first step act safety valve free sample

The Act requires the submission of several reports to review the BOP"s implementation of the law and assess the effects of the new risk and needs assessment system.

A “safety valve” is an exception to mandatory minimum sentencing laws. A safety valve allows a judge to sentence a person below the mandatory minimum term if certain conditions are met.  Safety valves can be broad or narrow, applying to many or few crimes (e.g., drug crimes only) or types of offenders (e.g., nonviolent offenders). They do not repeal or eliminate mandatory minimum sentences. However, safety valves save taxpayers money because they allow courts to give shorter, more appropriate prison sentences to offenders who pose less of a public safety threat. This saves our scarce taxpayer dollars and prison beds for those who are most deserving of the mandatory minimum term and present the biggest danger to society.

The Problem:Under current federal law, there is only one safety valve, and it applies only to first-time, nonviolent drug offenders whose cases did not involve guns. FAMM was instrumental in the passage of this safety valve, in 1994. Since then, more than 95,000 nonviolent drug offenders have received fairer sentences because of it, saving taxpayers billions. But it is a very narrow exception: in FY 2015, only 13 percent of all drug offenders qualified for the exception.

Mere presence of even a lawfully purchased and registered gun in a person’s home or car is enough to disqualify a nonviolent drug offender from the safety valve,

Even very minor prior infractions (e.g., careless driving) that resulted in no prison time can disqualify an otherwise worthy low-level drug offender from the safety valve, and

The Solution:Create a broader safety valve that applies to all mandatory minimum sentences, and expand the existing drug safety valve to cover more low-level offenders.

The Act represents a dramatically different and enlightened approach to fighting crime that is focused on rehabilitation, reintegration, and sentencing reduction, rather than the tough-on-crime, lock-them-up rhetoric of the past.

Perhaps the Act’s most far-reaching change to sentencing law is its expansion of the application of the Safety Valve—the provision of law that reduces a defendant’s offense level by two and allows judges to disregard an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum penalty if the defendant meets certain criteria. It is aimed at providing qualifying low-level, non-violent drug offenders a means of avoiding an otherwise draconian penalty. In fiscal year 2017, nearly one-third of all drug offenders were found eligible for the Safety Valve.

Until the Act, one of the criteria for the Safety Valve was that a defendant could not have more than a single criminal history point. This generally meant that a defendant with as little as a single prior misdemeanor conviction that resulted in a sentence of more than 60 days was precluded from receiving the Safety Valve.

Section 402 of the Act relaxes the criminal history point criterion to allow a defendant to have up to four criminal history points and still be eligible for the Safety Valve (provided all other criteria are met). Now, even a prior felony conviction would not per se render a defendant ineligible from receiving the Safety Valve so long as the prior felony did not result in a sentence of more than 13 months’ imprisonment.

Importantly, for purposes of the Safety Valve, prior sentences of 60 days or less, which generally result in one criminal history point, are never counted. However, any prior sentences of more than 13 months, or more than 60 days in the case of a violent offense, precludes application of the Safety Valve regardless of whether the criminal history points exceed four.

These changes to the Safety Valve criteria are not retroactive in any way, and only apply to convictions entered on or after the enactment of the Act. Despite this, it still is estimated that these changes to the Safety Valve will impact over 2,000 offenders annually.

Currently, defendants convicted of certain drug felonies are subject to a mandatory minimum 20 years’ imprisonment if they previously were convicted of a single drug felony. If they have two or more prior drug felonies, then the mandatory minimum becomes life imprisonment. Section 401 of the Act reduces these mandatory minimums to 15 years and 25 years respectively.

These amendments apply to any pending cases, except if sentencing already has occurred. Thus, they are not fully retroactive. Had they been made fully retroactive, it is estimated they would have reduced the sentences of just over 3,000 inmates. As it stands, these reduced mandatory minima are estimated to impact only 56 offenders annually.

