friendship international hotel rongsheng china made in china

Finding an ideal family-friendly hotel in Hulunbuir does not have to be difficult. Welcome to Friendship International Hotel, a nice option for travelers like you.

For those interested in checking out popular landmarks while visiting Hulunbuir, Friendship International Hotel is located a short distance from Hailaer National Forest Park (1.5 mi) and Hasar Bridge (1.8 mi).

You can also take advantage of some of the amenities offered by the hotel, including a concierge, a coffee shop, and baggage storage. As an added convenience, there is parking available to guests.

While you’re here, be sure to check out U.B.C. Coffee (0.2 mi), a popular restaurant that is within walking distance of Friendship International Hotel.

Good location near downtown attractions and Ancient City for food market. Room was huge, with couch and desk table. Cleaning staff didn"t replace toilet paper, and actual took the little we had already. No English. Hotel says there is a spa and fitness centre, but there isn"t. Breakfast is included and was really good with lots of options and fruit. Price was steep for China at around 700 RMB per night. Gas masks in the room for ??

The Commission finds no improvement overall in human rights conditions in China over the past year, and increased government restrictions on Chinese citizens who worship in state-controlled venues or write for state-controlled publications. Citizens who challenge state controls on religion, speech, or assembly continue to face severe government repression. The Commission notes that the Chinese government continued to pursue certain judicial and criminal justice reforms that could result in improved protection of the rights of China"s citizens. Yet these positive steps were clouded by new detentions and government policies designed to protect the Communist Party"s rule and tighten control over society. These detentions and policies violated not only China"s Constitution and laws, but also internationally recognized human rights standards.

The Chinese government engaged the international human rights community over the past year, hosting visits by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, permitting the International Committee of the Red Cross to open a regional office in Beijing, and committing to a visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture in November 2005. During her recent visit to China, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour said, "China has declared its commitment to human rights and has raised expectations for the country to match its growing prosperity with a firm commitment to advancing human rights." Arbour also expressed concern over China"s commitment to human rights and raised several political prisoners of concern with government officials.

China has an authoritarian political system controlled by the Communist Party. Party organizations formulate all major state policies before the government implements them. The Party dominates Chinese legislative bodies such as the National People"s Congress and fills important government positions at all levels by an internal selection process. Chinese authorities have introduced limited elements of political participation at the lowest levels of government to enhance their ability to govern. These elements include direct elections for village and residents committees, local people"s congress elections, and some popular input into the selection of low-level government and Party officials. The Party controls these selection and electoral processes by screening, and often selecting, the candidates. Chinese citizens are attempting to use the limited political space created by official reforms to protect their rights and interests, but Party officials and local governments often suppress these efforts, leading to social unrest.

The Chinese government does not recognize the core labor rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining. The government prohibits independent labor unions and punishes workers who attempt to establish them. Wage and pension arrears are among the most important problems that Chinese workers face. The government issued new regulations seeking to address the problem of unpaid wages and pensions, but in many cases Chinese workers continue to struggle to collect wages and benefits because the relevant agencies do not enforce the regulations. Workplace health and safety conditions are poor for millions of Chinese workers. China"s state-run news media have reported, with some exceptions, workplace accidents more openly and promptly than in previous years, even when workers have been killed or injured. Forced labor is an integral part of the Chinese administrative detention system, and child labor remains a significant problem in China, despite being prohibited by law.

The religious environment for Tibetan Buddhism has not improved in the past year. The Party demands that Tibetan Buddhists promote patriotism toward China and repudiate the Dalai Lama, the religion"s spiritual leader. The intensity of religious repression against Tibetans varies across regions, with officials in Sichuan province and the Tibet Autonomous Region currently implementing Party policy in a more aggressive manner than officials elsewhere. Sichuan authorities sometimes impute terrorist motives to Tibetan monks who travel to India without permission.

The government continues to strictly regulate Muslim practices, particularly among members of the Uighur minority. All mosques in China must register with the state-run China Islamic Association. Imams must be licensed by the state before they can practice, and must regularly attend patriotic education sessions. Religious repression in Xinjiang is severe, driven by Party policies that equate peaceful Uighur religious practices with terrorism and extremism.

In the past year, the Chinese government continued a campaign begun in 2002 that focused on harassing and repressing unregistered Protestant groups and consolidating control of registered Protestants. Hundreds of unregistered Protestants associated with house churches have been intimidated, beaten, or imprisoned. The Chinese government opposes the relationships that many unregistered Protestant house churches have developed with co-religionists outside China.

Chinese non-profit associations and organizations are growing in number and engaging in valuable educational work and issue advocacy. While some ministries and local governments support these groups, some high-level leaders consider the emergence of an independent civil society a threat to government and Party control. Central authorities use regulations to limit and control the development of civil society in China, forcing many groups to remain unregistered or operate underground. In 2005, Chinese authorities moved to curtail the activities of international and domestic civil society organizations, particularly environmental groups that challenged government policies.

Chinese judicial officials announced ambitious reform goals in 2005 that would address structural problems affecting the Chinese judiciary. These include changes to court adjudication committees, the system of people"s assessors, and judicial review of death penalty cases. Party authorities and local governments, however, continue to limit the independence of China"s courts. Internal administrative practices of Chinese courts also compromise judicial efficacy and independence. The Chinese judiciary has improved the educational level of Chinese judges and the quality of their judicial opinions. Rural courts, however, are rapidly losing judges to urban areas.

The Chinese government does not respect the freedom of speech and freedom of the press guaranteed in China"s Constitution. Chinese authorities allow government-sponsored publications to report selectively on information that, in previous decades, officials would have deemed embarrassing or threatening. But in the past year, officials have become less tolerant of public discussion that questions central government policies. Chinese authorities have tightened restrictions on journalists, editors, and Web sites, and continue to impose strict licensing requirements on publishing, prevent citizens from accessing foreign news sources, and intimidate and imprison journalists, editors, and writers.

