su rongsheng price

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HONG KONG (Reuters) - Jiangsu Rongsheng Heavy Industries Co Ltd has appointed Morgan Stanleyand JP Morganto finalize plans for its long-awaited IPO in Hong Kong, aiming to raise up to $1.5 billion in the fourth quarter, sources told Reuters on Tuesday.

This is Rongsheng’s latest bid to go public after it failed to raise more than $2 billion from a planned IPO in Hong Kong in 2008, mainly as a result of the global financial crisis.

Rongsheng"s early main shareholders included an Asia investment arm of Goldman Sachs, U.S. hedge fund D.E. Shaw and New Horizon, a China fund founded by the son of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.

The three investors sold off their stakes in Rongsheng for a profit early this year, said the sources familiar with the situation. Representatives for the banks, funds and Rongsheng all declined to comment.

Rongsheng’s revived IPO plan comes at a challenging time. Smaller domestic rival, New Century Shipbuilding, slashed its Singapore IPO in half last week, planning to raise up to $560 million from the originally planned $1.24 billion due to weak market conditions.

Given uncertainty in the global shipbuilding business environment as well as growing concerns over a huge flow of fund-raising events in Hong Kong, investment bankers suggest the potential size for Rongsheng could be $1 billion to $1.5 billion, according to the sources.

Rongsheng is seeking to tap capital markets to fund fast growth and aims to catch up with bigger state-owned rivals such as Guangzhou Shipyard International Co Ltd.

Rongsheng won a $484 million deal to build four ships for Oman Shipping Co last year. The vessels would carry exports from an iron ore pellet plant in northern Oman which is expected to begin production in the second half of 2010.

HONG KONG, Nov 26 (Reuters) - China Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group, the country’s largest private shipbuilder, said its chairman had stepped down just three months after the company posted its sharpest fall in half-year net profit.

Listed in November 2010, Rongsheng was hit by an insider dealing scandal involving a firm owned by Zhang ahead of the $15.1 billion bid for Canadian oil firm Nexen Inc by China offshore oil and gas producer CNOOC.

Rongsheng said earlier this month that investment firm Well Advantage, controlled by Zhang, had agreed to pay $14 million as part of a settlement deal with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

In August, Rongsheng posted an 82 percent drop in half-year profit on a dearth of new orders and warned economic uncertainties would continue to weigh on the global shipping market.

As part of the changes at China Rongsheng, the company said that Zhang De Huang was retiring and had resigned as an executive director and as vice chairman of the board.

Rongsheng Petro Chemical Co, Ltd. specialises in the production and marketing of petrochemical and chemical fibres. Products include PTA yarns, fully drawn polyester yarns (FDY), pre-oriented polyester yarns (POY), polyester textured drawn yarns (DTY), polyester filaments and polyethylene terephthalate (PET) slivers.

Prices at Tai"an Rongsheng Boutique Famous Su are subject to change according to dates, hotel policy, and other factors. To view prices, please search for the dates you wish to stay at the hotel.

Tai"an Rongsheng Boutique Famous Su is near the following attractions: Taishan East Road(Approximately 217m), Yinzuo Children Theme Amusement Park(Approximately 288m), Teenagers Technology Library(Approximately 560m).

