative punishment without effective judicial review or the minimal protections offered defendants in China"s formal criminal justice system.45The Chinese government argues that administrative detention decisions are subject to judicial review under China"s Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), but the UNWGAD concluded that ALL review is "in light of what happens in reality, of very little value" and that "no real judicial control has been created over the procedure to commit someone to re-education through labor."46In its December 2004 report, the UNWGAD found RETL to be a violation of the ICCPR and applicable international standards that require prompt judicial review of the lawfulness of detentions. The UNWGAD report concluded that the Chinese government had made no significant progress in reforming the system over the past seven years.47It also noted that RETL violates China"s own domestic law, which requires that all deprivations of freedom be authorized by national law, not administrative regulations.48

Chinese scholars and officials continued to engage foreign governments and legal experts on a range of criminal justice issues over the past year. Chinese law enforcement agencies expressed a growing interest in cooperating with other countries to combat transnational crime and expanded cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies on money laundering, drug trafficking, and other issues.164Numerous international conferences and legal exchanges with Western NGOs, judges, and legal experts took place, including programs on pre-trial discovery, defense attorneys, evidence exclusion, criminal trials and procedure, pleas and simplified prosecution procedures, bail, sentencing, parole, capital punishment, prison reform, and other subjects.165Participants in these programs encouraged more such exchanges.166

Finally, the Chinese government continued to engage the international human rights community on issues related to the criminal justice system. In addition to permitting a visit by representatives of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in September 2004, the Chinese government agreed to host the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture in November 2005.167In July 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross established a regional office in Beijing after signing an agreement with the Chinese government.168In August 2005, China hosted a visit by the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights.169During the visit, the High Commissioner and the Chinese government signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at facilitating China"s implementation of the ICCPR,170although that achievement was overshadowed by a contemporaneous spate of detentions.171Before the UN Human Rights Commission met in Geneva in March 2005, the U.S. government noted China"s commitment to open the ICRC office and receive these delegations as signs of progress in its human rights policies.172

29 A Global Review of Human Rights: Examining the State Department"s 2004 Annual Report, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, House Committee on International Relations, 17 March 05, Oral Statement of Michael Kozak, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State.

30 The UNWGAD defines a detention as arbitrary (1) when there is clearly no legal basis for the deprivation of liberty (for example when individuals are kept in detention after the completion of their prison sentences or despite an amnesty law applicable to them, or in violation of domestic law or relevant international instruments); (2) when individuals are deprived of their liberty because they have exercised the rights and freedoms guaranteed in certain provisions of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (UNDHR) or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and (3) when noncompliance with the standards for a fair trial set out in the UNDHR and other relevant international instruments is sufficiently grave as to make a detention arbitrary. United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet #26, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

36 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 9(3) and 9(4). China has signed, but has not yet ratified, the ICCPR. However, treaty signatories have an obligation to refrain from acts that would defeat the purpose of a treaty while ratification is pending. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18.

130 Liu Binglu, "Misuse of Retrials Is a Major Reason for Unjust Cases"; "Don"t Allow the Wings of Justice To Break: Using Unjust Cases to Look at Confessions Extorted Through Torture," Legal Daily; Veron Mei-Ying Hung, "Judicial Reform in China: Lessons from Shanghai," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 58 (April 2005), 17.

157 "Procuratorial Organs Ferret Out Illegal Sentence Reductions, Parole, and Medical Releases Involving More Than 17,000," CCTV International, reprinted in People"s Daily (Online),29 October 04.

164 For Chinese attention to the need for international cooperation generally, see e.g., "Chinese Top Legislator Calls for Int"l Efforts to Curb Organized Crime," Xinhua, 13 September 04 (FBIS, 13 September 04); Li Weiwei, "Four Major Trends in the Trafficking in Women and Children, Public Security Organs Face Three Challenges" [Guaimai funü ertong chengxian 4 da dongxiang, gongan jiguan mianlin 3 ge tiaozhan], Xinhua, reprinted in Procuratorate Daily (Online), 15 February 05. For expanded cooperation with US law enforcement agencies, see Matt Pottinger, "US and China Bridge Divisions to Fight Crime," Wall Street Journal, 3 March 05, A11.

165 Commission Staff Interviews. For news reports on some of these programs, see, e.g., Jiang Anjie, Zhao Yang, "17th International Penal Law Conference Opens in Beijing" [Di shiqi jie guoji xingfaxue dahui zai jing zhaokai], Legal Daily (Online), 13 September 04; "US-China "Criminal Defense Lawyer Training" Opens in Guangzhou" [Zhongmei "xingshi bianhu lüshi peixun guanmohui" zai Guangzhou zhaokai], People"s Daily (Online), 1 November 04; Liu Li, "All Rise: China Beijing Gets Taste of US Courtroom," China Daily (Online) 13 May 05; "World Legal Professionals Gather for Beijing Conference," Xinhua (Online), 5 September 05. Some Western NGOs reported obstacles with implementing criminal justice and other legal programs beginning in early 2005. Commission Staff Interviews and Correspondence.

172 China made these commitments in negotiations with the United States. A Global Review of Human Rights: Examining the State Department"s 2004 Annual Report, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations of the House Committee on International Relations, 17 March 05, Oral Statement of Michael Kozak.

