rongsheng refinery china pricelist

China"s independent refineries -- actively looking for fuel oil to feed their distillation units -- are struggling to secure adequate feedstock barrels for the coming months due to tight regional supplies and high prices, market and industry sources told S&P Global Platts.

With refinery upgrades in Russia, supplies of straight-run fuel oil have become very rare despite some arbitrage cargoes from Europe and Middle East flowing into Asian market occasionally, while the specification of the barrels varies from time to time, trading sources said.

Most straight-run fuel oil consumed in the Middle East is sourced locally, Iraq in particular, brought to Singapore to be blended to the refiner"s desired specification before being sold to the final destination. Other sources of supply are Russia"s M100 blend as well, usually sold directly to China.

"Such a price [of straight-run fuel oil] is only affordable to be used as feedstock to produce petrochemical products, but not to produce oil products," said a trader who supplies 30,000 mt/month of Russian straight-run fuel oil to a petrochemical plant in eastern China.

However, Ningbo Zhongjin Petrochemical, a regular straight run fuel oil buyer for petrochemical production, has been on the sideline amid sufficient feedstock since getting its latest arrival in mid-May, a Singapore-based source with its parent company Rongsheng said.

"Most of those fuel oil is not of good economic for refining, compared with crudes, no matter of which origin," a source with the Shandong-based independent refinery said. Crude imports are not subjected to consumption tax in China, but the volume is restricted by quota.

China"s private refiner Zhejiang Petroleum & Chemical is set to start trial runs at its second 200,000 b/d crude distillation unit at the 400,000 b/d phase 2 refinery by the end of March, a source with close knowledge about the matter told S&P Global Platts March 9.

ZPC cracked 23 million mt of crude in 2020, according the the source. Platts data showed that the utilization rate of its phase 1 refinery hit as high as 130% in a few months last year.

Started construction in the second half of 2019, units of the Yuan 82.9 billion ($12.74 billion) phase 2 refinery almost mirror those in phase 1, which has two CDUs of 200,000 b/d each. But phase 1 has one 1.4 million mt/year ethylene unit while phase 2 plans to double the capacity with two ethylene units.

With the entire phase 2 project online, ZPC expects to lift its combined petrochemicals product yield to 71% from 65% for the phase 1 refinery, according to the source.

ZPC has the widest flexibility on both crude slate and product slate as the newest integrated complex in China, which enables it to adjust production plans promptly in line with market changes, he said.

Zhejiang Petroleum, a joint venture between ZPC"s parent company Rongsheng Petrochemical and Zhejiang Energy Group, planned to build 700 gas stations in Zhejiang province by end-2022 as domestic retail outlets of ZPC.

Established in 2015, ZPC is a JV between textile companies Rongsheng Petrochemical, which owns 51%, Tongkun Group, at 20%, as well as chemicals company Juhua Group, also 20%. The rest 9% stake was reported to have transferred to Saudi Aramco from the Zhejiang provincial government. But there has been no update since the agreement was signed in October 2018.

This year, China is expected to overtake the United States as the world’s largest oil refining country.[1] Although China’s bloated and fragmented crude oil refining sector has undergone major changes over the past decade, it remains saddled with overcapacity.[2]

The changing roles played by China’s independent refineries are reflected in their relations with Middle East suppliers. In the battle to ensure their profitability and very survival, smaller Chinese teapots have adopted various measures, including sopping up steeply discounted oil from Iran. Meanwhile, Middle East suppliers, notably Saudi Aramco, are seeking to lock in Chinese crude demand while pursuing new opportunities for further investments in integrated downstream projects led by both private and state-owned companies.

China’s “teapot” refineries[5] play a significant role in refining oil and account for a fifth of Chinese crude imports.[6] Historically, teapots conducted most of their business with China’s major state-owned companies, buying crude oil from and selling much of their output to them after processing it into gasoline and diesel. Though operating in the shadows of China’s giant national oil companies (NOCs),[7] teapots served as valuable swing producers — their surplus capacity called on in times of tight markets.

Yet, the Chinese government has spent the better part of two decades trying to consolidate the country’s sprawling independent refining sector by starving private operators of access to imported crude oil and targeting the smallest, least efficient plants for closure.[8] In 2011, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued guidelines to eliminate small refineries to achieve economies of scale and improve efficiencies. Nevertheless, policies meant to discourage activity had the opposite effect, as most of the units that were earmarked for suspension expanded to stay open.[9]

Four years later, the NDRC adopted a different approach, awarding licenses and quotas to teapot refiners to import crude oil and granting approval to export refined products in exchange for reducing excess capacity, either upgrading or removing outdated facilities, and building oil storage facilities.[10] But this partial liberalization of the refining sector did not go exactly according to plan. Swelling with new sources of feedstock that catapulted China into the position of the world’s largest oil importer, teapots increased their production of refined fuels and, benefiting from greater processing flexibility and low labor costs undercut larger state rivals and doubled their market share.[11]

Meanwhile, as teapots expanded their operations, they took on massive debt, flouted environmental rules, and exploited taxation loopholes.[12] Of the refineries that managed to meet targets to cut capacity, some did so by double counting or reporting reductions in units that had been idled.[13] And when, reversing course, Beijing revoked the export quotas allotted to teapots and mandated that products be sold via state-owned companies, it trapped their output in China, contributing to the domestic fuel glut.