paperback. Condition: New. Ship out in 2 business day, And Fast shipping, Free Tracking number will be provided after the shipment.Paperback. Pub Date: October 2012 Pages: 170 Language: Chinese in Publisher: Guangxi Normal University Press Outright new school Path Series Left speak right training: high school math (Compulsory 4) (RJ A) features: Graphic concept levels and association clarity. Knowledge and methods of finishing. a problem-solving tool. Example Problems thinking guide. after expanding research. Summed up the error-prone point explicitly to avoid the wrong direction. Example for error-prone points and parse. Contents: 1.2 arbitrary angle of trigonometric functions of any angle in radians Chapter trigonometric 1.1 1.3 trigonometric induction formula 1.4 trigonometric image and nature of the 1.5 function y = Asin (x + ) image 1.6 trigonometric model a simple application of the end of the chapter summarizes the college entrance test sites and the latest five years of the College Entrance Examination resolution the ability to detect the actual background and the basic concepts of the flat-vector of the second chapter of the plane vector 2.1 2.2 planar linear vector arithmetic 2.2.1 vector addition geometric meaning of vector subtraction and its geometric meaning 2.2.3 vector multiplication fundamental theorem of arithmetic and geometric meaning 2.3 plane vector coordinates 2.2.2 2.3.1 plane vector the fundamental theorem 2.3.2 plane vector orthogonal decomposition and coordinate 2.3.3 plane vector coordinate operation 2.3.4 plane vector collinear coordinates 2.4 the number of plane vector plot the coordinates of the physical background and its meaning 2.4.2 2.4.1 plane vector scalar product the plane vector quantity plot. mold 2.5 plane. the angle between the vector application example vector method 2.5.2 2.5.1 plane geometry vector applications for example in the physical end of the chapter summarizes the college entrance test sites and the latest five years of the College Entrance Examination resolve ability to detect Chapter trigonometric etc. Transform 3.1 corners and poor sine. cosine and tangent formula 3.1.1 corners poor cosine formula 3.1.2 corners and the difference between sine. cosine. tangent formula 3.1.3 double angle sine. cosine. tangent Equation 3.2 simple trigonometric transformation end-of-chapter summary of the college entrance test sites and the latest five years of the third chapter of the College Entrance Examination resolution comprehensive ability testing textbook exercises answer book reference answers and promptsFour Satisfaction guaranteed,or money back.

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Privately owned unaffiliated refineries, known as “teapots,”[3] mainly clustered in Shandong province, have been at the center of Beijing’s longtime struggle to rein in surplus refining capacity and, more recently, to cut carbon emissions. A year ago, Beijing launched its latest attempt to shutter outdated and inefficient teapots — an effort that coincides with the emergence of a new generation of independent players that are building and operating fully integrated mega-petrochemical complexes.[4]

The changing roles played by China’s independent refineries are reflected in their relations with Middle East suppliers. In the battle to ensure their profitability and very survival, smaller Chinese teapots have adopted various measures, including sopping up steeply discounted oil from Iran. Meanwhile, Middle East suppliers, notably Saudi Aramco, are seeking to lock in Chinese crude demand while pursuing new opportunities for further investments in integrated downstream projects led by both private and state-owned companies.

China’s “teapot” refineries[5] play a significant role in refining oil and account for a fifth of Chinese crude imports.[6] Historically, teapots conducted most of their business with China’s major state-owned companies, buying crude oil from and selling much of their output to them after processing it into gasoline and diesel. Though operating in the shadows of China’s giant national oil companies (NOCs),[7] teapots served as valuable swing producers — their surplus capacity called on in times of tight markets.

Yet, the Chinese government has spent the better part of two decades trying to consolidate the country’s sprawling independent refining sector by starving private operators of access to imported crude oil and targeting the smallest, least efficient plants for closure.[8] In 2011, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued guidelines to eliminate small refineries to achieve economies of scale and improve efficiencies. Nevertheless, policies meant to discourage activity had the opposite effect, as most of the units that were earmarked for suspension expanded to stay open.[9]

2021 marked the start of the central government’s latest effort to consolidate and tighten supervision over the refining sector and to cap China’s overall refining capacity.[14] Besides imposing a hefty tax on imports of blending fuels, Beijing has instituted stricter tax and environmental enforcement[15] measures including: performing refinery audits and inspections;[16] conducting investigations of alleged irregular activities such as tax evasion and illegal resale of crude oil imports;[17] and imposing tighter quotas for oil product exports as China’s decarbonization efforts advance.[18]