Constitutional enforcement remains a politically sensitive topic in China, and the near-term prospects for the establishment of a more robust constitutional enforcement mechanism are remote. The Chinese government has ruled out establishing a constitutional court or giving people"s courts the power to review the constitutionality of laws and regulations, but has affirmed the right of citizens to petition the National People"s Congress Standing Committee for review of regulations that violate the Constitution or national law. The effect of this right remains limited, however, since Chinese citizens have no right to compel such review or to challenge the constitutionality of government actions. The Chinese government has enacted laws to curb administrative abuses, but Chinese officials retain significant administrative discretion. Existing legal mechanisms provide only limited checks on arbitrary or unlawful government actions.

Minorities that are willing to accept state controls and the official depiction of their ethnic groups and histories have been able to preserve their cultures while joining Party and government ranks. Minorities that demand greater effective autonomy and control over their cultural identities, however, regularly confront government policies that violate the Constitution and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. Government policy in Tibetan areas and in Xinjiang most often contravenes the Chinese Constitution and law. The government grants minorities in southwest China that have accepted central authority, like the Zhuang, Yao, and Yi, more freedom to exercise their lawful rights. Since 2000, China"s autonomous regions have experienced increased economic output and improved transportation and communication networks, but central control over development policy and financial resources has weakened economic autonomy in minority areas and disproportionately favored Han Chinese in Tibetan, Uighur, and other border areas. Central government investment has expanded educational access for minorities since 1949, though minority literacy rates and levels of educational attainment remain below those of the Han. Government-sponsored Han migration to minority areas has exacerbated ethnic tensions, particularly in Tibetan areas, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia.

The Chinese government promotes conservation, recycling, and the use of renewable energy sources to address environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources. Weak environmental laws, poor enforcement, and small government budgets for environmental protection hamper these efforts. The Chinese government promotes international cooperation on environmental matters and is receiving foreign technical assistance for environmental projects in China.

Trafficking of women and children in China remains pervasive despite government efforts to build a body of domestic law to address the problem. China"s population control policies exacerbate the trafficking problem. China"s poorest families, who often cannot afford to pay the coercive fines that the government assesses when it discovers an extra child, often sell or give infants, particularly female infants, to traffickers.

The two greatest public health challenges facing China today are infectious diseases and rural poverty. The central government is taking steps to improve the public health infrastructure in rural areas, but China"s poor lack preventive healthcare, and weak implementation of laws that provide for free vaccinations leave many adults and children unprotected. Central government efforts to address China"s HIV/AIDS epidemic continue to expand and deepen, but local governments often harass Chinese activists who work on HIV/AIDS issues. Government controls inhibit the flow of health-related information to the public, potentially affecting public health in China as well as international disease monitoring and response efforts.

National and local authorities are gradually reforming China"s household registration (hukou) system. In 2005, central authorities took some steps toward removing work restrictions on migrants in urban areas, but hukoudiscrimination in public services remains prevalent. Hukoureforms are enhancing the ability of wealthy and educated citizens to choose their place of permanent residence, but strict economic criteria often exclude poor rural migrants living in urban areas, preventing some of China"s most vulnerable citizens from receiving public services.

The Dalai Lama has said that he does not seek independence and aims for a solution based on Tibetan autonomy within China. But China"s leaders do not seem to recognize the benefits of moving forward in the dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his envoys. Chinese laws on regional ethnic autonomy contain provisions that could benefit Tibetans and their culture, but poor government implementation of these laws largely negates their potential value. Chinese government statistics suggest that Tibetans are not yet prepared to compete in the economic and ethnic environment created by central government policies. The Tibetan rate of illiteracy is five times higher than China"s national average. Most Tibetans do not have access to a bilingual education system that can impart skills to help them compete for employment and other economic benefits. Chinese laws and official statements lend credibility to Tibetan concerns that programs such as Great Western Development and projects such as the Qinghai-Tibet railroad will lead to large increases in Han migration. The rights of Tibetans to their constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly are subject to strict constraint. Government officials persecute prominent Tibetans, especially religious leaders, believed to have links to the Dalai Lama.

The Chinese government forcibly repatriates North Koreans seeking refuge in China from starvation and political persecution, contravening its obligations to handle refugees as required by the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Chinese government classifies all North Koreans in China as "illegal economic migrants" and denies the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) access to this vulnerable population. Living conditions of North Koreans in China are harsh, and women and children are particularly vulnerable to trafficking and prostitution. There is a compelling case for the Chinese government to recognize the North Koreans in China as refugees and allow the UNHCR access to them: the North Korean government regularly denies food to particular groups on political grounds, and refugees returned to North Korea face long prison terms, torture, or execution.

The Chinese government tolerates intellectual property infringement rates that are among the highest in the world, and has not introduced criminal penalties sufficient to deter intellectual property infringement. Steps taken by Chinese agencies in the past 12 months to improve the protection of foreign intellectual property have not produced any significant decrease in infringement activity. The Chinese government has made progress in bringing its laws into compliance with its WTO commitments. Although significant flaws remain, the new body of commercial laws has improved the business climate for foreign companies in China. With new, more transparent rules, the Chinese trade bureaucracy has reduced regulatory and licensing delays. The government has not fully implemented the key WTO principles of national treatment, non-discrimination, and transparency in such areas as distribution and agriculture. To address these problems, the Chinese government must continue economic reforms, establish a more transparent and consistent regulatory and licensing system, implement and enforce distribution rights for foreign companies, and strengthen enforcement of intellectual property laws.

The Commission"s Political Prisoner Database is a unique resource for promoting human rights in China. Members of Congress should use the Database to support their own advocacy of political and religious prisoners in China, and should ask official and private delegations traveling to China to present officials there with lists of political and religious prisoners derived from the Database. Members should also urge state and local officials and private citizens involved in sister-state and sister-city relationships with China to use the Database to build new advocacy efforts for the release of political and religious prisoners.