2021 marked the start of the central government’s latest effort to consolidate and tighten supervision over the refining sector and to cap China’s overall refining capacity.[14] Besides imposing a hefty tax on imports of blending fuels, Beijing has instituted stricter tax and environmental enforcement[15] measures including: performing refinery audits and inspections;[16] conducting investigations of alleged irregular activities such as tax evasion and illegal resale of crude oil imports;[17] and imposing tighter quotas for oil product exports as China’s decarbonization efforts advance.[18]

Yet, of the three most recent major additions to China’s greenfield refinery landscape, none are in Shandong province, home to a little over half the country’s independent refining capacity. Hengli’s Changxing integrated petrochemical complex is situated in Liaoning, Zhejiang’s (ZPC) Zhoushan facility in Zhejiang, and Shenghong’s Lianyungang plant in Jiangsu.[21]

As China’s independent oil refining hub, Shandong is the bellwether for the rationalization of the country’s refinery sector. Over the years, Shandong’s teapots benefited from favorable policies such as access to cheap land and support from a local government that grew reliant on the industry for jobs and contributions to economic growth.[22] For this reason, Shandong officials had resisted strictly implementing Beijing’s directives to cull teapot refiners and turned a blind eye to practices that ensured their survival.

To be sure, the number of Shandong’s independent refiners is shrinking and their composition within the province and across the country is changing — with some smaller-scale units facing closure and others (e.g., Shandong Haike Group, Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Corp, and Shandong Chambroad Group) pursuing efforts to diversify their sources of revenue by moving up the value chain. But make no mistake: China’s teapots still account for a third of China’s total refining capacity and a fifth of the country’s crude oil imports. They continue to employ creative defensive measures in the face of government and market pressures, have partnered with state-owned companies, and are deeply integrated with crucial industries downstream.[26] They are consummate survivors in a key sector that continues to evolve — and they remain too important to be driven out of the domestic market or allowed to fail.

The changing structure and dynamics of China’s refining sector, specifically with respect to Chinese teapots, has impacted energy relations with Middle East producers. Indeed, Chinese teapot refiners, which just a few years ago arose as attractive crude oil spot market targets, have lately emerged as outlets for longer-term crude exports from the region.

In 2016, during the period of frenzied post-licensing crude oil importing by Chinese independents, Saudi Arabia began targeting teapots on the spot market, as did Kuwait. Iran also joined the fray, with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) operating through an independent trader Trafigura to sell cargoes to Chinese independents.[27] Since then, the coming online of major new greenfield refineries such as Rongsheng ZPC and Hengli Changxing, and Shenghong, which are designed to operate using medium-sour crude, have led Middle East producers to pursue long-term supply contracts with private Chinese refiners. In 2021, the combined share of crude shipments from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, and Kuwait to China’s independent refiners accounted for 32.5%, an increase of more than 8% over the previous year.[28] This is a trend that Beijing seems intent on supporting, as some bigger, more sophisticated private refiners whose business strategy aligns with President Xi’s vision have started to receive tax benefits or permissions to import larger volumes of crude directly from major producers such as Saudi Arabia.[29]

The shift in Saudi Aramco’s market strategy to focus on customer diversification has paid off in the form of valuable supply relationships with Chinese independents. And Aramco’s efforts to expand its presence in the Chinese refining market and lock in demand have dovetailed neatly with the development of China’s new greenfield refineries.[30] Over the past several years, Aramco has collaborated with both state-owned and independent refiners to develop integrated liquids-to-chemicals complexes in China. In 2018, following on the heels of an oil supply agreement, Aramco purchased a 9% stake in ZPC’s Zhoushan integrated refinery. In March of this year, Saudi Aramco and its joint venture partners, NORINCO Group and Panjin Sincen, made a final investment decision (FID) to develop a major liquids-to-chemicals facility in northeast China.[31] Also in March, Aramco and state-owned Sinopec agreed to conduct a feasibility study aimed at assessing capacity expansion of the Fujian Refining and Petrochemical Co. Ltd.’s integrated refining and chemical production complex.[32]