The politics surrounding this new class of greenfield mega-refineries is important, as is their geographical distribution. Beijing’s reform strategy is focused on reducing the country’s petrochemical imports and growing its high value-added chemical business while capping crude processing capacity. The push by Beijing in this direction has been conducive to the development of privately-led mega refining and petrochemical projects, which local officials have welcomed and staunchly supported.[20]

Yet, of the three most recent major additions to China’s greenfield refinery landscape, none are in Shandong province, home to a little over half the country’s independent refining capacity. Hengli’s Changxing integrated petrochemical complex is situated in Liaoning, Zhejiang’s (ZPC) Zhoushan facility in Zhejiang, and Shenghong’s Lianyungang plant in Jiangsu.[21]

As China’s independent oil refining hub, Shandong is the bellwether for the rationalization of the country’s refinery sector. Over the years, Shandong’s teapots benefited from favorable policies such as access to cheap land and support from a local government that grew reliant on the industry for jobs and contributions to economic growth.[22] For this reason, Shandong officials had resisted strictly implementing Beijing’s directives to cull teapot refiners and turned a blind eye to practices that ensured their survival.

But with the start-up of advanced liquids-to-chemicals complexes in neighboring provinces, Shandong’s competitiveness has diminished.[23] And with pressure mounting to find new drivers for the provincial economy, Shandong officials have put in play a plan aimed at shuttering smaller capacity plants and thus clearing the way for a large-scale private sector-led refining and petrochemical complex on Yulong Island, whose construction is well underway.[24] They have also been developing compensation and worker relocation packages to cushion the impact of planned plant closures, while obtaining letters of guarantee from independent refiners pledging that they will neither resell their crude import quotas nor try to purchase such allocations.[25]

To be sure, the number of Shandong’s independent refiners is shrinking and their composition within the province and across the country is changing — with some smaller-scale units facing closure and others (e.g., Shandong Haike Group, Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Corp, and Shandong Chambroad Group) pursuing efforts to diversify their sources of revenue by moving up the value chain. But make no mistake: China’s teapots still account for a third of China’s total refining capacity and a fifth of the country’s crude oil imports. They continue to employ creative defensive measures in the face of government and market pressures, have partnered with state-owned companies, and are deeply integrated with crucial industries downstream.[26] They are consummate survivors in a key sector that continues to evolve — and they remain too important to be driven out of the domestic market or allowed to fail.

In 2016, during the period of frenzied post-licensing crude oil importing by Chinese independents, Saudi Arabia began targeting teapots on the spot market, as did Kuwait. Iran also joined the fray, with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) operating through an independent trader Trafigura to sell cargoes to Chinese independents.[27] Since then, the coming online of major new greenfield refineries such as Rongsheng ZPC and Hengli Changxing, and Shenghong, which are designed to operate using medium-sour crude, have led Middle East producers to pursue long-term supply contracts with private Chinese refiners. In 2021, the combined share of crude shipments from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, and Kuwait to China’s independent refiners accounted for 32.5%, an increase of more than 8% over the previous year.[28] This is a trend that Beijing seems intent on supporting, as some bigger, more sophisticated private refiners whose business strategy aligns with President Xi’s vision have started to receive tax benefits or permissions to import larger volumes of crude directly from major producers such as Saudi Arabia.[29]

The shift in Saudi Aramco’s market strategy to focus on customer diversification has paid off in the form of valuable supply relationships with Chinese independents. And Aramco’s efforts to expand its presence in the Chinese refining market and lock in demand have dovetailed neatly with the development of China’s new greenfield refineries.[30] Over the past several years, Aramco has collaborated with both state-owned and independent refiners to develop integrated liquids-to-chemicals complexes in China. In 2018, following on the heels of an oil supply agreement, Aramco purchased a 9% stake in ZPC’s Zhoushan integrated refinery. In March of this year, Saudi Aramco and its joint venture partners, NORINCO Group and Panjin Sincen, made a final investment decision (FID) to develop a major liquids-to-chemicals facility in northeast China.[31] Also in March, Aramco and state-owned Sinopec agreed to conduct a feasibility study aimed at assessing capacity expansion of the Fujian Refining and Petrochemical Co. Ltd.’s integrated refining and chemical production complex.[32]