The Chinese government has ratified the International Labor Organization"s (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (the "1998 Declaration") but has not fulfilled commitments under the Declaration. The ILO"s Fundamental Principles apply to all members and are a basic set of rights that require governments to allow workers to associate, to bargain collectively, to be free from forced labor, to be free from discrimination in employment, and to take steps to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.14China has ratified three of the eight ILO core conventions, which provide guidance on the full scope of the rights and principles in the 1998 Declaration, including two on child labor and one on equal remuneration for men and women.15A member of the ILO since its founding,16China has been a member of the ILO Governing Board since June 2002.17

The Chinese government has adopted a number of regulations that protect such worker rights as the right to receive a wage for work performed but rejects the basic internationally recognized rights of Chinese workers to form independent unions and bargain collectively. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which China ratified in 2002, guarantees the rights of workers to organize independent trade unions. At the time of ratification, the Chinese government took a reservation to ICESCR provisions that conflict with the Chinese Constitution and domestic labor laws.18

Despite being a member of the ILO"s Governing Board, the Chinese government has avoided discussions with the international labor community on Chinese workers" rights. For example, in December 2004, government officials cancelled a conference involving representatives of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that sought to review socially responsible investment in China and the role of longstanding OECD investment guidelines for multinational companies. International trade unionists criticized the cancellation and noted that it reflected the Chinese government"s lack of interest in discussing the application of international labor standards to Chinese workers.19

The Chinese government recognizes the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) as the sole representative of Chinese workers.20The ACFTU claims 120 million members, but ACFTU members cannot exercise internationally recognized labor rights. The Communist Party controls the ACFTU; Wang Zhaoguo, the Federation"s chairman, is a member of the Party Politburo.21The Party"s influence prevents the ACFTU from assisting workers in any way that violates Party guidelines.22Moreover, Chinese workers are not allowed to freely elect their ACFTU representatives.23

Forced labor is an integral part of the Chinese administrative detention system. A recent International Labor Organization report discusses prison labor without due process in Chinese re-education through labor (RETL) camps.68At least 250,000 to 300,000 individuals are currently detained in approximately 300 centers in the RETL system.69Although the Chinese government is in the process of reforming this system, it is unlikely to be abolished [see Section III(b)—Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants—for a detailed discussion of China"s administrative detention system]. In response to the Chinese government"s 2005 progress report on this issue, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights recommended that the Chinese government "abolish the use of forced labor as a corrective measure."70

3 Lawyers who represent labor protest leaders are often subject to harassment by authorities. "People"s Republic of China: Labor Unrest and the Suppression of the Rights to Freedom of Association and Expression," Amnesty International (Online), 30 April 02. Two workers were arrested after a non-violent strike at a garment factory and sentenced to five and two years in prison. The workers planned to appeal their sentences but could not find a lawyer who would agree to take their case. "Two Chinese Labor Activists Get Jail Terms For Demanding Wages and Insurance," Associated Press (Online), 17 May 05. Even when an attorney is available, the chance of a successful outcome is low. In Shanghai, some 8,000 workers turned to a legal aid center established by East China University of Politics and Law. One of the volunteer attorneys said that, "We do not have very good enforcement channels for labor law in China." Advocates complain that fines are too low to compel employers to obey the law. Tomio Geron, "Rights for China"s Workers," San Francisco Chronicle (Online), 15 June 05.

15 The United States has ratified only two of the eight ILO Core Conventions. U.S. State Department officials point out that even without ratification the Conventions are essentially already incorporated into U.S. law. For an overview of the United States" ratification of ILO core conventions, see "Final Internationally Recognized Core Labour Standards in the U.S.," Union Network International (Online), 4 September 01.

19Stephen Frost, "China: Facing Reality," International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers" Associations (IUF) Web site, 10 December 04.

Government officials initially emphasized that the RRA would liberalize state management of religious affairs, but they subsequently stressed the aspects that strengthen state control. At an international conference in 2004 that took place before the RRA was implemented, Zhang Xunmou, head of the policy and legal department of the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA), said the new regulation would bring about a "paradigm shift" in the control of religion in China.3 He also predicted that the RRA would set clear limits on official power over religion, safeguard religious freedom, and move from a system of direct bureaucratic control over religion to a system of self-government by religious groups.4 But as the March 1 implementation date drew closer, other senior SARA officials emphasized that the goal of the RRA is to manage religious affairs, and that officials working on religious issues could be held accountable for failing to follow the relevant laws and procedures.5

The Chinese government asserts the right to "[safeguard] the normal order of Tibetan Buddhism" by supervising the selection of reincarnations of important Tibetan lamas.51 State-run political education sessions require that monks and nuns denounce the Dalai Lama"s recognition in 1995 of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, the second-ranking Tibetan spiritual leader. Officials promptly took Gedun Choekyi Nyima, then age six, and his parents into custody and have held them incommunicado since that time. Chinese authorities installed another boy, Gyaltsen Norbu, several months later and demanded that secular and monastic communities accept his legitimacy. President Hu Jintao met with Gyaltsen Norbu in February 2005 and called on him to be "a model of loving the country and loving religion,"52 the same patriotic formula impressed upon all Tibetans. Gyaltsen Norbu"s appointment continues to stir widespread resentment among Tibetans.53 The U.S. government has repeatedly urged China"s government to end restrictions on Gedun Choekyi Nyima and his family and to allow international representatives to visit them.