Commenting on the rationale for these undertakings, Mohammed Al Qahtani, Aramco’s Senior Vice-President of Downstream, stated: “China is a cornerstone of our downstream expansion strategy in Asia and an increasingly significant driver of global chemical demand.”[33] But what Al Qahtani did notsay is that the ties forged between Aramco and Chinese leading teapots (e.g., Shandong Chambroad Petrochemicals) and new liquids-to-chemicals complexes have been instrumental in Saudi Arabia regaining its position as China’s top crude oil supplier in the battle for market share with Russia.[34] Just a few short years ago, independents’ crude purchases had helped Russia gain market share at the expense of Saudi Arabia, accelerating the two exporters’ diverging fortunes in China. In fact, between 2010 and 2015, independent refiners’ imports of Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) blend accounted for 92% of the growth in Russian crude deliveries to China.[35] But since then, China’s new generation of independents have played a significant role in Saudi Arabia clawing back market share and, with Beijing’s assent, have fortified their supply relationship with the Kingdom.

Meanwhile, though, enticed by discounted prices Chinese independents in Shandong province have continued to scoop up sanctioned Iranian oil, especially as their domestic refining margins have thinned due to tight regulatory scrutiny. In fact, throughout the period in which Iran has been under nuclear-related sanctions, Chinese teapots have been a key outlet for Iranian oil, which they reportedly unload from reflagged vessels representing themselves as selling oil from Oman and Malaysia.[38] China Concord Petroleum Company (CCPC), a Chinese logistics firm, remained a pivotal player in the supply of sanctioned oil from Iran, even after it was blacklisted by Washington in 2019.[39] Although Chinese state refiners shun Iranian oil, at least publicly, because of US sanctions, private refiners have never stopped buying Iranian crude.[40] And in recent months, teapots have been at the forefront of the Chinese surge in crude oil imports from Iran.[41]

China’s small-scale, inefficient “first generation” teapot refiners have come under mounting market pressure, as well as closer government scrutiny and tightened regulation. Though some have already been shuttered and others face imminent closure, dozens of China’s teapots, concentrated mainly in Shandong province, continue to operate thanks to the creative defensive measures they have employed and the important role they play in local economies.

Vertical integration along the value chain has become a global trend in the petrochemical industry, specifically in refining and chemical operations. China’s drive to self-sufficiency in chemicals is a key factor powering this worldwide trend.[42] And it is the emergent “second generation” of independent refiners that it is helping make China the frontrunner in developing massive liquids-to-chemicals complexes. Following Beijing’s lead, Shandong officials appear determined to follow this trend rather than risk being left in its wake.

Podcast: China"s petrochemical refiners are making their presence felt way beyond the country"s borders. How will this impact global supply, demand, and trade balances? Will global operating rates be reduced?

Textile giants Rongsheng and Hengli have shaken up China"s cozy, state-dominated oil market this year with the addition of close to 1mn b/d of new crude distillation capacity and vast, integrated downstream complexes. Petrochemical products, rather than conventional road fuels, are the driving force for this new breed of private sector refiner. And more are on their way.

Tom: Hello, and thank you very much for joining us for the latest in our series of podcasts, "China Connection." I"m Tom Reed, VP for China Crude and Products. I head our oil analysis and pricing for the Chinese market.

Tom: And today we are discussing the advent of petrochemical refineries in China, refineries that have been built to produce mainly petrochemical feedstocks. Just a bit of background here, these two big new private sector firms, Rongsheng and Hengli, have each opened massive, shiny new 400,000 b/d refineries in China this year. Hengli at Changxing in Northeast Dalian and Rongsheng at Zhoushan in Zhejiang Province on the East coast. For those unfamiliar with Chinese geography, Dalian is up by China"s land border with North Korea and Zhoushan is an island across the Hangzhou Bay from Shanghai. And the opening of these two massive new refineries by chemical companies is shaking up China"s downstream market. But China is a net exporter of the core refinery products, gasoline, diesel, and jet. So, building refineries doesn"t sound like a purely commercial decision. Is it political? What"s behind it? How will it affect the makeup of China"s petrochemical product imports?

Chuck: And clearly, the driver here for Rongsheng and Hengli, who as Tom mentioned, are chemical companies, they are the world"s largest producers of purified terephthalic acid, known as PTA, which is the main precursor to make polyester, polyester for clothing and PET bottles. And each of them were importing massive amounts of paraxylene, paraxylene being the main raw material to make PTA. And paraxylene comes from the refining of oil. And really the alternate value for paraxylene or its precursors would be to blend into gasoline to increase octane. So, when looking to take a step upstream in terms of reverse or vertical integration, they"ve quickly found themselves not just becoming paraxylene producers, but in fact becoming refiners of crude to begin with, which of course, is quite complex and it involves all kinds of co-products and byproducts. And as many know, the refining of oil, the primary driver there, as Tom has mentioned, is to produce motor fuels. So, we"re reversing this where the petrochemicals become the strategic product and we look to optimize or maybe even limit the amount of motor fuels produced.