Trafficking of women and children in and through China remains pervasive despite government efforts to address the problem. The Chinese government is collaborating with UN agencies and has adopted national measures to control human trafficking, principally by passing criminal laws to punish traffickers and giving public security bureaus the chief responsibility for the elimination of trafficking. The President and the Congress should continue to support international programs to build law enforcement capacity to prevent trafficking in and through China, and should develop and fund additional programs led by U.S.-based NGOs that focus on the protection and rehabilitation of victims, especially legal and educational assistance programs.

China"s leaders rank social stability as a key priority and have taken some top-down measures to address abusive official behavior that contributes to social unrest. The President and the Congress should encourage the Chinese government to continue these positive steps, but should also press the Chinese leadership for the kinds of bottom-up changes that will ensure a stable future for China, including (1) expanding popular participation in politics by curbing the discretion of election committees; (2) lifting current restrictions on civil society by removing the sponsor organization requirement; (3) removing restrictions on the news media; (4) giving Chinese citizens the power to enforce constitutional protections; (5) and taking decisive steps to make the judiciary independent.

The freedom to believe and to practice one"s religious faith is a universal and essential right, and the Chinese leadership should allow true freedom of religion for all Chinese citizens. The President and the Congress should foster and support the development of the freedom of religion in China by continuing longstanding U.S. diplomacy on the importance of religious freedom, and urging Chinese government engagement with the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance and a continuing dialogue with the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom.

U.S. law prohibits imports into the United States of forced labor products and the Commission is concerned that products resulting from forced labor in China may be reaching the United States. The President should direct the China Prison Labor Task Force created under Title V of Public Law 106-286 to establish an electronic database of sites in China known to be forced labor camps or production facilities. Imports into the United States of products manufactured in whole or part in facilities listed in this database should be presumptively considered to be the products of forced labor as defined in Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, until an inspection by U.S. customs officials determines otherwise.

Wage and pension arrears are growing problems in China and cause labor unrest. The President and the Congress should support exchange and training programs with Chinese organizations on orderly systems of wage and pension payments, including the collection and payment of outstanding wages and pensions.

The rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press are internationally recognized and are guaranteed in the Chinese Constitution, but Chinese citizens generally do not know that they have these rights. The President should propose, and the Congress should appropriate, funds to support U.S. programs to develop technologies that would help Chinese citizens access Internet-based information currently unavailable to them, as well as educational materials about their rights under international law to freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

The Chinese government uses technology, prior restraints, intimidation, detention, imprisonment, and vague and arbitrarily applied censorship regulations to suppress free expression and control China"s media. The President and the Congress should urge the Chinese government to eliminate prior restraints on publishing, cease detaining journalists and writers, stop blocking foreign news broadcasts and Web sites, and specify precisely what kind of political content is illegal to publish.

The Chinese government forcibly repatriates North Koreans seeking refuge in China and denies the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to this vulnerable population, contravening its obligations under the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well its 1995 Agreement with the United Nations. The President and the Congress should press the Chinese government to uphold its international agreements and grant the UNHCR unimpeded access to screen North Koreans" refugee petitions.

The Resident Legal Advisor at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing has provided important analysis of legal reform developments in China and coordination for legal exchanges between the United States and China. Despite this important role, the Advisor position has no permanent funding source. The President and the Congress should work to create a permanent Resident Legal Advisor position at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.

Social unrest in China is growing. According to official Chinese statistics, the number of public protests in China increased every year between 1993 and 2004. In 2003, public security authorities reported 58,000 public protests involving more than 3 million people. In 2004, public security authorities reported 74,000 public protests involving more than 3.5 million people, and a seven-fold rise from the 10,000 protests recorded in 1994. In October 2004 alone, more than 2 million farmers reportedly took part in more than 700 protests.

Many problems fuel China"s social unrest. Unlawful land seizures and embezzled compensation payments led to numerous land disputes, with one Chinese social scientist warning of "turbulence" if the government does not solve these problems. Laid off workers and pensioners protested unpaid wages, poor labor conditions, and unemployment, with some incidents involving tens of thousands of protestors. Abusive police behavior sparked large-scale protests in Chongqing, Gansu, Guangdong, Sichuan, and Yunnan last year. Environmental degradation is also a growing cause of citizen protests. The number of collective petitioning efforts, involving hundreds or thousands of protestors trying to present their grievances to officials at successively higher levels of government, is growing. Public anger also manifests itself on the Internet, where reports on law enforcement abuse sometimes generate waves of media criticism and individual commentary.

China"s leaders rank social stability as a key priority, and officials are attempting to address some of the immediate causes of social unrest. In the past year, the government passed laws and initiated campaigns with the stated goals of combating corruption, curbing law enforcement abuse, limiting administrative discretion, and resolving such problems as unlawful land seizures and unpaid wages. In an effort to defuse resentment of law enforcement agencies, for example, the Ministry of Public Security and the Supreme People"s Procuratorate initiated campaigns to address corruption, unlawful detention, and torture. The government has also undertaken efforts to ensure that employers pay migrant laborers.

While taking some steps to address public anger, the leadership has also imposed new controls that intensify the underlying causes of social unrest. Over the past year, the Chinese government launched a campaign to increase restrictions on the free flow of information. As part of this campaign, officials banned hundreds of "illegal" political publications, established a licensing system for reporters, and imposed new registration requirements for Web sites. Officials also prosecuted journalists and editors who reported too aggressively on local abuses and prohibited the use of text messaging and other media to circulate "rumors" and other "harmful" information. The Central Propaganda Department prohibited reporting on political and social topics the Party deemed sensitive or embarrassing. In May 2005, for example, the Department issued a new directive limiting the ability of news media to publish exposés on corruption and abuse in other locales. In late 2004, censors banned reports on land seizures, warning news media against "inducing and intensifying contradictions." Authorities also restricted public reporting on demonstrations and disturbances. These controls undermine the press, one of the few existing checks on local abuse, and leave officials and powerful private interests free to engage in the corrupt practices that are generating unrest across China.