Section 403 of the Act eliminates the so-called “stacking” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) penalties. Section 924(c) provides for various mandatory consecutive penalties for the possession, use, or discharge of a firearm during the commission of a felony violent or drug offense. However, for a “second or subsequent conviction” of 924(c), the mandatory consecutive penalty increases to 25 years.

Occasionally, the Government charges a defendant with multiple counts of 924(c), which results in each count being sentenced consecutive to each other as well as to the underlying predicate offense. For example, a defendant is charged with two counts of drug trafficking and two counts of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), which requires a consecutive 5 years’ imprisonment to the underlying offense for mere possession of a firearm during the commission of the drug offense. At sentencing, the Court imposes 40 months for the drug trafficking offenses. As a result of the first § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) conviction, the Court must impose a consecutive 60 months (5 years). But what about the second § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) conviction? In such situations, courts have been treating the second count as a “second or subsequent conviction.” As such, the 60-month consecutive sentence becomes a 300 month (25 years) consecutive sentence. In our hypothetical, then, the sentencing court would impose a total sentence of 400 months (40+60+300) inasmuch as the second 924(c) count was a “second or subsequent conviction.”

Now, under the Act, to avoid such an absurd and draconian result, Congress has clarified that the 25-year mandatory consecutive penalty only applies “after a prior conviction under this subsection has become final.” Thus, the enhanced mandatory consecutive penalty no longer can be applied to multiple counts of 924(c) violations.

Finally, Section 404 of the Act makes the changes brought about by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 fully retroactive. As the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s “2015 Report to Congress: Impact of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,” explained: “The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), enacted August 3, 2010, reduced the statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses to produce an 18-to-1 crack-to-powder drug quantity ratio. The FSA eliminated the mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine and increased statutory fines. It also directed the Commission to amend the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to account for specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances in drug trafficking offenses involving any drug type.”

While the Act now makes the FSA fully retroactive, those prisoners who already have sought a reduction under the FSA and either received one, or their application was otherwise adjudicated on the merits, are not eligible for a second bite at the apple. It is estimated that full retroactive application of the FSA will impact 2,660 offenders.

Reducing the severity and frequency of some draconian mandatory minimum penalties, increasing the applicability of the safety valve, and giving full retroactive effect to the FSA signals a more sane approach to sentencing, which will help address prison overpopulation, while ensuring scarce prison space is reserved only for the more dangerous offenders.

Mark H. Allenbaugh, co-founder of Sentencing Stats, LLC, is a nationally recognized expert on federal sentencing, law, policy, and practice. A former staff attorney for the U.S. Sentencing Commission, he is a co-editor of Sentencing, Sanctions, and Corrections: Federal and State Law, Policy, and Practice (2nd ed., Foundation Press, 2002). He can be reached at mark@sentencingstats.com.

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More than a year after it was enacted in 2018, key parts of the law are working as promised, restoring a modicum of fairness to federal sentencing and helping to reduce the country’s unconscionably large federal prison population. But other parts are not, demonstrating the need for continued advocacy and more congressional oversight. The way the Justice Department has been handling prisoner releases during the coronavirus pandemic gives some insight into what’s going wrong.

President Trump has bragged about signing the law, which was the first criminal justice reform bill passed in nearly a decade. But simply signing it is not enough. He needs to see it through.

The First Step Act is the product of years of advocacy by people across the political spectrum. Indeed, a very similar bipartisan bill nearly passed in 2015, but was dragged down by election-year politics. The Trump administration began working on its own criminal justice bill in early 2018, and an initial deal was catalyzed by a core group of bipartisan legislators. It was then refined through a series of compromises and, once the Senate decided to pick up the bill, sailed through both houses of Congress with supermajority support.

The law we now know as the First Step Act accomplishes two discrete things, both aimed at making the federal justice system fairer and more focused on rehabilitation.