So, just as an order of magnitude and to show the numbers aren"t so massive in terms of global PX demand or paraxylene demand. Back in 2010, the global demand for PX was around 30 million tons for the year, of which Chinese demand was about a third or 9.8 million tons. And then last year in 2018, global demand had increased to 43.5 million tons, but of which now China was consuming 25 million of those 43.5 million tons. So, you can see that China is consuming more than half of the global PX demand and yet their production or their capacity to produce PX was far below that. And as a result, China imported last year nearly 16 million tons of PX or about a third of the global production was actually shipped into China by producers who are in the Middle East or the primary sources are from Northeast Asia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and then Southeast Asia as well.

Chuck: And margins, of course, as well because no one wants to shut down their unit just to accommodate the new Chinese production. And what remains to be seen is global operating rates for these PX units will be reduced to maybe unsustainable levels. And as margins come down, they"ll be down for everyone, but the most efficient suppliers or producers will be the ones that survive. And in the case of Hengli and Rongsheng, low feedstock costs, if you"re driving down the cost of paraxylene, you take the benefit on the polyester side because now you have very competitive or very low-priced feedstock.

Tom: That"s a really interesting point actually. Looking at it from a refining economics point of view, if you were trying to diversify your revenue stream, for example, you probably wouldn"t want to increase your gasoline production. And gasoline margins in Europe are barely breaking even, they"re about $4 a barrel. In China, gasoline crack spreads are actually negative. So, fine, they"re self-sufficient in the paraxylene they need for weaving, but are they just... the refiners themselves, Hengli and Changxing, are they now just soaking up losses from the sales of their transport fuels? I think they may be initially, but they"re not just giving their gasoline away, obviously, these refineries were conceived as viable commercial concerns. Hengli anticipates profits, I think, of around 12 billion Yuan per year from its Changxing refinery giving a payback period on that investment of around five years. And each company, interestingly enough, has a distinct marketing strategy for their transport fuel.

Rongsheng is trying to build itself into a retail brand around Shanghai and the Zhejiang area. And Hengli is trying to muscle into the wholesale market on a national level, so it"s gonna be selling products across China. And in that respect, as we were discussing earlier, in fact, Rongsheng appears to have an advantage because where it"s located on the East Coast of China, that region is net short still of transport fuels, but Hengli in the Northeast, that"s a very competitive refining environment. It"s a latecomer to an already pretty saturated market: PetroChina, a state-owned oil giant, is a huge refiner up in Northeast China with its own oil fields, so a ready-made source of low-cost crude. And it"s also very close to the independent sector refining hub in Shandong Province, which is the largest concentration of refineries in China. So, I think there are definite challenges for them on the road fuel front, even if it sounds like they"re going to be pretty competitively placed further downstream in the paraxylene market.

Chuck: Well, and beyond paraxylene, they are looking at...to maximize paraxylene, not to get too technical, but you wanna split the naphtha into two different qualities and the high N+A, or the heavier naphtha is what yields the most paraxylene per ton of feed. But then you"re left with a lighter paraffinic naphtha, which is not particularly good to blend into gasoline. And so, therefore, both are building ethylene steam crackers using that naphtha and then taking the ethylene down into polyethylene plastics. Not strategic markets for these two players necessarily, but China also has massive deficits in terms of meeting its domestic polyethylene demand. China is the largest importer of polyethylene and polypropylene. So, these projects will help offset some of that as well. But I"m concerned, you mentioned about the road fuels and if they are making retail gasoline, one needs octane, and it"s precisely the precursors to the paraxylene that are needed, you have to buy those away from the chemical sector in order to blend up to the appropriate octane level. Is there a chance that they might be able to export fuels products or is that left to maybe some of the other established refining players in China?

Tom: Well, that"s one of the peculiarities of the Chinese market. As private sector companies, neither Rongsheng nor Hengli are allowed currently to export transport fuels. That"s a legacy concern of the Chinese government to ensure energy self-sufficiency downstream to make sure there"s adequate supply on the domestic market of those fuels. So, that is a real impediment for them. And when they ramp up production of gasoline, diesel, and jet, they are driving down domestic prices and they are essentially forcing product into the seaborne market produced by other refineries. So, in that respect, the emergence of Hengli in Northeast China on PetroChina"s doorstep has created a huge new sense of competition for PetroChina in particular. And I think certainly when you look at their recent financial data, it"s quite clear that they are struggling to adapt to the new environment in which it"s essentially export or die, because these new, massive refineries are crushing margins inside China.