Despite assurances of its "sincere" desire to establish diplomatic relations with the Holy See, the Chinese government has not altered its long-standing position that the Holy See must break relations with Taiwan and renounce a papal role in the selection of bishops. In late March 2005, senior Chinese leaders reportedly held substantive discussions with a senior European Catholic prelate in Beijing. The government generally responded to the papal transition with perfunctory recognition by granting the events minimal media coverage, but public security officials also increased harassment of Catholics, detaining 13 clerics. Chinese authorities also blocked discussion of the transition on domestic and international Web sites. Since May 2005, the Chinese government has made some conciliatory public statements. Since April 3, the Holy See has not publicly protested the detention of Catholic clergy, and Pope Benedict XVI has also made conciliatory public statements.71

Government controls on religious belief and practice in Xinjiang not only violate the freedom of religion of Xinjiang"s minority people, but also their freedom of expression and the right of each minority to protect and develop its own culture that is conferred by the 1984 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.101 Government policies also contravene several international conventions to which China is a signatory.102 The government"s refusal to recognize the Uighurs" constitutionally guaranteed right to practice their religion freely has exacerbated tensions in the region [see Section III(a)—Special Focus for 2005: China"s Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law]. A recent Human Rights Watch report warns that unless the government eases controls on Uighur religious activities, the policy "will likely alienate Uighurs, drive religious expression further underground, and encourage the development of more radicalized and oppositional forms of religious identity."103

71 "Breakthrough in Vatican-China Ties? " Reuters (Online), 19 August 05 (senior European Catholic prelate speculates on coming "breakthrough" in diplomatic relations); Ramón Pedrosa, "Beijing and the Vatican Edge Closer," International Herald Tribune (Online), 18 August 05; Sandro Magister, "Nuovi vescovi per la Cina di domani"; "Pope Benedict Reaches Out to China," Associated Press (Online), 12 May 05; John L. Allen, "The Word From Rome," National Catholic Reporter (Online), 13 May 05; Lucia Pozzi, " "Pechino dice sì al dialogo con il Papa"; Intervista a Dong Jinyi, ambasciatore cinese a Roma. "Cos;igrave; cambia il mio Paese," " Il Messaggero (Online), 14 May 05; "Pope Reaches Out to Non-Catholics and China During First Month," Associated Press (Online), 18 May 05; Elisabeth Rosenthal, "Hints of Thaw Between China and Vatican," International Herald Tribune (Online), 22 May 05; Joe McDonald, "Beijing, Vatican Express Enthusiasm for Ties, But Church"s Role Remains a Stumbling Block," Associated Press (Online), 29 May 05; "Hong Kong Bishop: Vatican "Anxious" for Diplomatic Ties with Beijing," Catholic World News (Online), 14 June 05; Nailene Chou Wiest, "Beijing Paving Way to Renew Vatican Links," South China Morning Post (Online), 15 June 05 (FBIS, 15 June 05); "Vatican Expresses Desire for Ties With China, but Stresses Religious Freedom," Associated Press (Online), 17 June 05; "Religious Freedom the Key, Says Vatican as It Seeks Ties," South China Morning Post (Online), 18 June 05; "Vatican Official Optimistic About Relations With China, Archbishop Lajolo Upbeat After Asian Trip," Zenit (Online), 23 June 05; "Bishop Calls for China, Vatican Compromise," Associated Press (Online), 23 June 05 (referring to Bishop Jin); "China and Vatican Make No Secret of Thaw," Los Angeles Times (Online), 25 June 05; "Report: Chinese Catholic Official Says Vatican and China Will Establish Ties," Associated Press (Online), 27 June 05 (referring to Anthony Liu Bainian); Minnie Chan, "Vatican Ties Closer With New Bishop," South China Morning Post, 30 June 05 (FBIS, 30 June 05) (referring to bishop Xing and reporting that the Chinese government sets up an intergovernmental working group on religious affairs to discuss potential relations with the Holy See); Wei Wu, "China"s Religious Official on Prerequisite to Better China-Vatican Ties," Xinhua (Online), 1 July 05 (referring to spokeswoman for SARA); Gerard O"Connell, "China Reportedly Wants "to Change its Relations" With the Holy See," UCAN (Online), 22 July 05; Vatican Information Service Press Release, 25 July 05; Bernardo Cervellera, "Chinese Priests Visit the Pope: an "Unexpected Gift"; a Sign of "Union With the Holy See," " AsiaNews (Online), 4 August 05; Wu Yung-chiang, "The Pope Meets With Chinese Priests; Foreign Ministry Makes No Comment on This," Ta Kung Pao, 4 August 05 (FBIS, 5 August 05); "Chinese Youths Visit the Pope Before Heading for World Youth Day," AsiaNews (Online), 10 August 05; "Catholics Regret Over Vatican Decision," China Daily (Online), 12 September 05; "China Rebuffs New Vatican Call to Send Bishops," South China Morning Post (Online), 13 September 05; "Negotiations Still on for Chinese Bishops" Rome Visit," AsiaNews (Online), 16 September 05; Gerard O"Connell, "Four Mainland China Prelates Absent as Pope Opens Synod of Bishops," Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 3 October 05; Bernardo Cervellera, "Beijing"s No to Bishops Shatters Illusion That Things Have Changed for the Better," AsiaNews (Online), 1 October 05. On the fundamental factors influencing Sino-Holy See relations in recent years, see, Beatrice Leung, "Sino-Vatican Relations at the Century"s Turn," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 14, No. 43 (May 2005), 353–370.