Its sentencing reformcomponents shorten federal prison sentences and give people additional chances to avoid mandatory minimum penalties by expanding a “safety valve” that allows a judge to impose a sentence lower than the statutory minimum in some cases. These parts of the First Step Act are almost automatic: once the act was signed, judges immediately began sentencing people to shorter prison terms in cases came before them. Similarly, people in federal prison for pre-2010 crack cocaine offenses immediately became eligible to apply for resentencing to a shorter prison term.

The law’s prison reformelements are designed to improve conditions in federal prison in two ways. One is by curbing inhumane practices, such as eliminating the use of restraints on pregnant women and encouraging placing people in prisons that are closer to their families. The other is by reorienting prisons around rehabilitation rather than punishment. That is no small task. Successfully expanding rehabilitative programming in federal prison will require significant follow-through from Congress and the Department of Justice. It’s no surprise, then, that these distinct parts of the act are functioning differently.

Before 2010, an offense involving 5 grams of crack cocaine, a form of the drug more common in the Black community, was punished as severely as one involving 500grams of powder. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 changed that, reducing this 100:1 disparity to 18:1 — but only on a forward-going basis. People convicted under the now-outdated crack laws were stuck serving the very sentences that Congress had just repudiated.

The First Step Act fixed that by making the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive. According to the Justice Department, as of May, roughly 3,000 people serving outdated sentences for crack cocaine crimes had already been resentenced to shorter prison terms. Shortened or bypassed mandatory minimums mean that every year another estimated 2,000 people will receive prison sentences 20 percent shorter than they would have.

Another 3,100 people were released in July 2019, anywhere from a few days to a few months early, when the First Step Act’s “good time credit fix” went into effect. This simple change allowed people in federal prison to earn approximately an extra week off their sentence per year — and it applied retroactively, too. For some people it meant seeing their friends and family months earlier than expected.

Taken together, these changes represent an important decrease in incarceration. One year after the First Step Act was signed, the federal prison population was around 5,000 people smaller, continuing several years of declines. It has continued to shrink amidst the coronavirus pandemic.

To be sure, there’s still a long way to go: the federal prison population remains sky-high. And the Department of Justice does not appear to be in complete lockstep with the White House’s celebration of the law. In some old crack cocaine cases, federal prosecutors are opposing resentencing motions or seeking to reincarcerate people who have just been released. Prosecutors in these cases argue that any motions for resentencing must also consider the (often higher) amount of the drug the applicant possessed according to presentence reports. Other technical disputes are also cropping up, with the Department of Justice often arguing for a narrow interpretation of the First Step Act.

The First Step Act calls for the Bureau of Prisons to significantly expand these opportunities. Within a few years, the BOP must have “evidence-based recidivism reduction programs and productive activities” available for allpeople in prison. That means vocational training, educational classes, and behavioral therapy (to name a few options recommended in the act) should be staffed and broadly available. Participating in these programs will in turn enable imprisoned people to earn “time credits” that they can put toward a transfer to prerelease custody — that is, a halfway house or even home confinement — theoretically allowing them to finish their sentence outside of a prison.

Rolling out this system as intended will be a challenge, however, in part because BOP programs are already understaffed and underfunded. Around 25 percent of people spending more than a year in federal prison have completed zeroprograms. A recent BOP budget document described a lengthy waiting list for basic literacy programs. And according to the Federal Defenders of New York, the true extent of the BOP’s programming shortfall isn’t even known, because the BOP won’t share information on programming availability or capacity. The bureau offered little insight into its existing capacity and needs at a pair of congressional oversight hearings last fall. Worse, a recent report from the First Step Act’s Independent Review Committee, made up of outside experts to advise and assist the government with implementing the law, casts doubt on the quality of the BOP’s existing programming.

The BOP’s lack of transparency also makes it hard to know how “time credits” are being awarded — and thus, whether the BOP is permitting people to make progress toward prerelease custody as Congress intended. The First Step Act provides that most imprisoned people may earn 10 to 15 days of “time credits” for every 30 days of “successful participation” in recidivism-reduction programming. But a recent report suggests the BOP will award a specific number of “hours” for each program. How many “hours” make up a “day,” for the purpose of awarding credits? This highly technical issue may appear trivial, but could significantly affect the reach of the First Step Act.