I think globally it"s increasingly a competitive environment for road fuels. China is already a net exporter of over 1mn b/d combined of gasoline, diesel, and jet. It"s the fastest-growing exporter of those fuels in the world. But over-supply is also percolating through into the seaborne market: Indian diesel exports are rising; everyone is trying to desperately seek out net short regions and they"re having to ship product further and further overseas. And we"re seeing a situation emerge now in China where these refineries are importing crude perhaps from Latin America and they"re exporting finished products to those same markets from which they took the crude. It"s a tricky arbitrage, one would imagine.

Chuck: And going back specifically to the Hengli and Rongsheng projects, it"s interesting to note, again, going to an order of magnitude or perspective, Hengli is producing or has capacity to produce 4.5 million tons of paraxylene. And in phase one, Rongsheng will have capacity to produce 4 million tons. And I know those are just large numbers, but again, bear in mind that last year, global demand was 43.5 million. So, effectively, these two plants, they could account for 20% of global demand. Just these two projects themselves to give you an idea of just how massive they are and how impactful they can be. Impactful or disruptive, it remains to be seen.

Tom: A sign it doesn"t do things by halves. Although that said, one of the interesting things they have done is essentially halved their transport fuel yields. So, where in a conventional refinery, your combined output of gasoline, diesel, and jet, those core products, might be in the region of 80%, when you look at these new refineries, they"ve really cut that back down to 40% or 50%. And there are new petrochemical refineries springing up, and it"ll be very interesting to see how disruptive those are to the petrochemical market. But in the conventional refining market, they are, I think under pressure to do even more to reduce their exposure to already weakened gasoline and diesel markets. I mean, Shenghong — this new textile company who"s starting up another massive new conventional refinery designed to produce petrochemical products in 2021, I think — they"ve managed to reduce that combined yield to around 30%. They"ve reduced that from an original blueprint.

Chuck: It"s remarkable, but just a note of caution, there have been other petrochemical and refinery projects built recently in Saudi Arabia and in Malaysia, in particular, with established engineering and established chemical and refining companies. And they"ve had trouble meeting the targeted dates for startup and it"s one thing to be mechanically complete, it"s another thing to be operationally complete. But both Hengli and Rongsheng have amazed me at how fast they were able to complete these projects. And by all reports so far, they are producing very, very effectively, but it does remain to be seen why these particular projects are able to run whereas the Aramco projects in Malaysia and in Rabigh in Saudi Arabia have had much greater problems.

Tom: It sounds like in terms of their paraxylene production, they are going to be among the most competitive in the world. They have these strategies to cope with oversupplied markets and refined fuels, but there is certainly an element of political support which has enabled them to get ahead of the pack, I guess. And suddenly in China, Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited the Hengli plant shortly after it came on stream in July, and Zhejiang, the local government there is a staunch backer of Rongsheng"s project. And Zhoushan is the site of a national government initiative creating oil trading and logistics hub. Beijing wants Zhoushan to overtake Singapore as a bunkering location and it"s one of the INE crude futures exchanges, registered storage location. So, both of these locations in China do enjoy a lot of political support, and there are benefits to that which I think do allow them to whittle down the lead times for these mega projects.

So, thank you for joining us today, and it"ll be interesting to follow all of these developments because there still are so many moving parts. And you can follow this on the petroleum side with China Petroleum, the publication in which Tom edits out of London or some of our petrochemical reports. We do daily assessments on the paraxylene markets as well as monthly outlooks, which include global price forecasts. And we have databases which show supply, demand, and trade flows, etc. And then also please tune in for future episodes of the "China Connection." And we thank you for your time and attention.

Plans for a joint Saudi Arabia-China refining and petrochemical complex to be built in northeast China that were shelved in 2020 are now being discussed again, according tosources close to the deal. The original deal for Saudi Aramco and China’s North Industries Group (Norinco) and Panjin Sincen Group to build the US$10 billion 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) integrated refining and petrochemical facility in Panjin city was signed in February 2019. However, in the aftermath of the enduring low prices and economic damage that hit Saudi Arabia as a result of the Second Oil Price War it instigated in the first half of 2020 against the U.S. shale oil threat, Aramco pulled out of the deal in August of that year.

