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They noted, however, that on April 26, while Mr. Murphy was in Taiwan, a special Presiden tial commission issued a report urging the United States to seek as “early as practicable” the seating of Peking, but without the expulsion of Taiwan.

The 50‐member commission was headed by Henry Cabot Lodge, former United States representative at the United Nations and now President Nix on"s personal representative at the Vatican.

For Mr. Murphy, who is 76 years old, the mission in Taiwan was the latest in a long series of special assignments, many of them highly confidential, that he has undertaken for four Presidents since his retire ment from the State Depart ment in 1959.

His most recent previous mis sion for President Nixon was in Cairo, where he was a mem ber of the United States delega tion at the funeral last year of President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

After four years of review, the CIA has decided that an exhaustive classified report on the history of U.S.-China relations cannot be released, sealing from the public for now the full story of the secretive Nixon-era negotiations, as well as this nation’s high-level dealings with Beijing during the Gerald R. Ford, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations.

The intelligence agency--which, under some pressure, has said it will be more open in its handling of Cold War-era archives--rejected a Freedom of Information Act request by The Times to declassify and release the China history. Commissioned by the CIA in 1985, the study is comparable in some ways to the Pentagon Papers, which offered a history of U.S. diplomacy in Vietnam.

Former President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger have published their memoirs, and other participants, historians, and experts have given their versions of what transpired in the critical era of U.S.-China diplomacy.

The China history, which reconstructs and analyzes secret negotiations between Washington and Beijing from the Nixon era through 1984, is officially characterized as “the only comprehensive survey of the negotiating record, based on official documents” held by the White House, the National Security Council, the departments of State and Defense, several presidential libraries and Kissinger’s archives.

A short, declassified summary of the study’s findings, published six years ago by the Foreign Service Institute, concluded that in diplomatic negotiations Chinese officials regularly seek “to identify foreign officials who are sympathetic to their cause; to cultivate a sense of friendship and obligation in their official counterparts; and then to pursue their objectives through a variety of stratagems designed to manipulate feelings of friendship, obligation, guilt or dependence.”

For example, the chronology says that during Nixon’s trip to China in 1972, “after facing a prospect of collapse of the communique negotiations, HAK (Kissinger) withdraws request for the Taiwan paragraph change.” Kissinger’s memoirs allude to these events, but do not actually say that he backed down from changes he had requested.

The study itself addressed the touchy issue of whether Presidents Nixon, Carter and Reagan and top advisers like Kissinger and Brzezinski got the best deals they could in negotiations over the future of Taiwan, Vietnam and Cambodia--or whether they were outmaneuvered by the Chinese.

“The fact that this report was commissioned in 1985 suggests that there are questions about whether we (the United States) got as much as we could have from these negotiations,” said Harry Harding of the Brookings Institution.

* To what extent, if any, did Nixon and Kissinger promise to help China in its military confrontation with the Soviet Union? In the late 1960s, Chinese and Soviet troops clashed along the two countries’ 4,000-mile border and fear of Soviet attack was the principal factor prompting China to move to ease ties with the United States.

* How far did Chinese leaders Mao and Chou go in pledging to help the United States in obtaining peace from Hanoi in the early 1970s and did the Chinese leaders deliver on their promises? Parts of the chronology were deleted for January, 1973, in the period when the final details of the Paris Peace Accords on Vietnam were being worked out.

* What message did Reagan and his Republican campaign advisers pass on to Chinese leaders during an August, 1980, mission to Beijing by Bush, then Reagan’s vice presidential running mate?

The Times first requested the CIA’s history of China negotiations in July, 1989. A year later, the agency rejected the request but agreed to an appeal. After another 2 1/2 years, the CIA concluded it would release parts of the chronology but not the study itself.

But Brent Scowcroft, who took part in the early U.S. negotiations with China as Kissinger’s top deputy, said he did not believe the details of the Nixon-era talks should be made public yet.

The Richard Nixon Foundation, created to memorialize the achievements of the 37th president of the United States, recently commemorated the 50th anniversary of his historic opening to China.