People with inside knowledge of the system point to other concerns, too. The law excludes some imprisoned people from earning credits based on the crime that led to their incarceration or their role in the offense, and some advocates report that the BOP has applied those exclusions broadly, disqualifying a much larger part of the imprisoned population than Congress intended. Advocates also have heard that program availability in prisons is much spottier than the BOP has suggested, rendering illusory the DOJ’s claim that people are already being assigned to programs and “productive activities” tailored to their needs.

Any expansion of programming also won’t be free. Knowing that, the First Step Act authorized $75 million per year for five years for implementation. But authorization is only the beginning of the budgeting process. Congress must also formally appropriate money to the BOP to fund the First Step Act for each year that it is authorized.

Thankfully, in December 2019, Congress passed and the president signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which included full funding for the First Step Act through the end of the current fiscal year. That makes up for a bumpy start: last year, Congress failed to appropriate anything at all, forcing the DOJ to use $75 million from elsewhere in its budget to cover the temporary shortfall.

While this new funding is good news, it still might not be enough. According to a member of the Independent Review Committee, full implementation may cost closer to $300 million. After factoring in “training, staffing, [and] building things like classrooms,” he says, $75 million simply may not be enough. But any more substantial funding seems unlikely to materialize: in a recent budget, the White House sought nearly $300 million to fund improvements related to the law, of which only $23 million was earmarked for programming.

The DOJ prioritized transfers for people deemed to pose a “minimum” risk of recidivism under a new system developed for the First Step Act. But that system, called “PATTERN,” has never been perfect, and appears to have been quietly revised to make it more difficult to reach a “minimum” score — and by extension, that much harder to win a transfer to home confinement. This revelation offers the latest example of how the First Step Act’s implementation has proceeded in fits and starts.

Before imprisoned people can use “time credits” they’ve earned from prison programming, two conditions must be met. First, if they’re seeking a transfer to a halfway house, there must be a bed available. That’s not a sure thing, especially after a round of budget cuts by the Trump administration. Second, an incarcerated person must demonstrate that their risk of committing a new crime is low, as calculated by PATTERN.

The process of developing that tool has not gone smoothly. The first version unveiled by the DOJ, in July 2019, appeared to use a method for calculating “risk” that overstated the actual risk of re-offending among formerly incarcerated people, exaggerated racial disparities, and gave people only marginal credit for completing education, counseling, and other programs while in prison. Taken together, the tool gave short shrift to the idea that people can change while in prison — the very premise of the First Step Act.

Early this year, the DOJ shared what seemed like good news: PATTERN, it said, had been improved to partially address some of the concerns raised by the Brennan Center and others. But the tool continued to use an overly broad definition of recidivism. And while the DOJ claimed it introduced changes to reduce racial disparities, it did not release data on the revised tool’s actual effect on racial disparities. As a result, imprisoned people, families, lawyers, and advocates were all concerned when the DOJ announced it would use PATTERN to help determine who would be transferred out of federal prison during the pandemic.

Those concerns were justified. It now seems that the BOP changed PATTERN more significantly than they initially disclosed to make it much harder to qualify as a “low” or “minimum” risk. (A DOJ report, released a week after ProPublica’s story, suggests that the impact of these changes was relatively small, but offers limited data, and — still — provides no analysis of racial disparities.) This change will certainly narrow the effect of the First Step Act. But more urgently, it seems likely to keep more people in federal prison, exposed to a heightened risk of catching a deadly disease.

Trump has repeatedly claimed credit for passing the First Step Act. He did the same in a Super Bowl ad. Now his administration needs to do the hard work of ensuring that the law lives up to its promise.

The First Step Act of 2018 became law when President Trump signed it on December 21, 2018. The First Step Act reduces and restricts enhanced sentencing for prior drug felonies, broadens the existing federal sentencing safety valve, clarifies 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C), and retroactively applies the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 as discussed below.