92 The restrictions on religious practice led to widespread resentment among the Uighurs that culminated in protests at Yining (Ghulja) in February 1997. Although reports differ on exactly what sparked the clash between Uighurs and Chinese security forces, eyewitnesses and official reports confirm that People"s Armed Police shot a number of unarmed demonstrators and security forces arrested hundreds of Uighurs for their participation in the protests demanding religious freedom and rights enshrined in the 1984 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, 15; Michael Dillon, Xinjiang—China"s Muslim Far Northwest, 92–99; Amnesty International, "People"s Republic of China: China"s Anti-terrorism Legislation and Repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region," 2002.

102 Including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, The Convention on the Rights of the Child, and The Convention Against Discrimination in Education.

107 Commission Staff Interview; "Beijing"s Orthodox Community Has First Paschal Liturgy Since 1957," Orthodoxy in China (Online), 3 May 05; "Eye on Eurasia: Russia"s Church in China," United Press International (Online), 27 October 04; Geraldine Fagan, "Will Orthodox Christians Soon Be Allowed Priests? " Forum 18 News Service (Online), 22 September 04; "Shanghai News Spokesperson Explains Closure of Dining Hall Managed by Taiwan Businessman," Orthodoxy in China (Online), 13 January 05; "A Verbatim Record of Vladimir Putin"s Meeting With Participants in the Bishops" Council of the Russian Orthodox Church," Orthodoxy in China (Online), 8 October 04; "Report of the Chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk, to the Bishops" Council of the Russian Orthodox Church (October 3–8, 2004), on External Church Activity, Care of the Diaspora of the Russian Orthodox Church," Orthodoxy in China (Online), 4 October 04; "China Visit of Russian Orthodox Church Delegation Comes to an End," Orthodoxy in China (Online), 26 October 04; "Entertainment Institutions to Be Ejected From Former Orthodox Churches in Shanghai," Orthodoxy in China (Online), 20 July 04; "China"s Ambassador Gave Dinner Honoring Chairman of Department of External Church Relations Moscow Patriarchate," Orthodoxy in China (Online), 13 July 04; Igor Rotar, "Xinjiang: Controls Tighten on Muslims and Catholics," Forum 18 News Service (Online), 29 September 05; ("One Orthodox source told Forum 18 that four Chinese citizens have now completed training at Orthodox seminaries in Russia and are ready for ordination, but so far the Chinese authorities had not given them permission to work in China as priests.")

113 "Senior Chinese House Church Leader Arrested; More Churches Raided Before Christmas," China Aid Association (Online), 10 December 05; "China: Christian Church Leader Arrested and at Risk of Torture For Possession of Religious DVDs," Amnesty International UK (Online), 23 December 04; "House-Church Leader Arrested; Zhang Rongliang Has a High Profile in China and Internationally," Christianity Today (Online), 5 January 05. On Zhang and the Fangcheng Fellowship and the Confession of Faith, see also David Aikman, Jesus in Beijing: How Christianity Is Transforming China and Changing the Global Balance of Power (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2003), 74–80, 92–95. In addition, approximately ten foreign Protestant leaders were expelled and 130 Chinese Protestant lay leaders were briefly detained when security officials raided a house church leadership training session in Harbin in February 2005. "American Church Leaders Deported; Beijing House Church Pastor Tortured in Prison," China Aid Association. Members of the South China Church claim that over 300 members of their church were detained between May and November 2004. "The Hard Truth Concerning the Case of the South China Church," Chinese Law and Religion Monitor, April–June 2005, 118–128.

124 Paul Hattaway, Brother Yun, Peter Xu Yongze, and Enoch Wang, Back to Jerusalem: Three Chinese House Church Leaders Share Their Vision to Complete the Great Commission (Carlisle, UK: Piquant, 2003), 13 (80–100 million); Aikman, Jesus in Beijing, 9 (up to 80 million); Kindopp, Hamrin, God and Caesar in China, 2 (at least 30 million, "with estimated figures as high as 45 million to 60 million"); Gianni Criveller, "Pechino nuova Antiochia? " Mondo e Missione (Online), July–August 2005 (less than 30 million); "Millions All Over China Convert to Christianity," Telegraph (Online), 3 August 05; "Just How Many Christians and Communists Are There in China? " Ecumenical News International (Online), 14 September 05; Caroline Fielder, "The Growth of the Protestant Church in China," address delivered at the 21st National Catholic China Conference in Seattle, WA, 27 June 05 (available at the Web site of the U.S. Catholic China Bureau).