The program was entitled “Grand Strategy Summit Dedicated to Addressing America’s Geopolitical Challenges,” and began with a keynote address by Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s first national security adviser and second Secretary of State. It was moderated by Robert O’Brien, a successor of Kissinger’s at the National Security Council.

Kissinger noted that Nixon came into office at a fraught moment for U.S. foreign policy, facing issues in Vietnam, the Middle East and the Soviet Union, while China was outside of any set of relationships with the U.S.

He generously praised Nixon’s combination of strategic vision and tactical flexibility. By introducing strategic thinking to American foreign policy, Kissinger said, Nixon was able to make simultaneous progress on all those key issues.

Kissinger described a memo Nixon sent to key members of his foreign policy team, instructing them to “avoid the approach of treating each problem on its so-called merits.” Otherwise, “aggressors” could use distractions to avoid focusing on America’s main concerns while opportunistically shifting from peaceful consultation to periodic confrontation as it suited their purposes. Kissinger said Nixon followed that approach during his entire 6 ½ years in office. America’s adversaries practice the strategy today.

Since Kissinger was Nixon’s chief national security influencer, he obviously played a key role in shaping the president’s approach. In his book, “On China,” Kissinger described the new approach as “America’s discovery of realpolitik,” which is his trademark contribution to U.S. foreign policy — though Nixon himself had never been known as a moralist on international relations.

On the opening to China, however, which Kissinger called Nixon’s “signal achievement,” that was pure Nixon, at least before his China collaboration with Kissinger. A lifetime hawk on Communist China, he laid out his new thinking in his 1967 Foreign Affairs article, “Asia After Viet Nam.” He described China as a problem for the world that had to be addressed in a responsible manner. As he put it, in the parlance of the day: “Red China [has become] Asia’s most immediate threat. … Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.

Winston Lord, who participated in the China project as a Kissinger aide, told a Wilson Center audience that when his boss saw the historic magnitude of Nixon’s purpose, he jumped at the opportunity to be part of it. When Nixon assigned Kissinger the lead role in the preliminary negotiations with China, he provided guidance on how they should be conducted: “We cannot be too forthcoming in terms of what America will do. We’ll withdraw [from Taiwan], and we’ll do this, and that, and the other thing.”

In the end, however, the two realists did just that, pulling the Seventh Fleet out of the Taiwan Strait and withdrawing U.S. forces from Taiwan, all before Nixon made his pilgrimage to meet with Mao Zedong.

After Kissinger’s remarks, the Nixon Foundation’s next speaker was O’Brien, interviewed by journalist Hugh Hewitt. O’Brien called China “probably the biggest national security threat we face as a country right now” and said the Chinese Communist Party “wants to destroy Taiwan” because of its democratic example to the Chinese people.

Nixon himself eventually recognized the failure of his engagement policy, as followed and nurtured by all his successors, except Ronald Reagan, Donald Trump, and now Joe Biden. Yet it was Kissinger, having come to the China engagement portfolio late in his career, who claimed it as his own special mission long after Nixon regretted that “We may have created a Frankenstein” — and Kissinger claims it yet today.

As for Taiwan, Kissinger has never been there. He jokingly chided Mao in 1972 for being willing to defer an attack to seize it for “100 years,” and warned the Taiwanese in 2007 that China “will not wait forever.” Nixon, on the other hand, visited Taiwan more than once and wrote in 1994 that, given Taiwan’s remarkable economic and political development, “China and Taiwan are permanently separated politically.”

More than a half-century after Nixon warned that “Red China [has become] Asia’s most immediate threat,” Kissinger unselfconsciously uttered the words that sounded the death-knell of the engagement policy: “[T]he peace and prosperity of the world depend on whether China and the United States can find a method to work together. … This is the key problem of our time.”

Yet, his moral equivalence makes no mention of the Chinese Communist Party, the real monster that Nixon blamed himself for creating but only erred in believing he could change or tame it. Kissinger, to this day, does not recognize Marxism-Leninism as the problem and personifies the naivete, albeit sophisticated and erudite, that O’Brien identified in what can only be called the “Grand Strategy disconnect.”

It was this week, in 1972, that President Richard Nixon made a dramatic visit to Beijing, capitalizing on China’s political split from the Soviet Union, then the preeminent Communist power and America’s main rival. At a stroke, he increased U.S. leverage with Moscow.