The fact that this landmark refinery joint venture is back under serious consideration underlines the extremely significant shift in Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical alliances in the past few years – principally away from the U.S. and its allies and towards China and its allies. Up until the 2014-2016 Oil Price War, intended by Saudi Arabia to destroy the then-nascent U.S. shale oil sector, the foundation of U.S.-Saudi relations had been the deal struck on 14 February 1945 between the then-U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Saudi King Abdulaziz. In essence, but analyzed in-depth inmy new book on the global oil markets,this was that the U.S. would receive all of the oil supplies it needed for as long as Saudi had oil in place, in return for which the U.S. would guarantee the security both of the ruling House of Saud and, by extension, of Saudi Arabia.

Concomitant with this weakening of relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. came a drift towards Russia first and then China. Given the reputational damage done to the perceived power of Saudi Arabia and its OPEC brothers by their inability to destroy or disable the growing threat from U.S. shale oil to their former dominance in the global oil markets, their attempts to pull oil prices back up to levels at which they could begin to repair thedamage done to their economiesby the 2014-2016 Oil Price War towards the end of 2016 also failed. At that point, fully cognisant of the enormous economic and geopolitical possibilities that were available to it by becoming a core participant in the crude oil supply/demand/pricing matrix, Russia agreed to support the OPEC production cut deal in what was to be called from then-on ‘OPEC+’, albeit in its own uniquely self-serving and ruthless fashion, again analyzed in-depth inmy new book on the global oil markets.

Given Russia’s significant leverage in the Middle East by dint of its pivotal position in making the OPEC deal credible in terms of being able to affect global oil prices, China also began to more aggressively leverage its own power with the group and in the region by dint of its being the world’s biggest net importer of crude oil and its increasing use of checkbook diplomacy. Nowhere were the two elements more in evidence than in China’s offer to buy the entire 5 percent stake of Aramco in a private placement. This was designed to enable Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to save face, given hisunsuccessful attempts from 2016 to 2020to persuade serious Western investors to have any significant part in the company’s initial public offering. Shortly after the offer was made,China was referred toby Saudi’s then-vice minister of economy and planning, Mohammed al-Tuwaijri, as: “By far one of the top markets” to diversify the funding basis of Saudi Arabia. He added that: “We will also access other technical markets in terms of unique funding opportunities, private placements, panda bonds and others.” In a similar vein, andjust last year, Saudi Aramco’s chief executive officer, Amin Nasser, said: “Ensuring the continuing security of China’s energy needs remains our [Saudi Aramco’s] highest priority — not just for the next five years but for the next 50 and beyond.”

Between the end of the 2014-2016 Oil Price War and now, there have been multiple high-level visits back and forth between Saudi Arabia and China, beginning most notably with the trip of high-ranking politicians and financiers fromChina in August 2017 to Saudi Arabia, which featured a meeting between King Salman and Chinese Vice Premier, Zhang Gaoli, in Jeddah. During the visit, Saudi Arabia first mentioned seriously that it was willing to consider funding itself partly in Chinese yuan, raising the possibility of closer financial ties between the two countries. At these meetings, according to comments at the time from then-Saudi Energy Minister, Khalid al-Falih, it was also decided that Saudi Arabia and China would establish a US$20 billion investment fund on a 50:50 basis that would invest in sectors such as infrastructure, energy, mining, and materials, among other areas. The Jeddah meetings in August 2017 followed a landmark visit to China by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman in March of that year during which around US$65 billion of business deals were signed in sectors including oil refining, petrochemicals, light manufacturing, and electronics.

Later, the first discussions about the joint Saudi-China refining and petrochemical complex in China’s northeast began, with a bonus for Saudi Arabia being that Aramco was intended to supply up to 70 percent of the crude feedstock for the complex that was to have commenced operation in 2024. This, in turn, was part of a multiple-deal series that also included three preliminary agreements to invest in Zhejiang province in eastern China. The first agreement was signed to acquire a 9 percent stake in the greenfield Zhejiang Petrochemical project, the second was a crude oil supply deal signed with Rongsheng Petrochemical, Juhua Group, and Tongkun Group, and the third was with Zhejiang Energy to build a large-scale retail fuel network over five years in Zhejiang province.

This latest Aramco-Norinco-Panjin Sincen deal, though, carries with it even broader ramifications of a much more overtly testing nature for U.S. President Joe Biden in terms of where he draws the line on supposed allies blurring trade considerations and security considerations. All Chinese companies function as part of the State apparatus – without any exception – and Norinco has the added troubling element for the U.S. that it is one of China’s major defense contractors, specializing in the full range of research, development, and production of military equipment, technology, systems, and weapons. This runs alongside ongoing concerns from Washington about Saudi Arabia’s on again-off again agreement with Russia tobuy its S-400 missile defense system, and much more recent news in December 2021 that Saudi Arabia is now actively manufacturing itsown ballistic missiles with the help of China.