In another example of Chinese authorities silencing "public intellectuals," in May 2005 the government abruptly and without explanation ordered the cancellation of an academic conference organized by Fordham University and the China University of Political Science and Law.16 Participants at the conference, entitled "Constitutionalism and Political Democratization in China—an International Conference," had planned to discuss sensitive topics such as "The Different Meanings of Democracy," "Democratization and Constitutionalism: China in Comparative Perspective," "Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy: Is China a Problem Case? " and "Which Path Should We Choose Toward Chinese Democracy? " Scheduled speakers included Western and Chinese experts well-known in China for doing work in sensitive areas, such as migrant labor and criminal defense.17 A People"s Daily editorial published during the government crackdown on public intellectuals illustrates the attitude of Chinese authorities that likely contributed to their cancellation of the conference:

Just before the International Labor Day holiday on May 1, Guangdong province"s Communication Administration Office, Government News Department, and Public Security Office issued a joint notice that required Internet content providers to monitor user identities, and limit users to a number that would allow them to be managed.28

Chinese authorities are encouraging China"s television and Internet news outlets, all of which are government sponsored, to increase their ability to influence public opinion abroad regarding China.29 Chinese authorities are also trying to increase their influence over bodies responsible for setting policies for Internet governance.30 For example, in March 2005, Zhao Houlin, a former telecommunications official in the Chinese government, and currently director of the International Telecommunication Union"s Telecommunication Standardization Bureau, said: "Today the management by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) [is something that] people consider to be management by the United States, by one government. People definitely want to see some changes."31 In June 2005, an article in China"s state-run press rationalizing that country"s crackdown on private Web sites cited a Chinese delegate to the United Nation"s Working Group on Internet Governance, Hu Qiheng, as saying she hopes China"s Internet governance experience can act as a lesson for global Internet governance.32

The government continues to restrict Chinese citizens" access to political information from sources outside of China that the government cannot control, influence, or censor. The central government attempts to block radio broadcasts by Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and the BBC. China"s laws restrict satellite dish ownership,91 and regulations require foreign news broadcasters to send all their satellite feeds through government-controlled channels. Foreign newspapers may be distributed only at foreign hotels and to "authorized subscribers."92 In October 2004, SARFT issued regulations prohibiting joint ventures from producing programs on "political news."93 In March 2005, SARFT issued an interpretive notice on these regulations limiting foreign companies to investing in a single joint venture, saying:

Chinese officials seem especially concerned that Chinese citizens may gain increased access to information on the Internet that the Party and government cannot censor. In January 2005, the official journal of the Party Central Committee published an article calling on authorities to "strengthen supervision of international Internet gateways; filter out foreign, external Web sites that provide harmful information that threatens state security, disrupts social stability, and spreads obscene content; and adopt diplomatic and legal measures to attack these Web sites."95 Chinese agencies block the Web sites of many human rights, educational, political, and news-gathering institutions without providing public notice, explanation, or opportunity for appeal. According to a study by researchers at Harvard University, Cambridge University, and the University of Toronto, Chinese authorities operate "the most extensive, technologically sophisticated, and broad-reaching system of Internet filtering in the world" to prevent access to "sensitive" religious or political material on the Internet. The report also stated that authorities utilize "a complex series of laws and regulations that control the access to and publication of material online."96

30 Liu Binjie, "Using Reform as the Motivator to Speed Up Development of Press and Publishing" [Yi gaige we dongli jiakuai xinenchubanye fazhan], China Youth Daily, reprinted in People"s Daily (Online) 26 January 05: [T]here only remains the cultural arena where our influence is insufficient. . . . We only need to develop and strengthen our cultural products, increase our cultural competitiveness, and only then can we gain a foothold in the world"s cultural market, only then will we be able to allow the world to understand China"s culture, and bring into play our culture"s influence on international society.

65 "Hong Kong Reporters Detained in Beijing" [Xianggang jizhe zai Beijing bei koucha], Boxun (Online), 29 January 05; "Chinese Government Bans Two Canadian Journalists with Chinese-Language TV Station," Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 January 05; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, " "Give Us All Your Notes and Pictures," " South China Morning Post (Online), 17 April 05; Serena Fang, "Silenced," Frontline (Online), 17 January 05; Edward Lanfranco, "Hebei Incident Shows China"s Dark Side," United Press International, reprinted in Washington Times (Online), 19 July 05.

74 Geraldine Fabrikant, Keith Bradsher, "Media Executives Court China, But Still Run Into Obstacles," New York Times, 29 August 05, C1; Pietro Ventani, "Sex and the City (and China"s Media Crackdown)," Asia Times (Online), 27 August 05; "Aiming at Virgin Investment Territory; A Roadmap of the Creative Ways that Foreign Companies Get Into China"s Cultural Industry" [Miaoxiang ziben chunudi; waizi qiaoru zhongguo wenhua chanye luxiantu], International Finance News, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 2 September 05.

81 "Editor Fired for Advocating China"s Reform," United Press International, reprinted in Washington Times (Online), 26 October 04. Authorities later stripped Xiao of his seat on the Guangdong Political People"s Consultative Conference. Leu Siew Ying, "Former Editor of "Tong Zhou Gong Jin" Stripped of Political Post," South China Morning Post (Online), 16 March 05.

