rongsheng north america inc quotation

Rongsheng Machinery Manufacture Ltd of Huabei Oilfield, Hebei, which was founded in 1976, has now been an internationally famous comprehensive petroleum machinery manufacturer, and has grown to be the largest manufacturer and dealer of land-use BOPs.

The company products include BOPs, BOP control system, choke and kill manifolds, snubbing equipment, mud pump, wellhead equipment and Christmas tree, pumping units, tubing and drill pipe joint, etc, which have all passed certification by American Petroleum Institute (API). Four categories out of these products, namely BOPs, BOP control system, choke and kill manifolds and mud pumps, have passed certification of GOST and RTN in Russia.

NOTE: Rongsheng North America, Inc. is the only legal subsidiary of Rongsheng Machinery Manufacture Ltd. in the United States which is authorized to sell "HRSB" brand products including BOP"s, Mud Pumps and Well Heads.

Rongsheng Petro Chemical Co, Ltd. specialises in the production and marketing of petrochemical and chemical fibres. Products include PTA yarns, fully drawn polyester yarns (FDY), pre-oriented polyester yarns (POY), polyester textured drawn yarns (DTY), polyester filaments and polyethylene terephthalate (PET) slivers.

HONG KONG, March 31 (Reuters) - China Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group has agreed with banks to extend loans and other financing worth 10 billion yuan ($1.6 billion) to 2015, in a signal that the country’s biggest private shipbuilder may be too big to be allowed to fail.

Chief Financial Officer Sean Wang said Rongsheng had “formed a consortium of onshore banks and signed a framework agreement with them to optimise and rearrange some of the bank loans.”

“As a result, most of the onshore borrowings will be extended to end-2015,” he said on an earnings call with analysts on Monday. The banks include Bank of China, The Export-Import Bank of China and China Minsheng Bank.

Rongsheng said its full-year loss last year ballooned to 8.68 billion yuan ($1.4 billion) from a 572.6 million yuan net loss in 2012. The company blamed a slump in new ship orders, which were less than half its target, but it said it believed a shipbuilding recession was over. Revenue dropped to 1.34 billion yuan from 7.96 billion yuan a year earlier.

Headquartered in both Shanghai and Hong Kong, Rongsheng said it had 127 million yuan ($20.4 million) of loans overdue that have not been renewed or repaid. Total borrowings and finance lease liabilities are 22.41 billion yuan ($3.61 billion), with 13.7 billion yuan of that due within 12 months.

Allowing Rongsheng more time to repay its debts has puzzled analysts and industry experts given the highly leveraged company’s dwindling cash balance and short-term debt burden.

The company’s auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, declined to comment further on its report that Rongsheng’s “material uncertainties ... may cast significant doubt about the group’s ability to continue as a going concern.”

Rongsheng, which builds mining giant Vale’s large ore carriers, said it plans to focus more on large liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers to meet increasing demand for new energy sources.

Shares in the company closed up 2.5 percent, after dropping more than 5 percent to a 14-week low in early Hong Kong trading. The benchmark Hang Seng Index rose 0.4 percent. Rongsheng’s market value has slumped more than 90 percent to just above $1 billion since its Hong Kong listing in late 2010.

Rongsheng said it is cutting senior and middle management pay by 30-50 percent. Analysts said it was not uncommon for companies in China to pare back management salaries when times are tough. As of end-December, Rongsheng had 4,738 employees, down 28 percent from a year earlier. Three years ago, the company employed about 20,000 staff and contractors.

HONG KONG (Reuters) - Shares in China Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group Holdings Ltdtumbled 16 percent on Monday after the U.S. securities regulator accused a company controlled by the shipbuilder"s chairman of insider trading ahead of China"s CNOOC Ltd"sbid for Canadian oil company Nexen Inc.Labourers work at a Rongsheng Heavy Industries shipyard in Nantong, Jiangsu province May 21, 2012. REUTERS/Aly Song

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint in a U.S. court on Friday against a company controlled by Rongsheng Chairman Zhang Zhirong, and other traders, accusing them of making more than $13 million (8.2 million pounds) from insider trading ahead of CNOOC’s $15.1 billion bid for Nexen.

“The news around the chairman comes on the back of other operational and credibility issues,” Barclays said in a note to clients. “We think China Rongsheng presents significant company-specific risk.”

In a filing with the Hong Kong stock exchange, Rongsheng - which entered a strategic cooperation agreement with CNOOC in 2010 - said it did not expect the U.S. investigation to affect its operations. It said Zhang did not have an executive role in the company.