The First Step Act adds the terms “serious drug felony” and “serious violent felony” to the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802. A defendant’s prior conviction for a “serious drug felony” or “serious violent felony” must have resulted in a sentence of 12 or more months in prison before it counts as a prior conviction for enhancement purposes. Moreover, a prior conviction more than 15 years before a defendant’s current offense can no longer be used to enhance his or her sentence. The new mandatory minimums for defendants with one prior “serious drug felony” or “serious violent felony” is now 15 years. For defendants with two or more prior convictions, the new mandatory minimum is 25 years.

The First Step Act broadens the federal sentencing safety valve found at 18 U.S.C. § 3553. It is called the safety valve because it permits a court to sentence some nonviolent drug offenders with no prior criminal history to sentences below the applicable mandatory minimums. The safety valve previously applied only to defendants with no more than 1 criminal history point under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Now, the safety valve applies to defendants who have no more than 4 total criminal history points, no prior 3 point offenses and no prior 2 point offenses.

The First Step Act clarifies 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C). Enhanced penalties for using a gun during certain crimes based on a defendant’s prior convictions only apply when the prior conviction was already final at the time of the current offense.

The First Step Act retroactively applies the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The Fair Sentencing Act eliminated the sentencing disparity between defendants convicted of crack cocaine offenses and powder cocaine offenses. Defendants currently serving time on crack cocaine offenses who were not granted relief by the Fair Sentencing Act may file a motion to reduce their sentences.

Like most federal criminal statutes, the First Step Act can be difficult to interpret. Lisa is on top of the First Step Act and will interpret it for you to see if the First Step Act can help you or a loved one. For a free consultation, call LisaLaw, LLC or fill out the on-line form for a free case review.

The primary “smart” sentencing provision of the Crime Bill appears in Title VII under the heading “Applicability of Mandatory Minimum Penalties in Certain Cases.” This provision, commonly known as a safety valve provision, served as a partial response to the Sentencing Commission’s 1991 report documenting the inconsistent and inappropriate application of previously enacted federal mandatory minimum statutes.8 To counteract this misapplication, the safety valve provision authorized sentencing courts to follow applicable sentencing guidelines without regard to more severe statutory mandatory minimum terms for certain less serious drug offenses (e.g., offenses not involving violence or firearms) when a defendant met a series of conditions (e.g., having pleaded guilty and having little criminal history).

The impact of this statutory safety valve grew when the Sentencing Commission in 1995 created a downward adjustment within the drug offense guidelines. The change provided for a two-level reduction in the guideline offense-level calculation for all defendants who met the criteria set out in the bill.9 Consequently, after passage of the 1994 Crime Bill and the guideline amendment it prompted, certain federal defendants who committed lower-level drug offenses could both avoid the application of severe mandatory minimums and benefit from a reduced guideline sentencing range.

These changes have helped shorten the sentences of tens of thousands of people who committed lower-level drug crimes but were subject to harsh drug-offense mandatory minimums enacted in other federal bills. Annual reports from the Sentencing Commission indicate that, in many years, well over 20 percent of federal drug defendants have benefited from the statutory safety valve, allowing them to be sentenced below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum. In FY 2000, for example, nearly 5,000 of roughly 21,000 federal drug defendants received statutory safety valve relief at sentencing;10 in FY 2010, over 5,500 of roughly 23,000 federal drug defendants secured such relief.11

In addition, all of these defendants and often thousands more benefited each year from the corresponding guideline safety valve provision that serves to lower applicable guideline sentencing ranges. In FY 2010, for example, more than 3,000 additional federal drug defendants benefited from a reduced guideline range.12 Overall, the number of federal drug defendants whose sentences were reduced by these safety valve provisions in the 25 years since the passage of the Crime Bill is now approaching 200,000.