China has supported some international initiatives against trafficking and built up a framework of domestic law to address the problem.20 Chinese experts and officials have cooperated with the Mekong Sub-Regional Project to Combat Trafficking in Children and Women, founded by the International Labor Organization, to reinforce the anti-trafficking provisions of the ILO Worst Forms of Forced Labor Convention.21 In domestic law, the 1997 revision of the Criminal Law abolished an older provision on "Trafficking in People" and inserted one on "Trafficking in Women and Children."22

Despite these government efforts, some 250,000 victims were sold in China during 2003, according to UNICEF.23 Statistics reported from the Fourth National Meeting on Women"s and Children"s Work, held in August 2005, reveal that over 50,000 women and children were rescued by police in four years. Together, these figures suggest that only about 5 percent of victims are rescued by the police.24 Zhu Yantao, a Ministry of Public Security official, recently noted that "with its huge population, China is likely to become the center of international human trafficking."25 Zhu explained that the prevalence of the crime in China is the result of economic disparities between men and women that force young rural women looking for work to move to the cities, where they fall into the hands of traffickers.26

18Ma Jianxiong, "Sex Ratio, Marriage Squeeze, and Ethnic Females Marriage Migration in China" [Xingbiebi, hunyin jizhuang yu fun qianyi], Journal of Guangxi Universities for Nationalities, Vol. 26, No. 4, July 2004. International trafficking particularly harms women and girls, as evident in the estimates cited in the State Department"s 2005 Report on trafficking that of the 600,000 to 800,000 victims trafficked each year, 80 percent are women and up to 50 percent minors. Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2005, available on the Department of State Web site, 6. The United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, as amended in 2003 [hereinafter TVPA] requires the State Department to cover "countries of origin, destination, or transit for a significant number of victims of severe forms of trafficking." Ibid., 26. The Trafficking in Persons reports assign the countries covered to one of three tiers based on their compliance with the TVPA"s minimum standards for combating trafficking. Ibid, 29. In order to indicate trends in trafficking and efforts to fight it, the TVPA was amended in 2003 to add a fourth category, the "Tier 2 Special Watch List," which focuses special attention on countries that are making efforts to cope with trafficking but need to do more. The 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report puts China in the Tier 2 Special Watch List because of its failure to provide evidence of increased efforts to cope with trafficking, especially of victims trafficked to Taiwan and North Koreans trafficked into China and forcibly repatriated. Ibid., 83–84.

26 "Over 50,000 Trafficked Women and Children Rescued by Police Over Four Years," [Sinianjian chuanguo gonganjiguan jiejiu bei guaimai fun ertong 5 wan duo ren], Shanxi Evening News (Online), 18 August 05. The author of this article seems to have acquired the statistics from the Fourth National Meeting on Women"s and Children"s Work, held on August 15–16, 2005. For comparison, a police report covering the years from 2001 to 2003 said 42,215 victims had been rescued during that period. Tian Yu, "Chinese Police Rescue 42,215 Women and Children over Three Years" [Woguo gong"an jiguan sannian jiejiu bei guaimai fun ertong 42,215 ren], Xinhua (Online), 2 March 04. It is difficult to ascertain the degree of overlap between the two reports. Statistics announced at a conference held in Guangxi in August 2005 to commemorate the 1995 Conference on Women in Beijing claim that a crackdown on trafficking across the border with Vietnam resulted in the rescue of 1800 victims over the course of five years. "Guangxi Strikes Hard at Cross-Border Crime of Trafficking in Women and Children," [Guangxi yanda kuaguo guaimai fun ertong fanzui], China Radio International (Online), 25 August 05.

The Chinese government promotes international cooperation on environmental matters, and is receiving foreign technical assistance for environmental projects in China.

The Chinese government is pursuing sustainable development domestically by encouraging recycling, conservation, and the use of renewable energy resources.5 Externally, Chinese officials favor international technology transfers and seek cooperation with international environmental protection agencies and groups.6 These are positive measures, but Chinese authorities continue to overlook environmental protection provisions already present in national development plans,7 compounding problems with China"s weak and poorly enforced environmental laws.8 In June 2005, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) identified a number of continuing barriers to environmental protection in China, including gaps in environmental legislation, the absence of time limits for compliance, delays in issuing laws and regulations governing administrative permits and environmental inspections, a lack of provisions governing legal responsibility for environmental violations, a single category of administrative punishment for polluters specifying a relatively small fine, and a lack of enforcement authority among environmental protection departments.9

Government controls inhibit the flow of health-related information to the public, potentially affecting public health in China as well as international disease monitoring and response efforts.

Government control over the flow of information has hampered an international effort to combat the spread of a new strain of avian flu virus. In May, the Ministry of Agriculture confirmed the first evidence of deaths of migratory birds in Qinghai province, apparently from an avian flu virus, more than two weeks after the initial deaths. In June, a U.S. newspaper reported that Chinese officials were encouraging farmers to protect their flocks by using amantadine, an antiviral drug meant only for use in humans.45Foreign scientists criticized the Chinese government, saying that such use of antivirals leads to resistant strains of the disease.46A spokesman for the Ministry of Agriculture denied encouraging the misuse of amantadine,47but he also announced that the Ministry would send out inspection teams to check on the possibility that it had been misused.48The most recent assessments of dead birds in Qinghai and Xinjiang reveal that the strains that killed the birds are not yet resistant to the amantadine.49

In July 2005, the WHO and other international health organizations complained that Chinese authorities had not shared key details about three outbreaks of avian flu in western China. The information sought by these international bodies included virus samples, genetic analysis, and information about the extent of the outbreaks and Chinese government efforts to contain them.50

4 Yu Tian and Jin Rongsheng, "New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme Warmly Received by Farmers in Liaoning"s Youyan Autonomous County," Liaoning Daily, 18 April 05 (FBIS, 14 May 05).

33 "Free Education for HIV Children in Guangdong," Shenzhen Daily (Online), 19 January 05; "HIV Rate Soars in Southern China City," United Press International (Online), 30 March 05.