Similarly, the Chinese government has increased controls over civil society and autonomous social organizations. The government continues to subordinate China"s state-run union to the interests of the Party and prohibit the formation of independent labor unions that could address worker grievances. Early in 2005, authorities took steps to curb the growing activism of environmental groups that had challenged government development decisions by pressuring them to join a government-controlled umbrella organization. Officials also began a crackdown on social groups registered as business organizations and continued to enforce restrictive registration and sponsorship requirements for civil society organizations. Government and Party officials have acknowledged the important role that voluntary social organizations play in helping to address China"s social problems. Instead of supporting the development of civil society organizations that could help resolve social and economic issues, however, the Chinese leadership has imposed new restrictions on these groups that undermine their ability to provide assistance, forcing many to operate underground.

Government repression of unregistered religious believers and ethnic minorities also contributes to instability. In 2005, the Chinese leadership refocused government attention on the traditional Party fear that religion and ethnicity are being used by "hostile outside forces" to infiltrate and destabilize Chinese society. As a result, instead of implementing China"s new Regulation on Religious Affairs in a way that offers new redress to believers against errors and abuses by the state"s religious bureaucracy and encourages faith-based social organizations, the Party directed local officials to "control" believers. Such tactics force religious expression underground and push otherwise law-abiding believers into conflict with the government.

The Chinese government relies on a combination of top-down rectification campaigns, political controls, and repression to achieve its version of social stability. These measures have failed to control corruption, local abuses, and social unrest, fueling additional resentment on the part of China"s citizens. Citizen efforts to address government abuses are driven underground, while local officials enjoy even greater discretion to violate rights. Without full transparency, free information flow, independent political participation, a vibrant civil society, genuine autonomy for ethnic minorities and religious believers, enforceable constitutional and legal rights, and effective checks on administrative discretion, China"s leaders will not achieve the goal of maintaining a stable internal environment as the foundation for continued national development.

Minorities that are willing to accept state controls and the official depiction of their ethnic groups and histories have been able to preserve their cultures while joining Party and government ranks. Minorities that demand greater effective autonomy and control over their cultural identities, however, regularly confront government policies that violate the Constitution and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. Government policy in Tibetan areas and in Xinjiang most often contravenes the Chinese Constitution and law. The government grants minorities in southwest China that have accepted central authority, like the Zhuang, Yao, and Yi, more freedom to exercise their lawful rights.

Since 2000, China"s autonomous regions have experienced increased economic output and improved transportation and communication networks, but central control over development policy and financial resources has weakened economic autonomy in minority areas and disproportionately favored Han Chinese in Tibetan, Uighur, and other border areas. Central government investment has expanded educational access for minorities since 1949, though minority literacy rates and levels of educational attainment remain below those of the Han. Government-sponsored Han migration to minority areas has exacerbated ethnic tensions, particularly in Tibetan areas, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia.

China"s ethnic makeup is complex.1 Fifty-five minority groups speak more than 60 languages2 and practice a variety of religions. Though they constitute less than 9 percent of the total population, minorities are spread across almost two-thirds of the Chinese landmass, chiefly along international borders. More than 30 minority groups have ethnic counterparts in neighboring countries,3 and Communist Party policies in minority areas stress loyalty to China. Government concerns over the loyalty of minorities have increased with the growth of popular movements in neighboring Central Asian states.4

Implementation of the REAL varies greatly by region and by minority group.17The Chinese government prohibits all Chinese citizens from expressing sentiments that "incite splittism" or "divide nationality unity," but monitors minorities more closely than Han Chinese.18The government grants a degree of local autonomy to ethnic groups that accept the central government"s authority, but silences those who attempt peacefully to advocate their rights under Chinese law. Mongol activist Hada, for example, is serving a 15 year prison sentence for organizing peaceful demonstrations for rights provided in the REAL. Minorities in the southwest have had more freedom to exercise their autonomy because they rarely challenge central authority.19The government tightly restricts religious practices and expressions of cultural identity in Xinjiang, Tibetan areas, and Inner Mongolia, however. In contrast to southwestern minorities, the Tibetans, Uighurs, and Mongols live in cohesive communities largely separated from Han Chinese, practice major world religions, have their own written scripts, and have supporters outside of China. Relations between these minorities and Han Chinese have been strained for centuries.

Despite these positive steps, the REAL Implementing Regulations also increase the role of the central government in autonomous areas, reflecting a broader national campaign to increase Party controls over society. All of the new State Council measures are binding on autonomous governments, including specific economic development projects, language policies, and migration policies that the autonomous governments previously had the authority to determine themselves.26Central authorities also tightened controls over minority cultural representation and launched an extensive propaganda campaign on the role of China"s minorities in building a united, multi-ethnic nation.27The same campaign stresses that future prospects for minorities depend on cooperating with the Han majority.

The Constitution entitles minorities, like all citizens of China, to freedom of religious belief, though Uighurs and Tibetans have been effectively stripped of this right. Religion is the central marker of ethnic identity for many minorities, and the government often equates the religious activities of these groups with "ethnic chauvinism" and "local splittism." 72The government represses Uighur and Tibetan religious practices [see Section III(d)—Freedom of Religion and Section VI—Tibet], though official policy concedes that minority religious beliefs are a "long-term issue" and "cannot be forcibly resolved in the short-term."73Minorities outside of Xinjiang and Tibetan areas who belong to one of the five officially recognized religions are generally allowed to practice their religions in registered religious venues managed by state-licensed clergy. Many minorities practice religions unique to their ethnic groups (and not one of the five state-recognized religions), which the government tacitly allows as a "minority custom" rather than as a religion per se.74Autonomous governments are required to teach "scientific thinking," a Party catchphrase for atheism, in the public school system and must prevent religion from "infiltrating" the educational system.