Recent work by Congress has further expanded the impact of the safety valve provision. In 2011, the Sentencing Commission released a report urging Congress to expand the safety valve to people who were convicted of drug offenses and have additional criminal history. The report also suggested that the safety valve should be applicable beyond drug cases.13 Taking partial heed, Congress in the FIRST STEP Act of 201814 expanded the safety valve to make federal drug defendants with additional (though still modest) criminal history eligible for relief from otherwise applicable mandatory minimums.

Under federal law, judges are generally prohibited from changing a sentence once it has been imposed. Compassionate release, to put it simply, provides a “safety valve” against this general principle, allowing federal judges to reduce a prisoner’s sentence when it is warranted by “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” For the past thirty years, statutory and bureaucratic roadblocks made compassionate release an unlikely avenue for prisoners to receive sentence reductions. With the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, the U.S. Congress made the first significant changes to the compassionate release statute in decades, permitting defendants for the first time to bring such motions directly to their sentencing courts. An overwhelming majority of circuit courts have concluded that the First Step Act’s changes to the compassionate release statute mean that district judges are not free to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason that a defendant might raise. Nevertheless, appellate courts remain divided over what exactly constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. This Note examines the historical development of, and rationales for, compassionate release and the reasons why appellate courts have struggled to define and apply the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard consistently. After recognizing that Congress’s goals in creating the compassionate release mechanism were to promote consistency while keeping the sentencing power in the judiciary, this Note proposes a two-part solution to balance these goals. This Note’s proposed framework ensures that judicial discretion continues to serve a critical role in compassionate release decisions and seeks to resolve the current disagreements among appellate courts.

For reference, these refer to the statutory language of 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(B), which instruct the federal judge on how he or she shall sentence anyone convicted of the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (i.e., an illegal drug) or possession with intent to either of these things.

How do you know if you are charged with one of these federal drug crimes that come with a mandatory minimum sentence of either 5-to-40 years (a “b1B” case) or 10-to-life (a “b1A” case)? Read the language of your Indictment. It will specify the statute’s citation.  If you do not have a copy of your Indictment, please feel free to contact my office and we can provide you a copy.

Can’t there be any way to get around that set-in-stone bottom line?  Yes.  There is also a statutory exception which allows the federal judge to dip below that mandatory minimum number of years in some situations.  It is called the “Safety Valve” defense.

The law, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), provides for an exception that allows the federal judge some leeway in drug crime convictions where he or she would otherwise be required to follow the mandatory minimum sentencing statute.  This is the Safety Value statute. It states as follows:

(f)Limitation on Applicability of Statutory Minimums in Certain Cases.—Notwithstanding anyother provision of law, in the case of an offense under section 401, 404, or 406 of theControlled Substances Act(21 U.S.C. 841, 844, 846), section 1010 or 1013 of theControlled Substances Import and Export Act(21 U.S.C. 960, 963), or section 70503 or 70506 of title 46, the court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission undersection 994 of title 28without regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds at sentencing, after the Government has been afforded the opportunity to make a recommendation, that—

(4)the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in section 408 of theControlled Substances Act; and

(5)not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement.

The only way to allow for this exception to be applied in a federal sentencing hearing is for the defense to argue its application and to provide authenticated and admissible support for use of the Safety Valve.

How does the defense do this?  It takes much more than referencing the exception to the general rule itself.  The defense will have to demonstrate the convicted defendant meets the Safety Valve’s five (5) requirements.

For a successful safety valve defense, the defense has to show that the total Criminal History Points are four (4) or less.  If you have a maximum of four Criminal History points, you have met the first criteria for the safety valve.

Note:  prior to the passage of the First Step Act, things were much harsher.  If the defense had even two Criminal History Points, then the accused was ineligible for the safety valve.  The First Step Act increased the number of points, or score, from one to four as the maximum allowed for application of the safety valve.  For more on the First Step Act, see The First Step Act and Texas Criminal Defense in 2019: Part 1 of 2 and The First Step Act and Texas Criminal Defense in 2019: Part 2 of 2.