Rongsheng, controlled by Zhang, also issued a profit warning on Monday, saying first-half earnings would fall sharply as a result of the shipbuilding downturn.

“Since weak earnings had been expected and the stock had already come down quite a bit, the early selling was mainly triggered by the insider trading probe,” said Steven Leung, a director at UOB Kay Hian.

Zhang was ranked the 22th richest Chinese person by Forbes Magazine in September 2011. But his net worth fell by more than half in the past year to $2.6 billion in March 2012 as shares of Rongsheng tumbled.

The unnamed Singapore traders used accounts in the names of Phillip Securities and Citibank C.N, while Well Advantage made its trades through accounts held at UBS Securities and Citigroup Global Markets. Neither of the Well Advantage accounts had traded Nexen shares since January 2012, and the Citigroup account had been completely dormant for over six months, the SEC says.

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As Ottawa scrutinizes two oil patch takeover proposals by foreign state-owned entities, privately owned Chinese companies are increasingly on the prowl in Alberta.

Chinese national energy companies such as PetroChina Co. Ltd. and China Petroleum and Chemical Corp. (Sinopec) own a variety of oil operations and properties in the Alberta oil patch. Now, private Chinese companies with no ownership by Beijing are scouting the province in an effort to position themselves for possible investments in oil properties and infrastructure.

Rongsheng Petro Chemical Co. Ltd., a major Chinese petrochemical company, visited Alberta at the end of September, meeting with bankers and industry executives, according to industry sources. Rongsheng inquired about everything from producing oil and gas to upgrading and refining crude. Such investments would help secure ingredients needed to fuel China"s manufacturing industry. Rongsheng chairman Li Shui Rong was part of the tour, according to a source.

Ottawa is considering whether to approve the $15.1-billion (U.S.) bid by China"s CNOOC Ltd. for Nexen Inc., which owns a majority stake in a producing oil sands project it shares with its suitor. Meanwhile, a bid by Malaysia"s Petronas for Progress Energy Resources Corp. is also under consideration by the Canadian government.

Mr. Stringham met with Rongsheng officials and said the company was interested in both upstream and downstream investments. Upstream assets include oil and gas fields, while downstream translates into processing facilities such as upgraders. Some refineries and upgraders have been shuttered in North America because of their financial volatility, but companies like Rongsheng have a different rationale for investing in processing complexes.

Further complicating the debate is Malaysia"s bid for Progress Energy. Petronas and Progress, which already have a joint venture partnership, plan to build a liquefied natural gas export facility in Prince Rupert, B.C.

Industry Minister Christian Paradis blocked the Petronas bid for Progress in October, saying the deal would not benefit Canada. The Malaysian company has since sweetened its promises and Mr. Paradis must issue his ruling within an undisclosed amount of time. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has promised to clarify the net benefit test soon, although he has not set a deadline.

Ian MacGregor, chairman of North West Upgrading Inc., which is building a refinery with Canadian Natural Resources Ltd., has not been contacted by Rongsheng, but believes the country would benefit if foreigners invested in more oil processing in Canada. There is enough raw bitumen and oil available that competitors would not create a shortage of feedstock necessary to make refined products.

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China"s Rongsheng has bought 2 million barrels of Upper Zakum from ADNOC at $2.2 a barrel above Dubai quotes and 2 million barrels of Murban from Total at $4 a barrel above Dubai quotes for end-November delivery, trading sources said.

The USA market for Inflatable Life Vests is estimated to increase from USD million in 2022 to reach USD million by 2029, at a CAGR of during the forecast period of 2023 through 2029.

The China market for Inflatable Life Vests is estimated to increase from USD million in 2022 to reach USD million by 2029, at a CAGR of during the forecast period of 2023 through 2029.

The Europe market for Inflatable Life Vests is estimated to increase from USD million in 2022 to reach USD million by 2029, at a CAGR of during the forecast period of 2023 through 2029.

The global key manufacturers of Inflatable Life Vests include Survitec, VIKING Life-Saving Equipment, The Coleman Company, Hansen Protection, Drager, Johnson Outdoors, Kent Sporting Goods, LALIZAS and Mustang Survival, etc. In 2021, the global top five players had a share approximately in terms of revenue.

This Inflatable Life Vests Market Research/Analysis Report Contains Answers to your following Questions ● What are the global trends in the Inflatable Life Vests market? Would the market witness an increase or decline in the demand in the coming years?