The Chinese Constitution states that all minorities are equal and prohibits all acts that discriminate against or oppress nationalities. Nevertheless, ethnic discrimination continues to exist throughout China, in both the government"s controls over cultural and religious expression and in private and governmental hiring practices. Many Han Chinese entrepreneurs with businesses in autonomous areas intentionally recruit Han workers from neighboring provinces rather than work with local minorities.89Employers favor those with fluent Mandarin language skills and, in some areas, certain job listings bar specific minorities from applying.90In the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the highest paying jobs are largely staffed by Han Chinese.91The central and Xinjiang governments announced personnel decisions in 2005 that explicitly favored Han Chinese over minorities. In April 2005, for example, the government specified that 500 of 700 new civil service positions in southern Xinjiang, where over 95 percent of the population is Uighur, would be reserved for Han Chinese.92The government actively recruited Chinese from outside of Xinjiang to assume key posts in the autonomous region, while providing insufficient incentives to stem the flow since 1979 of more than 200,000 trained personnel from Xinjiang to the east coast.93Han Chinese now constitute over 40 percent of the population in Xinjiang, compared to less than 6 percent in 1949. In April 2005, 9,000 workers from Han-populated poor counties in Gansu accepted "long-term contracts" to work on Production and Construction Corps farms in Xinjiang, despite high levels of unemployment among minorities living nearby.94

Since the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 and independent states were established in Central Asia, the Chinese government has tightened controls over Uighur expressions of ethnic identity.96Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Chinese government has equated peaceful expressions of Uighur identity with "subversive terrorist plots."97The Xinjiang government has increased surveillance and arrests of Uighurs suspected of "harboring separatist sentiments" since popular movements ousted Soviet-era leaders in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan.98In May 2005, the Xinjiang government intensified its "strike hard" campaign against activities it characterizes as ethnic separatism, religious extremism, or international terrorism.99In September 2005, Chinese authorities declared the "East Turkestan forces" the primary terrorist threat in China, and acknowledged that Xinjiang authorities have increased police surveillance and political controls throughout the region this year.100

1 The Chinese government uses a Stalinist formula to determine which groups constitute unique minzu, variously translated as "nationalities" or "ethnic groups." Accordingly, to be considered a nationality, a group must have a common language, territory, economic life, and culture. Stalin, J.V. "Marxism and the National Question," in Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages University Publishing House, 1953), 302. More than 400 groups registered as separate nationalities in the 1953 census, with more than 240 requesting recognition in Yunnan Province alone. The government was only able to winnow the number to 55 after awkwardly gerrymandering ethnic boundaries by sending work teams of anthropologists and government officials to the countryside to determine which groups "objectively" constituted unique nationalities. Many groups continue to contest the government"s classification system. For details on the classification process, see Katherine Palmer Kaup, Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 2000); Katherine Palmer Kaup "Regionalism and Ethnicnationalism in the People"s Republic of China," 172 China Quarterly, 863–884 (2002); and Fei Xiaotong, Collected Works of Fei Xiaotong [Fei Xiaotong xuanji] (Fuzhou: Haixian Wenyi Chubanshe, 1996), 285.

2 S. Robert Ramsey, The Languages of China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 157–292. Many of the minority languages are further divided into mutually unintelligible dialects.

5 Chinese President Hu Jintao noted in May 2005 that the per capita GDP in minority areas is only 67.4 percent of the national average and rural per capita income only 71.4 percent of the national average. Hu Jintao, "Opening Speech to the Ethnic Affairs Work National Conference" [Hu Jintao zai zhongyang minzu gongzuo huiyishang de jianghua], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 27 May 05. This figure, however, does not indicate the severity of economic discrepancies, as Han Chinese within minority areas typically have higher incomes than the minorities. The government tightly controls statistics on Han-minority economic discrepancies, and published statistics report figures based on regional differences rather than providing breakdowns by ethnic groups. Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 149–53. Numerous factors contribute to minority poverty. Minorities are concentrated in harsh geographical terrains on China"s periphery and lack the capital needed to extract natural resources in their territories. Poor infrastructure and low educational levels also contribute to their poverty. Government policies have exacerbated discrepancies in wealth between the minorities and Han. See Katherine Palmer, "Nationalities and Nationality Areas," in China Handbook, ed. Chris Hudson (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1997), 276–85. Several Western analysts report that central development strategies in Xinjiang since the launching of the Great Western Development campaign in 2000 have disproportionately favored Han Chinese. Nicholas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," 44 The China Journal 65, 82–3, 85 (2000); Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent (Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2004), 39. Uighur human rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer testified that the Great Western Development policies have had a deleterious impact on the Uighurs and resulted in the "bleakest period in Uighur history." Congressional Human Rights Caucus Members Briefing, The Human Rights Situation of the Uighurs in the People"s Republic of China, 28 April 05.

7 Tibetans Lose Ground in Public Sector Employment, Tibet Information Network (Online), 20 January 05; "China"s Influence in Central Asia (Part 5): Uighurs Count the Cost of China"s Quest for Stability," Radio Free Asia (Online), 24 November 04.

9 Wen Jun, "Assessment of the Stability of China"s Minority Economic Policy 1949–2002" [Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jingji zhengce wendingxing pinggu], Development Research, No. 3, 2004, 40–45. Han-minorities discrepancies in per capita income more than tripled in the first decade of reforms. Yang Zuolin, A General Discussion of Minority Economics [Minzu diqu jingji fazhan tongsu jianghua] (Kunming: Yunnan People"s Press, 1993), 12. Minorities have had difficulty attracting foreign capital given their poor infrastructure, poorly trained labor force, and low levels of trade and private enterprise. 1994 tax revisions further exacerbated discrepancies in wealth.

10 The Tibetan illiteracy rate (47.55 percent), for example, is five times the national average (9.08 percent). Tabulation drawn from 2000 Population Census of the People"s Republic of China (Beijing: China Statistics Press, August 2002), Table 2–3.

11 "Implementing "China"s Minority Education Regulations" Placed on Agenda," ["Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jiaoyu tiaoli" de zhiding lierule yishi richeng], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 16 June 05.

17 The Chinese government has imposed the fewest controls on minorities that accept central authority, which in turn have made these groups more willing to cooperate with Han Chinese. Mutual distrust between Han authorities and several minority groups has led to tighter government controls in some areas, however, exacerbating ethnic tensions according to both Chinese and Western analysts. See, for example, Ma Mingliang, "Muslims and Non-Muslims Can Coexist in Harmony in China, as They Do in Malaysia, If They Understand Each Other"s Culture Better," Islam in China, 31 Jul 05 (FBIS, 6 September 05); Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent.