39 Human Rights Watch, Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China, June 2005, 19; International Federation for Human Rights, Alternative Report to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: China: "At a Critical Stage," Violations of the Right to Health in the Context of the Fight Against AIDS, April 2005.

The Chinese government continues to maintain a coercive population control policy that violates internationally recognized human rights standards in three ways. First, the Population and Family Planning Law limits the number of children that women may bear.1 Second, this law coerces compliance by penalizing women who illegally bear a child with a "social compensation fee," a fine that often exceeds an average family"s annual income.2 Third, although physical coercion to ensure compliance with population control requirements is illegal in China, reports persist of local officials using physical coercion to ensure compliance, and in one case Chinese officials attempted to physically coerce a visiting Hong Kong woman to have an abortion.3 In December 2004, the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives heard credible testimony that compliance with the Chinese government"s population control policy continues to be enforced through coercive fines and loss of employment, as well as physical coercion including forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced implants of contraceptive devices, and other violent abuses against pregnant women or their families.4 These abuses create an atmosphere of fear in which most women feel they have little choice but to comply.5

1 PRC Population and Family Planning Law, enacted 29 December 01; Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), para. 17; Cairo International Conference on Population and Development (1994), Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, para. 72.

454 China: Human Rights Violations and Coercion in One Child Policy Enforcement, Hearing of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 14 December 04; Man Whose Wife Was Sterilized in China Wins Asylum," Los Angeles Times (Online), 9 March 05.

6 China: Human Rights Violations and Coercion in One Child Policy Enforcement, Hearing of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Testimony of John S. Aird, Former Senior Research Specialist on China, U.S. Bureau of the Census; "Violence in Enforcing Family Planning in a Chinese City," Chinese Rights Defenders Information Bulletin (Online), 23 June 05; "Chinese Jails for Violators of One-Child Policy," Kyodo World Service (Online), 11 July 05; "At a Meeting of Part-Time Members of the State Population and Family Planning Commission, Hua Jianmin Stresses the Need to Implement the Basic National Policy on Family Planning Unswervingly and Strive to Stabilize the Low Birth Rate," Xinhua, 9 July 05 (FBIS, 9 July 05); "China Adheres to Family Planning to Keep Low Birth Rate: Official," Xinhua (Online), 10 July 05; "Unreasonable Hunan Officials Arbitrarily Apply "One-Child Policy" by Forcing Hong Kong Woman To Have Abortion; Hong Kong Immigration Department Successfully Rescues Victim Within 24 Hours," Apple Daily (Online), 11 July 05 (FBIS, 12 July 05); "PRC Tries to Force HK Woman to Abort Six-Month Pregnancy," Agence France-Presse, 12 July 05 (FBIS, 12 July 05); "Gaocheng City Abuses Illustrate Flaws of China"s Family Planning Policy," Laogai Research Foundation (Online), 15 July 05; "Henan Family Planning Official Brutalizes Local Residents," China Information Center (Online), 15 July 05; "Family Planning Cadres in Sichuan Cities Line Their Pockets With "Violator"s" Fines," China Information Center (Online), 21 July 05; "Henan Woman Seized on the Street and Coerced to Have an Abortion," China Information Center (Online), 18 July 05.

9 "One-Child Policy Opponent Tortured," Human Rights in China (Online), 5 October 04; "Violence Against Women," in Report 2005, Amnesty International (Online) (covering events from January–December 2004). See also, "China Denies Detaining Woman Who Protested 1-Child Policy," Associated Press, 10 January 05 (FBIS, 10 January 05); "Chinese Woman Tortured After Coerced Abortion Faces More Jail Time," LifeNews (Online), 5 January 05; PRC Anti-Abortion Protestor Released, Continues to Face Police Harassment," Agence France-Presse (Online), 30 September 05; China: Human Rights Violations and Coercion in One Child Policy Enforcement, Hearing of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Testimony of Michael G. Kozak, Acting Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.

12 "China to Continue Its Population Control Policy," Xinhua, 5 January 05 (FBIS, 5 January 05); "China Remains Firm in Carrying Out Family Planning: Official," Xinhua, 9 June 05 (FBIS, 9 June 05); Charles Hutzler and Leslie T. Chang, "China Weighs Easing Its Harsh "One Child" Rule," Wall Street Journal (Online), 4 October 04; "Is China"s High-Level Leadership Taking the Lead on Research for a Reevaluation of the Family Planning Policy? " [Zhongguo sangaoguan qiantou yanjiu jihuashengyu zhengce mianlin tiaozheng?], Xinhua (Online), 19 October 04; Low Birth Rate Unstable: Official," Xinhua (Online), 16 September 05. Indications that the population control policy aims not only to reduce population growth but also to improve population "quality" can be found in "Family Planning Policy Saves China 300 mln Births," People"s Daily, 8 September 05 (FBIS, 8 September 05); "China To Focus on Improving Population Qualities: Official," Xinhua (Online), 27 June 05 (FBIS, 27 June 05); "At a Meeting of Part-Time Members of the State Population and Family Planning Commission, Hua Jianmin Stresses the Need to Implement the Basic National Policy on Family Planning Unswervingly and Strive to Stabilize the Low Birth Rate," Xinhua (Online), 9 July 05 (FBIS, 9 July 05); China: Human Rights Violations and Coercion in One Child Policy Enforcement, Hearing of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives.