It looks like a ‘Nixon to China’ move in reverse – Moscow warming ties with Beijing to put Washington in the hot seat. But the power dynamics that undergirded that dramatic step 50 years ago have shifted sharply, potentially weakening long-term impact.

Both have denounced Western criticism of their human rights records and are bridling over a raft of economic sanctions. Both see benefits in forcing Washington to spread its diplomatic and military resources between challenges in their two distant parts of the globe.

Still, how much practical difference Mr. Putin’s growing warmth with Beijing will make in his dealing with Western pushback over the move into Ukraine remains unclear. And that uncertainty reflects a major potential hitch in his Nixon-scale vision for a new Russia-China axis.

Mr. Xi’s long-term hope of repairing the recent downturn in relations with the West could limit how enthusiastically he returns Mr. Putin’s embrace over the coming days. That’s especially true if Russia’s invasion into Ukraine escalates into a full-fledged bid to take over Ukraine and in effect bomb its elected government into submission to Moscow.

Between 1971 and the Cultural Revolution’s official end, in 1976, a semblance of normality returned to China. US president Richard Nixon even toured the country in February 1972 in a historic visit that re-established ties between Washington and Beijing.

By the following year things had taken a more sinister turn. Red Guards laid siege to the Soviet, French and Indonesian embassies, torched the Mongolian ambassador’s car and hung a sign outside the British mission that read: “Crush British Imperialism!” One night, in late August, diplomats were forced to flee from the British embassy as it was ransacked and burned. Outside protesters chanted: “Kill! Kill!”.

Nixon asks that Congress be granted authority to consolidate federal assistance programs to states and cities, giving locals greater control over the use of federal funds.

The NASA Apollo 11 mission is a success with men landing on the moon. Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, and Michael Collins fulfilled the promise President Kennedy made, nearly ten years prior, of a lunar landing. They touch down on the moon’s surface four days after the launch.

Nixon affirms his desire to withdraw U.S. troops from southeast Asia and declares that individual nations will bear a larger responsibility for their own security. Initially referred to as the “Guam Doctrine,” this statement later becomes known as the “Nixon Doctrine.”

Nixon reveals that North Vietnam has rejected the administration"s secret peace offers. He proposes a plan for the gradual and secretive withdrawal of troops.

Nixon signs the Selective Service Reform bill aimed at calming conscription anxieties; this bill ensured that draftees are selected by a lottery system, that the prime eligibility of draftees be reduced from seven years to one, and that draftees aged 19 would be selected at highest priority.

Nixon approves a plan to form an Interagency Committee on Intelligence to coordinate operations against domestic targets, namely anti-war leftists and suspected communists.

In a televised address, Nixon proposes a five-point peace plan for Indochina. The plan includes a “cease-fire in place” and the negotiated withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

Nixon signs the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, which gives the secretary of labor the responsibility of setting workplace safety standards for jobs in the United States.

Nixon tells an ABC news commentator that he is now a “Keynesian,” or one who subscribes to the ideal (of Keynesian economics) that government spending could break a recession. This was unusual for a Republican president.

Nixon shocks the nation with the news that he plans to visit China within the next year, becoming the first president to do so; this visit helped to improve relations with China by ending 25 years of rivalry between the nations.

President and Mrs. Nixon arrive in China. A joint communique, later known as the Shanghai Communique, is released by the United States and China. It calls for both countries agree to increase their contacts, and for the United States to withdraw gradually from Taiwan.

Nixon, his wife, Pat, and his entourage, including National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, visited China from February 21 to February 27. The eight-day visit included official meetings, cultural visits, and sightseeing in Beijing, Hangchow, and Shanghai. The media extensively covered the trip, televising many of the events. Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou En-Lai met with President Nixon and American officials, and the people of both nations saw the beginning of a diplomatic thaw most thought impossible only months earlier. At his farewell banquet, President Nixon remarked in his toast, “This was the week that changed the world.”