18REAL, art. 9. Authorities sentenced four Uighur boys to three and a half years in prison after a schoolhouse brawl in April 2005, on the charge of "undermining the friendship of the nationalities." "Uighur Youths, Teacher Detained After School Brawl, Residents Say," Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 June 05.

19 Minorities in southwestern China live in closer proximity to Han Chinese than do Tibetans and Uighurs, who are separated from predominately Han-populated regions in central China by mountain ranges and deserts. Although many of the minorities in southwestern China live in single-ethnicity villages, often these villages will be interspersed in close proximity to those of other minority groups. Southwestern minorities tend to be segregated by villages rather than by larger administrative areas, whereas distances between communities of different ethnic groups tend to be greater in the Northwest. Many of the southwestern minority groups are also internally divided and have little interest in mobilizing against Han Chinese authority. For further detail see Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 171–81; and Thomas Heberer, "Nationalities Conflict and Ethnicity in the People"s Republic of China, With Special Reference to the Yi in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture," in Perspectives on the Yi of Southwest China, ed. Steven Harrel (Berkeley: University of California, 2001), 232–7.

29 The Constitution provides for the establishment of provincial-level autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures, and autonomous counties. The government began creating autonomous townships and villages in 1993 with the State Council"s passage of the Regulation on the Administrative Work on Ethnic Villages [Minzu xiang xingzheng gongzuo tiaoli], issued 29 August 93.By 2003 the government had established five provincial-level autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, 120 autonomous counties, and 1,173 autonomous villages. The government decided which areas would be granted autonomous status "through consultation between the government of the next higher level and the representatives of the minority or minorities concerned." General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Minorities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi shishi gangyao], issued 8 August 52, art. 9.Some members of the larger minority groups express concerns privately that the regional autonomy policy disproportionately favors smaller groups. Commission Staff Interviews. Many Uighurs and Zhuang note that within the provincial-level Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, several minority groups have their own autonomous prefectures or counties. Once established, these smaller autonomous areas are eligible for special development assistance funds that the central and provincial governments earmark for county-level autonomous governments. The Bayinguoleng Mongol Autonomous Prefecture in Xinjiang contains one-quarter of Xinjiang"s total land. Although only 4.46 percent of the Bayinguoleng population is Mongol and 34.25 percent is Uighur, the Chinese Constitution and the REAL require that the head of the prefectural government be Mongol. In another example, a portion of Guangxi"s poverty alleviation funds is earmarked for minority counties, which means that Bama Yao Autonomous County (17.24 percent Yao and 69.46 percent Zhuang) is eligible for certain development assistance programs not available to nearby Jingxi County, which does not have autonomous standing despite the fact that over 99 percent of its population is ethnically Zhuang. Article 16 of the Election Law also allows minorities with small populations a greater number of People"s Congress delegates. PRC Election Law for the National People"s Congress and Local People"s Congresses, enacted 1 July 79, amended 10 December 82, 2 December 86, 28 February 95, 27 October 04. Some Western experts believe the government consciously pitted minorities against one another when establishing regional autonomous areas in order to weaken their ability to confront the state. Gardner Bovingdon, "Heteronomy and Its Discontents "Minzu Regional Autonomy" in Xinjiang," in Governing China"s Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington, 2004), 117–154; Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," 86. Since 2000, the central government has explicitly stated that nationality development work will place a priority on the 22 smallest minority populations. Tang Ren, "Ethnic Minorities Need Help: Government Pledges Another Round of Poverty Alleviation Reforms to Save the Country"s 22 Small Ethnic Groups," Beijing Review (Online), 26 July 05. The May 2005 REAL Implementing Regulations require provincial-level governments to give priority to smaller minorities in their economic development and investment plans.

42 6.9 percent of government workers are minorities though minorities account for almost 9 percent of China"s total population. Ling Yun, "Analysis of Major Issues and Theories in Our Nation"s Minority Nationality Cadre Education" [Woguo minzu ganbu jiaoyu cunzai de zhuyaowenti ji lilun fenxi], Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2004, 17; Wang Xiubo, "Research and Thoughts Regarding The Current Situation Of Minority Nationality Cadres Corps Talent" [Guanyu shaoshu minzu diqu ganbu rencai duiwu xianzhuang de diaocha yu sikao], Progressive Forum, March 2004, 24–5; Yang Guocai, "Building a Minority Nationality Cadres Corps Is the Crux to Developing Minority Nationality Areas" [Shaoshu minzu ganbu duiwu jianshe shi minzu diqu fazhan de guanjian], Yunnan Nationalities University Journal, Vol. 21, No. 4, July 2004, 84–6. The proportion of technically trained minorities placed in high- or mid-level positions is 19 and 45 percentage points below the Han average according to Na Canhui, "In- Depth Analysis of Our Nation"s Minority Nationality Cadres" Training" [Woguo shaoshu minzu ganbu peiyu jizhi shenxi], South-Central Nationalities University Journal, Vol. 24, April 2004, 183–4. The absolute number of technically trained minorities has increased substantially. One Chinese scholar reports that the number rose from 238,000 in 1979to over 1.7 million in 2002. Zhang Linchun, "Policy Decisions and Successful Experience Regarding Minority Cadre Training and Use" [Woguo shaoshu minzu ganbu peiyang he xuanbo shiyongde zhengce guiding he chenggong jingyan], Tianshui Government Administration Academy, Vol. 2, 2002, 18.

47 "Number of CPC Members Reaches 69.6 Million," China Daily, 24 May 05 (FBIS, 24 May 05). Because the party represents the interests of the entire nation without bias, it would be "unscientific" to require specific minority representation within the party ranks, according to the official party position. Guo Zhengli, The Theory and Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy with Chinese Characteristics [Zhongguo tese de minzu quyu sishi lilun yu shijian] (Urumqi: Xinjiang University Press, 1992), 92.