Looking at the Safety Valve statute ( 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)), the second step in achieving application of the safety valve defense involves the circumstances of the underlying criminal activity and whether or not it involved violence of threats or violence, or if the defendant possessed a firearm at the time.

It has been my experience that it is pretty common for there to be a firearm of some sort involved in a federal drug crime prosecution.  Here, the impact of Texas being a part of the Fifth Judicial District for the United States Court of Appeals (“Fifth Circuit”) is important.

In the USSG, two points are given (“enhanced”) for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a federal drug trafficking offense.  See,  USSG §2D1.10, entitled Endangering Human Life While Illegally Manufacturing a Controlled Substance; Attempt or Conspiracy.

Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that under the Safety Valve Statute, the standard for the government  is much higher. According to their ruling, in order to be disqualified from application of the safety valve because of possession of a firearm, the defendant has to have been actually in possession of the firearm or in construction possession of it. See, US v. Wilson, 105 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 1997).

This is the example of the importance of effective criminal defense representation, where research reveals that it is easier to achieve a safety valve defense with a reference to case law.  The Fifth Circuit allows a situation where someone can get two (2) points under the USSG (“enhancement”) and still be eligible for the safety valve defense.

The commentary to § 5C1.2(2) provides that “[c]onsistent with [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct),” the use of the term “defendant” in § 5C1.2(2) “limits the accountability of the defendant to his own conduct and conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused.” See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, comment. (n.4). This language mirrors § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Of import is the fact that this language omits the text of § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) which provides that “relevant conduct” encompasses acts and omissions undertaken in a “jointly undertaken criminal activity,” e.g. a conspiracy.

Being bound by this commentary, we conclude that in determining a defendant’s eligibility for the safety valve, § 5C1.2(2) allows for consideration of only the defendant’s conduct, not the conduct of his co-conspirators. As it was Wilson’s co-conspirator, and not Wilson himself, who possessed the gun in the conspiracy,the district court erred in concluding that Wilson was ineligible to receive the benefit of § 5C1.2. Because application of § 5C1.2 is mandatory, see U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (providing that the court “shall” impose a sentencing without regard to the statutory minimum sentence if the defendant satisfies the provision’s criteria), we vacate Wilson’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

The defense must also be able to prove that the defendant’s role in the underlying criminal offense did not result in the death or bodily injury of someone else to achieve the safety valve defense under  18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).

In drug cases, this can mean more than some type of violent scenario.  The mere type of drug or controlled substance involved can impact the success of this defense.  Sometimes, the drugs themselves are the type that can cause severe harm or death.  Several controlled substances can be lethal.  In a federal drug case, there is a special definition for death resulting from the distribution of a controlled substance.

If the defense can prove with authenticated and admissible evidence that the defendant did not distribute a drug or controlled substance that ended up with someone’s death, or severe bodily injury, then the safety valve defense will be available to them.

Role adjustments happen when someone is alleged to be involved in a conspiracy, and they act in some type of position of responsibility.  They can be a leader, or organizer, or somebody who supervises other people in the operations, all as defined in the USSG.

If you are to achieve the safety valve defense, you cannot receive any “role adjustment” under the Sentencing Guidelines.  This must be established to the court by your defense attorney at the sentencing.

The defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement.

I realize that for many people, this language brings with it the assumption that the defendant has to be a snitch in order to meet this requirement for the safety valve defense.  This is not true.

With an experienced criminal defense lawyer, what it does mean is that the defendant has a meeting with the authorities with the goal of meeting the Safety Valve Statute requirements and no more.

The attorney can limit the scope of the meeting.  He or she can make sure that law enforcement follows the rules for the meeting.   The meeting is necessary for the defendant to achieve a safety valve defense, so there is no way to avoid a safety valve interview.

I arranged for my client to have his safety valve meeting as well as establishing the other criteria needed for application of the Safety Valve statute.  I was present at the meeting.  There was no cooperation regarding the other defendants, and he did nothing more than the minimum to qualify for the defense.  He was no snitch.