In late 1971, President Nixon had stunned the world by announcing that he would visit “Red China,” the first visit by an American President to the world"s most populous country. It was a startling announcement from a politician who had built much of his political career championing anti-Communism and using the issue as a means to ascend through the higher reaches of American government. Nixon had long harbored great antipathy for Communism and its adherents from his work on the House Committee for Un-American Activities in the 1940s to his stands as vice president in the Eisenhower administration to his own pronouncements as President.

As President, Nixon reasoned that improving relations with China would allow him to inject more fluidity into the international environment and offset the growing power of the Soviet Union. But in order to improve relations with China, he had to resolve the Taiwan issue. Until 1971, Nixon had been a supporter of the pro-Taiwan lobby that had blocked any move to recognize the People"s Republic of China.

At the end of the visit, China and the United States jointly issued the Shanghai Communiqué, which pledged that both countries wanted to strive toward normalizing relations. The United States also agreed that there was one China and Taiwan was part of it and that the United States would work toward the ultimate objective of removing U.S. forces from Taiwan. The most lasting contribution of the Nixon visit was a rapprochement with China itself, with the United States recognizing the People"s Republic of China as the sole diplomatic voice of China.

European allies applauded the trip, but leaders in Japan and Taiwan viewed the diplomatic move with caution and concern. Nixon"s secret diplomacy also concerned many who felt that matters of national interest ought to be debated publicly. Still, Nixon"s historic visit to China in 1972 opened the door to relations between two of the world"s most powerful countries, China and the United States.

Nixon dismisses the use of busing, or the transportation of students from different areas via school bus, as a means of achieving racial integration in schools and seeks legislation that would deny court-ordered busing.

On national television, Nixon states that he has ordered the mining of North Vietnamese ports and the bombing of military targets in the North Vietnam.

Nixon orders Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman to tell the F.B.I. not to go any further with its Watergate investigation, justifying his actions on national security grounds.

In a news conference, Nixon declares that no one on the White House staff, in the administration, or anyone “presently employed” was involved in the Watergate break-in.

Nixon endorses a bill which calls for revenue sharing with the states and grants over $30 billion to state and local governments over the course of five years.

Nixon signs sixty bills, one of which provides more than $5 billion in benefits for the aged, blind, and disabled, while also increasing Social Security taxes.

President Richard Nixon kicked off the Saturday night massacre when he ordered Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. Richardson had hired Cox to investigate the break-in at the Watergate hotel. When Nixon ordered Richardson to fire Cox, Richardson refused and instead resigned. The President then ordered Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus to fix Cox, but he too refused and resigned. Nixon turned to the third-most-senior official at the Justice Department, Solicitor General Robert Bork. Bork fired Cox. However, the firing of Cox backfired on President Nixon as public outrage about his actions led to the hiring of a new special prosecutor.

The Senate Watergate Committee subpoenas more than 500 tapes, which Nixon refuses to hand over, stating that presidential communications must remain confidential.

Despite Vice President Ford"s advice to surrender the necessary evidence to the House Judiciary Committee, Nixon refuses to hand over Watergate-related tapes.

In an 8-0 ruling, the Supreme Court orders that Nixon turn over sixty-four tapes to the Senate Watergate Committee. The tapes disclose Nixon"s knowledge and participation in the cover-up of the Watergate burglary.

On July 24, 1974, the Supreme Court ruled in an 8-0 decision that President Richard Nixon had to turn over sixty-four tapes, which disclosed his knowledge and participation in the cover-up of the Watergate burglary. The conversations on the tapes implicated Nixon and led to his resignation, the first time in United States history a President had resigned.

The Watergate scandal began when five men were arrested for breaking into the office of the Democratic National Committee on June 17, 1972. Initially it was unclear if there was any connection between the burglary and the Nixon administration but gradually it was revealed that the White House was involved.

Then on July 16, 1973, former White House aide Alexander P. Butterfield testified that since 1971 the White House routinely recorded conversations. The taping was undertaken ostensibly to provide a historical record of the Nixon Administration, but it soon emerged as a means to prove President Nixon"s guilt or innocence.