● How big is the opportunity for the Inflatable Life Vests market? How will the increasing adoption of Inflatable Life Vests for mining impact the growth rate of the overall market?

The USA market for Inflatable Lifejackets is estimated to increase from USD million in 2022 to reach USD million by 2029, at a CAGR of during the forecast period of 2023 through 2029.

The China market for Inflatable Lifejackets is estimated to increase from USD million in 2022 to reach USD million by 2029, at a CAGR of during the forecast period of 2023 through 2029.

The Europe market for Inflatable Lifejackets is estimated to increase from USD million in 2022 to reach USD million by 2029, at a CAGR of during the forecast period of 2023 through 2029.

The global key manufacturers of Inflatable Lifejackets include Survitec, VIKING Life-Saving Equipment, The Coleman Company, Hansen Protection, Drager, Johnson Outdoors, Kent Sporting Goods, LALIZAS and Mustang Survival, etc. In 2021, the global top five players had a share approximately in terms of revenue.

This Inflatable Lifejackets Market Research/Analysis Report Contains Answers to your following Questions ● What are the global trends in the Inflatable Lifejackets market? Would the market witness an increase or decline in the demand in the coming years?

● How big is the opportunity for the Inflatable Lifejackets market? How will the increasing adoption of Inflatable Lifejackets for mining impact the growth rate of the overall market?

Privately owned unaffiliated refineries, known as “teapots,”[3] mainly clustered in Shandong province, have been at the center of Beijing’s longtime struggle to rein in surplus refining capacity and, more recently, to cut carbon emissions. A year ago, Beijing launched its latest attempt to shutter outdated and inefficient teapots — an effort that coincides with the emergence of a new generation of independent players that are building and operating fully integrated mega-petrochemical complexes.[4]

The changing roles played by China’s independent refineries are reflected in their relations with Middle East suppliers. In the battle to ensure their profitability and very survival, smaller Chinese teapots have adopted various measures, including sopping up steeply discounted oil from Iran. Meanwhile, Middle East suppliers, notably Saudi Aramco, are seeking to lock in Chinese crude demand while pursuing new opportunities for further investments in integrated downstream projects led by both private and state-owned companies.

Four years later, the NDRC adopted a different approach, awarding licenses and quotas to teapot refiners to import crude oil and granting approval to export refined products in exchange for reducing excess capacity, either upgrading or removing outdated facilities, and building oil storage facilities.[10] But this partial liberalization of the refining sector did not go exactly according to plan. Swelling with new sources of feedstock that catapulted China into the position of the world’s largest oil importer, teapots increased their production of refined fuels and, benefiting from greater processing flexibility and low labor costs undercut larger state rivals and doubled their market share.[11]

2021 marked the start of the central government’s latest effort to consolidate and tighten supervision over the refining sector and to cap China’s overall refining capacity.[14] Besides imposing a hefty tax on imports of blending fuels, Beijing has instituted stricter tax and environmental enforcement[15] measures including: performing refinery audits and inspections;[16] conducting investigations of alleged irregular activities such as tax evasion and illegal resale of crude oil imports;[17] and imposing tighter quotas for oil product exports as China’s decarbonization efforts advance.[18]

Last October, Beijing reduced crude oil import quotas awarded to small independent refineries for the first time since they were allowed into the market while raising them for larger, more efficient private plants. Among the primary beneficiaries of these new allocations are a new generation of provincial-backed independent players long interested in expanding into the oil refining business.[19]

Yet, of the three most recent major additions to China’s greenfield refinery landscape, none are in Shandong province, home to a little over half the country’s independent refining capacity. Hengli’s Changxing integrated petrochemical complex is situated in Liaoning, Zhejiang’s (ZPC) Zhoushan facility in Zhejiang, and Shenghong’s Lianyungang plant in Jiangsu.[21]

But with the start-up of advanced liquids-to-chemicals complexes in neighboring provinces, Shandong’s competitiveness has diminished.[23] And with pressure mounting to find new drivers for the provincial economy, Shandong officials have put in play a plan aimed at shuttering smaller capacity plants and thus clearing the way for a large-scale private sector-led refining and petrochemical complex on Yulong Island, whose construction is well underway.[24] They have also been developing compensation and worker relocation packages to cushion the impact of planned plant closures, while obtaining letters of guarantee from independent refiners pledging that they will neither resell their crude import quotas nor try to purchase such allocations.[25]

To be sure, the number of Shandong’s independent refiners is shrinking and their composition within the province and across the country is changing — with some smaller-scale units facing closure and others (e.g., Shandong Haike Group, Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Corp, and Shandong Chambroad Group) pursuing efforts to diversify their sources of revenue by moving up the value chain. But make no mistake: China’s teapots still account for a third of China’s total refining capacity and a fifth of the country’s crude oil imports. They continue to employ creative defensive measures in the face of government and market pressures, have partnered with state-owned companies, and are deeply integrated with crucial industries downstream.[26] They are consummate survivors in a key sector that continues to evolve — and they remain too important to be driven out of the domestic market or allowed to fail.