SINGAPORE, Oct 14 (Reuters) - Rongsheng Petrochemical, the trading arm of Chinese private refiner Zhejiang Petrochemical, has bought at least 5 million barrels of crude for delivery in December and January next year in preparation for starting a new crude unit by year-end, five trade sources said on Wednesday.

Rongsheng bought at least 3.5 million barrels of Upper Zakum crude from the United Arab Emirates and 1.5 million barrels of al-Shaheen crude from Qatar via a tender that closed on Tuesday, the sources said.

Rongsheng’s purchase helped absorbed some of the unsold supplies from last month as the company did not purchase any spot crude in past two months, the sources said.

Zhejiang Petrochemical plans to start trial runs at one of two new crude distillation units (CDUs) in the second phase of its refinery-petrochemical complex in east China’s Zhoushan by the end of this year, a company official told Reuters. Each CDU has a capacity of 200,000 barrels per day (bpd).

Zhejiang Petrochemical started up the first phase of its complex which includes a 400,000-bpd refinery and a 1.2 million tonne-per-year ethylene plant at the end of 2019. (Reporting by Florence Tan and Chen Aizhu, editing by Louise Heavens and Christian Schmollinger)

(Yicai Global) May 20 -- Zhejiang Petrochemical"s oil  refining project with an annual capacity of 40 million tons on Zhoushan has finished  construction and equipment installation in the first stage and will start running soon,   Ningbo, Zhejiang province-based Rongsheng Petrochemical, which is ZPC"s  controlling shareholder, announced this afternoon.

The project, on the island of Zhoushan in southeastern China"s Zhejiang province south of Shanghai at the mouth of Hangzhou Bay, has total investment of around CNY173 billion (USD25 billion). It is not only the largest petrochemical project that Chinese private firms have invested in, but its production scale is also one of the biggest worldwide. It has 22 refining and 15 chemical units, and its two stages have a similar scale and will be able to refine 40 million tons oil upon completion, the released data show.

Less petroleum demand and the associated lower petroleum product prices encouraged refinery closures, reducing global refining capacity, particularly in the United States, Europe, and Japan. However, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) notes that a number of new refinery projects are set to come online during 2022 and 2023, increasing capacity.

As global demand for petroleum products returned closer to pre-pandemic levels through 2021 and early 2022, the loss of refinery capacity contributed to higher crack spreads—the difference between the price of a barrel of crude oil and the wholesale price of petroleum products—which serve as one indicator of the profitability of refining.

Constraints on global refinery capacity have been contributing to higher crack spreads in the first half of 2022, and they are likely to continue contributing to high crack spreads through at least the end of this year.

In its June 2022 Oil Market Report, the IEA expects net global refining capacity to expand by 1.0 million b/d in 2022 and by an additional 1.6 million b/d in 2023. New refining capacity growth includes several high-profile, high-capacity refinery projects underway, particularly in China and the Middle East, which could add more than 4.0 million b/d of new capacity over the next two years.

The most global refining capacity under development is in China. Chinese capacity is scheduled to increase significantly this year because of the start of at least two new refinery projects and a major refinery expansion.

The first new refinery is the private Shenghong Petrochemical facility in Lianyungang, which has an estimated capacity of 320,000 b/d and reported trial crude oil-processing operations beginning in May 2022.

The second new refinery is PetroChina’s 400,000 b/d Jieyang refinery, in the southern Guangdong province, which is expected to come online in the third quarter of 2022 (3Q22). A planned 400,000 b/d Phase II capacity expansion also began operations earlier in 2022 at Zhejiang Petrochemical Corporation’s (ZPC) Rongsheng facility.

Although these projects are the most imminent new capacity expansions in China, the country is expected to continue increasing its refining and petrochemical processing capacity through a number of additional projects expected to come online by 2030.

Most noteworthy among these additional expansions are the 300,000 b/d Huajin and the 400,000 b/d Yulong refinery projects, which both have target start dates in 2024.

Outside of China, the 300,000 b/d Malaysian Pengerang refinery restarted in May 2022 after a fire forced the refinery to shut down in March 2020. The refinery’s return is likely to decrease petroleum product prices and increase supply, particularly in south and southeast Asian markets.

Substantial refinery capacity was also added in the Middle East during the past year. The 400,000 b/d Jizan refinery in Saudi Arabia reportedly came online in late 2021 and began exporting petroleum products earlier this year.

More recently, the 615,000 b/d Al Zour refinery in Kuwait—the largest in the country when it becomes fully operational—began initial operations earlier this year and the facility’s operators expect to increase production through the end of 2022.

A new 140,000 b/d refinery is scheduled to come online in Karbala, Iraq, this September, targeting to be fully operational by 2023. A new 230,000 b/d refinery operated by a joint venture between state-owned-firms OQ (of Oman) and Kuwait Petroleum International is set to come online in Duqm, Oman, likely in early 2023.