When the existence of the tapes was revealed, the Senate Watergate Committee requested access to them. Unable to come to an agreement with Nixon on releasing the tapes, the Senate Committee called on the President to produce the tapes. Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox also issued a subpoena for the tapes as part of his investigation. President Nixon responded by refusing to release the tapes, claiming that his conversations were private and hence protected from forced disclosure by the doctrine of executive privilege-a concept which permits officers of the executive branch to maintain a level of privacy to promote open and vigorous debate. In his refusal, Nixon stated unequivocally that the tapes were “entirely consistent with what I have stated to be the truth.”

This confrontation set the stage for the United States v. Nixon, in which the Court ruled unanimously that President Nixon must turn over the tapes. Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the decision, in which the Court upheld the doctrine of executive privilege but said it was generally limited to areas of national security or diplomatic affairs. The Court went on to say that that the President is not above the law and Nixon must turn over the tapes.

Soon after the Court"s decision, Nixon released the tapes. The tapes revealed that the President had participated in a cover-up of the burglary as early as June 23, 1972, just days after it occurred. The release of the tapes eroded what was left of Nixon"s support. Beginning July 27, the House of Representatives adopted three Articles of Impeachment against the President.

In a televised speech on the night of August 8, 1974, President Richard Nixon announced his intention to resign at noon the next day. Although he conceded he had made some wrong judgments, he did not admit to any wrongdoing. Vice President Gerald Ford was sworn in as President the next day, remarking in his inaugural address, “My fellow Americans, our long national nightmare is over.”

Nixon"s resignation marked the first such act by a President in U.S. history. Among its many implications, the resignation confirmed that no individual-regardless of rank or station-was above the law, and that there were real consequences for those who violated the law willfully. As for its political impact, the resignation chipped away at the aura of the presidency and the public"s trust in government.

Three articles of impeachment are brought against Nixon by the House Judiciary Committee: obstruction of justice, abuse of power, and the unconstitutional defiance of its subpoenas.

Three new transcripts are released, showing that Nixon ordered a cover-up less than a week after the break-in. Nixon issues a statement with the transcripts indicating that he withheld this evidence from his lawyers and from those who support him on the Judiciary Committee.

Nixon is told by a few of his supporters that he would not win an impeachment trial. Nixon tells Kissinger, Ford, and a few Congressional leaders that he plans to resign.

On August 8, 1974, President Richard M. Nixon announced to a national television audience that he was resigning from the office of the presidency. Nixon"s resignation came less than a month after the House Judiciary Committee voted for three articles of impeachment relating to Nixon"s illegal involvement in the Watergate scandal and his use of government agencies to cover up that involvement. In the weeks prior his announcement, many loyal supporters had confidentially advised Nixon that he ought to consider resignation in order to spare the country the political trauma of an ineffective President during a long House impeachment and Senate trial.

President Nixon admitted to making mistakes, but not to the “high crimes and misdemeanors” alleged in the impeachment articles. Nixon decided to resign when he realized that he “no longer had a strong enough political base in Congress” to make it possible for him to complete his term in office. He thanked his friends for their support, and asked all Americans to back the new President, Gerald R. Ford, himself in office due to the resignation of former Vice President Spiro Agnew. As for his foes, the President remarked that was leaving office “with no bitterness toward those who have opposed me.” Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski, appointed after the dismissal of Archibald Cox, announced that his investigation would continue, possibly leading to the filing of criminal charges against the ex-President. On September 8, just a month after the resignation, President Ford granted Nixon a “full, free, and absolute pardon,” ruling out any criminal prosecution of the nation"s 37th President.

Nixon"s resignation marked the first such act by a President in U.S. history. Among its many implications, the resignation reinforced the powers of the Congress and the Supreme Court to insist that the law be followed. It confirmed that no individual-regardless or rank or station-was above the law, and that there were real consequences for those who violated the law willfully. As for its political impact, the resignation seemed to chip away at the aura of the presidency, making the office seem less important and powerful for its having been tarnished during the Nixon years.

Nixon leaves for California. His letter of resignation is sent to Kissinger, thus making Gerald Ford the thirty-eighth President of the United States.