Commenting on the rationale for these undertakings, Mohammed Al Qahtani, Aramco’s Senior Vice-President of Downstream, stated: “China is a cornerstone of our downstream expansion strategy in Asia and an increasingly significant driver of global chemical demand.”[33] But what Al Qahtani did notsay is that the ties forged between Aramco and Chinese leading teapots (e.g., Shandong Chambroad Petrochemicals) and new liquids-to-chemicals complexes have been instrumental in Saudi Arabia regaining its position as China’s top crude oil supplier in the battle for market share with Russia.[34] Just a few short years ago, independents’ crude purchases had helped Russia gain market share at the expense of Saudi Arabia, accelerating the two exporters’ diverging fortunes in China. In fact, between 2010 and 2015, independent refiners’ imports of Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) blend accounted for 92% of the growth in Russian crude deliveries to China.[35] But since then, China’s new generation of independents have played a significant role in Saudi Arabia clawing back market share and, with Beijing’s assent, have fortified their supply relationship with the Kingdom.

Smaller Chinese independents have been less fortunate, hit hard not just by tougher domestic regulation but by soaring crude oil prices.[36] US-led sanctions flowing from the war in Ukraine have compounded the pressure on teapots, which prior to the conflict had sourced about a fifth of their crude oil from Russia. Soaring oil tanker freight rates and the refusal of Chinese banks to issue letters of credit for Russian crude have choked off much of this supply, though some private refiners have compensated by using cash transfers to pay for Russian ESPO blend crude.[37]

Meanwhile, though, enticed by discounted prices Chinese independents in Shandong province have continued to scoop up sanctioned Iranian oil, especially as their domestic refining margins have thinned due to tight regulatory scrutiny. In fact, throughout the period in which Iran has been under nuclear-related sanctions, Chinese teapots have been a key outlet for Iranian oil, which they reportedly unload from reflagged vessels representing themselves as selling oil from Oman and Malaysia.[38] China Concord Petroleum Company (CCPC), a Chinese logistics firm, remained a pivotal player in the supply of sanctioned oil from Iran, even after it was blacklisted by Washington in 2019.[39] Although Chinese state refiners shun Iranian oil, at least publicly, because of US sanctions, private refiners have never stopped buying Iranian crude.[40] And in recent months, teapots have been at the forefront of the Chinese surge in crude oil imports from Iran.[41]

China’s small-scale, inefficient “first generation” teapot refiners have come under mounting market pressure, as well as closer government scrutiny and tightened regulation. Though some have already been shuttered and others face imminent closure, dozens of China’s teapots, concentrated mainly in Shandong province, continue to operate thanks to the creative defensive measures they have employed and the important role they play in local economies.

Vertical integration along the value chain has become a global trend in the petrochemical industry, specifically in refining and chemical operations. China’s drive to self-sufficiency in chemicals is a key factor powering this worldwide trend.[42] And it is the emergent “second generation” of independent refiners that it is helping make China the frontrunner in developing massive liquids-to-chemicals complexes. Following Beijing’s lead, Shandong officials appear determined to follow this trend rather than risk being left in its wake.

As Chinese private refiners’ number, size, and level of sophistication has changed, so too have their roles not just in the domestic petroleum market but in their relations with Middle East suppliers. Beijing’s import licensing and quota policies have enabled some teapot refiners to maintain profitability and others to thrive by sourcing crude oil from the Middle East. For their part, Gulf producers have found Chinese teapots to be valuable customers in the spot market in the battle for market share and, especially in the case of Aramco, in the effort to capture the growth of the Chinese domestic petrochemicals market as it expands.

China Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group Holdings Ltd, already suffering from a slump in the shipbuilding market, risks a loss of business in the promising offshore equipment sector after its chairman was implicated in an insider-trading scandal.

CNOOC Ltd, China"s biggest offshore gas and oil company and a client of Rongsheng, has indicated that its ties with the nation"s biggest private-sector shipbuilder may be affected by a probe being conducted by the United States securities regulator.

The US Securities and Exchange Commission said it is investigating whether Rongsheng Chairman Zhang Zhirong and other traders pocketed millions of dollars illegally from an inside tip ahead of CNOOC"s announcement of a takeover bid for US-listed Canadian oil producer Nexen Inc.

"A senior leader should take responsibility for what he says and does," Wang said at an earnings briefing in Hong Kong, referring to Zhang, a Jiangsu Province native who first built his wealth in real estate during the housing boom.

CNOOC"s rant is understandable. The oil and gas explorer certainly doesn"t want its image sullied at a time when it is trying to secure regulatory approvals in the US and Canada for the US$15.1 billion Nexen takeover bid that has been a long time in the making.

If successful, the deal would be China"s largest overseas acquisition and would give CNOOC privileged access to world-class oil sands projects, shale gas resource development and conventional oil from deepwater fields in the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea and Nigeria. CNOOC is betting that the expertise it will gain from these overseas ventures will help the company deliver long-term, sustainable growth.

Rongsheng, founded by billionaire Zhang, is in a strategic partnership with the state parent of CNOOC. Operating out of the city of Nantong in Jiangsu, Rongsheng has built a deepwater pipe-laying crane vessel for the oil producer, which set sail for the South China Sea in May.

CNOOC was also a cornerstone investor in Rongsheng"s 2010 Hong Kong IPO. Rongsheng"s price has fallen to less than one-seventh of its issue price of HK$8 (US$1.03).

The same afternoon, in another conference room just blocks away in Hong Kong"s financial district, Rongsheng Chief Executive Chen Qiang tried to downplay the impact of Zhang"s scandal as the company reported disappointing interim results.

He said state-owned companies usually grant major contracts via public bidding, and Rongsheng didn"t expect its tenders to be passed over by CNOOC, a big spender on ocean equipment, in the future merely because of credibility issues related to Zhang. Price and quality should determine a successful bid.

Rongsheng earlier said its business won"t be affected by the Zhang scandal because he is a non-executive director with no day-to-day role in the company. Zhang has disappeared from public view since the scandal broke out and couldn"t be reached for comment.

Still, Chen admitted that Rongsheng doesn"t have any pending projects with CNOOC, but he did confirm his company"s plans to develop ocean engineering with a team based in Singapore. That sector is set to take off as investment ramps up in China"s deepwater energy sector.

"The ocean engineering equipment industry remains one of the few manufacturing sectors with strong growth potential despite an overall economic slowdown," according to Zhao Zhiming, chief consultant of the China Petroleum and Petrochemical Equipment Association.

Rongsheng posted an 82 percent drop in net profit in the first six months, its sharpest-ever fall in half-year earnings, because of sluggish demand for new vessels. The company would have gone into the red without a subsidy from the Nantong City government.

Rongsheng said it received orders for two vessels in the period, compared with 24 a year earlier. There was no contribution from ocean engineering in the reporting period.

Company Chief Financial Officer Sean Wang said Rongsheng expects a "breakthrough" order for offshore equipment by the end of next year. He gave no details.

Goldman Sachs analysts, writing in a note, said Rongsheng"s outlook in shipbuilding is negative, but its prospects in offshore equipment were more promising.

Su Jing, vice project director for CNOOC"s deep-water drilling unit project team, said the company plans to introduce a second batch of domestically built equipment for offshore operations around 2015, after putting in place this year the pipe-laying crane vessel built by Rongsheng and an ultra deepwater drilling rig built by Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding Co.

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