26 Zhu Zhe, "For Students, Degree Weighs More Than Wedding Ring," Xinhua, 1 September 05 (FBIS, 1 September 05); "China Lifts Ban on Student Marriage," United Press International (Online), 11 August 05; "China to Lift Ban on Marriage, Childbearing for University Students," Xinhua (Online), 21 January 05. "More Chinese Graduate Students Marry in Secret," Xinhua (Online), 12 July 05; Paul Mooney, "China Withdraws Ban on Marriage and Childbearing by Students," Chronicle of Higher Education, 11 February 05.

Central authorities use regulations to limit and control the development of civil society in China, forcing many groups to remain unregistered or operate underground. In 2005, Chinese authorities moved to curtail the activities of international and domestic civil society organizations, particularly environmental groups that challenged government policies.

Individual civil society organizations and activists risk official retaliation when they directly challenge government decisions. In March, Chinese authorities ordered the Beijing AIDS Institute of Health Education, a registered non-governmental organization, to eliminate the terms "Health Education" and "AIDS" from its name or be closed. Institute sources voiced concern that this order would affect the group"s financial operations and limit its AIDS prevention efforts. Although officials asserted that the terms violated NGO naming rules, they issued the order a week after the Institute released a report alleging that government plans for using international AIDS funds lacked adequate public participation and representative patient sampling.18Similarly, local authorities in Henan province detained and arrested AIDS activists who criticized local government actions and attempted to contact higher-level government authorities.19

In early 2005, senior Chinese leaders mounted a wide effort to curtail activist civil society organizations. Articles in academic journals linked to the State Council pressed officials to prevent "Western countries from carrying out infiltration and sabotage of China through political NGOs."24International NGOs with U.S. ties have experienced more government interference in recent months.25Editorials in the state-sponsored press stressed the need for civil society organizations to carry out Party policies and ideology.26Central authorities ordered certain social science research groups that had attempted to operate outside of regular controls by registering as for-profit companies to reregister with MOCA or be closed.27

4 Ibid., 1, 3, 31–6, 40; Roundtable on HIV/AIDS, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 9 September 02, Written Statement submitted by Dr. Bates Gill, Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

14 According to Chinese news reports, specific changes in the MOCA drafts under consideration by the State Council include: (1) reducing the amount of registered capital required; (2) eliminating examination procedures; and (3) removing the restriction on having more than one NGO of the same type (e.g., bird watching association) in the same administrative region. The new regulations would apply to foreign NGOs as well. They also require local governments to give unspecified policy "assistance" to NGOs. Zhao Ling and Dong Shuhua, "New Regulations on Social Organizations to Come Out Within the Year: Civil Society Organizations to Receive Appropriate Encouragement." Many of these elements broadly resemble those found in the national foundation regulations passed in 2004. CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 73–4; Carl Minzner, "New Chinese Regulations on Foundations," 2 International Journal of Civil Society Law 110 (April 2004). The fact that the 2004 foundation regulations explicitly apply the sponsor organization requirement to representative offices of foreign foundations that seek to register in China suggests that future revisions to the national SO and NGNCE regulations may do so also.

Prospects appear remote for the establishment of a more robust constitutional enforcement mechanism in the near term. Constitutional enforcement remains a sensitive topic, and senior Party leaders have warned officials to guard against efforts to promote Western-style constitutional reform.19 In December 2004, the government ruled out establishing a constitutional court or some other mechanism for judicial review of the constitutionality of laws and official acts and stated that the Constitution is not a basis for litigation.20 Although scholars continued to study constitutional enforcement and held several conferences on the issue, authorities forced the cancellation of an international conference on constitutionalism and human rights in May 2005.21 In April 2005, authorities also shut down a Beijing consultancy that planned to assist citizens in enforcing their human rights.22 Chinese scholars suggest that if the government introduces any new constitutional enforcement mechanism in the near-term, it is most likely to be a special constitutional enforcement commission under the National People"s Congress.23

Since the 1980s, Chinese leaders have introduced and pursued limited policies to encourage popular participation in local political institutions. These include village and residents" committees (VCs, RCs), local people"s congresses (LPCs), and various systems allowing some popular input into the selection of lower-level government and Party officials. Chinese leaders introduced these reforms to enhance the Party"s ability to govern, limit the power of individual cadres, and improve China"s international image, among other policy goals.1 Such reforms partially check the behavior of local officials, since they must consider public opinion in addition to the demands of their superiors.2

8 Village Elections in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 July 02, Written Statement submitted by Yawei Liu, Associate Director, The Carter Center"s China Village Elections Project; International Republican Institute, Village Elections in China: Progress, Problems and Prospects, January 2001.

18 PRC Organic Law on Village Committees, enacted 4 November 98, art. 11; Village Democracy in China, Staff Roundtable of Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Written Statement of Anne Thurston, Associate Professor of China Studies, School of Advanced International Studies; O"Brien and Li, "Accommodating "Democracy" in a One-Party State," 120–2.

26 Some local municipal regulations permit migrants lacking local hukouto register to vote in RC elections. Beijing Municipal Residence Committee Election Measures [Beijing shi jumin weiyuanhui xuanju banfa], issued 26 April 00, art. 12. Some draft amendments to national laws governing RC elections would extend voting rights