Relations with China began slowly until the 1845 Treaty of Wangxia. The US opposed spheres of influence by outside powers by promoting the Open Door Policy after 1900, which it believed would allow American economic power to dominate the Chinese market and fend off other foreign competitors.Boxer Rebellion. Washington efforts to encourage American banks to invest in Chinese railways was unsuccessful in the 1900s. President Franklin Roosevelt made support of China against Japan a high priority after 1938. The US was allied to the Republic of China during the Pacific War against Japan (1941–1945). Washington tried and failed to negotiate a compromise between the Nationalist government and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1945–1947. After the victory of Mao Zedong"s CCP in Mainland China during the Chinese Civil War, relations soured. The US and China fought each other during Korean War. The US continued to recognize the Republic of China, which rules Taiwan as the legitimate government of China, and blocked the PRC"s membership in the United Nations until President Richard Nixon"s 1972 visit to China marked an unexpected reversal of positions. On January 1, 1979, the US established diplomatic relations with the PRC and recognized it as the sole legitimate government of China; at the same time, it continued unofficial relations with Taiwan within the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act. The political status of Taiwan continues to be a major source of tension between the two countries.

Since Nixon"s visit, every US president, with the exception of Jimmy Carter, has toured China. Relations with China strained under President Barack Obama"s Asia pivot strategy. Despite tensions during his term, the Chinese population"s favorability of the US stood at 51% in Obama"s last year of 2016, only to fall during the Trump administration.U.S. president Donald Trump and CCP general secretary Xi Jinping, with issues such as China"s militarization of the South China Sea and Chinese espionage in the United States arising.Trump administration labeled China a "strategic competitor" starting with the 2017 National Security Strategy.trade war against China, banned US companies from selling equipment to Huawei and other companies linked to human rights abuses in Xinjiang,currency manipulator.US-China trade war began, political observers warned that a new Cold War is emerging.

In early 1949, the People"s Liberation Army launched its successful campaign to cross the Yangtze River and capture of the KMT capital, Nanjing.John Leighton Stuart remained in the embassy in Nanjing and met twice with Zhou"s personal aide Huang Hua.Dean Rusk for permission to do so, Dusk refused, instructing Stuart to close the embassy and return to the United States.

Beginning in 1967, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission established the China Claims Program, in which American citizens could denominate the sum total of their lost assets and property following the Communist seizure of foreign property in 1950. American companies were reluctant to invest in China despite (future leader) Deng Xiaoping"s reassurances of a stable business environment.

The end of the 1960s brought a period of transformation. For China, when American president Johnson decided to wind down the Vietnam War in 1968, it gave China an impression that the US had no interest of expanding in Asia anymore. Meanwhile, relations with the USSR rapidly worsened. This gave Richard Nixon—running for president in 1968—the idea of using that rivalry to improve Washington"s relations with Moscow and Beijing, while each rival would cut back support for Hanoi.

Richard M. Nixon mentioned in his inaugural address that the two countries were entering an era of negotiation after an era of confrontation. Although Nixon during his 1960 presidential campaign had vociferously supported Chiang Kai-Shek, by the second half of the decade, he increasingly began to speak of there "being no reason to leave China angry and isolated". Nixon"s election as president in 1968 was initially met with hostility by Beijing—an editorial in the People"s Daily denounced him as "a chieftain whom the capitalist world had turned to out of desperation".National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. Domestic politics also entered into Nixon"s thinking, as the boost from a successful courting of the PRC could help him in the 1972 American presidential election. He also worried that one of the Democrats would preempt him and go to the PRC before he had the opportunity.

Kissinger and his aides did not receive a warm welcome in Beijing, and the hotel they stayed in was equipped with pamphlets excoriating US imperialism. However, the meeting with Zhou Enlai was productive, and the Chinese premier expressed his hope for improved China-US relations. He commented that the US had intentionally isolated China, not vice versa, and any initiative to restore diplomatic ties had to come from the American side. Zhou spoke of the late President Kennedy"s plans to restore relations with China and told Kissinger "We are willing to wait as long as we need to. If these negotiations fail, in time another Kennedy or another Nixon will come along."

This announcementanti-communists (most notably libertarian Republican Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater) denounced the decision, but most public opinion supported the move and Nixon saw the jump in the polls he had been hoping for. Since Nixon had sterling anti-communist credentials he was all but immune to being called "soft on communism". Nixon and his aides wanted to ensure that press coverage offered dramatic imagery.