50Central Personnel Office Notice on the Correct Handling of Party Members" Believing in Religion [Guanyu tuoshan jiejue gongchan dangyuan xinyang zongjiao wenti de tongzhi], issued20 March 93; Chinese Communist Party Notice on "Our Nation"s Basic Understanding and Policies Toward Religion in the Current Stage of Socialism" [Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa "guanyuwoguo shehuizhuyi shiqi he jiben zhengce de tongzhi"], issued March 1982. Religion is a central marker of ethnic identity for many in China, including the Tibetans and the country"s ten Muslim minorities.

57 Wen Jun, "Assessment of the Stability of China"s Minority Economic Policy 1949–2002" [Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jingji zhengce wendingxing pinggu], Development Research, No. 3,2004, 40–45.

58 Calla Weimer, "The Economy of Xinjiang," in Xinjiang: China"s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), 163–189; Nicholas Becquelin, "Staged Development in Xinjiang," 362; David Bachman, "Making Xinjiang Safe for the Han? Contradictions and Ironies of Chinese Governance in China"s Northwest," in Governing China"s Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 165–168.

59 Uighurs also regularly report that they are discriminated against in the broader job market, with offices publicly posting help wanted signs stipulating "Uighurs need not apply." "China"s Influence in Central Asia (Part 5)," Radio Free Asia. Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman state that "members of the Han majority appear to advance more rapidly than similarly qualified Uighurs, while even in Kashgar many specialized occupations are reserved for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps and other Han-dominated work units." Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, "Islam in Xinjiang," in Xinjiang: China"s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), 325. Economist Calla Weimer demonstrates statistically that Uighurs have less earning power than Han living in the same area. Calla Weimer, "The Economy of Xinjiang," 188.

62 "Complaint Against the Chinese Government"s Forced Eviction of Ethnic Mongolian Herders," Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online); Hong Jiang, Fences, Ecologies, and Changes in Pastoral Life: Society and Reclamation in Uxin Ju, Inner Mongolia, China, paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference in Chicago, IL, 3 April 05; Enhebatu Togochog, Ecological Immigration and Human Rights in Inner Mongolia, paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, 3 April 05.

63Stanley Toops, "The Ecology of Xinjiang: A Focus on Water," in Xinjiang: China"s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004),271; Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," 84.

68 More than 10,000 attended similar classes in preparation for secondary school. "Education for Ethnic Minorities II," China"s Education and Research Network Web site.

71 Steven Harrell and Ma Erzi (Mgebbu Lunze), "Folk Theories of Success Where Han Aren"t Always Best," in China"s National Minority Education: Culture, Schooling, and Development, ed. Gerard A. Postiglione (New York: Falmer Press, 1999), 220–1.

81 The Paper notes, for example, that it was the central authorities who "organized" 3,000 experts and scholars to compile a five-part series of books on each of China"s ethnic minorities. The White Paper also reports that "the state has set up institutions to collect, assort, translate and study in an organized and programmed manner the three major heroic epics of China"s ethnic minorities."

83 Minglang Zhou, Multilingualism in China: The Politics of Writing Reforms for Minority Languages 1949–2002 (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003). Not all of the minorities had unified written scripts when the Communist Party came to power in 1949. Practical challenges, such as determining which dialect should form the foundation for new phonetic scripts, limited many minorities" ability to utilize their own scripts rather than any concerted efforts by the central government to limit their use.

86 Mette Halskov Hansen, "The Challenge of Sipsong Panna in the Southwest," in Governing China"s Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 69.

90 A survey conducted in Xinjiang in 2003 revealed that over 67 percent of those interviewed felt strong Mandarin language skills were the most important qualification for hiring minorities. Wang Jianjun, "Develop Social Surveys, Train Qualified Talent" [Kaizhan shehui diaocha peiyang shiyingxing hege rencai], Advanced Scientific Education, No. 6, 2003, 64–7. "China"s Influence in Central Asia (Part 5): Uighurs Count the Cost of China"s Quest for Stability," Radio Free Asia.

95Xinjiang is home to 8.2 million Uighurs, who are largely Sunni Muslims of Turkic descent. Several other minorities live in the region, including Tajiks, Kazahks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Mongols. Xinjiang supplies over 35 percent of China"s oil and gas, and borders eight countries.

103 Gardner Bovingdon, "The Not-so-Silent Majority: Uighur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang," 28 Modern China 39, 39–78 (2002). For similar findings, see Jay Todd Dautcher, "Reading Out-of-Print: Popular Culture and Protest on China"s Western Frontier," in China Beyond the Headlines, eds. T.B. Weston and L.M. Jensen (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000),273–295; Justin Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uighur Nationalism Along China"s Silk Road (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Joanne Smith, "Four Generations of Uighurs: The Shift towards Ethno-Political Ideologies Among Xinjiang"s Youth," Vol. 2, No. 2 Inner Asia 195, 195–224 (2000).

105 China"s Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law: Does It Protect Minority Rights?, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 April 05, Testimony of Gardner Bovingdon, Assistant Professor, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

109 "China Imposes Chinese Language on Uyghur Schools," Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 March 04. Xinjiang residents previously had the choice of attending minority schools, in which classes were conducted in minority languages, or Chinese schools, where Mandarin was used. Graduates with Mandarin Chinese language skills are more competitive in the job market, and some Uighurs may welcome the opportunity to study the language. The government is demanding a rapid transition to bilingual schools, however, and is placing higher emphasis on Mandarin language use than on local minority language use. Uighurs in exile report that the government has banned Uighur language use in schools and that Uighurs fear "cultural annihilation" through the weakening of their language. Commission Staff Interview with Rebiya Kadeer, 22 August 05.

125 The charges included "inciting to split China, organizing meetings, taking oaths, accepting membership and possessing illegal publications and counterrevolutionary videos for propaganda purposes." "Bingtuan Supreme Court Affirms Jail Terms for Uighur Youths," Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 December 03.