In 2016, during the period of frenzied post-licensing crude oil importing by Chinese independents, Saudi Arabia began targeting teapots on the spot market, as did Kuwait. Iran also joined the fray, with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) operating through an independent trader Trafigura to sell cargoes to Chinese independents.[27] Since then, the coming online of major new greenfield refineries such as Rongsheng ZPC and Hengli Changxing, and Shenghong, which are designed to operate using medium-sour crude, have led Middle East producers to pursue long-term supply contracts with private Chinese refiners. In 2021, the combined share of crude shipments from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, and Kuwait to China’s independent refiners accounted for 32.5%, an increase of more than 8% over the previous year.[28] This is a trend that Beijing seems intent on supporting, as some bigger, more sophisticated private refiners whose business strategy aligns with President Xi’s vision have started to receive tax benefits or permissions to import larger volumes of crude directly from major producers such as Saudi Arabia.[29]

The shift in Saudi Aramco’s market strategy to focus on customer diversification has paid off in the form of valuable supply relationships with Chinese independents. And Aramco’s efforts to expand its presence in the Chinese refining market and lock in demand have dovetailed neatly with the development of China’s new greenfield refineries.[30] Over the past several years, Aramco has collaborated with both state-owned and independent refiners to develop integrated liquids-to-chemicals complexes in China. In 2018, following on the heels of an oil supply agreement, Aramco purchased a 9% stake in ZPC’s Zhoushan integrated refinery. In March of this year, Saudi Aramco and its joint venture partners, NORINCO Group and Panjin Sincen, made a final investment decision (FID) to develop a major liquids-to-chemicals facility in northeast China.[31] Also in March, Aramco and state-owned Sinopec agreed to conduct a feasibility study aimed at assessing capacity expansion of the Fujian Refining and Petrochemical Co. Ltd.’s integrated refining and chemical production complex.[32]

Commenting on the rationale for these undertakings, Mohammed Al Qahtani, Aramco’s Senior Vice-President of Downstream, stated: “China is a cornerstone of our downstream expansion strategy in Asia and an increasingly significant driver of global chemical demand.”[33] But what Al Qahtani did notsay is that the ties forged between Aramco and Chinese leading teapots (e.g., Shandong Chambroad Petrochemicals) and new liquids-to-chemicals complexes have been instrumental in Saudi Arabia regaining its position as China’s top crude oil supplier in the battle for market share with Russia.[34] Just a few short years ago, independents’ crude purchases had helped Russia gain market share at the expense of Saudi Arabia, accelerating the two exporters’ diverging fortunes in China. In fact, between 2010 and 2015, independent refiners’ imports of Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) blend accounted for 92% of the growth in Russian crude deliveries to China.[35] But since then, China’s new generation of independents have played a significant role in Saudi Arabia clawing back market share and, with Beijing’s assent, have fortified their supply relationship with the Kingdom.

Meanwhile, though, enticed by discounted prices Chinese independents in Shandong province have continued to scoop up sanctioned Iranian oil, especially as their domestic refining margins have thinned due to tight regulatory scrutiny. In fact, throughout the period in which Iran has been under nuclear-related sanctions, Chinese teapots have been a key outlet for Iranian oil, which they reportedly unload from reflagged vessels representing themselves as selling oil from Oman and Malaysia.[38] China Concord Petroleum Company (CCPC), a Chinese logistics firm, remained a pivotal player in the supply of sanctioned oil from Iran, even after it was blacklisted by Washington in 2019.[39] Although Chinese state refiners shun Iranian oil, at least publicly, because of US sanctions, private refiners have never stopped buying Iranian crude.[40] And in recent months, teapots have been at the forefront of the Chinese surge in crude oil imports from Iran.[41]

China’s small-scale, inefficient “first generation” teapot refiners have come under mounting market pressure, as well as closer government scrutiny and tightened regulation. Though some have already been shuttered and others face imminent closure, dozens of China’s teapots, concentrated mainly in Shandong province, continue to operate thanks to the creative defensive measures they have employed and the important role they play in local economies.