From 21 to 28 February 1972, President Nixon traveled to Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai. At the conclusion of his trip, the US and the PRC issued the Shanghai Communiqué, a statement of their respective foreign policy views. In the Communiqué, both nations pledged to work toward the full normalization of diplomatic relations. This did not lead to immediate recognition of the People"s Republic of China but "liaison offices" were established in Beijing and Washington.Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The statement enabled the US and PRC to temporarily set aside the issue of Taiwan and open trade and communication. Also, the US and China both agreed to take action against "any country" that is to establish "hegemony" in the Asia-Pacific. On several issues, such as the ongoing conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Israel, the US and China were unable to reach a common understanding.

Most major anti-US propaganda disappeared in China after the Nixon visit; although there was still occasional criticism of US imperialism, the Soviet Union had definitively become China"s arch-foe in the 1970s.

The rapprochement with the United States benefited the PRC immensely and greatly increased its security for the rest of the Cold War. It has been argued that the United States, on the other hand, saw fewer benefits than it had hoped for, inasmuch as China continued to back America"s enemies in Hanoi and Pyongyang. Eventually, however, the PRC"s suspicion of Vietnam"s motives led to a break in China-Vietnamese cooperation and, upon the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese War. Both China and the United States backed combatants in Africa against Soviet and Cuban-supported movements. The economic benefits of normalization were slow as it would take decades for American products to penetrate the vast Chinese market. While Nixon"s China policy is regarded by many as the highlight of his presidency, others such as William Bundy have argued that it provided very little benefit to the United States.

Other organizations within China also held positive reactions to Obama"s, particularly with his commitment to revising American climate change policy. Greenpeace published an article detailing how Obama"s victory would spell positive change for investment in the green jobs sector as part of a response to the financial crisis gripping the world at the time of Obama"s inauguration.US Departments of Energy and Commerce, non-governmental organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, and universities, have been working with Chinese counterparts to discuss ways to address climate change. Both US and Chinese governments have addressed the economic downturn with massive stimulus initiatives. The Chinese have expressed concern that "Buy American" components of the US plan discriminate against foreign producers, including those in China.

In an effort to build a "new model" of relations, Obama met Paramount leader Xi Jinping for two days of meetings, between 6 and 8 June 2013, at the Sunnylands estate in Rancho Mirage, California.American president and a Chinese Communist leader in 40 years, since President Nixon and Chairman Mao," according to Joseph Nye, a political scientist at Harvard University.combat climate change and also found strong mutual interest in curtailing North Korea"s nuclear program.Tom Donilon, the outgoing U.S. National Security Adviser, stated that cyber security "is now at the center of the relationship", adding that if China"s leaders were unaware of this fact, they know now.

On March 12, 2021, Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, and Dahua Technology were designated as national security threats by the Federal Communications Commission.

On 2 December 2021, the US Securities and Exchange Commission finalized rules which would enable it to delist Chinese firms which have been determined to be non-compliant with the disclosure requirements as stipulated in the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act from US stock exchanges.

In May 2022, Chinese officials ordered government agencies and state-backed companies to remove personal computers produced by American corporations and replace them with equipment from domestic companies. Bloomberg said the decision was one of China"s most aggressive moves to eliminate the usage of foreign technology from the most sensitive parts of its government and spur its campaign to substitute foreign technology with domestic ones.

US demand for labor-intensive goods exceeds domestic output: the PRC has restrictive trade practices in mainland China, which include a wide array of barriers to foreign goods and services, often aimed at protecting state-owned enterprises. These practices include high tariffs, lack of transparency, requiring firms to obtain special permission to import goods, inconsistent application of laws and regulations, and leveraging technology from foreign firms in return for market access. Mainland China"s accession to the World Trade Organization is meant to help address these barriers.

President Donald Trump is upset with China for buying Brazilian soybeans instead of American ones amid the ongoing trade war, but the South American industry got its start thanks to an earlier round of protectionist policies under President Richard Nixon.

Nixon temporarily froze the prices of consumer goods and restricted exports of food in 1973 in response to rising inflation, a move that essentially cut off exports of US soybeans. It worked, creating a surplus and lowering pricesfor American consumers.