China"s criminal justice system experienced continued upheaval over the past year. After several wrongful conviction scandals, the central government permitted a broad public critique of the criminal justice system. This discourse confirmed the extent to which coerced confessions, police incompetence, pervasive presumptions of guilt, extrajudicial influences on the courts, restrictions on defense attorneys, and other problems undermine the fairness of the criminal process.

Overall crime rates continued to rise in China in 2004, according to official statistics and regional reports. Public security agencies filed a total of 4.7 million criminal cases and prosecutors approved the arrest of 811,102 people in 2004, both increases of more than 7 percent over the prior year.5 Courts handled 644,248 criminal cases, an increase of 1.5 percent over 2003.6 Juvenile crime increased 19.1 percent over 2003 and is one of the fastest growing categories of crime in China.7 While officials published a few statistics reflecting positive trends, such as a drop in some violent crimes in 2004, leadership statements, public surveys ranking security as a major concern and regional complaints about increases in petty crime all point to a growing crime problem.8

Together, the Nie and She cases elicited a strong reaction in the Chinese news media and prompted public scrutiny of the criminal justice system. Although the Chinese government generally tightened information controls over the past year [see Section III(e)— Freedom of Expression], it permitted and in some cases encouraged public critiques of the criminal justice system as the scandals unfolded. Xinhua and the People"s Daily noted that Mr. She"s case had "exposed some holes in the judicial system" and prompted a "rethinking" of human rights protections.11 Chinese scholars and journalists, invoking these and other wrongful conviction cases, published detailed critiques on many problems in the criminal justice system.12 As one commentator observed, "as one case of wrongful death sentence after another is exposed, we see cursory, rushed investigations, confessions extorted by torture, unreliable polygraph reports, maliciously manufactured perjury and false evidence, suppression of evidence helpful to the accused, and so on."13 The two cases, news of which broke as senior officials were discussing death penalty reform, also intensified public discussion of capital punishment. These discussions offered new insights into China"s criminal justice system and shaped debate over criminal justice reforms.

Law enforcement officials continued to stress the need for both greater efficiency and more accountability. Responding to criticism that the wrongful conviction cases were in part the product of poor investigative work, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) reportedly launched a nationwide campaign to improve investigative capacity.14 China has significantly fewer police officers per capita than the international average,15 and some law enforcement agencies focused on hiring personnel and deploying more officers on the street.16 Beijing established blacklists of underperforming districts to encourage better policing.17 Senior Chinese officials also publicized efforts to crack down on corruption and abuses in the criminal justice system and stressed the need to balance "strike hard" efforts and the protection of suspect rights.18 In December 2004, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) noted that official statements on the importance of human rights represented a positive development.19

The Chinese government continues to imprison, detain, or otherwise harass intellectuals, reporters, dissidents, believers engaged in "illegal" religious activities, unauthorized Internet publishers, and others for the peaceful exercise of fundamental rights guaranteed under China"s Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although the Chinese government released a small number of political prisoners, including Rebiya Kadeer, Huang Qi, and Xu Guang, many Chinese citizens, including Yao Fuxin, Xiao Yunliang, Su Zhimin, Gong Shengliang and other members of the South China Church, Yang Jianli, Jigme Gyatso, Ngawang Phuljung, Choeying Khedrub, Tohti Tunyaz, Jin Haike, Xu Wei, Yang Zili, Zheng Houhai, Mao Hengfeng, and thousands of others continued to serve long prison or re-education through labor sentences for political offenses.20In June 2005, the Chinese government rejected a U.S. appeal for an accounting of prisoners still detained for activities related to the Tiananmen Square democracy protests.21The government also launched a new crackdown on dissent that resulted in a wave of political detentions and prosecutions [see Section III(d)—Freedom of Religion and Section III(e)— Freedom of Expression].22In many cases, police detained these and other individuals without formal charge or judicial review. Arbitrary detentions intensified during politically sensitive periods, such as the period following the death of former Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang in January 2005, the annual meeting of the National People"s Congress (NPC) in March 2005, the anniversary of the June 4th Tiananmen democracy protests, and the visit of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour in September 2005.23

Chinese authorities continue to apply vague criminal and administrative provisions to detain citizens for political offenses. In some cases, the government charges political activists with "endangering national security," "subversion," or "inciting splittism."24In other cases, public security agencies sentence political offenders to reeducation through labor (RETL) or other forms of administrative detention without trial.25After its 2004 visit to China, the UNWGAD noted that the Chinese government had made no significant progress in reforming these mechanisms:

The Chinese government took a few positive steps on issues related to political crimes. Late in 2004, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that the government had formed a "special task force" on ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).27In addition to the prisoner releases noted above, in January 2005, the Chinese government provided new information on paroles, sentence reductions, and potential sentence reductions for a number of Chinese political prisoners.28In April 2005, the U.S. State Department announced a Chinese government clarification that there is not a stricter standard for evaluating sentence reductions and parole for "security" crimes. Chinese authorities also pledged to conduct a national review of cases involving political acts that are no longer crimes under Chinese law.29China announced the last two steps shortly before the UN Human Rights Commission met in Geneva in March 2005.

Chinese law does not meet minimal international standards for prompt judicial review of criminal detention and arrest. Under the ICCPR, anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge must be brought before a judge or judicial officer promptly for review of the lawfulness of his detention or arrest.36In December 2004, the UNWGAD found that China"s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) and related regulations on pretrial detention fail to meet this basic standard because (1) Chinese suspects continue to be held for too long without judicial review; (2) procurators, who review arrest decisions, only examine case files and do not hold a hearing; and (3) a procurator cannot be considered an independent judicial officer under applicable international standards.37

The Chinese government continues to punish large numbers of offenses administratively without effective judicial review. Public security agencies reported that they punished 5.3 million "public order" offenses in 2004, nearly eight times the number of criminal cases handled by courts.38"Public order" offenses include traffic offenses, public disturbances, prostitution, drug use, and other "minor crimes" that the Chinese government typically sanctions with administrative penalties rather than formal criminal sentences.39