As a result, the safety valve was applied by the federal judge and my client achieved a safety valve application where he was sentenced to 8 years for distribution of meth: well below the 10 years of the mandatory minimums and the USSG calculation in his case of around 14 years.

Sadly, the same day that my client was sentenced, so were several of the co-conspirator defendants.  I was aware that they were also eligible for the safety valve defense.  However, the federal agent at the sentencing hearings that day told me that their lawyers never contact the government for a safety valve meeting.

They were never debriefed, so they could not meet the requirements for application of the safety value statute.  The judge had no choice –they each had to be sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentences under the law.

There are three exceptions to the minimum mandatory sentence requirement.  Two of those exceptions are available in a case where the defendant is “ratting” (or providing “substantial assistance” in a prosecution against someone else).  The third exception is called the safety valve, and does not require the government’s approval.

Qualification for the safety valve exception requires a defendant to satisfy five criteria.  The defendant’s past criminal record must be minimal; he must not have been a leader, organizer, or supervisor in the commission of the offense; he must not have used violence in the commission of the offense, and the offense must not have resulted in serious injury; and prior to sentencing, he must tell the government all that he knows of the offense and any related misconduct.

There are hundreds of federal criminal charges that carry mandatory minimum prison sentences.  Drug trafficking offenses are the most commonly prosecuted.  The safety valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)), allows a sentencing judge to disregard a statutory minimum sentence for the benefit of a low-level, nonviolent, cooperative defendant with a minimal prior criminal record, convicted of certain mandatory minimum controlled substance offenses.

Low-level drug traffickers can avoid mandatory minimum sentences if they qualify for the safety valve.  It is available to qualified offenders convicted of violations of the drug trafficking, simple possession, attempt, or conspiracy provisions of the Controlled Substances or Controlled Substances Import and Export acts.  It is not available to avoid the mandatory minimum sentences that attend some of the other controlled substance offenses, even those closely related to the covered offenses.  For example, convictions drug trafficking near schools, playgrounds, or public housing facilities are not qualified.  Recently, the First Step Act allowed safety valve relief to those convicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA).

The defendant must not have used violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense, pursuant to 18 U.SC. 3553(f)(2).  The offense must not have resulted in death or serious bodily injury to any person, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(3).  The safety valve has two disqualifications designed to reserve its benefits to nonviolent offenders.  It is not triggered by the conduct of a co-conspirator, unless the defendant aided, abetted, counselled the co-conspirator’s violence or possession.  Disqualifying firearm possession may be either actual or constructive.  Constructive possession is the dominion or control over a firearm or the

place where one is located.  Disqualification requires the threat of violence or possession of a firearm “in connection with the offense,” sometimes characterized as “active possession.”  In many instances, possession of a firearm in a location where drugs are stored or transported, or where transactions occur, will be enough to support an inference of possession in connection with the drug offense of conviction.  On the other hand, a sentencing enhancement for a co-conspirator’s possession does not automatically preclude qualification for the safety valve.  The Sentencing Guidelines define “serious bodily injury” for purposes of Section 3553(f)(3) as an “injury involving extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.”

The defendant must not have been an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in Section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4).  The term supervisor is construed broadly and includes anyone who exercises control or authority of another during the commission of the offense.  The Sentencing Guidelines disqualify anyone who receives a guideline level increase for their aggravated role in the offense.

Before the sentencing hearing, the defendant must have truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence he has concerning the offense(s) that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5).

Neither Section 3553(f) nor the Sentencing Guidelines explain what form the defendants’ full disclosure must take.  At least one court has held that under rare circumstances disclosure through the defendant’s testimony at trial may suffice.  Most often the defendant provides the information during an interview with prosecutors or by a proffer.  The defendant must disclose the information to the prosecutor, however.  Disclosure to the probation officer during preparation of the presentence report is not enough.  Interestingly, past lies do not render a defendant ineligible for relief under the truthful disclosure criterion of the safety valve, although they may undermine his credibility.