The 650,000 b/d Dangote Industries refinery in Lagos, Nigeria, set to be the largest in the country when completed, may come online in late 2022 or 2023. The refinery would most likely meet Nigeria’s domestic petroleum product demand as well as demand in nearby African countries, and it would also reduce demand for gasoline and diesel imports into the region from Europe or the United States.

In Mexico, state-owned refiner Pemex has been building a 340,000 b/d refinery in Dos Bocas, which hosted an inauguration ceremony on 1 July, even though the refinery is still under construction and is unlikely to begin producing fuels until at least 2023.

TotalEnergies is planning to restart its 222,000 b/d Donges refinery along the Atlantic Coast of France in May 2022, after closing the facility in late 2020, and some reports indicate the facility has begun importing crude oil for processing.

In addition to major new refinery projects, other facilities are also moving forward with capacity expansions at existing refineries—particularly in India. HPCL’s Visakha Refinery is undergoing a major expansion, estimated at 135,000 b/d, which is scheduled to come online by 2023. A number of other similar expansions are underway in India that may come into effect in 2024 or later.

Although no projects to build new refineries in the United States are currently planned, major refinery expansions are underway at a handful of Gulf Coast refineries, most notably ExxonMobil’s Beaumont, Texas refinery, which plans to increase its capacity by 250,000 b/d by 2023.

If the projects mentioned above were to come online according to their present timelines, global refinery capacity would increase by 2.3 million b/d in 2022 and by 2.1 million b/d in 2023.

EIA cautions that the estimate is not necessarily a complete list of ongoing refinery capacity expansions. Moreover, many of these projects have also already been subject to major delays, and the possibility of partial starts or continued delays related to logistics, construction, labor, finances, political complications, or other factors may cause these projects to come online later than currently estimated.

While China"s refining industry is expected to suffer from the dual impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and plummeting oil prices, the sector is set to enjoy better times in the second half of this year as several major plants resume operations, industry insiders said.

In the first half of 2020, China"s petroleum and chemical industry witnessed a 58.8 percent year-on-year profit slump to 141.6 billion yuan ($20.4 billion). Profit from the refining sector plunged more than any other segment, dropping 159 percent compared with the first half of 2019, said Fu Xianshen, vice-chairman of the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation.

However, with effective measures to contain COVID-19 and an uptick in international oil prices, the private refinery sector is likely to embrace improved fortunes in the coming months.

China"s refinery output went up 12 percent year-on-year in July, hitting the highest on record for any single month. It processed 59.56 million metric tons of crude oil, equivalent to about 14.03 million barrels per day, the National Bureau of Statistics said.

Tang Sisi, an analyst at research firm BloombergNEF, said it is expected oil demand will remain healthy in the second half as road and domestic air traffic move toward normalcy, keeping China"s crude demand at a high level.

"Capacity additions will intensify the competition in the refining sector, with Sinopec"s 200,000-barrels-per-day Zhanjiang Refinery fully commissioning, and the 400,000 barrels-per-day Zhejiang Petrochemical (Phase II) seeking test runs in the fourth quarter."

China-based Longzhong consultancy said run rates at independent refineries across China have fallen to around 70 percent this week from nearly 80 percent last month.

Tang said the impact of the pandemic highlights the importance of the natural hedge that comes from fuels and chemical integration. Boosting chemical yields has been shown to boost margins, with chemicals contributing 60-80 percent of combined margins for an integrated refinery with 40 percent chemicals output in the product slate.

Li Li, research director at energy consulting company ICIS China, said the Chinese refinery sector has shown vitality and resilience, having seized the opportunity of low global crude prices to book orders.

Rongsheng Petrochemical, another big independent refiner, said its operating revenue reached 50.28 billion yuan during the first six months of the year, up 27.32 percent year-on-year.

The NBS data also showed China"s domestic crude oil output rose 0.6 percent last month compared with the same month a year ago to 16.46 million tons, or 3.88 million bpd. Output for the January-July period reached 113.5 million tons, up 1.4 percent over the year-earlier period.

China Merchants Energy Shipping (CMES), the energy transport unit of China Merchants Group, has signed a agreement with Rongsheng Petrochemical to form a strategic partnership.

Under the agreement, the two companies will jointly develop cooperation opportunities in the area of shipping, logistics, and financing, especially for the Rongsheng’s Zhoushan Green Petrochemical Base project, which started a trial operation recently.

Zhoushan Green Petrochemical Base project is a new integrated refinery and petrochemical project on Zhoushan Island, and it is set to become one of the world’s largest crude-to-chemicals complex.